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This special issue of EuroJus collects the papers presented during the first edition of
the seminars of the Doctorate in Public, International and European Law of the University of
Milan that took place between the 15th and the 17th of October, 2018 in the prestigious setting
of Palazzo Feltrinelli, on the shores of the lake in Gargnano sul Garda.
Papers’ collection as well at the editorial revision of the papers were carried out solely
by  Gherardo Carullo, Research Assistant at the University of Milan, whom I’m especially
grateful to also for the precious help in organizing the two days of seminar in Gargnano. 
Participants were selected with an open call for PhD students and recent post-docs,
titled “Big Data and Public Law: new challenges beyond data protection”. The aim was to
gather papers that could, in various ways, identify the challenges deriving from the increasing
digitization  of  society  and  its  actors,  in  particular  by  examining  how  the  most  recent
technologies can influence national and supranational law. 
Therefore,  the  criteria  used  by  the  selection  Committee  of  full  Professors  of  the
University  of  Milan  favoured  those  paper  with  the  most  interdisciplinary  approach,
encompassing international law, constitutional law, tax law and administrative law; and to this
end, the call identified three main subject areas, which corresponded to the three different
panels.
The introduction to the seminar was delivered by  Jean-Bernard Auby, distinguished
Professor of Public Law  at Sciences-Po (Paris, France)  who held a lectio magistralis which
provided a wide  and inspiring overview of the various issues that lawyers face due to the
digital revolution, both at the local level, and globally.
The first panel – chaired by myself, in my capacity as Director of the PhD Programme
in  Public,  International  and EU Law of  the  University of  Milan  and as  organizer  of  the
doctoral seminar, and with the final remarks of Giuseppe Marino, Tax Law Professor at the
University of Milan – titled “Big Data and Public Law: artificial intelligence, algorithmic
decision and algorithmic transparency, Big Data and Taxation”, and focused on the role of
technology in relation to human rights.
The first  paper  of  this  panel,  of  Mauri,  addresses  the delicate  issue of  the  use  of
artificial intelligence for military purposes. In particular, the article analyses the admissibility
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Professor of Administrative Law and European Administrative Law. 
of so-called Algorithmic Target Construction (ATC), in order to assess the legality of such
instruments in relation to human rights.
The second paper, of Dal Monte, focuses on human rights, as well; its special focus is
on whether, and to what extent, the use of big data can constitute a risk for the individual’s
self-determination  and  for  the  implementation  of  his/her  fundamental  rights.  After  an
introduction on the  notion of  human dignity,  the text  unfolds  through a comparative law
analysis between Europe and the United States, thus evaluating how competition rules and
antitrust powers of the public authorities can be used as a tool to protect (also) the rights of
the individual.
On the tax law side,  Sut’s paper analyses the challenges that increasing digitalization
of the internal market poses for Member States and for European institutions. After a brief
exposition of the new problems that the digital market poses under a tax law perspective, the
author proposes an interesting analysis of the recent proposal for a Council Directive on the
Common System of Digital Services.
To conclude the first panel, Pitto’s paper focuses on another very topical issue, namely
electoral freedom and the use of big data as a tool for the dissemination of political messages.
The actuality of the problem, and the enormous size of it, is approached through an interesting
historical analysis, starting from the traditional means of political propaganda. The author
stresses  out  what  has  actually  changed  with  the  new  tools  offered  by  Information  and
Communication Technologies (ICT); and, in particular, how the use of big data to convey
messages on social media might have changed, or not, the traditional relationship between
voters and their representatives.
The  second  panel  –  chaired  by  Daniele  Senzani,  Professor  of  Public  Law  at  the
University of Bologna,  and with the final remarks of  Gabriele Della Morte,  Professor of
International  Law  at  the  University  of  Milan-Cattolica  –  titled  “Big  Data  and  State
Jurisdiction (The un-territoriality of Data): how centrality of territoriality is challenged by the
present day dynamics governing the search and seizure of digitized information”, and focuses
on problems arising from the immateriality of digital assets, as well as the speed with which
data move, and can be moved, from one nation to another.
Cantekin’s paper addresses specifically the problem of cross-border data transfers. The
author begins by analyzing the case US v. Microsoft, and then the US Cloud Act. Based on
these premises, the article focuses on the analysis of the opposing interests inherent in data
management, the protection of individuals and free trade.
The  second  contribution  to  the  panel,  by  Piovesani,  focuses  on  data  protection
litigation. The author analyzes in particular Regulation 2016/679/EU, the General Regulation
on Data Protection (so-called GDPR), and Regulation 2012/1215/EU, on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (so-called B1R).
The author deals in particular with the problems related to the coordination of proceedings
before different courts or tribunals, analyzing the discipline referred to in the GDPR and how
it can be interpreted in light of the rules provided by B1R.
Regarding criminal trials,  Bartoli analyzes the problem of accessing data in criminal
proceedings. In particular, the author focuses on the problems posed by the fact that data is
now often kept in the hands of private companies (so called cloud);  so that access to the
physical  facilities  where  such  data  is  stored  (data  centers)  can  sometimes  be  extremely
complex, if not impossible, due to territorial limitations and/or jurisdiction limitations.
The paper by  Jolly  focuses on criminal trial  and analyzes  the issues raised by the
development of distributed register technologies (so-called blockchain). From a criminal law
point  of  view,  the  author  assesses  in  particular  what  effects  the  new  delocalized  and
decentralized  tools  based  on  blockchain  have  on  national  jurisdiction.  The  paper  thus
evaluates how the targeted public theory could be referred to in order to establish jurisdiction
over offences enabled or facilitated by the use of such technologies.
Lastly, the third panel – chaired by  Russel L. Weaver, Professor at the University of
Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law (Kentucky - USA) and with the closing remarks
of  Jean-Bernard Auby and  myself – titled “Digitization of Public Administration and Big
Data: tools, challenges and prospects of the transition to a digitalized public administration”,
and focuses on the transformations underway in the public administration, both as regards the
modalities of action, and the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms.
The first paper of the panel, by Pinotti, analyses a problem at the basis of digitization,
i.e.  access  to  the  source  code of  software  used  by public  administrations.  Thanks  to  the
analysis of the recent case-law on this matter, the author verifies to what extent the right of
access can be deemed to exist in relation to the source code of a software licensed to a public
administration, when such software has been used to adopt an administrative decision.
Schneider’s second paper  of the panel questions what limitations can be said to exist
with respect to the use of intelligent algorithms, and therefore of artificial intelligence, for the
adoption of administrative decisions. The author underlines how crucial it  is to be able to
guarantee transparency and accountability in public decisions. For this reason, the paper calls
into question the use of artificial intelligence by public administrations, especially in those
circumstances  where the software  does  not  allow to comprehend the  reasons for  a  given
output.
Alberti’ s paper also focuses on the topic of the use of artificial intelligence by public
administrations. However, unlike Schneider, he assesses the compatibility of AI with the due
process principle. In particular, the author analyzes how the use of data can allow a deeper
knowledge by public administrations and, therefore, how the decision-making process can
change for the better thanks to the use of artificial intelligence.
Finally, Lima De Arruda introduces with her paper the concrete example of the state of
digitalization of the public administration in Brazil. In this context, the author explains how
the use of information and communication technologies can have disruptive effects for the
Brazilian bureaucracy, from tax authorities to the health system.
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I.1
“Algorithmic Target Construction”
and the Challenges by International Human Rights Law
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Algorithmic Target Construction (ATC) – 3. ATC under IHRL. –
3.1. Data Collection. – 3.2. “Categorical” Decisions. – 3.3. “Legibility”. – 3.4. Subjection to Solely-
Automated Decisions. – 4. Conclusion: Is A Different Approach Possible? 
1. The first use of an armed drone allegedly occurred during the US hunting of Osama bin
Laden,  and  more  precisely  on  February  4,  2002,  when  the  CIA spotted  a  «tall  man»,  much
resembling bin Laden, around whom several people were «acting with reverence», and fired an
Hellfire missile against him.1 The CIA operators’ assumption turned however to be untrue, as the
target was later discovered to be a local unfortunately – for him – the same height as bin Laden.
Interestingly  enough,  US  authorities  insisted  the  target  was  «legitimate»;  the  Pentagon  then-
spokeswoman so declared: «We’re convinced that it was an appropriate target … [but] we do not
know yet exactly who it was».2
Here the essence of a “signature strike” is captured perfectly. The term – now one of the art
–  refers  to  a  methodology for  selecting  actual  targets  for  drone  strikes  basing  solely on  their
observed  pattern  of  behavior  (i.e.  their  “signature”).3 The  target’s  personal  identity  remains
unknown before the strike and may remain so also after it. It differs from a “personality strike” in
that in the latter the target’s personal identity is known to the authorities before the strike, which as
a matter of fact takes place by virtue of the target’s personal identification. Signature strikes have
gained momentum under  the Obama Administration,  albeit  some initial  reservations.4 They are
believed to avoid a «huge number of civilian casualties»,5 and to work as an appropriate tool to
address the challenges of the well-known Global War on Terror.6
1 The episode is told by R. SIFTON, A Brief History of Drones, in The Nation, 27 February 2012, available  at: 
http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones#. 
2 Ibidem, italics mine.
3 For a definition of signature strikes, reference can be made to K. BENSON, “Kill ‘em and Sort it Out Later:” Signature
Drone Strikes and International Humanitarian Law, in Global Business & Development Law Journal, 2014, p. 18. See 
also S. HOLEWINSKI, Just Trust Us, in P. BERGEN, D. ROTHENBERG, Drone Wars. Transforming Conflict, Law, and 
Policy, Cambridge, 2014, p. 45-46; K. KINDERVATER, The Emergence of Lethal Surveillance: Watching and Killing in 
the History of Drone Technology, in Security Dialogue, 2016, p. 224 ff.; T. WALL, T. MONAHAN, Surveillance and 
Violence from Afar: The Politics of Drones and Liminal Security-Scapes, in Theoretical Criminology, 2011, p. 239–245.
4 See the anecdote narrated by M. ZENKO, Targeted Killing and Signature Strikes, in Council On Foreign Relations, 16
July 2012, available at:  http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/ (citing one legal
advisor that so described the President’s unease at striking at military-age males associated with terrorist activities but
whose personal identity remained unknown: «[H]e didn’t like the idea of kill ‘em and sort it out later»).
5 See the Report Emerging from the Shadows: US Covert Drone Strikes in 2012, in Bureau Of Investigative Journalism,
3  January  2013,  available  at:  http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/emerging-from-  the-shadows-us-
covert-drone-strikes-in-2012-2  /. 
6 Numbers and figures regarding the first year of the Trump Administration confirm that drone strikes are the first 
choice in counterterrorism abroad. See https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-01-19/strikes-in-somalia-
and-yemen-triple-in-trumps-first-year-in-office   (showing that the number of strikes conducted in Yemen and Somalia in 
2017 is nearly more than triple the number relating to the precedent year).
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The gist of signature strikes is that they rely essentially on a process that can be named
“Algorithmic Target Construction” (ATC). Current drone technology requires a human decision-
maker to be present at the act of engaging that target; the ultimate decision about the life or death of
the individual  is  thus entrusted to  a human agent.  The development  and deployment of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (henceforth: LAWS) puts such model  in discussion as not only
target selection, but also target engagement will be entrusted to a non-human decision-maker.7
The advent of LAWS is likely to act as a veritable turning point in our understanding of
using  force  against  humans;  several  features  of  this  technology,  and  the  impact  thereof  on
international law, have already been tackled.8 The present contribution aims at assessing the impact
ATC may have on human rights. In Section 2 a brief description of how ATC functions will be
provided; most suggestions will be drawn from current uses of technology in performing signature
strikes via armed drones. In Section 3 I will then turn to the framework of international human
rights law (IHRL) with a view to showing that ATC is suitable to affect basic human rights. I will
then draw conclusions leaving some radical questions open (Section 4).
2.  ATC can be defined as a process allowing for target selection and engagement through
algorithms.9 This  concept  has  been recently adopted  in  a  Briefing  of  the  Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.10 Proceeding in reverse order, “Construction”
refers to a methodology of gathering and then re-elaborating data which constitute the very input of
the process.  The outcome is  the identification of a “Target”,  namely an individual  or group of
individuals that will be made the object of force delivery, while the process through which data are
re-elaborated is “Algorithmic”. The notion of ATC can be “unpacked” so as to distinguish between
two particularly salient temporal stages at least, namely data collection and later decision-making.
As far as data collection is concerned, it is generally considered as the first component of
“processing”. To be employed in an operational scenario (such as battlefield or a law-enforcement
operation), LAWS will need to gather as much data as possible from the field, and therefore they
will presumably be endowed with software for carrying out a preliminary screening of individuals
and places.11 Collected  data  will  then  go through a  process  of  organization  and structuring;  in
particular, applying the same methodology currently in use for signature strikes, LAWS will likely
7 See among others:  Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof
Heyns, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/23/47 (9 April 2013); Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, Human
Rights Watch (November 2012). The forum that is currently hosting discussion on «emerging technologies in the area of
[LAWS]» is the Assembly of the States Party to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (hereinafter:
CCW),  which  decided  to  convene  three  Meetings  of  Experts  between  2014  and  2016;  the  2016  Fifth  Review
Conference of the CCW then established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that held its meeting on November
2017,  April  2018  and  August  2018.  A new  round  of  meetings  will  probably  take  place  in  2019.  See  amplius
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument. 
8 For a recent and thorough analysis, see D. AMOROSO, Jus in bello and jus ad bellum arguments against autonomy in
weapons systems: A re-appraisal, in QIL Zoom-In, 2017, p. 5-31.
9 For a better understanding of how algorithms work and how influential their use can get, see P. Z ELLINI, La dittatura
del calcolo, Milan, 2018.
10 See M. BREHM,  Defending The Boundary. Constraints And Requirements On The Use Of Autonomous Weapon
Systems Under International Humanitarian And Human Rights Law, in Academy Briefing No. 9, May 2017, available at:
https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Briefing9_interactif.pdf  . 
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employ  software  allowing  for  detecting  individuals  or  group  of  individuals  possessing  certain
personal attributes that are considered as statistically correlated to certain conducts – a process
commonly referred to as “profiling”.12 The purpose of such process is to  predict an individual’s
action on the basis of a so-called “pattern of life analysis”; the individuals whose data are gathered
and elaborated by the machine are therefore “reduced” to a profile and put into “categories”. Such
type of analysis and technique of re-elaboration of personal data has been used for signature strikes
since the beginning,13 so that LAWS will be programmed so is more than a mere prevision.14 In
short, «an individual’s pattern of behavior – or “signature” – serves as a proxy for determining if
that individual» may be a target for the use of force.15 In terms of technological feasibility, suffice it
to  recall  that  recently  IBM  has  declared  that  it  was  about  to  offer  an  algorithm  capable  of
distinguishing terrorists out of refugees.16 As has been conveniently pointed out, «one of the most
acute dangers of profiling is the fact that it tends to reduce the person to the profile generated by
automated processes which are liable to be used as a basis for decision-making».17
Decision-making is  another crucial  step of ATC. While the current  practice of signature
strikes  leaves the final  decision (i.e.  whether  to  engage or  not  the selected target)  to  a  human
operator, automated decision-making (understood as a process where taking the final decision is
entrusted to a software, i.e. to a non-human operator) is already in place in different contexts, such
11 See A. SPAGNOLO,  Human rights implications of autonomous weapon systems in domestic law enforcement: sci-fi
reflections on a lo-fi reality, in QIL Zoom-in, 2017, p. 43.
12 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation; hereinafter: GDPR), art. 4(4): «“profiling” means any form of
automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating
to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work,
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements».
13 N. ABÈ,  Dreams in Infrared: The Woes of an American Drone Operator, in  Spiegel Online, 14 December 2012,
available  at:  http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pain-continues-after-war-for-american-drone-pilot-a-
872726.html («[w]e watch people for months. We see them playing with their dogs or doing their laundry. We know
their patterns like we know our neighbors’ patterns. We even go to their funerals»); G. M ILLER,  At CIA, a Convert to
Islam Leads the Terrorism Hunt, in Washington Post, 24 March 2012, available at:
              http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-24/world/35447818_1_cia-officials-robert-grenier-ctc.
14 See M. SCHMITT, J. S. THURNER, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict,
in Harvard National Security Journal, 2013, p. 268.
15 Paraphrasing BENSON, Kill ‘em and Sort It Out Later, cit., p. 29.
16 P. TUCKER,  Refugee or Terrorist? IBM Thinks Its  Software Has the Answer,  in  Defense One,  27 January 2016,
available  at:  http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/refugee-or-terrorist-ibm-thinks-its-software-has-
answer/125484/.
17 See the Report of the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Application of Convention 108 to the Profiling Mechanism: Some Ideas for the
Future Work of the Consultative Committee, 11 January 2008, p. 5-6, available at https://rm.coe.int/16806840b9, italics
mine. The matter is of particular concern when it comes to policing algorithms that may subject minorities to greater
surveillance and therefore police force; see K. K. KOSS, Leveraging Predictive Policing Algorithms to Restore Fourth
Amendment Protections in High-Crime Areas in a Post-Wardlow World, in  Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2015, p. 301-
334.
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as  recruitment,  behavioral  advertisement,  access  to  credit.18 It  has  been  argued  that  entrusting
LAWS to take engagement decisions will be more efficient than having a human operator do so.19 
As  will  be  illustrated  in  the  following,  it  is  by  reason  of  dangers  associated  with  the
algorithmic processing of such data  (to  name a few, poor  final  decisions,  misjudgments,  or  an
alarming  inclination  for  discriminatory outcomes)  that  a  certain  degree  of  human  control  over
automated decision-making has been retained of paramount importance. It is however questionable
the  extent  to  which  human  will  be  able  to  exert  control  on  such  processes,  especially  when
machine-learning or self-learning algorithms are employed.20 Brief,  LAWS employing machine-
learning algorithms in ATC will be able to generate their own rules and conduct basing on their
initial databank and gained experience “in the field”,21 which means that their ability to select and
engage  targets  properly  will  depend  on  previous  experience  in  the  relevant  operational  field
(battlefield; law-enforcement area of operations; etc.).22 This has an impact on what will be later
defined as “legibility” of the system: human operators will hardly be in the condition to understand
how and why a LAWS operating through self-learning algorithms acted in a certain way.
In sum, ATC will  be a  key feature in  the development  of  next-generation LAWS. As a
complex process, it will involve data gathering, data elaboration and more importantly automated
decision-making allegedly independent of human intervention. For all these steps, human rights of
the potential  targets  are  put  at  stake to  some extent,  which implies  that  in  building algorithms
developers must take those rights in due consideration – «seriously», in the famous words of Ronald
Dworkin.
 
3.  In order  to  assess  the  impact  the  development  of  ATC can have  on  IHRL,  it  seems
appropriate  to  enucleate  at  least  four  critical  features  of  that  process:  (1)  mass  surveillance
techniques; (2) “profiling” or “categorization” of potential targets; (3) “legibility” of the algorithms
leading to the final decision; (4) absence of human control on the decision-making process. For
each feature a short recapitulation of existing case-law and scholarship is provided, with a view to
18 Algorithms that rely on “profiling” of the concerned individuals to reach a “decision” are currently employed, for
example, to refuse an online credit application or e-recruitment practice; see GDPR, Recital 71, and G. M ALGIERI, G.
COMANDÈ, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation,
in International Data Privacy Law, 2017, p. 253. For an interesting overview of today’s pervasiveness of profiling and
automated decision-making, see F. PASQUALE, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and
Information, Cambridge-London, 2015, and A. CHANDER,  The Racist Algorithm?, in  Michigan Law Review, 2017, p.
1023-1045.
19 For instance, human operators are often exposed to “machine-bias”. See T. CHENGETA, Defining the emerging notion
of “Meaningful Human Control” in Weapon Systems, in New York University International Law and Politics, 2017, p.
852-853.
20 For a definition of “machine-learning”, see S. SHALEV-SHWARTZ, S. BEN-DAVID,  Understand Machine Learning.
From Theory to Algorithms, Cambridge, 2014.
21 See O. ULGEN, Kantian Ethics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, in QIL Zoom-In, 2017, p. 73.
22 See ICRC,  Report  of  the ICRC Expert  Meeting,  Autonomous  Weapon Systems: Technical,  Military,  Legal  and
Humanitarian Aspects, 9 May 2014, available at:  https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-
weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014;  id.,  Report  of  the  ICRC  Expert  Meeting,  Autonomous  Weapon  Systems:
Implications  of  Increasing  Autonomy  in  the  Critical  Functions  of  Weapons,  15-16  March  2016,  available  at:
https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4283-autonomous-weapons-systems.
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exploring whether similar rules apply – mutatis mutandis – when it is mainly the right to life to be
at stake.
3.1. Widespread practices of blanket interception of communications and mass collection of
data raise growing concern among human rights bodies as far as the right to privacy is concerned.23
While the right to privacy is notoriously subject to restrictions,24 strict conditions apply when it
comes to public authorities putting in place massive surveillance and the systematic collection and
storing  of  data.25 A wide  spectrum of  data  is  likely  to  be  gathered  for  the  purposes  of  ATC.
Generally speaking, “data” that  are  relevant  under the right  to privacy encompass “personal”,26
“sensitive”,27 “biometric”28 and “big” data.29 While in the recent decades there has been a growing
concern  about  the  need  to  protect  these  data,  undeniably States  still  enjoy a  certain  room for
maneuver. 
Possibly  thanks  to  the  pervasiveness  of  new  technologies  of  data  interception  and  re-
elaboration, however, human rights bodies have raised the bar for such operations to be conducted
lawfully.  For  instance,  the  ECtHR has  scrutinized  practices  such as  the  interception  of  private
23 To catch a glimpse of the existing discourse around these practices,  see UNGA Res. 68/167, 21 January 2014,
available  at:  http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167;  see  also  OHCHR,  The  Right  to
Privacy  in  the  Digital  Age,  Report  of  30  June  2014,  UN  doc  A/HRC/27/37,  available  at:
http://undocs.org/A/HRC/27/37. On the right to privacy generally, see Art. 12 UDHR («No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,  home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks»); see Art.
17 ICCPR and  General Comment No. 16, Article 17, 8 April 1988; Art. 8 ECHR. For an historical overview of the
international provisions protecting the right to privacy, see G. DELLA MORTE, Big Data e protezione internazionale dei
diritti umani. Regole e conflitti, Naples, 2018, p. 75 ff.. 
24 See  General Comment No. 16, cit., § 7 («[a]s all persons live in society, the protection of privacy is  necessarily
relative», italics added); Art. 8(2) ECHR (listing three parameters for limiting the right to privacy, namely legality,
necessity and proportionality).
25 Such considerations move from the assumption that massive storage of data as well as constant surveillance are
dangerous  for  a  democratic  society.  Yet  decades  ago  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights  (hereinafter:  ECtHR)
acknowledged that «an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance» would
risk «undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it»; see ECtHR, Klass et al. v. Germany,
No. 5029/71, judgment (plenary), 6 September 1978, § 49. For a discussion on the right to privacy as at particularly at
stake when counterterrorism measures are put in place, see  amplius M. NINO,  Terrorismo internazionale, privacy e
protezione dei dati personali, Naples, 2012.
26 Defined as «any information relating to an identified or identifiable» individual (see GDPR, art. 4(1)). See also the
Modernized Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, adopted by
the 128th Session of the Committee of Ministers in Elsinore, Denmark, on 18 May 2018, CM/Inf(2018)15-final (CETS
No. 108) (hereinafter: Modernized Convention), art. 2.
27 For  a  list  of  personal  data  that  must  be  considered  as  «sensitive»  inasmuch  as  revealing  certain  personal
characteristics, see GDPR, art. 9.
28 «personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural
characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial
images or dactyloscopic data» (GDPR, art. 4(14)).
29 It is impossible to account for the immense literature that has been developed on big data so far. See DELLA MORTE,
Big Data, cit., p. 159-169, with references.
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communications30 and addressed the issue of technologies that allow for the monitoring of private
activities  by  State  authorities.  In  the  Szabó  and  Vissy case  the  Court  held  that  while  that
«governments resort to cutting-edge technologies» is «a natural consequence of the forms taken by
present-day terrorism», it would «defy the purpose of government efforts to keep terrorism at bay
… if  the  terrorist  threat  were paradoxically  substituted  for  by a  perceived threat  of  unfettered
executive power intruding into citizens’ private spheres by virtue of uncontrolled yet far-reaching
surveillance techniques and prerogatives».31 It follows that legal safeguards have to be put in place
by States when employing such «strategic, large-scale interception» of personal data.32 What should
be taken note of is that in assessing the respondent State’s safeguards the Court interpreted the
requirement of necessity «in a democratic society» provided for by Art. 8(2) ECHR as requiring the
more stringent «strict necessity»  by reason of  the pervasiveness of the cutting-edge surveillance
technologies based on «automated and systemic data collection».33 In short, the rationale the Court
leans on seems to be the following: the more impactful on human rights a surveillance measure is,
the more stringent the conditions for the resort thereto need to be.
In the case of LAWS, the purpose of data collection would be inter alia to identify a target
for the use of force. In this sense, it would be the right to life – the supreme one, an absolute one
and  one  from which  no  derogation  is  allowed  –  to  be  put  primarily  at  stake.  It  follows  that
requirements for gathering such personal data need to be far more stringent than in other contexts
that have come under the scrutiny of human rights bodies so far. A blanket, massive collection of
personal data for law-enforcement purposes would virtually expose every individual, in a given
geographical area, to a violation of their right to privacy.
3.2. Turning to the decision-making process, human rights bodies have so far voiced concern
regarding decisions taken by public authorities on the basis of an automated processing of personal
data. In particular, algorithmic processes may put individuals under “categorical” suspicion solely
due to their membership – either alleged or effective – in a certain category. 
For instance, arresting an individual on the basis that his/her affiliation to an organization is
indicative of an higher propensity of committing illegal acts has been considered by the Court of
Strasburg as a violation of Art. 5 ECHR.34 Such practice has important implications on the right to
equality and non-discrimination as well.35 It has been repeatedly outlined how profiling tends to
30 See Liberty et al. v. the United Kingdom, judgment, 1 July 2008; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, judgment, 18 May
2010, and more recently Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], No. 47143/06, judgment, 4 December 2015.
31 See Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, No. 37138/14, judgment, 12 January 2016, §§ 67, 68.
32 Ibidem, § 67.
33 Ibidem, § 73 in principio and 67.
34 See Shimovolos v. Russia, No. 30194/09, judgment, 21 June 2011 (for a case regarding an individual being subject to
a deprivation of his personal liberty as his name had been included in a «surveillance database» set up by Russian
authorities that employed algorithmic processes to detect «potential extremists»). See also Ostendorf v. Germany, No.
15598/08, judgment, 7 March 2013 (for a case regarding a deprivation of personal liberty considered lawful also by
virtue of the fact that public authorities had not based their determination on the individual being enlisted in a police
database).
35 For  a  general  appraisal  of  the  principle  of  non-discrimination,  see  HRCttee,  General  Comment  No.  18:  Non-
Discrimination,  10 November 1989,  § 12;  see also  Report  of  the Special  Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism, Racial Discrimination, UN doc A/HRC/29/46, § 22. 
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expose individuals to negative forms of discrimination, especially based on racial and ethnic origin,
religious or other beliefs and political opinions, just to name a few.36
The decisive element in assessing the lawfulness of automated decision-making appears to
lie in that such process fails to consider the individual  as such; rather s/he is considered only as
belonging to an abstract category. Failure in appreciating the actual situation of an individual is
problematic in human rights bodies’ recent case-law. Decisions regarding passports withdrawal or
imposition of travel  bans have been considered as in  violation of human rights because public
authorities have not been able to carry out a fresh review of the individual situation, thus imposing
restrictions that could not be characterized as «necessary in a democratic society».37 In a Dissenting
Opinion delivered by three judges of the Court of Strasburg, the categorical treatment of people
who  happened  to  be  at  a  certain  place  in  a  certain  hour  –  without  distinguishing  between
demonstrators and bystanders – by police forces was deemed in contrast with the right to liberty in
that individuals had been treated «like objects».38 Again, the rationale that underlies these judgments
is that each and every decision affecting human rights at a certain degree need to take an individual
situation into due account.
Applying this rationale to LAWS, it has been already outlined that their unique feature lies
in that not only data collection and elaboration, but also the final decision – delivering lethal force
against an individual – are entrusted to a non-human agent. In order for ATC to be consistent with
the prohibition on categorization, it therefore has to be developed in a way that ensures that the
specific features of each and every situation are taken in due account by LAWS before resorting to
force. On closer inspection, such conclusion is implied in the well-known requirements for the use
of force that IHRL instruments establish with respect to the right to life: «absolute necessity» and
«proportionality».39 A lethal decision resulting solely from a pattern-of-life analysis is inconsistent
with the right to life, as implied by the abovementioned case-law: if life can be taken only when
«absolutely  necessary»,  and  if  arguably  decisions  taken  upon  individual  categorization  are
incompatible with the – less stringent – requirement of «necessity in a democratic society», then a
fortiori a categorical killing as such would be at odds with the right to life.40 Incidentally, what has
36 See amplius Brehm, Defending the boundaries, cit., p. 61.
37 See ECtHR,  Battista v.  Italy,  No.  43789/09, judgment,  2  December 2014;  Stamose v.  Bulgaria,  No.  29713/05,
judgment, 27 November 2012 (for cases concerning the freedom of movement as enshrined by Art. 2 Prot. 4 ECHR);
contra, see Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, No. 37331/97, judgment, 4 June 2002, particularly at § 70.
38 See ECtHR, Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], judgment, 15 March 2012, Joint Dissenting Opinion by
Judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki, particularly at § 10.
39 See Art. 2(2) ECHR; Art. 6(1) ICCPR; Art. 4(1) ACHR; Art. 4 ACHPR. For relevant case-law, see ex multis ECtHR,
Giuliani and Gaggio vs. Italy, No. 23458/02, 24 March 2011, § 176 (affirming that «a stricter and more compelling test
of  necessity  must  be  employed  than  that  normally  applicable  when  determining  State  action  is  “necessary  in  a
democratic  society” under paragraph 2 of  Articles 8 and 11 of the Convention»);  HRCttee,  Suarez  de Guerrero v
Colombia, Views, Comm no R.11/45, 9 April 1981, Supp No. 40 (A/37/40) at 137 (1982); IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema et
al v Dominican Republic, judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 24 October 2012.
40 See ECtHR [GC],  Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, judgment, 22
March 2001, § 73 (in which consideration was given to «recourse to anti-personnel mines and automatic-fire systems, in
view of their automatic and indiscriminate effect, and the categorical nature of the border guards’ orders to “annihilate
border violators … and protect the border at all costs”»).
14
I.1
been said so far might work as a principled argument against signature strikes in today’s drone
operations.
However, what current case-law attaches great importance to the absence of a fresh review
on an individual situation (an  objective element) as such rather than to the subject tasked with
carrying out such review (a  subjective element).  Restating the point,  it  does not stem from the
foregoing that LAWS employing “categorical”, but situationally appropriate, decisions would be
proscribed, even if in the decision-making process human deliberation is absent. 
3.3. Another issue regarding automated decision-making is that individuals affected by such
process may not know how and why algorithms have led to the final decision. It does not seem
necessary to underscore how pressing the issue gets when it comes to decisions particularly suitable
for affecting basic human rights, such as the right to life.
To begin with, current IHRL applicable to the right to privacy acknowledges the individual’s
right to understand the functioning and the impact of algorithms concerning him/her. For instance,
this right is inferable from several provisions regarding data protection adopted in the frameworks
of the Council of Europe41 and the European Union42, in both cases in binding terms. In particular,
the right to know the reasons that underlie an automated decision derives from a set of several rights
such as the right to receive  ex ante information from data controllers and the right to access to
information ex post, that is after the decision-making process has been undertaken or concluded.43
In  the  GDPR’s  words,  the  individual  has  a  right  to  be  informed  about/be  given  access  to
«meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the  significance and the  envisaged
consequences of such processing» for the individual. Some have proposed to interpret the right as
encompassing a right to legibility, in the sense that algorithms must be designed and built in a way
that  they  are  both  transparent  and  comprehensible  to  people  concerned  thereby.44 Legibility
therefore finds a ground of justification in that it is intended to ensure that  automated decision-
making does not turn into an unintelligible process.
Thinking of ATC in terms of legibility turns to be particularly effective through the lens of
the right to life as well, for the following reasons. First, an ex-ante knowledge of how algorithms
involved in the ATC process appears to satisfy the legal requirement of legality of the use of force
as enshrined in IHRL: any deprivation of life must result  from the exercise of a power that is
provided either in domestic law or in international law, or both.45 Arguably the protection of the
right to life necessitates «an appropriate legal and administrative framework  defining the limited
41 See the  Modernized  Convention,  art.  9;  Explanatory Report  to  the  Protocol  amending the Convention for  the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, CM(2018)2-addfinal (CETS No. 223)
(hereinafter: Explanatory Report), §§ 71-83.
42 See GDPR, arts. 13, 14 (right to notification), 15 (right to access) and art. 22 (right not to be subject to a decision
based solely on automated processing, including profiling). For the sake of clarity, references to the GDPR are intended
only to draw analogies and not to suggest that it is applicable to our subject matter: Art. 2.2.d clearly excludes such
chance.
43 See for instance GDPR arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15.
44 See in particular MALGIERI, COMANDÈ, Why a Right to Legibility, cit., p 245.
45 Art. 6(1) ICCPR,  Art. 2(1) ECHR,  and Art. 4(1) ACHR  all require expressly a legal basis, whereas the ACtHPR
does not.
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circumstances in which law enforcement officials may use force and firearms, in the light of the
relevant  international  standards».46 If  such regulatory framework is  obscure,  or  fails  to provide
individuals  with understandable – “legible” – indications about  the conditions in  which LAWS
resort to lethal force in law-enforcement situations (the abovementioned «limited circumstances»),
the requirement of legality will be hardly met. The issue gets all the more troublesome once the
scenario is taken into consideration where ATC employ self-learning algorithms, which as explained
in the foregoing ensure low rates of predictability.
Second, ex-post explanation about the process that has actually led to a specific automated
decision comes to the fore from the perspective of procedural obligations under IHRL. Procedural
obligations are a particular form of positive obligations involving the duty to invest into (alleged)
violations  of  a  right  and  to  prosecute  those  who  are  responsible;  in  this  sense,  it  is  «not  an
obligation of result but of means only».47 In order for an investigation to comply with human rights
standards, it allegedly has to be capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was
justified  in the circumstances.48 In the dynamic of ATC processing, it is therefore of paramount
importance that public authorities provide an intelligible account of how an automated process has
worked; a failure to “explain how”,49 reddere rationem, may lead to responsibility under IHRL.50
With respect to the use of force, if LAWS employ an ATC technique that does not allow their users
to understand how and why the machine has taken that particular decision – which may be the case,
again,  when self-learning algorithms are employed –,  it  follows that the right  to  life  would be
violated under the procedural tenet as well.51
To sum, the right to legibility as pushed forward by scholarship is a useful tool for testing
the  compatibility  of  ATC  with  IHRL also  with  respect  the  right  to  life.  Failure  to  provide
information and explanation about how and why algorithms work and lead to a certain decision,
46 See ECtHR, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, No. 23458/02, judgment, 24 March 2011, § 209.
47 See ECtHR [GC],  Šilih v. Slovenia, § 193. See also IACtHR,  Cantoral Huamaní and Garcia Santa Cruz v. Peru,
Preliminary objection, merits,  reparations and costs,  10 July 2007, Series  C 167 (2007),  § 131, and  Pueblo Bello
Massacre v Colombia, 31 January 2006, Series C 140 (2006), § 143. Its aims are: (i) ensuring that those responsible are
brought to justice; (ii) promoting accountability and preventing impunity; (iii) avoiding denial of justice; (iv) eventually
drawing necessary lessons for revising practices and policies with a view to avoiding repeated violations.
48 ECtHR,  Isayeva  v.  Russia,  No.  57950/00,  judgment,  24  February  2005,  §§  221-223  (for  a  case  where  the
ineffectiveness of the investigation was predicated in that it had made «few attempts to find an explanation for …
serious and credible allegations», thus placing the need for an explanation about the use of force at the center of the
right to life under its procedural tenet). 
49 See ECtHR,  Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, No. 11082/06 and 13772/05, judgment, 25 July 2013, § 848
(discussing the algorithmic method used for distributing convicted individuals among prisons).
50 The issue has also been tackled from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. See P. MARGULIES, Making
Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, in
J. OHLIN (ed),  Research Handbook on Remote Warfare, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2017, p. 23 (underscoring that the
onus is on the State to provide adequate details about decision-making processes at large).
51 Some scholars that support the development and deployment of LAWS are apparently prone to accepting the idea
that human operators may not be able to understand how and why LAWS take specific lethal decisions. See for instance
K.  ANDERSON, D.  REISNER, M. WAXMAN,  Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapons Systems, in
International Law Studies,  2014, p.  394 (arguing that  «as  machine-learning and artificial  intelligence technologies
develop, it is becoming increasingly clear that human beings may not necessarily always be able to understand how
(and possibly why) autonomous systems make decisions»).
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both  ex ante and ex post, will expose public authorities employing LAWS to responsibility under
IHRL. Again, as we explained in our analysis of categorical decision-making, legibility does not
imply human presence at the single deliberation of employing lethal force against a human target.
LAWS ensuring a satisfying level of legibility would thus be acceptable under IHRL also absent
human intervention in the decision-making process.
3.4. The last issue raised by ATC has to do with another right that is well-accepted today in
the field of data protection, namely the individual right not to be subject to a decision significantly
affecting  them based  solely on an  automated  processing  of  their  personal  data.52 The  need for
maintaining human presence in the decision-making process – so far dispensable – would be of
some relevance eventually.
The rationale and the scope of this right must be ascertained in the light of the relevant
provisions. First,  it  does  not qualify as absolute as it is permissible to make exceptions to it in
certain cases, notably upon express authorization by the relevant public authorities.53 However, on
closer inspection, relevant provisions are clear in requiring that even in those cases a minimum of
safeguard measures must be guaranteed to the affected individuals,54 among which are: the right to
obtain human intervention; to express one’s point of view; to obtain an explanation of the decision
reached after such assessment; and to challenge the decision.55 Importantly, the notion of “human
intervention” can be interpreted in a broad sense, encompassing not only cases in which human
intervention  is  absent  in  the  automated  decision-making  process,  but  also  cases  of  nominal
interventions  (i.e.  those  in  which  humans  exercise  no  real  influence  on  the  outcome  of  the
decision).56 In other words, human intervention must be  meaningful for ensuring that the right in
question is respected in concreto. It must be recalled that such interpretation of human intervention
is actually contrasted by some authors, whose take is that also “nominal” human intervention may
52 See GDPR, art.  22(1):  «The data subject  shall  have  the  right  not  to  be subject  to  a  decision based solely on
automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly
affects him or her»; Modernized Convention, art. 9(1): «Every individual shall have a right: (a) not to be subject to a
decision significantly affecting him or her based solely on an automated processing of data without having his or her
views taken into consideration»; Explanatory Report, § 75: «It is essential that an individual who may be subject to a
purely automated decision has the right to challenge such a decision by putting forward, in a meaningful manner, his or
her point of view and arguments».
53 See for instance GDPR, Recital 71 («decision-making based on such processing, including profiling, should be
allowed where expressly authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject, including for
fraud and tax-evasion monitoring and prevention purposes conducted in accordance with the regulations, standards and
recommendations of Union institutions or national oversight bodies and to ensure the security and reliability of a service
provided by the controller, or necessary for the entering or performance of a contract between the data subject and a
controller, or when the data subject has given his or her explicit consent»).
54 See Explanatory Report,  § 75 («However,  an individual cannot  exercise this right  if  the automated decision is
authorised by a law … which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests»).
55 See GDPR, Recital 71 and 22(1). Importantly, art. 22(1) does not refer to the right to receive explanation, while
Recital 71 does; it seems however more appropriate to interpret the former provision in the light of the latter, which is
consistent with well-known interpretive criteria.
56 See MALGIERI, COMANDÈ, Why a Right to Legibility, cit., p. 251-252 (underscoring how only such interpretation is
able to prevent an illegitimate discrimination between «fully automated systems» and «scoring systems» in performing
the same activities and potentially producing the same outcome).
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be deemed sufficient.57 Be that as it may, the rationale of the provision is to protect individuals
when affected by particular processes, for example “scoring” mechanisms employed by bank when
assessing creditworthiness, in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.58 Such safeguard essentially
consists in introducing human components such as critical sensibility and judgment capabilities in
the  decision-making  process:  human  discretion  is  considered  as  the  strongest  bastion  against
discrimination and unfair treatment of data.
Whether such a rationale can be extended (yet mutatis mutandis) to ATC is questionable, as
the divergence between the former contexts (e.g. credit scoring) and those where LAWS will be
operated in our scenario (e.g. law-enforcement operations) may warn against drawing rash and far-
fetched  analogies.  An  a  fortiori reasoning  here,  albeit  appealing,  may  risk  obliterating  that
divergence. On the one hand, ATC undeniably produces legal effects concerning the individual and
«significantly affects» him/her, given that it is the very right to life to be at stake.59 On the other
hand, the difference in operational contexts should not be underestimated: law-enforcement agents
are  often  required  to  take  split-second  decisions  based  on  the  individual’s  conduct  in  specific
circumstances – in short, where operational tempo may not allow for a human operator to review a
decision made by a LAWS.60 The temporal dimension, in short, can be regarded as a cutting-point
element of distinction from other contexts where data processing normally occurs.
The right not to be subject to a solely automated decision is interestingly mirrored in the
recently coined notion of Meaningful Human Control (MHC), a veritable  punctum dolens in the
current  debate  on  LAWS.61 Virtually  all  States,  NGOs  and  representatives  of  the  civil  society
consider MHC as the basic requirement for any weapons system, as it requires human deliberation
to  be  present  at  critical  decisions  made  by LAWS (such  as  target  selection  and engagement).
57 See S. WACHTER, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data
Protection Regulation,  in  International  Data Privacy  Law,  2017,  p.  92  («the  phrase  “solely”  suggests  even  some
nominal human involvement may be sufficient»).
58 See MALGIERI, COMANDÈ, Why a Right to Legibility, cit., p. 251.
59 See GDPR, Art. 22(1); for a commentary, see MALGIERI, COMANDÈ, Why a Right to Legibility, cit., at 252 (explicitly
interpreting the provision as encompassing all practices having any influence on «human rights and constitutional rights
of individuals» and pinpointing that such human rights at stake «cannot be considered a “numerus clausus”»).
60 For an appropriate example, see C. HEYNS,  Human Rights and the Use of Autonomous Weapons Systems During
Domestic Law Enforcement, in  Human Rights Quarterly, 2016, p. 358 (arguing that LAWS programmed with facial
recognition software whereby they can use lethal force against an hostage-taker exposing himself for a split second are
lawful,  as  long as  the human alternative is  suboptimal  and human control  is  ensured over the operation;  in these
particular circumstances, given the narrow-spatial boundaries of the operation, it does not seem to be at odds with the
right to life).
61 For an overview of the notion, its scope and its purposes, see U.N. Institute For Disarmament Research (UNIDIR),
The Weaponization Of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Considering How Meaningful Human Control Might
Move The Discussion Forward,  2015,  p.  4,  http://www.unidir.org/en/publications/the-weaponization-of-increasingly-
autonomous-technologies-considering-how-meaningful-human-control-might-move-the-discussion-forward;
CHENGETA, Defining the emerging notion, cit., p. 833 ff.. The first conceptualization of MHC has been pushed forward
by the British NGO Article 36: see the Report Key Areas For Debate On Autonomous Weapon Systems, 2014, available
at:  http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW-May-2014.pdf.  The  importance  of  MHC  in  the
debate is captured by C. Heyns,  Autonomous weapons in armed conflict and the right to a dignified life: an African
perspective, in South African Journal On Human Rights, 2017, p. 50 (arguing how MHC is perceived as «the dividing
line between acceptable and not acceptable machine autonomy»).
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However,  there  regrettably  is  ample  disagreement  about  how  to  understand  the  notion:  some
consider  it  necessary to  retain  a  human  operator  as  a  general  supervisor  with  little  chance  to
intervene in the single lethal decision (a “broad” understanding of MHC),62 while others call for a
more substantial role played by the human operator (a “narrow” understanding of MHC).63
The dichotomy of narrow and broad understandings of MHC reproduces the contrast around
“nominal”  human  intervention  in  automated  decision-making.  Notwithstanding  the  respective
different contexts it seems that the underlying rationales of meaningful human intervention relating
to the right  not to  be subject  solely to  an automated decision and the specific notion of MHC
actually overlap. It has been argued that the «major purpose» of a notion of MHC is to fill any
possible «accountability gap».64 Having a human agent in a relationship of control and dependence
with LAWS is perceived as the only way to ensure accountability in cases where LAWS’s conduct
results in a violation of relevant law; a broad understanding of MHC (for example, limited to having
a human presence at the act of pre-programming a LAWS) replicates similar drawbacks associated
with  “nominal”  human  intervention,  namely  higher  risk  of  biases,65 poorer  situational
understanding, lack of critical sensibility and judgment.66
To sum up, it is true that the right not to be subject to solely automated decision-making
founds its place in the field of data protection and privacy, and expanding it may seem an improper
use of the a fortiori argument. However, on closer inspection its rationale is close to the one that
inspires the notion of MHC. In both cases, meaningful human presence ensures intervention at the
outcome of an automated decision-making process, which allows for the human “component” to be
part of the equation. In the case of LAWS, the requirement of MHC reflects the more specific need
for accountability in cases where a particular use of force was not permitted. 
4.  Summarizing what has been argued so far, for ATC to be IHRL-compliant it must: (1)
involve data collection only when «strictly necessary» as far as the right to privacy is concerned; (2)
employ categories that are consistent with the right to life’s requirements of «absolute necessity»
and «proportionality»; (3) ensure a sufficient degree of legibility, i.e. an understanding of the actual
functioning  of  the  process  that  leads  to  the  use  of  force;  (4)  allow  for  meaningful human
intervention to the extent that accountability gaps are eliminated. All these requirements are quite
stringent, especially if applied to existing technology; this is why most scholars who contrast the
62 See for instance M. SCHMITT,  Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the
Critics, in Harvard National Security Journal, 2013, p. 1-38.
63 See for instance N. SHARKEY, Staying in the loop: human supervisory control of weapons, in N. BHUTA, S. BECK, R.
GEIΒ, H. LIU, C. KREΒ (eds.), Autonomous Weapons Systems, Cambridge, 2016, p. 34 ff..
64 See CHENGETA, Defining the emerging notion, cit., p. 883 and passim.
65 For a brief explanation of «automation bias» and risks associated therewith, see CHENGETA, Defining the emerging
notion, cit., p. 853-854 (concluding that «mere involvement of a human being in the loop» must be rejected as it does
not ensure that a human operator retains effective control over the weapon).
66 Paraphrasing MALGIERI, COMANDÈ,  Why a Right to Legibility, cit., p. 252; see  amplius CHENGETA, Defining the
emerging notion, cit.,  p. 872 ff. (arguing that «the analysis of facts on the battlefield and fitting them to pre-defined
parameters» – which is what constitutes «the real decision-making to kill» – is not sufficient for the purposes of MHC, a
notion that requires that human agents be «in control of the system for each individual attack because such control is
central to establishing the responsibility of combatants»).
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development of LAWS are inclined to do so on the basis of their actual feasibility (i.e. technological
or pragmatic objection).67 
There  is  however  an  alternative  understanding  of  ATC’s  implications  on  human  rights,
focusing  more  on  the  uniqueness  of  autonomous  decision-making  as  a  process  where  human
deliberation may be absent with regard to a specific use of force. It is an argument based on human
dignity – possibly one of the most contrasted, debated notions in the contemporary discourse around
human rights.68 Some scholars argue that the lack of human presence at force delivery against an
individual entails a violation of human dignity as such, as targets are treated as mere objects.69 The
essence of this kind of arguments lies in that non-human decision-makers «have no understanding
of the importance of life, and of the implications of taking it»:70 emphasis here is therefore not
placed on accountability,  but rather on the capacity of  understanding the gravity of a decision.
Appealing to concepts such as “human dignity” or “humanity” raises however a bunch of issues, in
first place as the meaning of such expressions is contested not only in the legal debate, but also –
and foremost – in the moral one. 
67 The essence of such objection has been recently captured by HEYNS, Autonomous weapons in armed conflict and the
right to a dignified life, cit., p. 58: «the requirement of meaningful human control is needed not as a matter of principle,
but in order to secure accuracy in targeting and as a basis for legal reform. Clearly, this approach is conditional on
technological developments, and may or not be trumped depending on such progress».
68 To recapitulate here the immense literature on this subject would be impossible. Suffice it to recall the following
contributions: O. SCHACHTER,  Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,  in  American Journal of International Law,
1983, p. 848 ff.; J. FROWEIN, Human Dignity in International Law, in D. KRETZMER, E. KLEIN (eds.), The Concept of
Human Dignity in Human Right Discourse, The Hague, 2002, p. 121 ff.; for a ECHR-centered focus, see J. COSTA,
Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in C. MCCRUDDEN (ed.), Understanding
Human Dignity, Oxford, 2014, p. 393 ff..
69 See  Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, cit., particularly at § 95
(«[d]eploying LARs has been depicted as treating people like “vermin”, who are “exterminated.” These descriptions
conjure up the image of LARs as some kind of mechanized pesticide»); P. ASARO, Jus Superveniens: robotic weapons
and the Martens Clause,  in R. CALO,  M.  FROOMKIN, I.  KERR,  Robot Law, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2016, p. 385
(«this also relates to the question of human dignity. If a combatant is to die with dignity, there must be some sense in
which that death is meaningful. In the absence of an intentional and meaningful decision to use violence, the resulting
deaths are meaningless and arbitrary, and the dignity of those killed is significantly diminished»); O. U LGEN,  Human
Dignity in an Age of Autonomous Weapons: Are We in Danger of Losing an "Elementary Consideration of Humanity"? ,
in ESIL Conference Paper, 2016, p. 8 («[h]uman targets are denied the status of rational agents with autonomy of will,
and arbitrarily deemed irrational agents subject to extrajudicial killings or sub-humans not worthy of human face-to-
face contact»). A dignity-based approach is defended by, inter alios, the Holy See: see for instance the Statement at the
2017 GGE, unfortunately unavailable on the CCW website: «[a] machine is only a complex set of circuits and this
material system cannot in any case become a truly morally responsible agent. In fact, for a machine, a human person is
only a datum, a set of numbers among others». 
70 See HEYNS, Autonomous weapons in armed conflict and the right to a dignified life, cit., p. 58.
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To  address  the  issue  in  a  satisfying  manner  is  not  possible  here;  probably  the  most
appropriate conclusion would be at least to leave a door open for a more principled reflection that
could  take  moral  considerations  into  account.  This  is  all  the  more  imperative  in  a  time  when
humanity faces an unprecedented scenario of «death by algorithm»:71 the discourse around ATC, the
(mis-)use of “big data” and compliance with IHRL can at most  put off – and not  wipe out – the
intrinsic moral dilemma raised by this new technology and the risks associated thereto.
DIEGO MAURI
71 The quote is from HEYNS, Autonomous weapons in armed conflict and the right to a dignified life, cit., p. 48.
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The use of big data as a risk for individual self-determination
and the implementation of competition law in the digital market - A
comparative approach between the European Union and the United
States of America72
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. Human dignity as a fundamental right – 3. The fundamental rights to
privacy and to data protection – 4. A short comparison between the European Union and the United 
States on data protection – 5. Digital and data-driven economy: elements of a same phenomenon – 
A brief overview on the EU Digital Single Market – 6. Competition law and the control over market
power dynamics in digital markets – 7. Conclusions
1.  This paper aims at studying two main fundamental rights, namely, the rights to human
dignity and to the protection of personal data which, throughout their analysis in the digital context,
will be found to be affected by the use of new technologies and the mechanisms of digital economy.
In order to carry out the said analysis the first two paragraphs will investigate the origins and
the meaning of the right to human dignity in its sense of self-determination, and to privacy in its
narrower notion of personal data protection and will try to demonstrate that both these rights that
are currently recognised and protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(the  “Charter”  or  “CFR”)  initially  took  origin  from the  studies  of  US  scholars  and  from the
interpretive activity of the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCotUS”). 
The third paragraph will briefly offer some observations on the comparison between the two
legal systems of the EU and the US concerning privacy protection. 
The fourth paragraph will consider the framework of data driven economy which forms an
important  part  of  the  digital  economy  and  will  particularly  play  an  imperative  role  in  the
development  of  the  EU digital  single  market  as  craved  by the  2020 objectives  set  out  by the
European Commission,  in  order  to  increase commercial  transactions  inside and outside the EU
economic area. 
The  final  paragraph  will  explore  the  possibility  to  apply competition  law (at  least,  EU
competition  law  –  insofar  as  the  EU  single  market  is  concerned)  with  the  view  to  increase
competition between firms operating in the digital context and in the meantime to reduce market
power of the biggest digital firms. In the concluding paragraph, some remarks on the analogies and
differences between the EU and the US legal systems will be made and some solutions to prevent
the infringement of the right to self-determination will be suggested. 
2.  Over  the  years,  human  dignity  has  been  differently  denoted.  Starting  from  its
consideration as an absolute (sometimes even a relative) value73, it eventually obtained an official
72 This text has been conceived and drafted for the purposes of the participation in the Seminar Big Data and Public
Law: new challenges beyond data protection, organised by the University of Milan and held in Gargnano (Italy), on 15-
17 October 2018. This paper was introduced within Panel 1 – Big Data and Public Law. 
73 D. SHULZTINER, G. E. CARMI, Human Dignity in National Constitutions: Functions, Promises and Dangers, in 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, 2014, p. 470; S. Lieto, Dignità e “valore” tra etica, economia e diritto, in 
RDPE, 2013, pp. 163 ff.; M. DÜWELL, Human dignity: concepts, discussions, philosophical perspectives, in 
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recognition as a human right74. However, the common ground between its consideration either as a
mere  value  or  as  a  right  is  represented  by  its  fundamental  nature.  To  be  precise,  although
philosophers and scholars initially estimated it as a non-legal value, dignity was never denied a
universal and essential importance, insofar as it was related to the context of human relationships75.
According to these views, human dignity mainly relates to the individual as observed in his moral
relationships with other individuals belonging to the same community he belongs to, and its notion
could be easily associated to a concept of «relational dignity»76. 
Starting from this perspective, academics noted that human dignity could manifestly play the
role  of  founding  value  of  any  human  right77,  even  as  a  sort  of  a  so-called  «fundamentally
fundamental right»78.  Inter alia,  this version has finally been confirmed by the interpretation of
human dignity as the unifying trait between the main international documents protecting human
M. DÜWELL, J. BRAARVIG, R. BROWNSWORD, D. MIETH (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, 
Cambridge, 2014, p. 29; F. POLITI, Il rispetto della dignità umana nell’ordinamento europeo, in S. MANGIAMELI 
(ed.), L’ordinamento europeo – i principi dell’Unione, Milan, 2006, pp. 4 ff.
74 First and foremost through its official recognition in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (1945 – see 
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/) and in article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948 – see
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/). The philosophical and doctrinal wave which interpreted 
human dignity as a human right stemmed from the violent events occurred during the II World War, which called for 
urgent legal measures to the benefit of the individuals. Simone Weil and Hannah Arendt belonged to the said doctrinal 
wave (see also S. WEIL, La personne et le sacré, 1957, cit. in S. Lieto, Dignità e “valore” tra etica, economia e diritto,
in RDPE, 2013, p. 179; S. RODOTÀ, Il diritto di avere diritti, Rome, 2012; C. MENKE, Dignity as the right to have 
rights: human dignity in Hannah Arendt, in M. DÜWELL, J. BRAARVIG, R. BROWNSWORD, D. MIETH (eds.), 
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, cit., p. 332; S. BAER, Dignity, liberty, equality: a fundamental rights 
triangle of constitutionalism, in University of Toronto Law Journal, 2009, p. 443; C. DUPRÉ, The Age of Dignity, 
London, 2015, pp. 37 ff.).
75 Worth to be mentioned are some of the theories on human dignity supported by Aristotle, according to whom any 
individual is endowed with dignity, although all individuals may not be equally respectable depending on the fact that 
they make actions to the benefit of other people (U. VINCENTI, Diritti e dignità umana, Bari-Rome, 2009, pp. 7 ff. in 
C. SCOGNAMIGLIO, Dignità dell’uomo e tutela della personalità, in Giustizia Civile, 2014, pp. 67 ff.). This 
perspective had partially been adopted by the Romans, who considered human dignity as a natural gift (P. BECCHI, Il 
principio dignità umana, Brescia, 2009, in C. SCOGNAMIGLIO, Dignità dell’uomo e tutela della personalità, cit., pp. 
67 ff.) and later by Kant who based his concept of dignity upon his analysis of the «moral law» allowing the human 
being to be considered never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end [I. KANT, The Metaphysics of 
Morals (II. Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue), Cambridge, 1996]. 
76 F. SCARAMELLA, La dimensione relazionale come fondamento della dignità umana, in Rivista di filosofia del 
diritto, 2013, pp. 305-320; B. MALVESTITI, La dignità umana dopo la “Carta di Nizza”. Un’analisi concettuale, 
Naples-Salerno, 2015; K. T. GALVIN, L. TODRES, Dignity as honour-wound: an experiential and relational view, in 
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2015, pp. 410-418.
77 E. DUBUOT,  La  dignité  dans  la  jurisprudence  de  la  Cour  de  justice  des  Communauteés  européennes,  in  L.
BURGUOGUE-LARSEN  (ed.),  La  dignité  saisie  par  les  juges  en  Europe, Brussels,  2010,  p.  82;  S. PEERS,
T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD (eds.), The EU Charter of fundamental rights: A commentary, London, 2014, pp.
21-23.
78 This expression is used by Burkhert for the right to privacy, but could be used by analogy for defining the right to 
human dignity in the sense intended by Dupré and Ruggeri. See H. BURKHERT, Dualities of privacy – An Introduction
to ‘Personal Data Protection and Fundamental Rights’, in M. V. PEREZ ASINARI, P. PALAZZI (eds.), Challenges of 
Privacy and Data Protection Law, Brussels, 2008; C. DUPRÉ, The Age of Dignity, cit.; A. RUGGERI, Alla ricerca del 
fondamento dell’interpretazione conforme, in Forum di Quaderni costituzionali Rassegna, available at 
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0056_ruggeri.pdf. 
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rights, until the value at stake has been included, in 2009, as a formal and first fundamental right
recognised and protected by the CFR79, so underlining its leading importance. 
For the first time in the history of existing legal systems human dignity has explicitly been
proclaimed as a right and was given an absolute inviolable nature: in other words, in principle, this
right could not be limited by the exercise or the protection of other – even fundamental – rights80.
Nevertheless, at least in the European Union, the express provisions of article 1 of the Charter did
not allow its interpreters to concretely and easily safeguard the concerned right by directly applying
its precept, by reason of the circumstance that the norm is quite general and indefinite. As a matter
of fact, by stating that  «[h]uman dignity is inviolable.  It must be respected and protected»,  the
Charter only foresees a passive behaviour to respect the individuals’ exercise of the right to human
dignity and an active conduct in taking any action to protect individuals from potential threats in the
exploitation of the above right81. 
However,  by doing  so,  human  dignity is  not  defined and remains  a  vague  notion82.  As
occurred for its inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the CFR human dignity
has not been defined. For this reason, scholars use to affirm that legislators did not specified it
intentionally so as to confer dignity with a general concept that could be fit  for any necessary
practical meaning83. Indeed, in line with this theory, the notion of dignity could be articulated into
different meanings and forms with the view to protect different practical situations, but above all to
include all the other fundamental rights within the wide boundaries of the right that protects them.
This would then be possible in the light of its  omnibus connotation as founding right of the other
fundamental rights. 
However, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean human dignity is not expressly embedded
in  the  Constitution.  Nonetheless,  the  United  States  have  a  longstanding  tradition  in  protecting
dignity through the interpretative activity of the SCotUS which is familiar with including such a
value under the framework of the so-called “mother rights”84. Such essential rights may not result in
being expressly protected by the US Constitution, but they obtain judicial safeguard thanks to the
construction  granted  by the  supreme judges  who  are  vested  with  the  power  to  create  binding
precedents according to the stare decisis doctrine. Some of the manifest cases where the SCotUS
recognised a right as being a mother-right (notwithstanding the fact that it was not expressed in the
79 Article  1  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  OJ  2012,  C  236  (see  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016P/TXT&from=EN).
80 In this sense, see the judgment of the ECJ of 14 October 2004, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-
GmbH v. Oberbeurgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, C-36/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614 (see 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=49221&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=660433). However, in 
weighting conflicting fundamental rights, article 52 of the Charter, which provides for the so-called “safeguard clause”, 
always needs to be taken into account. For an in-depth analysis, see S. RODOTÀ, Il diritto di avere diritti, Rome, 2012,
pp. 31 ff.
81 In this sense and concerning the right to privacy, see H. BURKHERT,  Dualities of privacy – An Introduction to
‘Personal Data Protection and Fundamental Rights’, cit.
82 See also F. POLITI, Il rispetto della dignità umana nell’ordinamento europeo, cit., p. 58.
83 D. SCHULZTINER, G. E. CARMI, Human Dignity in National Constitutions: Functions, Promises and Dangers, in
The American Journal of Comparative Law, 2014.
84 See also, S. BAER, Dignity, liberty, equality: a fundamental rights triangle of constitutionalism, cit.
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Constitution) specifically concerned the right to privacy, which thus got an acknowledgment at a
constitutional level85. In the light of these precedents and according to the doctrine which reconnects
dignity to the general category of the right to liberty – under which also the right to privacy falls86 –,
even human dignity as acknowledged by the US judges may be construed as a founding value. In
Lawrence v. Texas87, which is a peculiar case of the US jurisprudence, the SCotUS went through the
notion of dignity even more markedly, justified it in relation to the concept of privacy and held that
dignity may also be articulated into its meaning of one’s freedom to decide autonomously and, thus,
in one’s freedom of choice and self-determination88. 
This  is  the reason why some scholars  tend to  state  that  the American notion of dignity
resembles to a value, whereas its EU concept is now undisputedly recognised as a fundamental right
and should benefit  from a greater protection89.  The same goes for the protection of the right to
privacy and to data protection which is not part of US Constitution (and is therefore safeguarded by
judicial  interpretation),  whilst  in  the  EU  it  is  formally  acknowledged  and  implemented  as  a
fundamental and inviolable right. 
Regardless of the above-mentioned theory, it is however important to admit that the US have
a strong tradition of human rights judicial protection and that some of the most important rights
which have then been included in the respective legislative acts, even in the EU, took origin from
US conceptions of the same rights. This is all the more true when the right to privacy is concerned,
as it will be shortly analysed below.
3.  As anticipated in the first  paragraph, the right to privacy is a patent example of how
American case-law and scholars have had an impact on the recognition and the implementation of
fundamental rights which then influenced their notion in the EU. As a matter of fact, the concept
connected to the general right to privacy was created in early 1890 by the two eminent American
scholars Warren and Brandeis who basically defined privacy as «the right to be let alone»90. This
doctrine takes its cues from the distinction between privacy –  i.e.  the legal asset needing to be
85 Ex multis, see cases Roe v. Wade, 410 USA, 113 (1973), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381, USA 479 (1965). 
86 A. BARAK,  Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right,  in C. MCCRUDDEN (ed.),
Understanding Human Dignity, Oxford, 2013, p. 186.
87 539 US 558 (2003).
88 N. RAO, On the use and abuse of dignity in constitutional law, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2008, p. 240.
89 G. BOGNETTI, The concept of human dignity in European and US constitutionalism, in G. NOLTE (ed.), European
and  US  Constitutionalism,  Cambridge,  2005;  ;  D. SHULZTINER,  G.  E. CARMI,  Human  Dignity  in  National
Constitutions: Functions, Promises and Dangers, cit., pp. 470 ff.
90 This definition originated from a case involving Mr. Warren’s wife and the publication of some of her pictures made 
by means of a newly-created Kodak camera. Mr. Warren’s wife did not want to be affected from a reputational, social 
and personal damage, which would have been originated by the circulation of pictures allowed by the use of new 
technologies. For an in-depth analysis, see A. RENGEL, Privacy in the 21st century, Studies in Intercultural Human 
rights, Leiden-Boston, 2013; K. LACHANA, Elements of convergence in the historical origins and ideological 
foundations of the US and European privacy law: the nexus between the “right to be let alone” and continental 
jurisdictions, in M. BOTTIS (ed.), Privacy and Surveillance, Current aspects and future perspectives, Athene, 2013, pp.
24-44; L. MIGLIETTI, Il diritto alla privacy nell’esperienza giuridica statunitense, Naples, 2014, pp. 19 ff.; 
M. K. OHLHAUSEN, A. P. OKULIAR, Competition, Consumer Protection, and The Right [Approach] to Privacy, in 
Antitrust Law Journal, 2015, pp. 125 ff.
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protected by the legal system – and the right to privacy – i.e. the legal tool by which the legal asset
can be safeguarded91. 
In truthfulness, Warren and Brandeis were not the first ones to theorise the right to privacy,
because in 1834 Justice Cooley, judge of the SCotUS, ruled over a case on tort law and – quite by
chance – examined the matter of an individual’s privacy by deeming that the «right to one’s person
may be said to be a right of complete immunity: the right to be let alone» 92. However, it was only
with Warren and Brandeis that privacy and its connected rights were considered in the perspective
of the need for the individual  to take some aspects of his  life secret and confidential,  with no
intrusions from other people. Therefore, only 1890 could be universally considered as a “cut-off”
date for the formal acknowledgement and recognition of the right to privacy93. 
Only afterwards, this brand new legal concept started to be exported to Europe and then to
the European Union94.  Scholars also began to analyse the level of a «reasonable expectation of
privacy» which is useful for legislators and judges to identify a general and adequate definition of
the right to privacy that could be valid for any individual, thus not associated with a subjective and
personal perception of the need to be let alone95. Thanks to this doctrine, the European Convention
on Human Rights included the right to privacy, as worthy to be safeguarded as a human right96. 
Nowadays,  despite the quite negative meaning which some philosophers tried to give to
privacy97, it is nowadays widely accepted by scholars that the concept of privacy (and accordingly
that of the relevant right to privacy), just like the one of dignity, is a sort of an «umbrella concept»
embedding many definitions which generally refer  to  positive connotations identifying multiple
details of an individual, that the latter wishes to preserve as confidential  and not to disclose to
others98. As a result, even the notion of the right to privacy may embrace different denotations and
may be applied differently depending on the context it refers to. 
91 A. RENGEL, Privacy in the 21st Century, cit., p. 31.
92 T. C. COOLEY, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs which Arise Independent of Contract, Chicago, 1879;
R. B. STANDLER, Privacy Law in the U.S.A., 1997, retrieved from http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm; N. LUGARESI,
Internet, Privacy e Pubblici Poteri negli Stati Uniti, Milan, 2000, p. 49.
93 M. K. OHLHAUSEN, A. P. OKULIAR, Competition, Consumer Protection, and The Right [Approach] to Privacy,
cit., p. 126.
94 See the commentary on article 8 of the CFR by Bassini and Pollicino. M. BASSINI, O. POLLICINO, IN 
S. ALLEGREZZA, R. MASTROIANNI, F. PAPPALARDO, O. POLLICINO, O. RAZZOLINI (eds.), Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali dell’Unione europea, Milan, 2017, p. 135. 
95 J. L. MILLS, Privacy the lost right, Oxford, 2008, pp. 20 ff.; D. J. SOLOVE, Understanding Privacy, Cambridge, 
MA, 2008, pp. 71 ff. This tendency started from the well-known case Katz v. United States (389, US 347, 360, 1967) 
where Justice Harlan stated «[a] person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy...[T]here is a
two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual [subjective] expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable” [...]».
96 European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  signed  in  Rome  on  4  November  1950  (see
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf). 
97 For instance, the above cited Hannah Arendt held that the fact that the individual has privacy means that he is 
deprived of something. Therefore some definitions of privacy were provided with a negative connotation, instead of the 
positive attitude that the right to privacy attempts to underline. See D. J. SOLOVE, Understanding Privacy, cit., pp. 80 
ff.
98 D. J. SOLOVE, Understanding Privacy, cit., p. 45; see also D. J. SOLOVE, Nothing to Hide – the False Tradeoff
between Privacy and Security, New Haven, 2011, pp. 24 ff.;  e J. E. COHEN,  What privacy is for, in  Harvard Law
Review, 2013, p. 1908.
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Worth to be particularly mentioned are two of the multiple definitions offered by academics.
Namely,  two American researchers,  Westin and Solove,  have studied the right  to  privacy more
recently and confirmed that – indeed – it deals with a multifaceted and complex human perspective,
so that it must be conceived at a general level in order to include all the possible concrete situations.
However, both Westin and Solove believed that one of the most interesting and important aspects of
the right to privacy deals with the protection of oneself’s information, that is to say with the faculty
to decide whether and how to disclose personal data to third parties and to which purposes99.  The
said doctrinal tendency, which has been developing almost simultaneously with the rise of new
technologies (that let data flow easier and much quicker than before), led European judges to detect
a separate fundamental right formally recognised for the first time by the Nice Charter100,  then
replaced by the binding CFR in 2009101. Hence, to date the European Union seems the first legal
system where the right to data protection is safeguarded as a fundamental right102, moreover in a
distinct manner as compared to the broader right to privacy. 
Still,  in  spite  of  its  narrower  definition,  even  the  right  to  data  protection  agrees  to  be
articulated into various  forms.  One of the most  interesting classification conceived by scholars
involves the models of informational privacy, on the one hand, and of decisional privacy, on the
other. The said division is reckoned to be derived from a passive and an active understanding of
privacy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  informational  privacy  would  be  approached  to  a  rather  passive
behaviour of the data subject (the individual whose data may be disclosed103) and this would also be
99 D. J. SOLOVE, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the consent dilemma, in Harvard Law Review, 2013, 
p. 1882; D. J. SOLOVE, Understanding Privacy, cit.; A. WESTIN, Privacy and Freedom, in Washington and Lee Law 
Review, 1968.
100 Formally,  the  Nice  Charter  (see  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:32000X1218(01):IT:HTML) had exactly the same content as the Charter of fundamental rights, but acted
as a soft law instrument until its entry into force and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1st December 2009 (see
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN).
101 Certainly, the right to data protection had expressly been included in Convention no. 108 (Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data – see 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680078b37) signed within the framework 
of the Council of Europe in 1981, entered into force in 1985 and currently ratified by 43 States. This Convention is said 
to have built a sort of «golden standard» as it sets out different rights connected to the right to data protection which are 
implemented also in the more recent legal acts for the safeguard of the individuals in exercising their right to the 
protection of personal information (see F. W. HONDIUS, A quarter century of international data protection, in Hague 
Yearbook of International Law, The Hague, 2005, p. 31). 
102 Article 8 reads as follows «1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2.
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by
and independent authority».
103 «Data subject» is a definition taken from the newly entered into force EU GDPR, i.e. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ 2016, L 119, pp. 1-88 (see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32016R0679&qid=1543829083725&from=EN), in particular from its article 4, number 1, which reads as 
follows: «”personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data 
subject”); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
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confirmed by US scholars after a series of judgments which needed to construe the fifth and the
fourteenth amendments of the US Constitution and that ruled that it was convenient to differentiate
the personal interest in preventing the disclosure of one’s personal data from that to make decisions
in a total autonomous manner104. This last connotation would call for a more active conduct – i.e. to
independently take decisions – which is rather connected to the decisional nature of privacy. Then,
whereas the informational privacy is  clearly protected,  for instance in the EU by the CFR, the
decisional aspect of privacy cannot be asserted as an express fundamental right. It could however be
recognised as an inviolable right by considering the right to data protection (and thus to privacy)
together with the right to human dignity, and supposing that these two crucial rights are suitable to
be melted into a single freedom which is the right to self-determination, while protecting one’s own
intimacy and identity. The freedom to self-determinate means the faculty to decide whether and how
to disclose personal data, which kind of data to unveil and for which purposes105. 
In  the  end,  the  above  theory  caused  legal  interpreters  to  create  a  contemporary  and
innovative  right  represented  by  the  so-called  right  to  informationnelle  Selbstbestimmung (or
informational  self-determination)106.  This  concept  has  been  employed  by  the  German
Bundesverfassungsgericht in a judgment issued in 1983, where it was acknowledged as «the power
of the individual to decide in a substantial autonomous manner about the assignment and use of his
personal  data»107 thanks  to  the  exploitation  and  interpretation  of  article  1  of  the  German
Constitution  which  protects  human  dignity  as  an  inviolable  value.  Henceforward,  the  original
definition of informational self-determination is able to definitely confirm the direct connection
between the right to human dignity and the right to privacy and data protection. Moreover, given
that  the  above-mentioned  concept  has  been  developed  due  to  the  works  of  academics  and
jurisprudence across the American and the European continents, it should be useful to compare the
two legal systems on the safeguard of the right to data protection, because some differences should
be stressed in  order  to  proceed in  the analysis  of data-driven economy carried out  in  the fifth
paragraph.
4. In terms of protection of the rights to privacy and to data protection, the European Union
and  the  United  States  tend  to  apply different  principles  in  the  light  of,  especially,  the  aspects
outlined below.
Firstly, significant divergences are seen in their express recognition as fundamental rights.
Indeed, in addition to have granted the two rights at hand a constitutional warranty, thanks to their
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person».
104 See judgment in Whalen c. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) where the SCotUS expressly referred to «the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and [...] the interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions». See H. BURKHERT, Introduction. Dualities of Privacy – An Introduction to “Personal 
data Protection and Fundamental Rights”, cit., pp. 20 ff.; N. J. King, Fundamental Human Right Principle Inspires 
U.S. Data Law, but protections are less fundamental, in M. V. PÉREZ ASINARI, P. PALAZZI (eds.), Cahiers du CRID,
n. 31, Défis du Droit à la Protection de la Vie Privée – Challenges of Privacy and Data Protection Law, Brussels, 2008, 
pp. 79 ff.
105 N. J. KING, ibidem.
106 G. SARTOR, Tutela della personalità e normativa per la “protezione dei dati”, in Informatica e diritto, 1986, XII.
107 Courtesy translation. See G. SARTOR, ibidem.
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inclusion in the CFR108, the EU has recently adopted a unique legal framework (the General Data
Protection  Regulation  –  GDPR109)  for  the  protection  of  personal  data  of  any  natural  person,
regardless of the fact that such a person is a EU citizen or not110. Being a regulation, the GDPR is
directly  applicable  in  the  same  manner  in  every  Member  State  and  thus  guarantees  the  full
harmonisation of its provisions within the EU111, but data protection also benefits from other EU
legislative acts adopted for being implemented in different contexts (e.g. criminal investigations112).
Secondly, on the American side, the US Constitution does not formally provide for any right to
privacy or to data protection, but these ones are basically protected through the interpretative work
of the SCotUS, which has often been called to construe the fourth,  the fifth and the fourteenth
amendments  with  the  purpose  to  protect  individuals  from  harms  to  their  privacy113.  Thirdly,
differently from the EU, the United States do not grant a uniform safeguard of individuals’ privacy,
because they cannot profit from a harmonised legal framework (this legislative sector is indeed
characterised by a strong fragmentary nature, due to the fact that every legislative act concerns a
different social, political or economic sector114). Fourthly, the main interesting discrepancy concerns
108 Article  6  of  the  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT&from=EN), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, now provides the Charter with the same legal
value as the founding Treaties.
109 See footnote 103 above.
110 Indeed, the GDPR applies regardless of the data subjects’ origins when data is processed either in the EU or outside
the EU when (i) the controller or the processor are anyway based in the EU, (ii) the processing made outside the EU 
handles data from EU citizens (article 3 of the GDPR). This is also known as the extraterritoriality principle of EU data 
protection. See, ex multis, J. P. ALBRECHT, Uniform Protection by the EU – The EU Data Protection Regulation 
Salvages Informational Self-determination, in H. HIJAMNS, H. KRANENBORG (eds.), Data Protection Anno 2014: 
How to Restore Trust?, Mortsel, 2014, pp. 122 ff.; F. FABBRINI, Privacy and National Security in the Digital Age,  in 
Tilburg Law Review, Journal of International and European Law, 2015, p. 8; C. FOCARELLI, La privacy. Proteggere i 
dati personali oggi, Bologna, 2015, p. 146.
111 R. ADAM, A. TIZZANO, Lineamenti di diritto dell’Unione europea, Turin, 2010.
112 See Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ 2016, L 119, pp. 89-131 (see 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L0680&qid=1543829334357&from=EN). 
Another important act which is now under the scrutiny of the Council of the EU for its adoption is the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of 
personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications – see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0010&from=EN)
which will be meant to replace Directive 2002/58/EC on electronic communications that now seems quite obsolete for a
complete protection of consumers’ and individuals’ personal data in their electronic communications and transactions 
(see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32002L0058&qid=1543829428945&from=EN). This regulation is also known as the «e-privacy 
regulation». 
113 K. LACHANA,  Elements of  convergence in the historical  origins and ideological foundations of  the US and
European  privacy  law:  the  nexus  between  the  “right  to  be  let  alone”  and  continental  jurisdictions,  p.  29;  L.
MIGLIETTI, Il diritto alla privacy nell’esperienza giuridica statunitense, cit., p. 27; A. RENGEL, Privacy in the 21st
Century, cit.
114 Some of the most known US legislative acts on privacy issues are the Freedom of Information Act - FOIA (1966), 
the Privacy Act (1974 – see https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2012-title5/pdf/USCODE-2012-title5-partI-
chap5-subchapII-sec552a.pdf), the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (1988), the E-FOIA (1996 – see 
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an academic achievement which relates to the circumstance that the US tend to exclusively protect
the  privacy of  their  own residents.  Conversely,  the EU provides  for  privacy safeguard  for  any
individual,  given that  it  includes the relevant  right  in the Charter  and,  therefore,  grants  to  any
natural person and not exclusively to its citizens115. Simultaneously, scholars began to think that, for
the above said reason, the rights to privacy and to data protection in the EU would be directly
connected to the protection of human dignity, recognised in favour of any human being. On the
other hand, commentators believed that the US cover privacy needs in a manner that is instead
associated to the implementation of liberties116. 
This peculiar achievement reached by legal researchers represents an important milestone in
this brief analysis, because dignity will henceforth be considered as aimed at protecting any and all
individuals,  even regardless of their economic and market role.  To the contrary,  by referring to
liberty,  a  considerable  role  would  be  deemed  to  be  played  by  market  structure  where  only
consumers – who are natural persons117 – seem to be protected. 
According to scholars, the foregoing would probably mean that the EU legal system would
better  protect  individuals  than  the  US  one,  because  in  principle,  the  EU  worries  more  about
individuals, whereas the US tend to mainly care about markets, profits and, thus, consumers, mostly
disregarding individuals  that  are  neither  consumers,  nor  American  citizens118.  However,  from a
political  perspective,  this  would  not  be  completely  correct,  because  the  previous  observations
emerge from a European point of view, in the light of which Europe has traditionally been built not
only upon economic liberties, but also on the compliance with human rights. Conversely, such a
theory starts from social and political needs different from those which led to the development of
the US legal system that, in any case, must be recognised as safeguarding human rights, although
their definitions could vary if compared to their respective denotations in the EU. Nonetheless, such
a divergence would not necessarily mean that a legal system is superior to the other one119. Suffice it
to say that also freedom to conduct a business is recognised by the CFR and may sometimes require
a balancing with other fundamental rights, since it may contrast with individuals’ and, in particular,
consumers’ rights120. 
Without going further into detail in the analysis of the comparison between the EU and the
US on this issue, Susan Baer’s theory on the constitutional triangle should be evoked, as it could
give precious hints for the development of this research. As a matter of fact, the above legal model
makes an attempt in maintaining that, in most legal systems, a constitutional triangle of values may
https://www.justice.gov/oip/freedom-information-act-5-usc-552 and also https://www.foia.gov) and the Patriot Act 
(2001 – see https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf). For an in-depth analysis see inter alia,
L. MIGLIETTI, Il diritto alla privacy nell’esperienza giuridica statunitense, cit.; U. PAGALLO, La tutela della privacy
negli Stati Uniti d’America e in Europa, Milan, 2008; A. RENGEL, Privacy in the 21st Century, cit.
115 M.  MILANOVIC,  Human  rights  treaties  and  foreign  surveillance:  Privacy  in  the  digital  Age ,  in  Harvard
International Law Journal, 2016, inter alia, pp. 100 ff.
116 J. Q. WHITMAN, “Human dignity” in Europe and the United States: the social foundations, in G. NOLTE (ed.),
European and US Constitutionalism, Cambridge, 2005.
117 However, it is necessary to specify that not every individual could be a consumer.
118 G. BOGNETTI, The concept of human dignity in European and US constitutionalism, cit.
119 See J. Q. WHITMAN, “Human dignity” in Europe and the United States: the social foundations, cit., p. 124.
120 For the sake of clarity, for in the EU, consumers are granted with the inviolable right to profit from a high level of
protection – article 38 of the Charter.
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be identified. The values upon which the said triangle is built are dignity, liberty and equality, even
if  they can be conflicting.  In any case,  none of these three values could be disregarded by the
concerned triangle, because there are three angles and each one of them is ideally filled with one of
the above clarified values. What is subject to change is the flexibility of the inclination of the angles
that, if legally translated, may vary according to the bigger importance recognised to dignity or to
liberty  or,  still,  to  equality121.  Eventually,  the  foregoing  would  mean  that  dignity  could  be
underestimated in favour of liberty or of equality or vice versa, but in no event one of the values
could be expunged to benefit the other two. Then, according to the above view, the EU and the USA
legal systems could be based upon different constitutional triangles and give more relevance either
to dignity or to liberty. But the two of them122 are forced to implement such a triangle in any social,
political or economic context. 
Baer’s theory allows us to introduce the final part of this research concerning the issue of
data-driven economy, insofar as the above specified principles bearing the constitutional triangle
theory should equally be applied in the digital context, despite  the fact that digital economy has
potentially  no  territorial  and  legal  boundaries.  It  will  be  understood  how  the  principle  of
extraterritoriality enshrined by the EU GDPR will come to the aid of the reader.
5. The 2020 Europe Strategy envisaged by the European Commission in early 2010 includes
the Digital Agenda123 among its seven main pillars. By the end of 2020, the said Agenda should
largely be implemented thanks to  the expansion and the increase of the Digital  Single Market,
basically retracing the building principles of the European Single Market because of which,  inter
alia, original Member States agreed the constitution of the European Communities. 
Not  only the EU economy,  but  also global  economy is  nowadays  facing the  challenges
brought by the web. In particular, keeping on developing through it, digital economy could be said
to be mostly functioning by means of the ceaseless flow of data. Such data is mainly represented by
personal information belonging to web users. In this respect, it is no secret that in the last years the
European digital market has lived a boost largely thanks to the flow and the processing of web
users’ and non-users’ personal data and this is also the reason why the EU legislator believed to take
even deeper steps in the regulation of individuals’ data flows and processing with the new GDPR:
not surprisingly, even the title of the GDPR demonstrates that it is specifically addressed to simplify
the free movement of personal data124. 
It is strongly believed among academics that personal data is the raw material upon which
most part of global economy currently works, but it also is a sort of currency that can be given in
exchange for other services or goods that are apparently free125.  Nonetheless, although data has
121 S. BAER, Dignity, liberty, equality: a fundamental rights triangle of constitutionalism, cit.
122 Actually, three of them if considered with equality.
123 See Digital Agenda website (see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single- market/en/europe-2020-strategy) and the 
objectives of the Digital Single Market (see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en).
124 See also, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Building a European data economy, 10 January 2017, 
COM(2017) 9 final, p. 5 (see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:52017DC0009&from=EN).
125 Inter alia, see F. PANAGOPOULOU-KOUTNATZI, Facebook as a challenge to privacy, in M. BOTTIS (ed.), 
Privacy and Surveillance, Current aspects and future perspectives, Athene, 2013, p. 217; A. ACQUISTI, 
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gained a monetary value, it always has a personal intimate value of the person to whom it belongs
to126.  Such a  personal  significance is  however  subject  to  the risks  of  unsolicited and undesired
intrusions by third parties of which concerned data subjects are either unaware or not well informed.
Indeed, through the collection of single personal data, or of even small sets of personal information,
and by means of the automated mining and combination of such information,  huge amounts of
personal details may be directly or indirectly made available to third parties, that can ultimately use
them for economic purposes. These massive groups of data are currently named as “Big Data” and
are created by the combination of single pieces of information,  collected and generally used to
derive predictive information on single individuals and social groups127. They are well-known for
being  easy to  collect  and combine  and for  being  characterised  by the  so-called  3Vs  (Volume,
Velocity and Variety)128. 
Therefore, Big Data constitutes the biggest innovation of this decade, because it can serve
the “customisation” function useful to adapt any service or product to the specific needs of any
single  individual,  whose  data  is  collected,  processed,  analysed  and combined129.  This  option  is
mostly used in real or virtual market dynamics, and holders of such data do have a decisive impact
on  consumers’ choice  if  they  use  them  or  make  someone  other  use  them  to  drive  sales  and
consumptions. It is not forcedly a negative impact, because consumers could get more benefits from
buying something that is more coherent with their personal needs. However, consumers may also be
concerned by the fact that their information is collected, then combined and maybe assigned to third
parties, regardless of an express and completely conscious consent in that regard130, to the detriment
of their self-determination. 
Moreover, data-driven economy also raises some issues concerning the possible commercial
deals that see personal data as their main object. It is hereby referred to possible data transactions
between interested parties, which basically confirm the nature of personal data as economic assets
that  can be subject  to  assignments  for free or  as  a  result  of a  sale.  Since these are  significant
concerns  especially  felt  by  data  subjects  (whether  they  are  individuals  or  consumers),  public
institutions should address users’ worries in a fair manner taking into consideration both the data
subjects’ need to be protected in their intimacy and the demands of the market for more information
J. GROSSKLAGS, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy?, in Digital Privacy: Theory, 
Technologies and Practices, 2007, retrieved from https://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/Acquisti-Grossklags-
Chapter-Etrics.pdf;  M. J. BECKER, The consumer data revolution: The reshaping of industry competition and a new 
perspective on privacy, in Journal of Direct, Data and Digital Marketing Practice, 2014; N. M. RICHARDS, The 
dangers of surveillance, in Harvard Law Review, 2013, p. 1938; C. J. HOOFNAGLE a.o., Behavioural Advertising: the 
offer you cannot refuse, in Harvard Law and Political Review, 2012, pp. 273-279. 
126 F. COSTA CABRAL, O. LYNSKEY,  Family Ties: The Intersection between Data Protection and Competition in
EU Law, in CMLR, 2017, pp. 12 ff.
127 See,  ex multis,  C.  FOCARELLI,  La privacy.  Proteggere  i  dati  personali  oggi,  cit.,  p.  45;  A. MANTELERO,
Competitive value of data protection: the impact of data protection regulation on online behaviour, in  International
Data Privacy Law, 2013, p. 231.
128 N.  P. SCHEPP, A. WAMBACH,  On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market  Power Assessment,  in  Journal of
European Competition Law & Practice, 2016. Some scholars held that another “V” should be added and would stand
for  their  «added Value» compared  to  a  single  piece  of  information  (see,  Focarelli,  La privacy.  Proteggere  i  dati
personali oggi, cit.).
129 Ibidem.
130 Ibidem.
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in the light of its free movement, provided that data is legitimately collected131. Accordingly, the
foregoing justifies the duty for public authorities to keep on monitoring market players so that, first,
they comply with data protection rules and, second, they act in the framework of completely fair
market conditions.
6. One of the goals of this paper is to demonstrate that competition law could play a bigger
role in the protection of web users’ and consumers’ personal data. Indeed, according to what has
been  pointed  out  in  the  previous  paragraph,  it  may seem evident  that  market  players  and  fair
functioning of market dynamics are of an utmost importance even for digital economy based on the
continuous flow of personal data.  This is  all  the more clear for the two observations described
below. 
Firstly, one of the main targets of competition law is consumers’ protection (that, as already
underlined,  has  also  been upgraded to a  fundamental  right  by the CFR)132 and pursuant  to  the
definition given by EU law to a  consumer,  this  is  «any natural  person who [...]  is  acting for
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession»133. This essentially means that any
consumer is, at the same time, an individual benefitting from inviolable rights, who could also be a
web  user  and  a  consumer  in  his  digital  economic  transactions,  although  such  transactions  are
characterised by the mere exchange of personal data for services which are only apparently free of
charge.  At  any rate,  the  said  exchange  has  a  considerable  economic  significance  that  is  often
imperceptible  to  the  user134 and  this  is  also  the  reason why data  holds  quite  an  immeasurable
competitive value to the market for the market players using it135. 
Secondly, another goal of competition law is to monitor market dynamics in order to create
fair and competitive conditions for any undertaking, which means that at the end of any economic
process,  consumers can profit  from better  economic conditions.  The abovementioned targets  of
competition  law  are  equally  applicable  to  the  digital  market  where  real  firms  operate  in  an
electronic context to make profits and increase their turnovers. 
As  mentioned  before,  digital  market  is  more  and  more  characterised  by  the  huge
phenomenon of data collection. Suffice to remind the case of two-sided or multi-sided markets136 or
of search engines,  which let  suppliers and consumers  keep in touch more easily and make the
131 As stated by the European Commission in its Communication of 2014, Towards a thriving data-driven economy, 
SWD(2014) 214 final (see 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0442&from=FR). 
132 F. COSTA CABRAL, The Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Discretion of
the European Commission in Enforcing Competition Law, in Maastricht Journal, 2016, pp. 495-513; A. BARENGHI,
Diritto dei consumatori, Milan, 2017, pp. 3 ff.
133 Article 2, paragraph 1, letter b), directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 
1993, L 95, pp. 29-34 (see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:31993L0013&qid=1543829645563&from=EN).
134 According to a recent survey, personal data is given a very insignificant economic value by its “owners”, in spite of 
the greater monetary value it has for third parties collecting and combining it. That research has been carried out by the 
Financial Times and its results have been later published on Sole24Ore on 14 June 2013, in the article Big data: tre 
profili a confronto sul valore dei dati personali (see http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/tecnologie/2013-06-14/data-profili- 
confronto-012622.shtml?uuid=AbTdmq4H).
135 A. MANTELERO,  Competitive  value  of  data  protection:  the  impact  of  data  protection  regulation  on  online
behaviour, in International Data Privacy Law, 2013, pp. 229-238.
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supply and demand process quicker, at the same time collecting great amounts of personal data both
from suppliers and from consumers. Digital platforms – like search engines or digital markets – are
usually owned and managed by big digital companies and, in view of the number of users they
attract and of their reputation, such companies may have questionable positions on the EU market
(that is hereby mainly object of analysis) in the light of competition law. In the recent past, this
branch of law – which in the US is more known as antitrust law137 – has however served to detect
potential infringements on the digital market by big digital companies such as, inter alia, Google,
Facebook,  Microsoft  or  Yahoo!.  In  fact,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  these  giant  multinational
companies gained important market shares all over the world thanks to the permanent growth of
their users. 
But  alongside  with  the  increase  of  the  number  of  users,  there  has  also  been  a  bigger
availability of personal data that allowed these companies holding a greater competitive value than
less notorious or smaller companies. 
As  a  consequence,  in  the  last  years,  antitrust  authorities  have  shed  a  light  on  potential
antitrust conducts and, not surprisingly, investigations involved the same undertakings even in the
different legal systems of the EU and of the USA138. Most of these investigations concerned merger
cases139, where the European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission were asked to
136 G. LUCCHETTA, Is the Google Platform a two-sided market?, retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2048683.
Moreover, it is important to stress that this kind of digital platforms increase their incomes and activities day-by-day
only thanks to the so-called positive «feedback loop» created by their users, when they use the service of the platforms
and they give a public positive feedback about the supply they received. On “feedback loops”, see also N.P. SCHEPP,
A. WAMBACH, On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power Assessment,  in  Journal of European Competition
Law & Practice, 2016, pp. 121 ff.
137 It is however to be reminded that scholars strongly recognise the origins of EU competition law in US antitrust law,
which supplied the basic models to identify illegitimate conducts on the market by undertakings, such as non-allowed 
cartels or abuses of dominant position on the market, as well as problematic mergers between companies. See 
J. KLEIN, P. M. RAO, Competition and consumer protection in the cyberspace marketplace, in 20th ITS Biennal 
conference: The Net and the Internet – Emerging Markets and Policies, Rio de Janeiro, 2014,  pp. 4 ff.
138 It  is hereby convenient to only mention some of the cases opened by the EU and the US antitrust authorities
(respectively,  the European Commission and the Federal Trade Commission). For the EU, see  case COMP/M.5727
Microsoft  /  Yahoo!  Search  Business  (see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
qid=1543829834283&uri=CELEX:32010M5727),  case  COMP/M.7217,  Facebook  /Whatsapp  (see  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1543829865420&uri=CELEX:32014M7217),  case  COMP/M.6281,
Microsoft/Skype  (see  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
qid=1543829888874&uri=CELEX:32011M6281),  case COMP/M.4731,  Google/DoubleClick (only  available  in
summary – see  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC0722(03)&from=EN). For
the  US,  see  FTC  file  no.  071/0170,  case  GoogleDoubleClick  (see  
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-commstmt.pdf), for the merger
Facebook/WhatsApp, see FTC Notifies Facebook, WhatsApp of Privacy Obligations in Light of Proposed Acquisition,
10  April  2014  (see  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-notifies-facebook-whatsapp-privacy-
obligations-light-proposed), and EPIC press release of 25 August 2016,  Facebook to Collect WhatsApp User Data,
Violating FTC Order and Privacy Promises (see https://epic.org/2016/08/facebook-to-collect-whatsapp-u.html).
139 Other sensitive issues may concern illegitimate agreements between undertakings or abuses of dominant position
on the market, which are respectively regulated by articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU” – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016E/TXT&from=EN). Article
101 sets out that «1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between
undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of  undertakings  and  concerted  practices  which  may  affect  trade  between
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previously verify the feasibility of such mergers in view of their compliance with antitrust law.
Nevertheless,  in  none of  these cases  antitrust  authorities  deemed necessary to  stop mergers  by
reason of the market shares held by the buyer and by the purchased company. At any rate, the
European Commission has recently levied Facebook with a 110 euro million fine for not having
provided  complete  and  correct  information  during  the  investigation  phase  since  2014.  This
information concerned the fact that Facebook was already able to automatedly match Facebook and
WhatsApp users’ accounts in 2014, but it declared the opposite to the European Commission when
submitting its request for verification140. This did not have any impact on the decision allowing their
merger,  but  the  fine  was  however  imposed  because  of  the  incompleteness  of  the  information
provided.
 Although antitrust cases in the EU and in the US did not directly concern the protection or
the availability of personal data by these undertakings, the investigations carried out are able to
confirm that more and more interest is growing around such digital companies141, because greater
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the internal market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; c) share markets or
sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which,  by their nature or according to commercial  usage,  have no connection with the
subject of such contracts. 2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically
void. 3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: - any agreement or
category of agreements between undertakings, - any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, -
any  concerted  practice  or  category  of  concerted  practices,  which  contributes  to  improving  the  production  or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting  benefit,  and  which  does  not:  (a)  impose  on  the  undertakings  concerned  restrictions  which  are  not
indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  these  objectives;  (b)  afford  such  undertakings  the  possibility  of  eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question». Article 102 TFEU reads as follows:  «Any
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall
be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such
abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading  conditions;  (b)  limiting  production,  markets  or  technical  development  to  the  prejudice  of  consumers;  (c)
applying  dissimilar  conditions  to  equivalent  transactions  with  other  trading  parties,  thereby  placing  them  at  a
competitive  disadvantage;  (d)  making  the  conclusion  of  contracts  subject  to  acceptance  by  the  other  parties  of
supplementary obligations which,  by their nature or according to commercial  usage,  have no connection with the
subject of such contracts». For a detailed study on this articles, see J. F. BELLIS, I. VAN BAEL, Il Diritto Comunitario
della Concorrenza, Turin, 2009;  B. CORTESE, F. FERRARO, P. MANZINI, Il Diritto antitrust dell’Unione europea,
Turin, 2014; B. CORTESE (ed.), EU Competition Law. Between Public and Private Enforcement, Amsterdam, 2013; F.
GHEZZI, G. OLIVIERI, Diritto Antitrust, Turin, 2013.
140 See  European  Commission  press  release  of  18  May  2017  (see  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1369_en.htm).
141 On 19 December 2017, the German competition authority issued to Facebook its preliminary assessment on an
alleged abuse of dominant position in the market sector of services provided by social networks and especially through
infringements of data protection law, because the company collects data from users that surf third-party websites or
apps thanks to an embedded application programming interface that is the so-called “Like-Button”. Moreover, users are
not aware of this huge collection of data and this is why the authority believes that they had not properly consented to
the  collection  of  their  data  (see  the  complete  press  release  at
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_12_2017_Facebook.html).
Besides,  for  instance,  on 30 August  2018,  Bloomberg  announced that  Google  would have  set  an  agreement  with
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concerns have been raised by the applicability of the EU GDPR in view of the extraterritoriality
principle pointed out above. This regulation paves the way for a greater protection of personal data
of users, consumers and individuals in general, that needs to be complied with also by these digital
multinational holdings, usually been established under US law. However, despite being normally
based  in  the  United  States,  they  are  also  used  to  setup  subsidiaries  in  Europe  for  their  own
businesses. Notwithstanding this, the GDPR equally applies to them insofar as they have the said
subsidiaries in the EU and they collect and process Europeans’ personal information. Besides, the
GDPR  sets  out  detailed  provisions  for  transborder  data  flows  and  for  a  better  data  subjects’
protection. Yet, much has still to be done in terms of monitoring the implementation of the GDPR
for EU public authorities, but also in terms of real compliance with it when it comes to controllers’
and processors’ duties. 
Nonetheless,  when  considering  the  context  of  the  –  especially  EU –  digital  market,  as
outlined  in  this  paragraph,  according to  a  vast  majority  of  scholars  and to  the  European  Data
Protection Supervisor, competition law could serve as another useful legal instrument to prevent
companies from behaving in an illegitimate manner from the point of view of data protection law142.
7. As outlined in the previous paragraphs, it can be stated that the rights to privacy and to
data protection are closely connected to the right to human dignity. 
This may be confirmed by the fact that the assignment (even for free) of one’s personal data
implies the exercise of one’s self-determination in order to protect one’s own intimacy and identity.
Self-determination is a clear expression of human dignity, i.e. the need for the individual to have the
full control of what he wants others to know about him. Once the individual founds himself limited
in exercising his right to  his  informational  self-determination,  his  consent  to the collection and
processing of his personal data may not be totally consciously given and his rights both to data
protection and, accordingly, to human dignity, may turn out to be infringed. 
Nevertheless, within the European Union, any of the said rights is currently protected as
being fundamental and inviolable by virtue of the Charter of fundamental rights. This would mean
Mastercard, in order to verify if its users paying with the Mastercard system would have bought products or services
that  Google  itself  advertises  to  them,  by  analysing  their  credit  card  payment  data  released  by  Mastercard.  (M.
BERGEN, J. SURANE, Google and Mastercard Cut a Secret Ad Deal to Track Retail Sales, 31 August 2018 – available
at  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/google-and-mastercard-cut-a-secret-ad-deal-to-track-retail-
sales).
142 F. COSTA CABRAL, The Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Discretion of
the European Commission in Enforcing Competition Law, cit.; F. COSTA CABRAL, O. LYNSKEY, Family Ties: The
Intersection between Data Protection and Competition in EU Law, cit.; F. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, Behavioural
Sciences and the Regulation of Privacy on the Internet, in A. ALEMANNO, A. SIBONI (eds.),  Nudge and the Law,
London,  2015,  pp. 179-207;  N.  P. SCHEPP,  A. WAMBACH,  On  Big  Data  and  Its  Relevance  for  Market  Power
Assessment, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, pp. 120-124; P. R. PRABHAKER, Who owns
the online consumer?, in  Journal of Consumer Marketing,  2000, pp. 158-171; R. PODSZUN,  The Digital Economy.
Three Chances for Competition Law, in Maastricht Journal, 2016, pp. 747-751; W. KERBER, Digital Markets, Data,
and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law, and Data Protection, retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2770479;
J. KLEIN,  P.M. RAO,  Competition  and  consumer  protection  in  the  cyberspace  marketplace,  cit.  See  also  EDPS,
Preliminary opinion on  Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay between data protection,
competition  law  and  consumer  protection  in  the  Digital  Economy,  March  2014  (see
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf).
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that,  in  principle,  no  other  lower  right  or  economic  interest  may overcome  them.  In  practice,
however, this does not always occur and both chronicle cases143 and scholarly concerns demonstrate
that  personal  data  breaches  are  increasing,  rather  than  being  kept  under  control.  This  mostly
happens because of the huge economic interests disguising behind the use of the web, which are
even more fuelled by the flow and the availability of personal data allowing companies to have
higher  turnovers  thanks  to  customised  and  targeted  advertising  activities,  which  let  them save
money that would otherwise be invested on market researches. 
In  view of the foregoing,  not  only are  data  protection laws important  to  safeguard data
subject’s moral integrity and dignity, but also competition law could come to the aid of consumers –
who at the same time are individuals and data subjects – by ensuring that big companies do not
make  an  illegitimate  use  of  the  massive  amount  of  data  they  hold  or  of  their  market  power,
consequent to the availability of such data. 
This paper focussed on a condensed comparative scrutiny between the European Union and
the United States  of  America in terms of  safeguard of dignity,  protection of personal  data  and
implementation of competition law in the digital market, by giving few hints on the issues arisen
from the processing of personal data by US holding companies that should fall under the scope of
the EU GDPR. The said processing raises concerns above all for EU citizens insofar as they feel
being  less  protected  under  US  data  protection  laws.  And  such  a  feeling  might  have  been
consolidated by some scholarly beliefs, based on the traditional theory of the supremacy of the EU
over the US in the protection of fundamental rights. 
Although it would be difficult to assess which one of the two legal systems would be better
in  this  respect  for  the  reasons outlined  in  the  fourth  paragraph,  Baer’s  theory of  the  so-called
«constitutional  triangle»  could  be  adopted  in  order  to  accept  that  different  legal  systems  may
recognise  more  importance  to  dignity  and  to  the  bundle  of  human  rights  connected  thereto,
alternatively to liberty and to the associated economic freedoms. Nevertheless, the greater relevance
given to dignity or to liberty does not exclude the other from the triangle (together with equality),
thus  the  two sets  of  values  cannot  be  excluded  one  with  another  and  must  receive  at  least  a
minimum level of protection. This could be a reasonable explanation for different warranty levels in
the EU and in the US. As a matter of fact, it cannot be said that the US do not protect human rights
as the birth of the fundamental rights concerned in this paper are proved to be occurred thanks to
American  case-law and  doctrine.  Since  EU competition  law as  well  imitates  the  previous  US
antitrust model, the European Union may be said to have developed US legal traditions into more
vigilant models. In an era where internet technologies are of everyday common use for professional
or personal reasons and allow the entertainment of transnational relationships, in order to cope with
personal  data  breaches,  a  wider  multilateral  approach  would  be  preferred,  both  under  data
protection and competition laws. However, since it would not be easy to synchronise the activities
143 See, for instance, the recent datagate involving Facebook and a professor from Cambridge University, which let
Cambridge Analytica have direct access to millions of Facebook users’ personal data, so that the data mining company
could combine and analyse data, in order to build political profiles of users around the world and try to persuade them
in the exercise of their voting rights. See some of the many articles released on The Guardian and the New York Times
at  https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election;
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/26/the-cambridge-analytica-files-the-story-so-far;
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.
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of EU and US privacy and antitrust enforcement authorities, because of considerable differences in
their regulatory frameworks, much could be done by the same multinational companies, even by
adopting – for instance – codes of conduct that would also increase their commercial reputation
among consumers, by which they could grant adequate standards of protection for their consumers’
personal data. In addition, they could also offer services and products designed in consideration of
the most recent developments in privacy by design and privacy by default  progresses, to make
consumers  feel  more  at  ease  with  the  technologies  they  use.  Conversely,  in  the  absence  of  a
voluntary adaptation and compliance of at least the biggest firms, the European Union would reveal
an added value when compared to the US legal system, by reason of its legal structure. As a matter
of fact, at least the advantage of having harmonised data protection and competition laws for all
Member States, as well as national and central enforcement separate authorities both for privacy
and  competition  matters  grants,  it  a  more  efficient  approach  in  the  protection  of  dignity  and
fundamental rights. 
Outside its boundaries, the protection of EU citizens’ dignity and data protection could be
ensured thanks to the innovations brought by the GDPR, such as the extraterritoriality principle and
the circumstance that, having recognised more rights relating to personal data, data subjects would
be more aware of the risks to be avoided and of the remedies suitable to be employed for protecting
their inviolable rights. 
As the GDPR is applicable since a few months, scholars and case-law will be able to analyse
its practical developments in the future and some precautions could still potentially be embedded in
the proposal for the e-Privacy regulation, which is now under the scrutiny of the EU legislator. 
FIORELLA DAL MONTE
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Taxation and Big data: an analysis of the proposal for a Council
Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues
resulting from the provision of certain digital services
(Proposal of the European Commission COM (2018) 148 final dated
March 21, 2018)
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The digital economy and its main tax implication. – 3. The tax
policy  context.  –  4.  The  Proposal  of  the  European  Commission.  –  5.  Some  conclusive
considerations.
1. According to one of its possible definition144, big data are a «high – volume, high velocity
and  /  or  high  variety  information  assets  that  demand  cost  –  effective  innovative  forms  of
information processing for enhanced insight, decision making and process optimization». 
Taking into account the link existing between big data and taxation, two main aspects are worth
mentioning. On one hand, big data could represent a strategic asset for tax administrations, who are
indeed data rich organizations. The data available to the fiscal authorities are traditionally those
filed by the taxpayers themselves (through, for example, the tax returns) or, as an alternative, those
collected directly by the tax authorities during their tax audits. In the current context, also thanks to
the  automated  streams  of  information  exchanged  under  initiative  such  as  the  Country  –  by  –
Country reporting, the tax authorities have at their disposal additional data, which, together with the
traditional ones, are becoming big and thus representing an additional real – time set of information
potentially enabling tax authorities to be more effective. The condition for the exploitation of such a
potential key asset is the availability for tax administrations of big data processing technologies and
the achievement of a high level of digital maturity145. 
On the other hand, the exploitation of big data represents one of the key features of the
businesses active in the so called digital economy, about which the majority of the stakeholders take
the view that the current international tax system is not able to properly capture the value created
and, as a consequence, to tax it. In a nutshell, there is a quite common perception that some income
produced  by  the  digital  economy  is  somehow  «stateless»146.  On  such  stateless  income  many
jurisdictions would like to expand their taxing rights; the result is a very intense on – going debate,
which is polarizing the interest of the international tax community.
Taking  into  consideration  this  second  aspect  of  the  big  data,  the  paper  focuses  on  the
European Commission’s directive proposal for the introduction of an  interim digital  service tax
within the European Union147 (hereinafter referred to as the “Proposal”), with the hope to give a
144 See https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data.
145 For an in – depth analysis of such an aspect, see OECD, Technologies for better tax administration. A practical 
guide for revenue bodies, Paris, 2016.
146 OECD / G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, Addressing the tax challenges of the Digital Economy 
– Action 1: 2015 Final Report, Paris, 2015, p. 12.
147 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Council directive on the common system of a digital services tax on 
revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services (COM (2018) 148 final of 21.03.2018), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
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contribution to the discussions that will take place next October within the first seminar organized
by  the  University  of  Milan  and  entitled  to  «Big  data  and  Law:  new  challenges  beyond  data
protection». 
At this aim, paragraph 2 of the paper gives an overview of the main characteristics of the
digital  economy – focusing in  particular  on the  importance of  big  data  – and the possible  tax
implications thereof. While these issues deserve an in – depth ad hoc study that is beyond the scope
of the present paper, the analysis will limited to that preliminary considerations that are deemed
necessary for a better understanding of the following parts. Paragraph 3 describes the current state
of the debate, which is now on-going at the international, regional and national level, in order to
make a complete reconstruction of the background behind the Proposal. A critical reading of the
proposed directive is included in paragraph 4, with the intention of highlighting its significance and
detecting possible areas of improvement. In this respect, it appears important to warn as from now
the reader that all the available scholars’ comments on the Proposal are quite negative148. In any
case, the proposed directive appears to be of interest, since it represents the first tentative coming
from a regional organization to introduce an unilateral interim tax measure to face the challenges
posed by the digital economy. Some conclusive remarks are finally articulated in Paragraph 5.
2. As of today, there is no shared definition of digital economy; however, such a lack is quite
understandable. On one hand, the digitalization represents indeed an extensive phenomenon, which
encompasses all the businesses, with the consequence that «the digital  economy is increasingly
becoming  the  economy  itself»149.  In  light  of  this  aspect,  scholarship  has  articulated  the  view
according to which the term «digitalization of the economy» instead of «digital economy» would
better apply to the current scenario. On the other hand, any tentative definition of the phenomenon
under analysis is probably destined to become outdated in a short time, given the rapid development
characterizing the digital economy. Having said that, the term «digital economy» is conventionally
used in the context of this  paper as a collective name making reference to a range of different
activities, all of which have the following four salient characteristics in common150. 
148 J. BECKER, J. ENGLISH, EU Digital Services Tax: a populist and flawed proposal, in Kluwer International Tax Blog
(March 2018), available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/03/16/eu-digital-services-tax-populist-flawed-proposal/; CFE
FISCAL COMMITTEE,  Opinion Statement FC 1/2018 on the European Commission Proposal of 21 March 2018 for a
Council directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain
digital services, in European Taxation, 2018, p. 371; A. M. JIMÈNEZ, BEPS, the Digital(ized) Economy and the Taxation
of  Services  and Royalties,  in  Intertax,  2018, p.  635;  L.A.  SHEPPARD,  Digital  permanent establishment  and digital
equalization taxes, in Bull. Intl. Taxn., 2018; D. STEVANATO, “Digital Tax” all’europea: una creatura deforme (March
2018),  available  at  https://www.leoniblog.it/2018/03/23/digital-tax-alleuropea-creatura-deforme-dario-stevanato/;  A.
TURRINA,  Which “Source Taxation” for the Digital Economy?, in  Intertax, 2018, p. 495;  F. VAN HORZEN – A. VAN
ESDONK, Proposed 3% Digital Services Tax, in International Transfer Pricing Journal, 2018, p. 267.
149 OECD, Action 1 Final Report (2015), supra n. 3, p. 11.
150 For the description provided in the present Paper, the position of the European Union has been mainly taken into
consideration since the Paper focuses on the EU Commission’s proposal and also because the position of the European
Union is quite aligned to that of the OECD. More specifically, the OEDC lists the following aspects as key features of
the digital economy: i) mobility with respect to intangibles, users and business functions, ii) reliance on «big data», iii)
network effects, iv) use of multi-sided business models, v) tendency toward monopoly or oligopoly and vi) volatility
due to low barriers to entry and rapidly evolving technology (see OECD,  Action 1 Final Report (2015),  supra n. 3, at
para. 4.3). In the more recent Interim Report published by the OECD, such aspects have been confirmed as key features
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i)  Limited  physical  presence  of  the  businesses  active  in  the  digital  economy,  as  a
consequence  of  the  decreased  need  for  local  personnel  to  perform business  functions  and  the
corresponding increased ability to conduct the business activity remotely (so – called «scale without
mass» phenomenon). In other words, digital undertakings are able to manage their global operations
on an integrated basis from a jurisdiction, which may differ from that / those jurisdictions in which
the operations are carried out and the suppliers and customers are located. 
ii) The importance of intangible assets which are crucial contributors of value for digitalized
businesses. In this respect, it is worth underlining that the aforementioned feature of «mobility»
applies also to the intangible assets on which the digital companies rely on, since the function of
managing  intangible  assets  can  be  assigned  and  transferred  from  one  location  to  another
(particularly within the same multinational group), with important consequences on where business’
profits are subject to tax. 
iii) Tendency toward monopoly or oligopoly, especially in case of immature markets where
the company acting as first actor is usually able to achieve a dominant position in a very short time;
iv) Reliance on big data which are available to digital business thanks to the user participation. Data
has always played an important role for businesses – also the traditional ones –; what characterizes
the digital economy is the fact that data represent a component of the value creation process of such
a relevance as never before: the use, collection and analysis of data is becoming an integral part of
the digitalized business models. In order to better understand such consideration, it is important to
further analyse the process – consisting of several phases – through which data become value. First
of all, data have to be generated thanks to online activities performed by the digital services users;
such data are stored and collected and, after a relatively short period of time, become big data,
because of their increasing volumes. Big data are than processed, interpreted and analyzed: such
step is essential in order to make the collected big data valuable; only through such analysis indeed,
big data become readable and, as such, valuable. 
According to  a  persuasive  reconstructive  study made  by the  OECD151 –  and taken  into
consideration also by the European Commission for the Proposal – , the involvement of the users in
the phase of data origination characterizes all the business models of the digital economy. The level
of such an involvement can instead vary from one business model to another. On one hand, the user
participation  is  qualified as  passive in  all  those cases  in  which the user  does  not  perform any
activity different to those strictly necessary in order to enjoy the online services (e.g. downloading
an app, using a particular device or providing consent for user data to be collected). In all other
cases, the user participation is qualified as active, even if with different possible levels. The lower
level of user participation is required in case of recommendation mechanisms, involving activities
such as bookmarking, tagging and rating, as it is typical for platforms providing for digital contents
or IT solutions and e-commerce websites. An intermediary level of user participation characterizes
instead  activities  such  as  writing  comments  and  reviews  (e.g.  TripAdvisor)  and  taking  and
of the digital economy, even if partially combined with each other. The result is a final list which includes the following
aspects among the salient characteristics of the digital economy: i) cross – jurisdictional scale without mass, ii) reliance
upon intangible assets (including intellectual property rights) and iii) data and user participation (see OECD / G20 BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report, Paris, 2018, at
para 2.5).
151 OECD, Interim Report (2018), supra n. 8, at para 143 – 149.
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uploading photos and videos (e.g. Instagram and YouTube). The highest level of user participation
is needed in case of social network (e.g. Facebook), in relation to which the user is asked to add
friends and actively contribute to the creation of the community. 
Moreover, also the way through which value is created from big data can differ from one
digital  business  to  another:  several  companies  use  directly  the  customer  data  collected  for
improving their  own business operations while others monetize them by selling targeted online
advertisements or, in any case, by transferring the user data to third parties.
Since the international tax rules currently in place have been established in the Twenties
when the digital revolution was still far from happening, they disregard all the key features of the
digital economy mentioned above. In very basic term, under the current international tax system,
some sort of physical presence is required, being the permanent establishment the threshold for
allocating any taxing right on the business profits of a non – resident company152 to the market
jurisdiction. However, as noted above, the business models of the digital economy are characterized
by a  limited  physical  presence:  hence  the  major  tension  between  the  framework  of  reference
provided  by the  international  tax  regime  and  the  essential  features  of  digital  business  models
emerges. The result  is the perception of the existence of what the scholarship has defined as a
«(digital) international tax gap»153. 
3.  The debate on how to fill such digital international tax gap dates back at least to 2013,
when the OECD launched the 15 – point Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”).
As  part  of  such  Action  Plan,  the  OECD requested  for  public  comments  in  relation  to  the  tax
challenges raised by digitalization. With the aim to be proactive in response to the OECD initiative,
the  European  Commission  set  up  a  group  of  expert,  assigning  them  the  task  to  develop  a
comprehensive Union position on tax issues in the digital economy154. The outcome of the experts’
work was included in a report155,  according to  which,  among the others,  no special  tax regime
should be introduced for digital companies but any reform should have structured in general terms,
with  the  introduction  of  simple,  stable  and  predictable  tax  rules,  the  need  of  which  has  been
strengthened by the digitalization.
In these years, the European Commission kept on working on the challenges of the digital
economy, setting the creation of a Digital Single Market as one of its ten key priorities, with the aim
of making Europe as world leader in the digital economy156. Direct taxation was deemed by the
152 The threshold of the permanent establishment is met in case that the non – resident company operates through a
fixed place of business in a given jurisdiction or, as an alternative, through a dependent agent (the so called «agency
permanent establishment»). 
153 A. TURRINA, Which “Source Taxation” for the Digital Economy?, supra n. 6.
154 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Decision of 22.10.2013 setting up the Commission Expert  Group on Taxation of the
Digital Economy (C (2013) 7082 final of 22.10.2013), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
155 COMMISSION EXPERT GROUP ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, Report, 28.05.2014, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/.
156 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Communication to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe  (COM (2015)
192 final  of 6.5.2015),  available at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.  According to the definition provided by the European
Commission, a «digital single market is one in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under conditions of
fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of
42
I.3
European Commission to be one of the topics to be addressed – even if, at this stage, not the most
important one – in order to make such a Digital Single Market concrete. 
After  2  year  –  long work,  the OECD issued in  October  2015 a final  report  (Action 1)
acknowledging that the digital economy exacerbates BEPS risks, as well as poses some challenges
for  the  international  taxation.  The result  was  the  adoption  by the  OECD of  a  «wait  and  see»
approach,  the main reason of which was the expectation that  the anti  – BEPS effects  of other
measures implemented within the BEPS project would have had a substantial impact not only on
the BEPS issues, but also on the broader tax challenges posed by the digital economy.
As of today, such a position seems to be unviable: starting from 2017, the debate on digital
economy has indeed further intensified both at international, EU and national level, suggesting that
there is a quite common political pressure to act quickly. Without pretending to be exhaustive and
starting  from  the  international  level,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  the  G20  Finance  Ministers
requested the OECD to deliver a follow-up of Action 1. Hence, in September 2017, the OECD
opened a public consultation, the outcome of which was an Interim report issued in March 2018157.
In this occasion, the OECD takes a step forward if compared with the position expressed in BEPS
Action 1: it  acknowledges indeed that the tax challenges of the digital economy go beyond the
boundaries of the BEPS concerns and address the redefinition of the criteria for the allocation of
taxing rights on business profits among different jurisdictions. In this respect, the OECD states
further that a consensus – based solution is needed for facing the challenges of the digital economy,
that such kind of solution is not yet achievable since there are divergent views on how the issue
should  be  approached  and  that,  as  a  consequence,  further  work  is  needed,  with  the  goal  of
producing an update in 2019 and a final report in 2020158.
In this context, some countries have either adopted or announced the adoption of unilateral
measures for the taxation of the digital activities: some examples are given by the so called diverted
profit tax introduced by the United Kingdom, the equalization levy which applies in India and the
web tax proposed by the Italian Government159. 
residence».
157 OECD, Interim Report (2018), supra n. 8.
158 Just  to  mention  the  initiatives  taken  at  the  United  Nations Level,  the  Committee  of  Experts  on international
cooperation in tax matters has issued a report entitled to the «Tax Challenges in the Digitalized Economy», with the aim
to take a proactive approach in the on - going debate on the solution required for tackling the challenges of the digital
economy,  with particular  attention to  the needs  of  the developing countries  (see  UN COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS, Tax challenges in the digitalized economy. Selected issues for possible
Committee Consideration, 17 – 20.10.2017, available at www.un.org). Further work is expected to be done at the UN
level. According to the recently released agenda of the next seventeenth session of the UN Committee of experts in
international cooperation in tax matters to be held next October in Geneva, the tax consequences of the digitalized
economy will  represent  one of  the  substantive  issues  to  be  discussed during the session (see UN  COMMITTEE OF
EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS, Provisional agenda and organization of work, 02.08.2018,
available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/events/event/seventeenth-session-tax.html).
159 Italy appears to be at the forefront of the on – going debate on the taxation of the digital companies. A short term
solution has been introduced by article 1, paras 1011–1019 of Law N. 205 of 27 December 2017 (Finance Bill 2018),
with a deferred planned application starting from 1 January 2019. The objective scope of the proposed tax should be
further specified by a decree issued by the Italian Ministry of Finance; such a decree – expected for April 2018 - has not
been published yet. It is likely that Italy decide to prevent the entry into force of the measure, preferring to wait for the
adoption of an interim tax at the European level.  In this respect, see  A. TOMASSINI,  L’incerta corsa alla tassazione
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At the intermediary regional level of the European Union, the importance of setting up a
Digital  Single Market has been remarked by the European Commission in May 2017160.  In the
following July, a discussion on the challenges of the taxation of profits of the digital economy was
launched within the Council of the European Union. On September 2017 in the contest of his State
of  the  Union speech,  the  President  of  the  European  Commission  sent  a  letter  of  intent  to  the
President of the European Parliament and the President of the European Council,  announcing a
legislative  proposal  establishing  rules  at  EU  level  allowing  taxation  of  profits  generated  by
multinationals through the digital economy161. The Finance Ministers of Germany, France, Spain
and Italy signed a joint political statement in support of EU law compatible and effective solutions
«based on the concept of establishing a so called equalization tax on the turnover generated in
Europe by the digital companies»162. At the informal ECOFIN meeting in Tallinn on 16 September
2017, six more member states expressed their interest and support to the approach suggested in the
aforementioned joint political statement. In its communication entitled to «A Fair and Efficient Tax
System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market» adopted on 21 September 2017163, the
Commission identified the challenges that  the digital  economy poses for existing tax rules and
committed to analyze the policy options available. Following the Digital Summit in Tallinn on 29
September 2017, the European Council adopted on 19 October 2017 conclusion that underlined the
«need for an effective and fair taxation system fit for the digital area»164. The ECOFIN Council
conclusions of 5 December 2017 invited the Commission to  adopt proposals responding to  the
challenges of taxing profits in the digital economy, highlighting the interest of many Member States
for temporary measures, such as for example an equalization levy based on revenues from digital
activities in the EU that would remain outside the scope of double tax conventions165.
dell’economia digitale, in Corriere Tributario, 2018, p. 169. Besides, Italy has introduced a procedure of cooperation
and enhanced collaboration that allows large multinational groups to discuss and examine jointly with the Italian tax
authorities whether they may be deemed to have a permanent establishment in Italy (see art. 1bis of Law Decree No. 50
of 4 April 2017, converted by Law No. 96 of 21 June 2017). According to the intention of the Italian legislator, such
measure is mainly targeted to companies active in the digital economy. For an in – depth analysis, see M. CERRATO, La
procedura di cooperazione e collaborazione rafforzata in materia di stabile organizzazione (c.d. web tax transitoria), in
Rivista di diritto tributario, 2017, p. 751. 
160 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid – Term Review on the implementation of the Digital
Single Market Strategy. A connected Digital Single Market for all  (COM (2017) 228 final of 10.05.2017), in http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/.
161 PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, State of the Union 2017. Letter of intent to President Antonio Tajani
and to Prime Minister Jüri Ratas, 13.09.2017, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/events/event/seventeenth-session-
tax.html.
162 FINANCE MINISTERS OF FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY AND SPAIN, Political Statement. Joint initiative on the taxation
of companies operating in the digital economy, 07.09.2017, available at www.mef.gov.it.
163 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. A fair and efficient tax
system in  the  European Union  for  the  digital  single  market (COM (2017)  547 final  of  21.09.2017),  available  at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
164 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, European Council meeting (19 October 2017) – Conclusions (EUCO 14/17 of 19.10.2017),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
165 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Outcome of the Council meeting. Economic and financial affairs (15305/17 of
5.12.2017), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
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4.  The Proposal under analysis is the answer given by the European Commission to the
aforementioned calls from several Member States of reacting quickly to the international tax gap: in
this respect, the proposed introduction of a digital indirect service tax represents indeed a short –
term solution, in order to face the current challenges of the digital economy. Alongside the Proposal,
the European Commission has issued another legislative proposal (outside the scope of the present
Paper) which constitutes the Commission’s preferred long – term solution since it aims to reform
corporate tax rules by introducing the concept of «significant digital presence»166. The distinction
between the long – term and the short – term solution lies in the fact that only the former requires an
amendment of the tax treaty framework currently in place (and, as a consequence, needs more time
to be effectively implemented)167.
The objective scope of the digital service tax is defined by article 3 of the Proposal, which
qualifies as taxable revenues those resulting from the following services:
i) The placing on a digital interface of advertising targeted at users of that interface as well
as the transmission of data collected about users and generated from users’ activities on digital
interfaces. The word «interface» is broadly interpreted by the Proposal (art. 2.3), in order to include
any software, website or application that can be accessed by a user – both individual or business
(art. 2.4 of the Proposal). By this way and making reference to the taxonomy included in the Impact
Assessment168, the proposed directive aims to tax all the fees resulting from those business models,
in which access to a service (e.g. social network or search engine) is granted to users for free and
personal  data  obtained  from  such  users  are  than  monetized  by  selling  targeted  advertisement
placements or by selling the data itself to others businesses (e.g. Google and Facebook). In those
cases  where  the  supplier  of  the  advertising  service  and  the  owner  of  the  digital  interface  are
different entities, only the former should be taxed, in order to prevent cases of double taxation (art.
3.3 of the Proposal). 
ii) The making available to users of a multi-sided digital interface which allows users to find
other users and to interact whit them, and which may also facilitate the provision of underlying
supplies of goods or services directly between users (art. 3.1 b) of the Proposal). With reference to
such kind of revenues, the Proposal aims to tax those fees paid by the users to access a platform,
where the users offer services or goods among themselves (e.g. Airbnb or Blablacar). The revenues
resulting from the supplies of goods and services made directly by the users connected thanks to the
digital  interface  do  not  fall  instead  within  the  definition  of  taxable  income  according  to  the
proposed Directive. 
As expressly provided for in article 3.4.a of the Proposal, fees paid by users for accessing
digital platforms which make available to them digital contents / IT solutions fall outside the scope
166 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a
significant digital presence (COM (2018) 147 final of 21.3.2018), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/. For an analysis,
see  R. PETRUZZI -  V. KOUKOULIOTI,  The European Commission’s Proposal on Corporate Taxation and Significant
Digital Presence: A Preliminary Assessment, in Eur. Taxn., 2018, p. 58. 
167 In this respect, see A. TURRINA, supra n. 6, p. 502.
168 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Commission staff working document. Impact Assessment accompanying the documents
“Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  laying  down  rules  relating  to  the  corporate  taxation  of  a  significant  digital
presence” and “Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting
from  the  provision  of  certain  digital  services” (SWD  (2018)  81  final/2  of  21.3.2018),  available  at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/, Box 1 at p. 15.
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of the Proposal (i.e. digital platforms providing media / content, gaming, electronic communication
and payment services, cloud computing services and other digital solutions / software; in order to
give some concrete examples, we can mention Netflix or Spotify). Further exemptions are provided
for financial trading and crowd funding (art. 3.4.b – c of the Proposal). Also revenues related to
distant sales model / e- commerce (Amazon) do not fall within the objective scope of the proposed
digital service tax (preamble 13 of the Proposal).
In light of the above, it appears clear that the European Commission has opted for a targeted
approach, selecting only some of the revenues resulting from the digital services. The reasoning of
the European Commission underlying such selection appears quite articulate, even if it is not so
clearly expressed in the Impact  Assessment.  Trying to build up all  the logical steps,  it  appears
correct to describe the reasoning of the European Commission as follows: the user participation
contributes significantly to the creation of value for the digital businesses; such value is created in
the user’s jurisdiction and should be taxed there, according to the common shared «value creation»
rationale which is a widely accepted principle pervading the whole BEPS project; however, under
the current international tax rules, no taxing right is recognized to the user’s jurisdiction because the
services are provided remotely by the digital businesses with no physical presence in the market
country  or,  in  any  case,  with  a  very  limited  physical  presence  not  meeting  the  permanent
establishment threshold; in order to provide for a «fair» taxation – «fairness» is a recurring key
word in the Proposal –, the best solution would be to implement a long term measure which would
however require a global consensus – based solution and (probably) a coordinated amendment of
the double tax treaties (and more time); but since there is a political imperative from some Member
States to react quickly, a short term measure to be implementable within a reasonable time span is
proposed, by selecting only those services «where the participation of a user in a digital activity
constitutes an essential input for the business carrying out  that  activity and which enable that
business  to  obtain  revenues  therefrom»169,  provided  that  they «are  responsible  for  the  greatest
difference between where profits are taxed and where value is created»170. In other words, «[t]he
interim solution is meant to be a good and simple interim proxy to deal with the most extreme cases
of mismatches between the location of taxation and value creation»171.
Taxpayers  for  the  purposes  of  the  digital  service  tax  are  all  those  legal  entities172 –
irrespective of their tax residence –, which meet both of the following thresholds in a given year: i)
a worldwide turnover exceeding Euro 750 million and ii) an amount of revenues subject to the
digital  service  tax  obtained  within  the  European  Union  above  Euro  50  million  (art.  4  of  the
Proposal). 
The first threshold (based on the total annual worldwide revenues) aims mainly to limit the
application of the tax to companies of a certain scale,  assuming that,  as noted above173,  digital
economy  is  characterized  by  big  players  taking  the  most  advantage  from  the  current  digital
169 In this respect, see considerations made in paragraph 2 above.
170 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Explanatory memorandum of the Proposal, supra n. 4, at para. 5.
171 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Impact  Assessment,  supra n.  26,  at  para.  9.3.2,  where  further  considerations of  the
European Commission are available. 
172 Meaning any legal person or legal arrangement that carries on business through either a company or a structure
transparent for tax purposes (art. 2.1 of the Proposal).
173 In this respect, see considerations made in paragraph 2 above.
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international tax gap174. In this respect, the choice of the European Commission to set the same
threshold as that provided for the country – by – country reporting175 and for the common corporate
tax base176 appears positive, since it contributes to set up a coherent and easy framework in which
market operators are required to take always the same threshold as reference for the applicability of
a given tax regime / requirement. The second threshold aims instead, according to the European
Commission’s intentions177, to limit the application of the digital service tax to those cases where
there is a significant digital footprint at Union Level in relation to the revenues covered by the
digital service tax.
The applicability of the digital service tax is extended by the Commission to both EU and
non – EU entities, in order to make it compatible with the European Union law as well as with the
International Trade Law. More specifically, with reference to the European Union primary law, the
freedom to provide services (article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”)) implies the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, as well as the
abolition of any restriction which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive in concrete
the activities of a foreign service provider178. At the international level, an analogous constraint is
provided by article XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which prohibits a less
favorable treatment of foreign service providers compared to the domestic one179. 
In this respect, some authors180 have taken the view that the proposed digital service tax
would  in  concrete  address  mainly  non  –  EU  (US)  digital  companies,  determining  a  de  facto
discrimination for the foreign service providers. Such a conclusion seems to be confirmed by the
data provided by the European Commission itself181, according to which only a 7,2% share of the
EU digital companies will meet both the thresholds set up by the European Commission.  
Moreover, in a broader perspective, such an extension of the subjective scope of the digital
service tax does not appear coeherent with the ultimate rationale of the tax under analysis, i.e. to tax
fairly those entities who are non – resident within the European Union but create value there thanks
to  the  European  Union’s  users.  In  other  words,  because  of  the  aforementioned  comprehensive
approach, the Proposal seems to go beyond its purposes, providing for the introduction of a new
indirect tax also to entities which are assumed to be already fairly taxed, i.e. Member States tax
resident entities, as well non – EU entities operating with a permanent establishment within the
174 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Explanatory memorandum, supra n. 4, p. 10. 
175 EUROPEAN COUNCIL,  Directive  EU  2016/881  of  25  may  2016  amending  Directive  2011/16/EU  as  regards
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
176 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a council directive on a common corporate tax base (COM (2016) 685 final
of 25.10.2016), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
177 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Explanatory memorandum, supra n. 4, p. 10.
178 CJEU, Judgment of 22 October 2014, Blanco and Fabretti, joined cases C-344/13 and C-367/13, EU:C:2014:2311, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/.
179 For an in – depth analysis (also with reference to the doubts of compatibility with the EU State aid law and VAT 
law), see N. BAMMENS, Y. BRAUNER, V. CHAND, R.J. DANON, L. DE BROE, P. PISTONE, L. SPINOSA AND A. TURRINA, 
Request for input on work regarding the tax challenges of the digitalized economy (October 2017), available at 
http://www.unil.ch/taxpolicy/. 
180 J. BECKER, J. ENGLISH, EU Digital Services Tax: a populist and flawed proposal, supra n. 6; A. M. Jimènez, BEPS,
the Digital(ized) Economy and the Taxation of Services and Royalties, supra n. 6; L.A. SHEPPARD, Digital permanent 
establishment and digital equalization taxes, supra n. 6, p. 2.
181 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Explanatory memorandum, supra n. 4, p. 68.
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European Union.  This  would  lead  to  a  situation  of  double  taxation,  about  which  the  Proposal
provides only for a deductibility of the digital service tax from the corporate tax basis182. 
As far as the place of taxation is concerned, those revenues deemed as taxable according to
article  3  of  the  Proposal  shall  be  treated  as  obtained  in  a  member  state  if  the  user  of  the
corresponding digital service is located in that Member State. In other word, the users create the
connection between the taxpayer and the European Union. More in detail:
i) With reference to the placing on a digital interface of targeted advertising, the user shall be
deemed to be located in a member state if the advertising in question appears on the user’s device
when the device is being used in that member state (article 5.2.a). In case of transmission of data
collected  about  users  and  generated  from  users’ activities  on  digital  interfaces,  the  territorial
condition is met if the data transmitted are those generated from the user while using a device in
that member state (article 5.2,c).
ii) With reference to the multi – sided digital interfaces instead, a distinction is made if there
is an underlying supply of services or goods between the users of the platform. If this is the case,
the territorial requisite is met if the user uses a device in that Member State to access the digital
interface and conclude the underlying transaction. Otherwise, the user shall be deemed to be located
in a member state only if he has an account opened using a device in that Member State (article
5.2.b). 
In this respect, the Proposal further clarifies that the Member state where a user’s device is
used shall be determined by reference to the Internet Protocol address of the device (art. 5.5 of the
Proposal). 
The provisions related to the place of taxation are probably the most interesting ones since
their wording, as well as their structures appear totally new for the current tax system. Somehow
such  provisions  disclose  more  than  the  others  the  European  Commission’s  tentative  (and  the
corresponding difficulty) to find adequate measures to fill the currently existing international tax
gap.
The combined presence of the three aforementioned elements (i.e. taxable revenues obtained
by a taxable person in a Member State) would make the proposed digital service tax applicable.  
Moreover, from a practical point of view, this means that, in case that a digital business has (as it is
quite likely to be) both EU and non – EU users, the share of revenues related to users non located
within the European Union (and thus not covered by the digital service tax) should be firstly split
from the total taxable revenues and then the remaining share of revenues should be apportioned
within the Member States according to the several allocation keys laid down in article 5.3 of the
Proposal for each type of taxable service. In case of businesses with users active only within the
European Union, only the aforementioned second step should be implemented, in order to define
the  proportion  of  taxable  revenues  obtained  in  each  Member  State.  Finally,  in  case  of  a  pure
domestic situation in which all the users of a digital business are located in the same member state,
all the relevant revenues should be taxed there. Once determined the share of taxable revenues of
each Member State in a given tax year, the digital service tax due in that member state shall be
calculated applying the single rate of 3%.
182 See Recital 27 of the Proposal, which in any case represents only a recommendation to the Member States and not 
an obligation. 
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As far  as  the administrative aspects are  concerned,  a  One – Stop – Shop simplification
mechanism is provided by the Proposal: digital businesses can enjoy a single contact point, through
which they can identify themselves for the purposes of the digital service tax, submit the relevant
return and provide for the corresponding payments. A system of administrative cooperation should
than allow the exchange of information as well as the transfer of the relevant payments between the
member state of identification and the others where digital  service tax is due (chapter 4 of the
Proposal):  by this  way,  a  new requirement  for  administrative  cooperation  has  been  introduced
within the current EU framework183. About such collection system, many doubts arise since it would
probably share the same problem of the VAT one – stop – shop.
5. Being at the end of our critical reading of the Proposal, it seems appropriate to go back to
the first line of the proposed directive, according to which its legal basis is article 113 of TFEU
stating  that  the  European  Union  is  admitted  to  adopt  «provisions  for  the  harmonisation  of
legislation concerning turnover taxes,  excise duties and other  forms of  indirect  taxation to  the
extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the
internal market and to avoid distortion of competition». This means that, in order to recognize the
competence of the European Union with reference to the Proposal, two conditions should be met.
First  of  all,  the  digital  service  tax  should  be  qualified  as  an  indirect  tax  –  as  the  European
Commission does184. Moreover, the Proposal should be a necessary measure in order to eliminate, as
far as possible, factors that may distort conditions of competition or hinder the free movement of
goods and services, whether at the national or community level. Moreover, a special legislative
procedure should be followed, which requires unanimity of all the Member States for the adoption
of the Proposal. As of today, such unanimity appears quite difficult to be reached, also in light of the
fact that the EU finance ministers were strongly divided upon the first discussion of the Proposal 185.
One  could  argue  if,  in  case  of  absence  of  unanimity,  the  Member  States  in  favor  of  the
Commission’s proposal (as Italy would be) could decide to introduce the interim measure by means
of enhanced cooperation; however, also this root does not appear feasible since such a cooperation
shall  in  any case not  imply an undermining of  the  internal  market,  a  barrier  to  trade  between
Member States, a distortion of the competition or a violation of the sovereignty of the other member
states (see articles 326 – 327 of the TFEU). The result is that the adoption of the Proposal appears
far from obvious, calling the European Union to keep on working on a global solution at the OECD
level.
As it  has  been noted,  «in  one way or  another,  it  would  seem that  the  existing  body of
international and supranational rules posing counter-limits on the adoption of unilateral measures
are  so  pervasive  that,  were  they  to  be  eventually  implemented,  could  actually  appear  as  an
183 For a reconstructive study of the framework currently provided at the European Union level with reference to the 
administrative cooperation in the field of taxation, see G. MARINO, International and European measures for de – 
offshoring: global ambitions and local hypocrisies, in Intertax, 2017, p. 530.
184 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Impact assessment, supra 26. For a critical position of such qualification, see, among the 
others, A. TURRINA, Which “Source Taxation” for the Digital Economy?, supra 6.
185 See F. GUARASCIO, EU digital tax on corporate turnover faces uphill road, Reuters (28 Apr. 2018), available at 
https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-ecofin-tax/eu-digital-tax-on-corporateturnover-faces-uphill-road-
idUSKBN1HZ0JS.
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equalization levy in name only or as a type of levy with fairly concerning distortive effects. Such a
conundrum would seem to suggest that the current international legal framework appears more
successful  than  anticipated  in  making  international  tax  coordination  unavoidable,  virtually
undermining the enactment of unilateral measures that would be in line with the policy objectives
that have been outlined above»186.
A final consideration should be articulated with reference to the item of the data protection,
even  if  the  seminar  in  occasion  of  which  this  Paper  has  been  written  aims  to  talk  about  the
challenges arising from the use of the big data «beyond data protection». As mentioned above, the
place of taxation for the purposes of the proposed digital service tax should be determined on the
basis of the Internet Protocol address of the device of the users or, if more accurate, on the basis of
other  methods of  geolocation.  In  this  respect,  the  Proposal  provides  in  generic  terms that  data
should  be  collected  for  the  purposes  of  the  Proposal  in  a  way  that  does  not  allow  for  the
identification of the users (art.  5.6 of the Proposal).  In addition to the above, recital  34 of the
proposed Directive (even if not legal binding for the Member States) provides that any processing
of personal data should be conducted in accordance with the EU Regulation 2016/679187, with the
further  clarification  that  «[w]henever  possible,  personal  data  should  be  rendered  anonymous»
(emphasis added). The perception is that, at least in the field of taxation, the concerns about the
right of the tax payers to protect their data still remain unanswered.  
SILVIA SUT
186 A. TURRINA, Which “Source Taxation” for the Digital Economy?, supra 6, p. 519.
187 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, available at http://curia.europa.eu/.
.
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Electoral freedom in the age of big data: an historical critique*
SUMMARY:  1.  Introduction  and  methodological  remarks.  –  2.  The  origins  and  the  meaning  of
electoral freedom. – 3. The regulation of media and mass media influence on the election. – 4. From
electoral  propaganda on the internet  to  the social  media:  what  has  changed in  the  relationship
between electors and their representatives. – 5. Is electoral freedom truly jeopardized by the use of
big data algorithms with political and electoral purposes? – 6. Conclusive remarks.
1. The recent and discussed case of Facebook - Cambridge Analytica had the result of giving
a  clear  empirical  evidence  of  how  big  data  regulation  may  be  relevant  with  respect  to  the
democratic processes.  
The scandal started in March 2018, after that the Guardian and the New York Times reported
that a data analytics firm named Cambridge Analytica had harvested millions of users’ data from
Facebook profiles and used them to broadcast messages with political contents aimed at influencing
electors  political  choices  during  the  American  Presidential  Elections  of  2016  and  the  Brexit
Campaign in the UK, by virtue of the use of big data algorithms188. 
Such use of systems of data recollection explicitly addressed to broadcast political contents
(often combined with the use of fake news189) to selected categories of electors, in order to meddle
in  political  choices  seems  to  have  opened  broad  and  multifaceted  scenarios  in  the  debate  on
electoral regulation and the protection of electoral freedoms. 
In this perspective and in the attempt of underlining the most relevant aspects of the matter
for constitutional law, we may indeed speculate on whether:
a) the meddling in public elections by virtue of the use of big data algorithms is a real new
threat for the health of modern democracies; 
b) the traditional  paradigm of electoral  freedom may be considered adequate before the
increasing of external influence on election;
c) a new regulation of electoral meddling by virtue of big data algorithms is needed or the
regulation  of  such  phenomenon  may be  connected  to  the  traditional  legal  discipline  of  media
influence on the elections and / or political propaganda.   
In  order  to  correctly approach the  above mentioned aspects,  it  is  although necessary to
clarify the definitions of the expressions «electoral freedom» and «big data».
188* Paper presented on 16th October 2018 during the Seminar «Big data and Public Law: new challenges beyond data 
protection» at Università di Milano.
It seems that the method allegedly used often implied the creation of fake social media profiles which were 
used to spread political contents and fake news about electoral competitors to selected categories of electors. See R. J. 
GONZALES, Hacking the citizenry?  in Anthropology today, XXXIII, June 2017 and J. CARVALKO, Defending against 
opaque algorithmic meddling in free elections, in Technology and society magazine, June 2018, p. 30. For a more 
detailed outline on the case and the activity of Cambridge Analytica.  
189 See with respect to the most recent works on the matter G. PITRUZZELLA, O. POLLICINO, S. QUINTARELLI, Parole e 
potere. Libertà d'espressione, hate speech e fake news, Milano, 2017.
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Electoral freedom is a well-known and broadly used basic constitutional concept, deeply
rooted in the western liberal tradition since the XVIII Century revolutions190. 
For the sake of brevity191 and in order to resume the key components of electoral freedom, it
might be opportune to move from a simpler and more solid foundation, which might be actually
offered  by  Article  21  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  192.   Indeed  said  article
envisages the right to free and genuine elections and might be seen as a good synthesis of some of
the most widespread and universally accepted principles of democratic processes.
Following the structure of Article 21, electoral freedom refers, on the one hand to the right
of electors to express a free political choice without any external interference (genuineness of vote).
On the other hand, of course, electoral freedom is also referred to the need to ensure that any
political competitor in the election may act in equal conditions (par condicio and equality of arms).
Finally, the guarantee of electoral freedom is also connected to the establishment of legal
mechanisms of voting which ensure the realization of the above mentioned principles and also
remedy to any possible distortion of same (guarantee of free voting procedures). 
As per the definition of «big data algorithms» it might be useful to make reference to a well-
known definition coined by anthropologist Justin Lane who describes big data as «massive amounts
of electronic data that are indexable and searchable by means of computational systems (…) stored
in on servers and analyzed by algorithms193». Another important aspect we have to bear in mind is
also the industrial dimension of the big data, as a market in which firms such as Facebook, Google
and  Twitter  have  the  possibility  of  sharing  and selling  to  third  parties  a  huge amount  of  data
harvested from their users194.  
Even though the use of big data with political purposes inspired a broad debate in legal
doctrine195, it appears that, somehow, the actual significance of many problems related to the impact
of technological developments on fundamental processes of functioning of the State might be hard
to  evaluate  with  the  eyes  of  a  contemporary observer,  as  any historical  phenomenon which  is
approximate in time.  
In such perspective it  might  be opportune,  indeed,  to  peruse the matter  by virtue of an
historical point of view, focusing the analysis on the progressive development of the principle of
190 See ex multis G. CHIARA, Titolarità del voto e fondamenti costituzionali di libertà ed eguaglianza, Milano, 2004; F. 
LANCHESTER, Voto (diritto di), in Enclicopedia del diritto, XLVI, Milano, 1993; G. SCHEPIS, Elezioni (storia dei sistemi
elettorali in Italia), in Enciclopedia del diritto, XIV, 1965. 
191 Clearly a complete analysis of the issue should require a deeper effort which is inconsistent with the aim of the 
present paper.
192 «Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. The will of the people shall be 
the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures».
193 J. E. LANE  ,  Big data and anthropology: concerns for data collection in a new research context  , in  Journal of the 
Anthropological Society of Oxford-online  , January 2016, p. 74. 
194 See J. E. LANE, cit., p. 74-88.  
195 See G. BELL, The secret life of big data, in T. BOELLSTORFF, B. MAUER (eds.), Data now bigger and better, 2015, 
Chicago, p. 7-26; V. M. SCHONBERGER, K. CUKIER, Big Data: a revolution that will transform how we live, work and 
think, Boston, 2013.
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electoral freedom and correspondent legal regulation of the external influences on elections, with
special reference to the influences of the media. 
Hence  the  paper,  moving  from  the  above  mentioned  theoretical  and  methodological
premises, aims at giving some brief conclusions on the possible intersections of electoral freedom
and the use of big data algorithms to orientate political choices in the light of the historical roots of
the principle of electoral freedom and the various examples of the regulation of external influences
on national elections. Moreover it will be also necessary to speculate on whether the problem of the
misuse of big data algorithms with the purpose of meddling in the elections shall be considered as a
real and new threat for electoral freedom and electoral systems or it might be treated as another
chapter in the evolution of legal regulation of mass medias influence on electoral processes. 
2. We can easily affirm that the concept of electoral freedom196 truly represents one of the
key and basic principles of modern democracies197. Such principle indeed, in its first meaning, has
been  originally  designated  with  reference  to  the  need of  protecting  electors  from any possible
improper influence and limitation that could jeopardize the genuineness of their political choice. 
Under this point of view it is possible to read all of the traditional guarantees of electoral
rights such as the secrecy of vote, which was perceived, since the French Revolution, as the most
important defense for the new electors198.  
Notably the French Revolution with its rupture with the  Ancien Régime represented a key
moment for the debate on electoral systems design as well as the perfect «humus» for the raise of
the public theories on the set of warranties that have to be ensured in order to pursue the guarantee
of electoral freedom during the elections199. 
Under a different point of view, the concept of electoral freedom was also intimately linked to the
idea of universal suffrage. On the one hand, as affirmed by Huard, «il y a suffrage universel quand
aucune condition d‘âge autre que la majorité légale et aucune condition financière n‘est imposée
pour participer au scrutin200». In other words, in order to actually achieve universal suffrage it is
196 Hereinafter the reference to electoral freedom must be interpreted as inclusive of the set of principles envisaged 
under Article 21 i.e. genuineness of vote, equal access to elections, and fairness and freedom of the voting procedures 
(see supra p. 2). 
197 With respect to the close relationship between electoral freedom and democracy see H. KELSEN, I Fondamenti 
della democrazia (1929), Bologna 1966; N. BOBBIO, Il futuro della democrazia, Torino, 1995; M. LUCIANI, Il voto e la 
democrazia, Roma, 1991. 
198 Nevertheless it is opportune to mention some relevant opinions of important authors of the age such as J. J. 
Rousseau, who believed that the secrecy of vote may also lead to the diffusion of the corruption in the public offices in 
particular if accompanied by the lack of efficient instrument of  prevention of the abuses. The lack of secrecy anyhow is
also strictly connected with the idea of vote as a public function, involving a view of the voter as a citizen who is 
performing a constitutional function instead of a simple individual (see the following footnote).  
199 Notably, since the French Revolutionary Convention of 1792, the right to vote has been indicated properly as a 
droit (i.e. individual right), and by virtue of such nature it had to be accompanied by a set of warranties aimed at 
ensuring that it could be freely exercised by the citizens. The opposite model that envisages the vote as a fonction, i.e. a 
public function, laid the foundation for the raise of systems of restricted suffrage based on minimum wage or capacity 
of the electors (e.g. in reading and writing).  
200 R. HUARD, Le suffrage universel en France (1848-1946), Paris, 1991, p. 25, reported by M. ROSPI, La tutela della 
segretezza del voto e l’evoluzione della democrazia. Uno studio di diritto comparato, IV seminario annuale del Gruppo 
di Pisa, Università Roma Tre, 18 September 2015 available at www.gruppodipisa.it.
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mandatory to ensure that no conditions are envisaged in order to grant the right to vote to the
electors201. 
On the other hand, universal suffrage could only be achieved if the electors could count on
the fact that they were able to vote in the lack of external pressure and consequences due to the
choices expressed. 
In this respect, the set of warranties linked to the right to vote such as the secrecy of vote202,
the  lack  of  burdens  of  age203 and  wage  that  we  can  connect  to  electoral  freedom,  had  to  be
considered as necessary also in order to achieve the universal suffrage204. Hence, their protection
truly represented, under such perspective, a basic constitutional objective.
Nonetheless, the contradictory relationship between universal suffrage and the provision of
conditions of wage and capacity to have access to elections represented a typical feature in the
debate  on  electoral  rights  in  the  centuries  XVIII  and  XIX205.  The  actual  realization  of  the
revolutionary principle of equality was in fact hindered by a bourgeois ruling class with oligarchic
and homogeneous  purposes  which  was  interested  in  maintaining  the  control  of  society206.  Said
contradiction  progressively  disappeared  with  the  effective  extension  of  suffrage  and  the
crystallization of the principles addressed to guarantee electoral freedom, in general terms, from the
first decades of the twentieth century.
The centrality of the principle of electoral freedom for modern democracies is, as we said,
well known and commonly accepted within constitutional doctrine. As per the Italian constitutional
experience,  such  centrality207 is  also  well  testified  in  the  Preparatory  Papers  of   the  Italian
Constitutional Assembly, in which it has been defined as an «objective liberty of exercising the right
to vote for the benefit of electors that the authorities of the State have the task to ensure208». In this
respect, while it is clear that public authorities have to ensure the lack of illegitimate pressure and
influences  on  electors,  it  is  opportune  to  point  out  that  another  significant  issue  connected  to
electoral  freedom is  actually  the  identification  of  those influences  that  might  be  considered  as
legitimate209. 
The prior interest of the legislator in such respect is clearly to avoid those influences that
may jeopardize  the  free  and  genuine  expression  of  voter’s  choice  as  well  as  punishing  those
attempts of interventions aimed at interfere in the suffrage210.
201 See E. BETTINELLI, Diritto di voto, in Digesto - Discipline pubblicistiche, Torino, 1990, p. 7.  
202 The principle was also included in the French Constitution of 1795. 
203 Except for legal age envisaged for the access to vote. 
204 Notably in the lack of such guarantees many electors could have been forced to renounce to their right to vote due 
to the concerns on the consequences of the votes expressed. 
205 See M. S. GIANNINI, Il pubblico potere, Bologna, 1986; C. MORTATI, Le forme di governo. Lezioni, Padova, 1973. 
206 F. LANCHESTER, Stato (forme di), in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Milano, XLIII, p. 803.
207 See in such perspective C. LAVAGNA, Istituzioni di diritto pubblico, Torino, 1985, p. 525; L. PALADIN, Diritto 
costituzionale, Padova,1991, p. 292. Said authors make reference to electorate freedom as the most significant and 
general feature of the suffrage. 
208 Free translation of the declaration made by Umberto Merlin. See Atti dell'Assemblea costituente  , II, Roma, 1951.
209 See. F. LANCHESTER, Voto (diritto di), in Enciclopedia del diritto, XLVI, Milano, 1993, p. 8. 
210 It is properly the area of intervention of the electoral felonies which under Italian law are mainly regulated by the 
Statute no. 61/2004. 
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Finally another public interest connected to the guarantee of electoral freedom, as we said, is
the need of avoiding that some particular political forces may illegitimately benefit from undue
advantages on other political parties. It is indeed the dimension of electoral freedom to which we
referred in terms of guarantee of the fairness of the electoral competition or par condicio and it is
basically the main ground in which we may move the debate on big data influences on elections. 
In this respect, legal doctrine agrees in individuating in the preparatory phase to elections a
key moment for the actual guarantee of electoral freedom, both on the side of genuineness of the
choice of voters and the fairness of the electoral competition211. 
The regulation of electoral propaganda (i.e. the activity that political bodies carry on in order
to convince the subjects entitled to vote212) is, in such perspective, one the of the most important
concerns of the legislators with respect to the purpose of avoiding information asymmetries and
ensuring a more conscious choice for the electors.  
In order to carry on our analysis it is then opportune to dwell on the subject of the historical
evolution of the regulation on political propaganda. Such reconstruction, however, has to consider
that in those legal systems inspired to the principle of free elections, electoral propaganda has to be
seen both as a fundamental liberty as per political entities rights as well as a possible threat to the
rights of voters also subject to constitutional protection213. 
3. The history of the regulation of political propaganda may be linked, for our purposes, to
the history of the technological development of the media and the mass media and their use to
broadcast political contents aimed at convincing the electors to take a particular political decision. 
Clearly the media have always existed but it is basically from the XX Century that they have
reached a communicative capacity such as to be denominated as mass media214.  
Radio  and  television  have  led  to  a  new and broader  connection  between  audience  and
broadcasters of contents including, of course, messages with political and electoral purposes.  
The potentiality of the new mass media and their  possible use in order to influence the
course  of  elections  was  immediately  clear  also  to  the  different  legislators  with  respect  to  the
regulation of electoral propaganda.
In general  terms,  as  anticipated  in  the  former  paragraph,  the regulation of  political  and
electoral propaganda215 is basically focused on the goal of avoiding illegitimate influences on the
election as well as ensuring the effectiveness of the principle of the equality of arms, which would
211 See E. FERRIOLI, La disciplina delle campagne elettorali e referendarie, in R. NANIA, P. RIDOLA, I diritti 
costituzionali, Torino, 2001, p. 623; S. BAGNI, La propaganda elettorale tramite internet: quale disciplina, in Dir. 
informatica, I, 2004, p. 634. Another term which is commonly used in legal doctrine in this respect is «equality of 
chances» of any participant to the electoral competition. Said expression clearly shows the link between electoral 
freedom and the constitutional principle of equality.  
212 See F. LANCHESTER, Propaganda elettorale, in Enclicopedia del diritto, XXXVII, Milano, 1988. 
213 F. LANCHESTER, Propaganda elettorale, cit., p. 8. 
214 See for further remarks on the topic R. BIANCO, Diritto delle comunicazioni di massa, 2007, Bari. See also G. 
BUSINO, Propaganda, in Enciclopedia Einaudi, Torino, 1980 for a broader historical reconstruction. According to the 
latter indeed the real origins of propaganda have to be found as well during the French Revolution in which for the first 
time such phenomenon became a stable and developed component of political competition.  
215 For a definition of such expressions see E. BETTINELLI, Propaganda, in Digesto - Discipline pubblicistiche, Torino,
1997. 
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be violated if a political body may count on a particular advantage on competitors provided by the
control of the mass media216. 
However, since political propaganda represents a fundamental right directly linked to the
right to free expression, the legal discipline of electoral propaganda has to ensure that such liberty is
balanced with the above mentioned principles connected to electoral freedom217. 
In this respect, as per Italian regulation of the matter218, it is possible to affirm that such
balance has been pursued according to two different  types  of regulation linked to the different
stages of the electoral process219.
The first type of regulation refers to the last phase of the election and basically consists in
the provision of a period of electoral silence aimed at granting the electors a short period to process
the electoral choice without further direct influences by political competitors. 
The second type of regulation deals with the need of ensuring the par condicio of political
competitors that is granting all the participants the same chances in terms of use of mass media to
broadcast political contents. Such exigence is indeed pursued by virtue of the provision of time
limitations for the broadcast of electoral spots on radio and television as well as the introduction of
a maximum number of political messages per day220. 
With reference to the above mentioned profiles, the main stages of the regulation on media
influence on elections in Italy may be individuated as follows: as per the so-called electoral silence,
the Italian statute no. 212/1956  221 had already established a legal discipline of electoral propaganda
and political communication which envisaged some rules on the use of campaign advertisement and
posters during the 30 days before the elections and introduced at Article 9  222 the so-called electoral
silence223 during the day before the elections and the day of the vote224. 
Notably, such discipline was not applicable to electoral propaganda on radio and television,
with the consequence of an important gap in the regulation of propaganda. Only in 1975225 with the
216 See F. LANCHESTER, Propaganda elettorale, cit., p. 9. 
217 The opinion is also confirmed by the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court that affirmed the need of 
protecting the liberty of choice of electors, who have the right to express their political opinion rationally. In this 
respect, the Court stated that the persuasive strength of television (also with respect to the other mass media) may 
jeopardize the free capacity of choice of the electors because of its pervasive nature. Said characteristics, according to 
the Court, shall therefore justify a strict regulation of the use of the television to broadcast political contents (see ex 
multis Constitutional Court no. 48/1964, 225/1974 and 148/1981). 
218 For sake of brevity the paper focuses on the evolution of the legal discipline of the matter under Italian law but 
many of the remarks may be extended to other legal systems.
219 See S. BAGNI, cit., p. 633. 
220 Cf. S. BAGNI, cit., p. 634.
221 Named «Norme per la disciplina della campagna elettorale».
222 Which has been deeply modified by Article 8 of the Statute no. n. 130/1975.
223 During the electoral silence it is forbidden to carry on campaign speeches and electoral caucuses as well as 
organizing any form of political propaganda within 200 meters from the places in which the voting operation will be 
held. 
224 In general terms, with respect to the electoral silence, see G. MAZZOLENI, La comunicazione politica alla vigilia 
della seconda Repubblica, in Problemi dell'informazione, 1993, from p. 212.
225 Between those regulations it is opportune to make reference to the important decision of the Italian Constitutional 
Court no. 48/1964 in which the Court stated that the limitations to political propaganda were in line with the provisions 
of the Constitution and, moreover, such limitations do not affect freedom of speech and have to be referred to the 
principle of the par condicio and / or equality of chances which has also a constitutional foundation. See F. 
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Statute  no.  103/1975 a  first  (and  probably  incomplete226)  regulation  of  the  matter  has  been
achieved227. 
Another important step in the evolution of the regulation of political propaganda may be
seen in the approval of the Statute no. 515/1993  228 which was inspired by the purpose of providing a
general  and  organic  discipline  propaganda  (in  all  of  its  forms)229 including  specific  rules  on
acquisition and access to the press230, the other mass media as well as mechanisms of public audit231.
Even though the Statute represented an important stage in the progressive regulation on propaganda
on the media,  soon it  became clear  that  the provisions included therein were unsuitable  for an
effective  guarantee  of  the  par  condicio and  the  genuineness  of  vote.  Hence,  some  significant
amendments were introduced by the Legal Decree no.  83/1995  232 and finally by the Statute  no.
28/2000.   
Such Statute has represented a new kind of approach to the regulation of propaganda since it
envisaged  a  set  of  rules  which  were  applicable  to  all  electoral  campaigns  and  political
communications for the whole year233. Basic principles of the new regulation, according t o Article 1
of the Statute were indeed: the guarantee of the  par condicio and impartiality with respect to all
political subjects, the promotion of the free access to the media for political communication and the
regulation of the use of the media during electoral campaigns234. 
Finally,  as  per  the  last  examples  of  political  propaganda  and  use  of  mass  media  it  is
opportune  to  mention the Statute  no.  313/2003 which included a  set  of  provisions  finalized to
ensure  the  par  condicio with  respect  to  local  radio  and  TV broadcasters,  and  the  Statute  no.
215/2012. The latter has amended the Statute no. 28/2000 with the introduction of provision aimed
at promoting  par condicio in terms of gender representation with reference to the access to mass
media propaganda235. 
LANCHESTER, Propaganda, cit., especially the footnote 58, for further remarks on the case and its impact on Italian 
regulation of propaganda.  
226 See C. CHIOLA, Disciplina della propaganda elettorale delle emittenti private, in Il diritto delle radiodiffusioni e 
delle telecomunicazioni, Milano, 1984, p. 2. 
227 The Statute also insituted a parlamentary commission (Commissione parlamentare per l'indirizzo generale e la 
vigilanza dei servizi radiotelevisivi), also known as Commissione di Vigilanza Rai with functions related to the audit of 
the national television and radio services and regulation of par condicio and political propaganda. 
228 Named «Disciplina delle campagne elettorali per l'elezione alla Camera dei deputati e al Senato della Repubblica».
229 See R. BORRELLO, Stampa e par condicio: riflessioni critiche sulla vigente disciplina, in Giur. cost., 3, 2008, p. 
2769. 
230 An important measure included under the Statute was the prohibition for the press to publish electoral previsions 
and statistics on electoral intentions within the 15 days before the elections. 
231 Article 2 of the Statute included for instance the prohibition during the 30 days before the elections to broadcast all 
forms of messages of political propaganda on newspapers, television and radio with the exception of those political 
contents that ensured the realization of the par condicio principle such as political debates, conferences and other events
with the presence of political competitors. Said Article would have been repealed by Statute no. 28/2000.   
232 Also commonly named as «Decree Gambino».
233 Not only with respect to the period before the elections. 
234 For a more detailed review on the Statute see R. BORRELLO, Oggetti politici e trasmissioni radiotelevisive: prime 
riflessioni comparatistiche sulla legge n. 28 del 2000, in Giur. cost., 1, 2000, p. 635. 
235 See R. BORRELLO, Stampa e par condicio: riflessioni critiche sulla vigente disciplina, in Giur. cost., 3, 2008, p. 
2769. 
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 4.  The diffusion of the internet and its  use to broadcast political  and electoral messages
addressed to users truly represented a sort of revolution in the debate on the regulation of influences
on electors and freedom of vote236. 
Since the second half of the nineties political parties massively used internet as a tool for
electoral propaganda237, even in the lack of a relevant regulation of the matter. As per Italian legal
system indeed,  neither  the above mentioned  Statute  no.  28/2000 nor  the most  recent  measures
adopted, such as the Legislative Decree no. 44 del 2010  238, have provided an organic legal discipline
of the electoral propaganda on the internet239. 
Notwithstanding the  above remarks,  it  is  opportune  to  add that  in  some cases  a  partial
regulation of single aspects of the matter has been achieved by virtue of several rulings issued by
the  Italian  Data  Protection  Authority  especially  with  reference  to  the  use  of  massive  email-
spamming of political contents to users in the imminence of the elections. 
In such concern, since the 2005 the Authority has been affirmed some important principles
related to the broadcast of political messages directed to influence the electorate by email, sms, fax
to electors, affirming the need of a previous and explicit consent of voters as well as the disclosure
of the privacy policy of the broadcaster240. 
Moreover, another aspect which is worth pointing out is the difficulty of legislators to adapt
to the internet revolution the traditional principles on par condicio in the use of communicative
tools for the political bodies and genuineness of vote. It is self-evident indeed that on the one hand,
the traditional legal solutions such as electoral silence and limitation of broadcasting of political
messages are hardly applicable to the internet in the age of the so-called «e-democracy241». On the
other hand, due to the deep differences between the internet and the traditional mass media, the
regulation of the latter is as well hardly subject to an extension to the political propaganda on the
internet. 
The delay and the difficulties of the legal regulation of propaganda on the internet has been
confirmed also by the critical issue of the increasing use of social networks to broadcast political
contents to users and in general as a basic tool of modern political communication.
The topic of the diffusion of the social networks and their  use to pursue political  goals,
however, offers the chance to reflect on a broader issue, which seems to be critical also in order to
duly approach the matter of the use of big data algorithms to meddle in the elections.  
236 See ex multis A. VALASTRO, Internet e strumenti partecipativi nel rapporto tra privati e amministrazioni, in M. 
NISTICÒ, P. PASSAGLIA (eds.), Internet e Costituzione, Torino, 2014; S. RODOTÀ, Tecnopolitica, Bari-Roma, 1997. 
237 See S. BAGNI, cit., p. 629 who refers to the broad use of internet since the campaign for the elections of 2004 in 
Italy. 
238 Which included the definition of media audiovisive services that, however, is not applicable to internet websites. 
239 As it has been observed by P. COSTANZO, Quale partecipazione politica attraverso le nuove tecnologie 
comunicative in Italia, in Dir. informatica, I, 2011, p. 21.
240 See ex multis the so-called «Authority’s Prescriptions» ex Article 154, par. 1 of the Legislative Decree no. 196 del 
2003 dated 11.02.2010 and the relevant considerations in P. COSTANZO, Quale partecipazione politica attraverso le 
nuove tecnologie comunicative in Italia, cit., p. 23. With respect to the most recent documents adopted by the Authority,
see «Provvedimento in materia di trattamento di dati presso i partiti politici e di esonero dall´informativa per fini di 
propaganda elettorale» dated 6th March 2014.
241 See for a more detailed analysis of the issue P. COSTANZO, Profili costituzionali di internet, in E. TOSI (eds.), I 
problemi giuridici di internet. Dall’E-commerce all’E-Business, Milano, 2003, p. 89.  
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In this respect, indeed, the matter deals with one well-known topic in current constitutional
debate on political parties and technological development: internet does not simply represent a new
tool to communicate but it has deeply changed the basis of the democratic relationship between the
electors, their representatives and intermediate bodies such as political parties242. 
If it is true that, on the one hand, internet has provided the political bodies with a powerful
tool to influence voter’s opinions, it is opportune to remark that, on the other hand, with the use of
the internet and the social networks the electors have found a way to directly connect with their
representatives and gained several new methods of participation in the democratic processes243. 
In other words internet has deeply impacted democracy in a variety of ways and it seems
that, regardless of our efforts, it is impossible to reconnect the previous changes in mass media
evolution  from newspapers  to  the  radio  and  from the  radio  to  the  television244 to  the  internet
revolution.  
5. It appears that the use of big data algorithms to meddle in the elections and influence key
portions of the electorate has to be perused bearing in mind the above mentioned premises and
remarks, with respect to the ongoing revolution of democratic relationship that internet and social
network have triggered.  
The  brief  review of  the  historical  evolution  of  the  regulation  of  external  influences  on
elections demonstrated that the main aims of legislator connected to electoral freedom were focused
on realizing par condicio / equality of arms of political competitors and protecting the genuineness
of vote, basically with the selection of those influences that could be considered inadmissible and /
or illegal. 
In this respect we have firstly to speculate on whether the big data phenomenon, as shown in
the Facebook – Cambridge Analytica case, may truly have a serious impact on the above mentioned
principles and, in the positive, what can legislators do in order to prevent the violations of same.
As per the realization of par condicio between political competitors, it seems that even the massive
forwarding of political contents by virtue of the use of big data algorithms, does not entail particular
problems as long as all  electoral competitors may have access to the tool. It is the case of the
appointment of data analytics firms like Cambridge Analytica that have been working on behalf of
political bodies since quiet long time245. 
In such perspective indeed the use of internet and big data algorithms may simply be seen as
another example of technological development of electoral propaganda, that does not impact, in
standard conditions (i.e. when all actors have the same possibility of access) on electoral freedom.
242 The literature on the matter is abundant. See T. E. FROSINI, Internet e democrazia, in Dir. Informatica, 2017, p. 657;
P. MARSOCCI  ,  Lo spazio di Internet nel costituzionalismo  , in   Costituzionalismo.it; U. ALLEGRETTI, Democrazia 
partecipativa, in Enc. dir., 2011, p. 295. 
243 Notably internet helped in achieving transparency as it has also provided electors with the tools to verify the 
information provided by their representatives. 
244 See M. BASSINI. Partiti, tecnologie e crisi della rappresentanza democratica. Brevi osservazioni introduttive, in 
Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2015, p. 867. 
245 See J. NAUGHTON, Us Elections 2012: is Facebook the “Real Presidential Swing State”?, in Observer, 2, 
September 2012 who explains how even during the 2012 Presidential Elections in the US, the Democratic Party has 
invested a huge amount of money aimed at set up a program of targeted propaganda and user’s data analysis on social 
media, also with the help of specialized firms.
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Of course the guarantee of equal access represents a basic condition in such perspective and shall be
treated within the debate on transparency and impartiality of the internet, which however does not
fall within the object of the present article246.
The impact of big data algorithms used with electoral purposes on the genuineness of the
vote on the other hand, seems to have opened more complex issues. Firstly, also in this case we can
argue that the attempt of influencing electors with various means does not represent a novelty in the
history of democracy. Hence, as we said, under such point of view we are simply dealing with a
more accurate example of technological improvement of those means of influence.   
Nevertheless  the  issue  seems  to  be  more  complicated  especially  when  approached  in
connection with the broader debate on the on-going challenges that the social networks and the
internet have brought with respect to the traditional guarantees of electoral freedom, particularly the
secrecy  of  vote.  The  number  of  available  information  of  electors,  indeed,  has  reached  severe
dimensions and such amount of data may have a direct impact also with reference to the electoral
process.  Notably  several  companies  have  developed  complex  algorithms  capable  to  elaborate
accurate previsions, also in terms of opinions and political preferences, just requiring a relatively
small number of user’s information.  
On the other hand we also have to point out that in many cases it is the same population of
the  social  networks  that  agrees  to  express  and  share  political  opinions  on  the  internet  (e.g.
comments on blog or media website, inscription to groups on social media). This disclosure clearly
has the effect of providing precious and useful information for big data analysts (and hence for the
political bodies that hire their services) and often produces the effect of affecting the secrecy of
vote.  
In such perspective we also could remark that some of the traditional guarantees of freedom
of  vote  such  as  the  same  secrecy,  which  were  designed  within  an  oligarchic  society  with  a
significant  distance  between  representatives  and  the  electoral  bodies,  seem to  need  now to  be
adjusted to the current  status  of electoral  competition.  Of course this  does not  mean that  such
guarantees are useless. On the contrary, it has to be enhanced with respect to the current problems
that we are facing nowadays. 
In  other  words  the  right  of  expression,  which  includes  the  right  to  express  of  political
opinions  using a social  network,  has to  be protected with a  set  of measures  pursuing electoral
freedom that should also prevent the misuse of user’s information to possibly influence the electors.
In this concern, indeed, it seems that it is within the protection of personal data of internet users that
we should study the issue of the modern regulation of genuineness of vote, with the purpose of
condemning the illegitimate harvesting of data  and other violations that  may help in  providing
information  that  could  be  used  for  political  profiling  or  with  the  purpose  of  meddling  in  the
elections247.   
In such respect, however, we have to point out that, as noticed in the previous historical
reconstruction, the protection of the genuineness of electors choice has been always achieved with a
246 With reference to the matter see P. COSTANZO, Quali garanzie costituzionali per gli interventi rimediali in rete, in 
Dir. Informatica, 2013, p. 17; C. ROSSELLO, La governance di internet tra diritto statuale, autodisciplina, soft law e lex 
mercatoria in Dir. comm. internaz., 2006, 1, p. 45.  
247 However it is opportune to point out that it is not possible to do much in those cases in which the sharing of 
personal information and opinions correspond to the consent and the free will of the users.  
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selection of those influences that could be considered as illicit. Thus, modern legal regulation aimed
at protecting electoral freedom should probably focus mainly on the persecution of illicit methods
of  data  collection,  breaches  in  users  privacy248 and  cyber-attacks  during  elections  instead  of
attempting to regulate the thousands of possible factors of influence on electors that may come from
internet, social network and big data algorithms. 
6. The case of Cambridge Analytica seems to have put in light how big data algorithms may
be  used  with  political  purposes  and  possibly  in  the  attempt  of  meddling  in  the  elections.
Nevertheless many authors seriously doubt about the effective benefits of the use of such tools for
the political campaigns249. 
However for the reasons indicated in the present papers it seems it is possible to affirm that
we are actually facing  a  new stage  in  the  evolution  of  technological  tools  applied to  electoral
propaganda. 
Nevertheless, as we have said, the phenomenon has to be also studied with reference to the
profound changes that have affected the relationship between electors and their representatives due
to the raise of the internet and the social network and their use in the democratic processes. 
It seems indeed that the very same concept of electoral freedom has changed in view of the
current and different needs  of the electors that legislators have to fulfil  with the adoption of a
suitable legal regulation. In this concern it appears that the most urgent needs of electors linked to
the promotion of «modern electoral freedom» deal with the protection of personal data and privacy
of the users on the internet. 
Hence when we try to speculate on possible legal measures to adopt in such purpose it is
probably in the above mentioned areas that an actual intervention of legislators is needed. 
On the other hand, other useful legal tools may be represented by the regulation of political parties
misconducts involving the use of data harvested with methods lacking in transparency. 
It is the case of the amendment that the EU Commission is currently drafting to EU party
funding rules with the purpose of imposing fines on political parties who misuse personal data of
the electors to carry on their campaigns250. The measure is supposed to be applicable to the parties
248 Making reference to legal evolution of the matter in Italy it is interesting to remark that even with regards to 
electoral propaganda by email and sms from 2005 the first important contribution in the development of regulation was 
provided by the Italian Data Protection Authority on the ground of privacy and protection from data breaches instead of 
the ground of regulation of political propaganda tout court. Under such point of view the current status of legal 
regulation, with the lack of a discipline of electoral propaganda carried out with the use of big data and social network 
has several common elements with the above mentioned period. Hence maybe the legal solution adopted in such period 
may be of use also with modern challenges to electoral freedom.   
249 It is doubtful that a concrete contribution to the victory of Donald Trump has come from the contribute of the data 
analysis of Cambridge Analytica. Firstly it is proved that similar methods were used also by the democrats and since 
Barack Obama victory of 2012 in which social network were massively used to carry on the campaign. Secondly the 
same tools have been used also to support Hilary Clinton’s campaign which also made broad use of data analysis with 
political purposes. See in this respect R. J. GONZALES, cit., p. 11 and other authors mentioned in the paper such as E. 
HERSH, Hacking the electorate, Cambridge, 2015.  
250 Even though the draft is not yet available several sources reported the news in the first weeks of August 2018 see 
e.g. EU targets European political parties that misuse voters’ data  , in  Financial Times  , 26th of August 2018   and L’Ue 
vuole evitare un'altra Cambridge Analytica: multe ai partiti che usano i dati per la propria campagna  , in  La 
Repubblica  , 27th August 2018.    
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that use data harvested by virtue of illegal methods or privacy breaches and other circumstances
similar to the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal to carry on their campaign. 
Moreover the regulation might include provisions focused on preventing political micro-
targeting on social networks i.e. the practice of sending targeted and political messaging to users
without their consent.  
 The Commission is also working on a set of recommendation to Member States in order to
ensure the promotion of the highest level of transparency in political propaganda also under national
legislations. 
Such measures represent a new interesting type of approach to the matter since they are
based on the ratio of keeping political parties liable for the use and the abuse of personal data with
respect to electoral propaganda. Moreover the risk to pay the fine251 may conduct the parties to
avoid hiring certain data analysts in case of doubts on the transparency of the methods used by the
latter to harvest and process data.   
Finally a possible area of intervention could be the provision of legal mechanisms aimed at
reducing  the  impact  of  fake  news  and  the  use  of  fake  profiles  to  broadcast  targeted  political
contents,  forcing social  networks and web corporations to  promote a more effective control  on
online contents252. 
SIMONE PITTO
251 The amount of the fine, according to available sources, might be in the range of 5 per cent of the annual budget of a
political party. 
252 In such perspective many social media like Twitter have recently increased their efforts in identifying and removing
fake profiles especially when they are used to broadcast political and targeted messages and terrorist propaganda and 
violence. It seems then that the Cambridge Analytica case has triggered a change of approach of social media like 
Twitter to political propaganda. See Twitter, sospesi altri 486 account “manipolatori  ”, in  La Repubblica  , 28th August 
2018.  
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The interface between the jurisdictional rules of Reg. (EU) No
2016/679 and those of Reg. (EU) No 1215/2012
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. ‒ 2. The interface between the jurisdictional rules of the GDPR and
those of the B1R: Recital (147) GDPR and 67 B1R. ‒ 3. Jurisdiction and coordination of multiple
proceedings in the GDPR: Arts 79(2) and 81. ‒ 4. The interface with Arts 4(1), 7, 18, 25, 26, 29 and
30 B1R. ‒ 5. The interface in collective redress and mass harm situations. ‒ 6. Conclusions.
1.  In  addition  to  administrative  ones,  Reg.  (EU)  No  2016/679  (hereafter  “GDPR”)253
provides for private enforcement remedies that are purported to protect the fundamental right to
data protection. In particular, where his rights are impaired by an infringement of the GDPR, the
data  subject  entertains  the  right  to  an  effective  judicial  remedy  and  to  receive  compensation,
respectively under Arts 79(1) and 82(1) of the regulation.
Effective judicial remedies referred to in Art 79(1) GDPR are those provided for in the laws
of each Member State (hereafter “MS”), and, in essence, injunctions254 directed against a controller
or processor (hereafter jointly referred to as “controller”). Furthermore, Art 82(1) GDPR grants the
data subject the right to receive compensation for material and non-material damage resulting from
the infringement of the regulation255.
Considering  that  single  infringements  of  the  GDPR may affect  a  large  number  of  data
subjects simultaneously, Art 80(1) of the regulation provides that, where permitted by the laws of
the MS courts seised, the rights granted by Art 79(1) and 82(1) of the same regulation may be
exercised by the data subject through a «non-for-profit body, organisation or association».
Moreover, assuming that infringements of the right to data protection may have cross-border
implications,  the  GDPR  implements  specific  jurisdictional  rules.  Where  disputes  arising  from
infringements  of  the  GDPR  are  characterized  by  an  international  element,  Art  79(2)  of  the
regulation determines the courts of which MSs may grant the remedies provided for in Art 79(1)
and 82(1)256 of the same regulation. Art 79(2) GDPR clearly favors the data subject257, by allowing
him to sue either in the courts of the MS where he habitually resides, or where the controller has an
253 Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119/1, 4.5.2016, p. 1 ff  
(http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj).
254 See P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data 
Protection Regulation, in A. DE FRANCESCHI (edited by), European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market, 
Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, 2016, p. 97; C. KOHLER, Conflict of Law Issues in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation 
of the European Union, in RDIPP, 2016, p. 667-668.
255 Recitals (75) and (85) GDPR provide examples of damage that may result from the infringements of the regulation.
256 See Art 82(6) GDPR.
257 On the protective policy underlying Art 79(2) GDPR, see L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-
border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, in Stockholm Faculty of Law Research Paper Series, 2018, p. 2 ff.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159854 (accessed 15.8.2018); P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding 
Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data Protection Regulation, p. 97-98.
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establishment258.259 Furthermore, Art 81 GDPR governs the coordination of proceedings concerning
the same infringement of the regulation and instituted in the courts of different MSs.
However, the specific jurisdictional rules of the GDPR are not the only rules on the conflict
of  jurisdiction  that  may apply to  disputes  between  data  subjects  and controllers.  In  particular,
provided that such disputes are, in principle, civil and commercial in nature, where characterized by
an international element, the general jurisdictional rules of Reg. (EU) No 1215/2012 (hereafter “the
B1R”)260 may purport to be applicable to proceedings instituted under Art 79(1) and 82(1) GDPR261.
2.  The GDPR deals with the issue of the interface between its specific jurisdictional rules
and the general ones of the B1R. Recital (147) GDPR stipulates that, general rules on jurisdiction of
the B1R must not prejudice the application of the specific ones of the GDPR, «in particular as
regards proceedings seeking a judicial remedy including compensation».
However, the recital is not reflected in any provision of the regulation, and, as such, it has an
uncertain legal force262. Attention should thus be drawn on a provision of the B1R: Art 67, which
actually  inspired  the  wording  of  Recital  (147)  GDPR.  «Shall  not  prejudice»  are,  in  fact,  the
keywords in Recital (147) and Art 67 B1R. Akin to Recital (147) GDPR, Art 67 B1R provides that
258 This, by the way, gives the data subject the chance of suing the Third State controller in a MS, in all cases, even 
where the latter lacks an establishment in a MS. Cf. M. BRKAN, Data protection and European private international 
law: observing a bull in a China shop, in IDPL, 2015, p. 265.
259 For sake of completeness, Art 79(2) GDPR allows the data subject to sue in the courts of the MS where he 
habitually resides, unless the controller is a public authority of a MS in the exercise of its public powers. Certain 
scholars posit that, under Art 79(2) GDPR, the data subject should be allowed to sue the public authority in the courts of
the MS where the latter has an establishment. However, the wording of the provision is not conclusive and the one 
employed in Recital (145) GDPR rather suggests that proceedings against a public authority acting in the exercise of its 
public powers fall outside the scope of the provision. Cf. M. BRKAN, Data protection and European private 
international law: observing a bull in a China shop, p. 272-273.
260 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ L 351/1, 
20.12.2012, p. 1 ff (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1215/oj).
261 The civil and commercial nature of disputes and the existence of an international element are in fact the two 
elements that define the scope ratione materiae of the B1R. In principle, following the findings of the CJEU in the 
Eurocontrol case, the first element is traced where the controller is a private party or a public authority acting in a 
private capacity, whereas it is excluded where the latter is acting in the exercise of its public powers. See C. KOHLER, 
Conflict of Law Issues in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, p. 669 and footnote 51; M. 
BRKAN, Data protection and European private international law: observing a bull in a China shop, p. 261-262, 272-
273; and CJEU, 14.10.1976, C-29/76, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:137 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=77A4E0AAF7FC923395E75488EAF2BAF4?
text=&docid=89285&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1160263).
262 See CJEU, 2.4.2009, C-134/08, Hauptzollamt Bremen v J. E. Tyson Parketthandel GmbH hanse j., 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:229, point 16 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=73634&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1160390).
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the latter regulation must «not prejudice the application of provisions governing jurisdiction263 (…)
in specific matters which are contained in instruments of the Union (…)»264.
What  follows from Art  67 B1R is  that  specific  jurisdictional  rules such as those of the
GDPR, do not supersede the general rules of the former regulation, but rather prevail265 «to the
extent of any inconsistency» with the latter regulation266. In other words, the specific rules of the
GDPR are not to be understood as lex specialis vis-à-vis the general ones of the B1R, but rather as a
«lex formidabilis»267!
Hence, the rules on jurisdiction of the B1R must be disregarded whenever their application
may «contradict (…) or affect the integrity and consistency of the special regime provided [in the
GDPR]»268, whereas in all other cases, the former rules may continue to be applicable269. This means
that the rules of the B1R may still be applicable, unless their application hampers the jurisdictional
favor granted to the data subject, by reducing the number of MSs where he may sue the controller
under Art 79(2) GDPR270, or by providing the latter with a greater number of MS courts where it
may sue the former.
3.  Art  79(2)  GDPR  governs  jurisdiction  over  actions  brought  by  data  subjects  –  and,
apparently, by NGOs too (§ 5) –, but does not cover actions brought by controllers, which instead
may fall within the purview of the general rules of the B1R271.
This said, the MS of habitual residence referred to in Art 79(2) GDPR is likely to be that
where the infringement of the regulation affects the data subject, and, namely, where damage is
263 Unlike Recital (147) GDPR, mentioning «rules on jurisdiction», Art 67 B1R makes broader reference to 
«provisions governing jurisdiction», which thus covers both the special rule on jurisdiction (Art 79(2)) and that on 
coordination of proceedings (Art 81) of the GDPR.
264 Few pieces of EU legislation on specific matters contain jurisdictional rules. See L. LUNDSTEDT, International 
jurisdiction over cross-border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 31-32; A. DICKINSON, E. LEIN (eds.), 
The Brussels I regulation recast, Oxford, 2015, p. 564, footnote 4.
265 See A. BARLETTA, La tutela effettiva della privacy nello spazio (giudiziario) europeo nel tempo (della 
“aterittorialità”) di internet, in Europa e diritto privato, 2017, p. 1197.
266 See A. DICKINSON, E. LEIN (eds.), The Brussels I regulation recast, p. 564.
267 G. VAN CLASTER, Sur des bases fragiles. Le RGPD et les règles de compétence concernant les infractions au droit 
respect de la vie privée, in L’Observateur de Bruxelles, July 2018, p. 29. Cf. L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction 
over cross-border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 32 ff.
268 P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data 
Protection Regulation, p. 104.
269 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, in 
Cuadernos de Derecho Transacional, 2017, p. 451; I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations 
and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy Tourism''?, in Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 2017, p. 22 and 
footnote 59; P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data
Protection Regulation, p. 104; C. KOHLER, Conflict of Law Issues in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation of the 
European Union, p. 669.
270 See L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 
33-34; C. KOHLER, Conflict of Law Issues in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, p. 669.
271 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 
451.
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caused272. Though being used as a connecting factor also in other European private international law
instruments, the notion of habitual residence within the meaning of Art 79(2) GDPR is far from
being undisputed273 and yet  less  controversial  than  that  of  establishment  mentioned in  the  first
period of the same provision.
As concerns the notion of establishment, it is submitted that, following the first period of Art
79(2)  GDPR,  the  data  subject  may  elect  to  sue  in  the  MS  where  the  controller  has  an
establishment274 and not only in that where the latter has its main establishment275. This gives the
data subject a wider choice, since the notion of establishment in Recital (22) GDPR is broader than
that of main establishment in Art 4(16) of the regulation276.
272 See ID., p. 455.
273 Cf. G. VAN CLASTER, Sur des bases fragiles. Le RGPD et les règles de compétence concernant les infractions au 
droit respect de la vie privée, p. 29-30; L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border private enforcement
actions under the GDPR, p. 28-29; P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights 
under the General Data Protection Regulation, p. 101 ff.
274 Provided that the provision only refers to cases where the controller has an establishment in a MS, it should not 
apply where the controller has none. However, Kohler posits that the provision may vest jurisdiction in the courts of the 
MS of the representative appointed by a controller lacking establishments in a MS, in accordance with Art 27 GDPR. 
Actually, this opinion is backed by the last period of Recital (80) GDPR, which stipulates that enforcement proceedings 
should also be available against representatives. However, the recital is not reflected in any provision of the GDPR, 
including Art 79(2) thereof. Furthermore, in the Weltimmo case, the CJEU found that a processor had an establishment 
in a MS, by taking into account a number of facts, among which, the appointment of a representative with an address in 
that MS. It appears that, in principle, the mere appointment of a representative in a MS should not be sufficient to 
consider a controller as having an establishment in the same MS. Therefore, the preferred reading of the first period of 
Art 79(2) GDPR, is that the provision does not vest jurisdiction in the courts of the MS where a representative is based, 
unless it may qualify as an establishment within the meaning of the regulation. See C. KOHLER, Conflict of Law Issues 
in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, p. 668; CJEU, 1.10.2015, C-230/14, Weltimmo s.r.o. v 
Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, ECLI:EU:C:2015:639, points 32 ff 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
docid=168944&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=3527546).
275 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 
453, echoing P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General 
Data Protection Regulation, p. 99-100. But see L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border private 
enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 27-28, 34, according to which establishment referred in Art. 79(2) GDPR is 
actually to be understood as main establishment.
276 The recital reflects the «flexible definition» of establishment in Recital (19) Directive 95/46/EC, endorsed by the 
CJEU in the Google Spain, Weltimmo and Wirtschaftsakademie cases. See, respectively, CJEU, 14.5.2014, C-131/12, 
Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, point 49 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=152065&doclang=en); 
Weltimmo, points 32 ff; 5.6.2018, C-210/16, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v 
Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, point 55 
(curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=202543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3527736).
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Generic  reference  to  an  establishment  also  implies  that,  though  likely277,  the  relevant
establishment is not necessarily that where the infringement of the GDPR took place278.  On the
contrary, that is to say, if the data subject were required to fulfil the cumbersome task of proving
that the infringement of the GDPR took place in the establishment located in the MS of the seised
courts, the aim pursued by the regulation of granting the data subject with more favorable rules on
jurisdiction  could  be  undermined279.  This  is  why,  following  a  first  reading,  the  establishment
mentioned in Art 79(2) GDPR may lack any connection with the infringement of the regulation,
even if this would admittedly encourage forum shopping by data subjects280.
But a second and different reading should be preferred, one that better reflects the principles
enshrined  in  the  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  (hereafter  “CJEU”)  on  EU  data  protection
legislation281. Following such case law, establishment is not just that where the unlawful handling of
personal data took place, but also that in the context of whose activities such handling was carried
out282. The latter being the case where such activities are «inextricably linked»  with the unlawful
handling283. If these findings were applied to the first period of Art 79(2) GDPR, then the provision
could vest jurisdiction in the courts of the MS of the establishment where the infringement of the
regulation  took  place,  and where  activities  carried  out  were  inextricably linked with  the  same
infringement. Where followed, this reading could lower the risk of forum shopping and yet favor
the data subject sufficiently284. 
The second reading should thus be preferred in that it better reflects the case law of the
CJEU,  whereas  the  first  reading,  a  part  from encouraging  forum shopping,  could  lead  to  the
application of Art 79(2) GDPR also in cases lacking an international element285.
277 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 
451; D. COOPER, C. KUNER, Data Protection Law and International Dispute Resolution, in RCADI, CCCLXXXII, 
2017, p. 121.
278 See G. VAN CLASTER, Sur des bases fragiles. Le RGPD et les règles de compétence concernant les infractions au 
droit respect de la vie privée, p. 29; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) 
n. 2016/679 concernenti il trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel 
regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 453.
279 See P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data 
Protection Regulation, p. 100.
280 See ID., p. 101.
281 Namely, on Directive 95/46/EC and, in particular, on Art 4(1)(a) thereof.
282 See Art 3(1) and the first period of Recital (22) GDPR. See also the findings of the CJEU on Art 4(1)(a) Directive 
95/46/EC in Google Spain, point 52, and Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstetin, point 57.
283 See CJEU, Google Spain, points 51 ff; Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, point 60.
284 However, alike the first, the second reading does not secure a strong connection between the seised court and the 
infringement of the GDPR in all cases. This is the consequence of taking the flexible notion of establishment, which is 
linked to a wider issue: the far reaching scope of European data protection legislation. Cf. I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial 
Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy Tourism''?, p. 26 ff.
285 The international element that triggers the application of Art 79(2) GDPR consists in the difference between the MS
where the data subject habitually resides and that where the establishment of the controller is located. The first reading 
examined above appears to imply that the existence of an establishment in a foreign MS may be sufficient to trigger the 
application of Art 79(2) GDRP. If so, the provision could be applicable in purely domestic cases, that is to say, where 
the data subject, the controller, the infringement and the damage caused are located in the same MS, insofar as the 
controller has an establishment in a different MS. Instead, following the second and preferred reading also examined 
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Drawing  on  Art  81  GDPR,  the  provision  addresses  the  issue  of  multiple  proceedings
concerning «the same subject matter as regards processing by the same controller». Pursuant to Art
81(1) and (2) GDPR, where such proceedings are pending before the courts of different MSs, the
MS court second seised may elect to suspend proceedings instituted before it, but only after having
taken contact with the MS court first seised, to confirm the existence of proceedings concerning the
processing by the same controller. Art 81(3) GDPR further provides that, where proceedings are
pending at first instance before the MS court second seized, the latter may also, on application of
one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the MS court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in
question and its law permits consolidation thereof286.
Recital (144) GDPR might suggest that Art 81 of the regulation only refers to proceedings
instituted under Art 78 of the same regulation, that is to say against a decision by a supervisory
authority287.288 However, the recital may not lead to a narrower reading of Art 81 GDPR and the
broad wording of the provision suggests that it should also be applicable to multiple proceedings
instituted under Art 79(2) of the regulation289.
If  this  is  correct,  then  a  following question  arises:  whether  the  provision  applies  where
multiple  proceedings  are  instituted  by  data  subjects  only,  or  also  where  such  proceedings  are
pending in parallel with those instituted by a controller, under different heads of jurisdiction, say Art
7(2) B1R (§ 4).
Though the wording of Art 81 GDPR appears to be broad enough to cover also the latter
case, it has been held that, where multiple proceedings are instituted respectively by data subjects
and controllers, their coordination should be governed by the general rules of the B1R and not those
of the GDPR290. 
Unlike Art 81 GDPR, general rules of the B1R on related proceedings and lis pendens are
based on the principle of temporal priority: the MS courts second seised must stay proceedings. As
discussed below (§ 5), the principle enshrined in these general rules is inadequate in mass harm
situations, such as those that may arise from infringements of the GDPR.
above, the international element may exist only if the MS where the data subject habitually resides is different from that
of the establishment where the infringement of the GDPR took place, or where activities inextricably linked to the same
infringement were carried out. There appears to be also another element that should be deemed international and thus 
trigger the application of Art 79(2) GDPR: damage resulting from the infringement of the regulation caused in a MS 
other than that where the data subject habitually resides.
286 This provision was clearly inspired from Art 30(2) B1R.
287 P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data 
Protection Regulation, p. 106.
288 Actually, this reading may be upheld by referring to Art 76(3) and (4) of the proposed text of the GDPR. See 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection), COM(2012) 11 final, 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0011/COM_CO
M(2012)0011_EN.pdf).
289 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 
458 and footnote 29.
290 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 
458 ff.
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These are the reasons why the preferred reading of Art 81 GDPR is that the provision may
apply  in  cases  of  multiple  proceedings  concerning  the  processing  by  the  same  controller,
irrespective of the party that has instituted them.
4. Indeed, domestic courts, and, ultimately,  the CJEU will have the last say as to which
jurisdictional rules of the B1R will survive the GDPR291. In the meantime, scholars have faced the
issue with reference to, in particular, Arts 4(1), 7, 18, 25, 26, 29 and 30 B1R, which respectively
provide for the general head of jurisdiction, special heads of jurisdiction, the head of jurisdiction
over consumer contracts, prorogation of jurisdiction, related proceedings and lis pendens.
Before examining each of the provisions mentioned above and the interface with the GDPR,
it must be recalled that Art 79(2) of the regulation does not govern jurisdiction over actions brought
by controllers, which instead may fall within the purview of the B1R.
Having this recalled, under Art 4(1) B1R, a person domiciled in a MS may be sued in the
courts of that MS. This provision is not exactly the same as the one in the first period of Art 79(2)
GDPR, since the notion of domicile is narrower than that of establishment within the meaning of
the latter provision. In particular, when it comes to companies, following Art 63 B1R, domicile is
the place of the MS where the company (or other legal person or association) has its statutory seat,
central administration or principal place of business. As a consequence, where the place of domicile
is not the establishment within the meaning of the first period of Art 79(2) GDPR, the data subject
should be allowed to sue the controller also in the courts of the MS where the controller has its
domicile under Arts 4(1) and 63 B1R292.
Moving to special heads of jurisdiction of the B1R, these apply in addition to the general
head of jurisdiction and thus, under the latter regulation, a claimant may elect whether to sue a
defendant domiciled in a MS either in the courts mentioned in Art 4(1), or, alternatively, in those
mentioned in Art 7 of the same regulation293.
Art 7(1) B1R provides that, in matters relating to contract, courts having jurisdiction are
those of the MS where the place of performance of the obligation in question is located294. It is
submitted that,  where the provisions  of the GDPR are embedded in a  contract  between a data
subject and a controller, and disputes arise from the infringement of the same provisions, the latter
should also be allowed to sue in the courts of the MS mentioned in Art 7(1) B1R295, which – though
unlikely – may be different from those mentioned in Art 79(2) GDPR.
291 See I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy 
Tourism''?, p. 22.
292 See L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 
13; I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy Tourism''?, 
p. 22.
293 See Art 5(1) B1R.
294 See Art 7(1)(a) B1R.
295 See L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 
13-14; C. KOHLER, Conflict of Law Issues in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, p. 669-670; 
M. BRKAN, Data protection and European private international law: observing a bull in a China shop, in International 
Data Privacy Law, p. 266.
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Instead, where disputes concern contracts entered into by weaker parties296, protective heads
of  jurisdiction apply297.  These heads  of  jurisdiction take precedence over  the other  rules of the
B1R298 and  purport  to  favor  weaker  parties  on  a  jurisdictional  level.  Art  18  B1R  deals  with
jurisdiction over consumers contracts. Akin to Art 79(2) GDPR, Art 18(1) B1R provides that a
consumer may sue the professional either in the courts of the MS where he is domiciled or where
the latter is based. Hence, where a contract embedding the provisions of the GDPR exists and the
data subject is a consumer,  the latter  should be able to rely on Art 18 B1R 299,  especially if his
domicile is different from that where he habitually resides within the meaning of Art 79(2) GDPR.
Art 18 B1R also provides that the professional may sue the consumer only in the MS where
the latter is domiciled300. Though clearly inspired by the protective rules on jurisdiction of the B1R,
including Art 18 thereof, surprisingly, neither Art 79 GDPR, nor any other provision of the latter
regulation, governs jurisdiction over actions brought by the controller against the data subject and
thus, as repeatedly mentioned above, jurisdiction over such actions may be governed by the general
rules of the B1R.
Drawing back to special heads of jurisdiction, under Art 7(2) B1R, in matters relating to tort
jurisdiction lies with the court of the MS where the harmful event occurred or may occur. This is the
provision of the B1R that has raised major debate among scholar as to the interface of the latter
regulation and the GDPR.
Following the sc. ubiquity approach taken by the ECJ, Art 7(2) B1R vests jurisdiction both
in the courts of the MS where damage is caused and in those of the MS where the event giving rise
to it takes place301.
In the specific case of claims for compensation of damages arising from the infringement of
personality rights by means of content placed online on an internet website302, the CJEU held that
296 During the recasting of Reg. (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, by its letter of 20 September 2011, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor urged the Commission to consider whether «jurisdictional rules [should] protect the weaker party 
also in data protection litigation». The proposal was dropped and, ultimately, only consumers, insured (policyholders 
and beneficiaries) and individual employees qualify as weaker parties under the B1R. See the letter of the 20th of 
September 2011, by the European Data Protection Authority, addressed to the Commission and bearing the following 
record number: GB/HH/et/D(2011)1571 C 2011-0106 (https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/11-09-
20_letter_reding_en.pdf).
297 See Sections 3, 4 and 5 B1R, which respectively apply in cases of insurance, consumer and individual employment 
contracts.
298 Except exclusive heads of jurisdiction in Art 23 B1R.
299 See M. BRKAN, Data protection and European private international law: observing a bull in a China shop, in 
International Data Privacy Law, p. 276-278. See also L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border 
private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 14 ff.
300 See Art 18(2) B1R.
301 See CJEU, 30.11.1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA., 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=89372&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3528393).
302 See, for further readings, M. A. LUPOI, Attività online e criteri di collegamento giurisdizionale, in RTDPC, 2018, p.
509 ff; Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, delivered on 13.7.2018, in C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid 
Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:554 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=195583&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3528548); B. HESS, The 
Protection of Privacy in the Case Law of the CJEU, in B. HESS, C. M. MARIOTTINI (eds.), Protecting Privacy in Private
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courts having jurisdiction under Art 7(2) B1R are those of the MS where the injured party has his
center of interests – which, though unlikely, may be different from his habitual residence – or those
where the publisher is established, or, alternatively, those where the content placed online is or has
been accessible303. Following such case law, in the first two cases, the courts have jurisdiction over
damage to the injured party, wherever it was caused, whereas, in the third case, the courts of the MS
have jurisdiction only over damage caused in that State304.
Provided that, potentially, content placed online may be accessed in all 28 MSs, the courts of
all such MSs could take jurisdiction, though only in relation to damage caused in their respective
territory305. This solution leads to a fragmentation of jurisdiction amongst the courts of the MSs and
is why the approach taken by the CJEU is known as the “mosaic” approach.
It  is  doubt  whether  the  “mosaic”  approach should  extend to  Art  79(2)  GDPR306;  the  preferred
reading  is  it  should  not307.  In  cases  of  claims  for  compensation  of  damages  arising  from the
infringement of the right to data protection on the internet, the courts of the MS seised under Art
79(2) should be allowed to assess the entire damage suffered by the data subject, even where such
courts are not those of the MS where the latter has his center of interests or where the controller is
established308.  If  otherwise,  the  aim pursued by the  GDPR of  granting  data  subjects  «full  and
effective compensation for the damage they have suffered»309 could be undermined.
Furthermore, scholars disagree as to whether Art 79(2) GDPR may apply in parallel with Art
7(2) B1R, even if the latter provision admittedly increases the number of MS courts the data subject
may rely on. Those who rule out the possibility stress that, if both provisions were applicable, in
case of infringements of the right to data protection on the internet, data subjects would be granted
International and Procedural Law and Data Protection, Baden-Baden, 2015, p. 89 ff.
303 See CJEU, 25.10.2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH and Others v X and Société MGN 
LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=111742&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3528601) and, most 
recently, 17.10.2018, C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=195583&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3528684).
304 See CJEU, eDate Advertising, points 42 ff, citing CJEU, 7.3.2005, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., 
Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA., ECLI:EU:C:1995:61 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=98911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3528759), on a case of 
defamation through the press, where the court took, for the first time, the “mosaic” approach. 
305 See Opinion of AG Bobek, in Bolagsupplysningen, points 77 and 80.
306 See G. VAN CLASTER, Sur des bases fragiles. Le RGPD et les règles de compétence concernant les infractions au 
droit respect de la vie privée, p. 29.
307 Cf. L. LUNDSTEDT, International jurisdiction over cross-border private enforcement actions under the GDPR, p. 
29; M. BRKAN, Data protection and European private international law: observing a bull in a China shop, in 
International Data Privacy Law, p. 271.
308 In the eDate Advertising the notion of establishment is that taken in Directive 2000/31/EC, which appears to be 
slightly narrower than that of the GDPR. See CJEU, eDate Advertising, points 53 ff; Recital (19) Directive 2000/31/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, 
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on electronic commerce”), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p.
1 ff (http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj).
309 Recital (146) GDPR.
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an  «overextended jurisdictional  privilege»310 and  this  «would harm the clarity and unity of  the
special regime laid down in Art 79(2) GDPR»311.
Even if these assumptions were correct, there appears to be a reason why the concurrent
application of Art 7(2) B1R and 79(2) GDPR should be endorsed.
Art  7(2)  B1R  governs  jurisdiction  also  over  actions  brought  by  alleged  tortfeasors  for
negative declarations seeking to establish the absence of their liability in tort312. Now, bearing in
mind that  jurisdiction over  actions  brought by controllers  seeking a declaration of non-liability
under the GDPR may be, in principle, governed by Art 7(2) B1R313, if the latter provision were not
applicable in parallel with Art 79(2) GDPR, then controllers could sue in a greater number of MSs
than those where the data subject could.  This imbalance would be even greater where the data
subject were claiming together with data subjects from different MSs, through an Art 80(1) GDPR
NGO, in which case, the only courts available would be those of the MS where the controller has an
establishment (§ 5). All this appears to be inconsistent with the protective policy underlying the
GDPR and is  why a  concurrent  application  of  Art  79(2)  thereof  and  Art  7(2)  B1R should  be
endorsed.
Coming to prorogation of jurisdiction by consent, under Art 25 B1R, parties may agree that
«the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or
which  may  arise  between  them  in  connection  with  a  particular  legal  relationship».  A similar
agreement on jurisdiction may be either exclusive or non-exclusive; it is exclusive where the parties
have not agreed otherwise. Where exclusive, the agreement confers jurisdiction on the selected MS
court  and derogates  jurisdiction of  any other  court,  whereas  a  non-exclusive one  only bestows
authority upon the selected courts. This means that, where a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement
applies, a part from the selected MS courts, other courts may take jurisdiction over the prorogued
disputes, insofar as they are provided with such under different rules of the B1R, say, for instance,
Arts 4(1) or 7 thereof.
But a jurisdiction agreement may also be asymmetric. An asymmetric jurisdiction agreement
is one which provides one of the parties with a greater number of courts to resort to. A particular
kind of asymmetric agreements are sc. one-sided jurisdiction agreements, whereby one party may
sue only in the courts of one State and the other may sue in the courts of that and other States. In
other words, such a kind of jurisdiction agreements are exclusive for one party and non-exclusive
for the other. 
Similar agreements are the only that, according to the B1R, weaker parties, amongst which
consumers, may enter into314. In fact, following Art 19 B1R, in case disputes have arisen between a
consumer and a professional,  the litigants may enter into a jurisdiction agreement  according to
310 I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy Tourism''?, 
p. 23.
311 P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data 
Protection Regulation, p. 105.
312 See CJEU, 25.10.2012, C-133/11, Folien Fischer AG and Fofitec AG v Ritrama SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2012:664 
(curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=128908&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3529058).
313 But see P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the General Data
Protection Regulation, p. 92 and 105.
314 See Arts 15, 19 and 23 B1R.
73
II.1
which the consumer may sue in more MS courts than those made available in Art 18(1) B1R, whilst
leaving the professional with no other choice than suing in the courts where the same consumer is
domiciled.
Under the GDPR, jurisdiction agreements should be permitted, as far as they increase the
number of MS courts where the data subject may sue the controller315, whilst reducing or leaving
unaffected  the  number  of  MS  courts  made  available  to  the  controller.  Hence,  a  one-sided
jurisdiction agreement favoring the data subject should be permitted, whereas an exclusive or a non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement should not316.
This said, prorogation of jurisdiction may also take place tacitly. According to Art 26 B1R,
tacit prorogation of jurisdiction occurs when a party enters into an appearance before the court of a
MS without challenging jurisdiction,  thereby vesting the seised court with such. Art 26(2) B1R
provides that, where the defendant is a weaker party, such as a consumer, the seised courts must
inform the  latter  that  he  may contest  jurisdiction  and  the  consequences  of  entering  or  not  an
appearance. 
Also the latter provision of the B1R should be applicable in parallel with the jurisdictional
rules of the GDPR, unless the data subject is the defendant317. In the latter case, where the data
subject is the defendant, Art 26 B1R should not be applicable318, or, perhaps, it could be, insofar as
the latter be granted the same protection weaker parties enjoy under the second paragraph of the
provision.
Drawing on the rules on the coordination of proceedings provided for in the B1R, Art 29
thereof deals with the case of «proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the
same parties brought before the courts of different MSs», whilst following Art 30 of the regulation
deals with «related actions (…) pending in the courts of different MSs». In essence, these rules aim
at preventing conflicting decisions and, in both cases, this risk is addressed by providing that the
MS courts second seised must stay proceedings and, where applicable, decline jurisdiction in favor
of the MS courts first seised319. Unless an exclusive jurisdiction agreement applies320, the courts
second seised have no discretion. On the contrary, Art 81 GDPR leaves the MS courts second seised
free to elect whether to stay proceedings321.
315 See I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy 
Tourism''?, p. 23-24; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 
concernenti il trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento 
“Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 452; P. FRANZINA, Jurisdiction regarding Claims for the Infringement of Privacy Rights under the 
General Data Protection Regulation, p. 107-108.
316 Cf. C. KOHLER, Conflict of Law Issues in the 2016 Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, p. 669.
317 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della giurisdizione nel regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679 concernenti il 
trattamento dei dati personali e il suo coordinamento con la disciplina contenuta nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, p. 
452.
318 See I. REVOLIDIS, Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations and the GDPR: a Case of ''Privacy 
Tourism''?, p. 24-25.
319 See, respectively, Arts 29(1) and 30(2) B1R.
320 See Art 31(2) B1R.
321 See above § 2.
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Where proceedings concern the processing by the same controller, it appears that the latter
provision should take precedence over Arts 29 and 30 B1R322. This, as mentioned above (§ 3), in the
light of the broad wording of Art 81 GDPR and for the further reasons discussed below (§ 5).
5. Infringements of data protection legislation often affect a large number of data subjects
based in  different  States and,  in  mass harm situations,  injured parties  are  keen to seek redress
collectively, rather than separately.
I t is likely that the assumptions above were the basis for Art 80(1) GDPR, according to which
the rights granted by Art  79(1) and 82(1)  of the regulation may be exercised by data  subjects
collectively through a «non-for-profit body, organisation or association»323, to the extent that the
laws  of  the  MS  courts  seised  permit  collective  actions324.  Actually,  despite  Recommendation
2013/396/EU  encouraging  MSs  to  introduce  injunctive  and  compensatory  collective  redress
mechanisms for the implementation of rights granted under EU law325, not all MSs have326 and only
in a small number of them such mechanisms appear to be «relatively well-functioning»327.328
This  said,  the  GDPR does  not  provide  for  a  specific  rule  on  jurisdiction  applicable  to
collective claims329.  Nonetheless, Art 79(2) GDPR should also be deemed applicable where the
claimant is an NGO seeking an effective judicial remedy or compensation on the behalf of data
subjects. In fact, though Art 79(1) GDPR speaks of the data subject’s right to an effective judicial
remedy, the second paragraph of the provision only mentions court proceedings instituted against a
controller. The wording of Art 79(2) GDPR thus suggests that the scope  ratione personae of the
322 Cfr. A. BARLETTA, La tutela effettiva della privacy nello spazio (giudiziario) europeo nel tempo (della 
“aterittorialità”) di internet, 1199.
323 For sake of completeness, the second and last paragraph of Art 80 GDPR stipulates that MSs may provide that 
NGOs may exercise the right referred to in Art 79 – but not that referred to in Art 82(1) – autonomously.
324 Art 80(1) GDPR further provides that the NGO may represent the data subject, as far as it has been «properly 
constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public interest, and 
is active in the field of the protection of the data subjects’ rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their 
personal data».
325 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law (2013/396/EU), in 
OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, p. 60 ff (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2013/396/oj).
326 See Report from the Commission to the Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee
on the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union 
law (2013/396/EU), COM(2018) 40 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2018:40:FIN).
327 On the shortcomings of collective redress in the EU and the need for a uniform framework of law in the field of 
data protection, see L. JANČIŪTĖ, Data protection and the construction of collective redress in Europe: exploring 
challenges and opportunities (February 27, 2018). Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3136040 (accessed 
15.8.2018).
328 Most recently, on the 11th of April 2018, the European Parliament and the Council passed a proposal for a directive 
on representative actions for protection of the collective interests of consumers, which should cover «a variety of areas 
such as data protection». See Recital (6) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, 
COM(2018) 184 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0184).
329 See M. BRKAN, Data protection and European private international law: observing a bull in a China shop, in 
International Data Privacy Law, p. 273.
75
II.1
provision is  determined by the defendant (a controller  or processor) and regardless of who the
claimant  is330.  Furthermore,  Art  80(1)  GDPR provides  that  the  NGO may exercise  the right  to
receive compensation on behalf of data subjects, whilst Art 82(6) of the regulation provides that
proceedings for exercising such right shall be instituted in the MS courts referred to in Art 79(2) of
the same regulation. Hence, the combined reading of Art 80(1) and 82(6) GDPR further suggests
that  Art  79(2)  of  the  regulation  might  be applicable  where  the  NGO is  appointed  by the  data
subjects to seek compensation on their behalf.331
If so, where data subjects have their habitual residence in the same MS, Art 79(2) GDPR
should allow the NGO to sue either before the courts of that MS or those of the MS where the
controller has an establishment, provided that – it must be recalled – the laws of such MSs permit
collective actions.  Instead,  in  the case where the data  subjects  have their  habitual  residence in
different MSs, the NGO they have appointed should be allowed to sue on their behalf only in the
courts of the MSs where the controller has an establishment, since the courts of the MS where only
part of the data subjects have their habitual residence would be lacking jurisdiction with respect to
the rest of them.
What follows from the above is also that, where data subjects acting collectively have their
habitual residence in different MSs, Art 79(2) GDPR could provide the appointed NGO with just
one forum, that of the MS where the controller has an establishment, as far as – once again – the
laws of such MS permit collective actions. 
If this is correct and if Art 79(2) GDPR were the only applicable head of jurisdiction in
similar cases, a controller could prevent the risk of being the subject of a collective action brought
by an NGO appointed by data subjects habitually residing in different MS, by placing its one and
only establishment in a MS where collective claims are not permitted or difficult to be pursued. 
But Art 79(2) GDPR should not be the only head of jurisdiction NGOs should be able to rely
on. NGOs should also be allowed to sue in the courts of the MSs having jurisdiction under Art 4(1)
and 7(2) B1R. In fact, though also heads of jurisdiction of the B1R are ill-suited for collective
actions,  the two provisions  of the latter  regulation allow several  claimants  to  sue one or more
defendants in the courts of the same MS simultaneously332.
330 See also Recital (145) GDPR, which refers to the «plaintiff», rather than to the «data subject».
331 On the contrary, as underlined by Lein, the head of jurisdiction over consumer contracts in Art 19 B1R is «lost in 
cases in which an association or representative is acting for the consumers». In fact, the CJEU holds that the head of 
jurisdiction applies only where the consumer is, «in his personal capacity, the plaintiff or defendant», provided that, in 
accordance with the wording of Art 16 Reg. (EC) No 44/2001 (today, Art 19 B1R), the provision applies «only to an 
action brought by a consumer against the other party to the contract, which necessarily implies that a contract has been 
concluded by the consumer with the trader or professional concerned». Nonetheless, there are strong reasons why the 
rule on jurisdiction should be opened to class actions. See, respectively, E. LEIN, Cross-Border Collective Redress and 
Jurisdiction under Brussels I: A Mismatch, in D. FAIRGRIEVE, E. LEIN (eds.), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress, 
Oxford, 2012, p. 135; CJEU, 25.1.2018, C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:37, points 44 and 45 and the case law cited therein 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=198764&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3530052); M. MORANI, 
L’azione di classe in Europa, aspettando la Corte di giustizia europea sul caso Schrems vs. Facebook, in Int’l Lis, 2016.
332 See A. STRADLER, The Commission’s Recommendation on Common Principles of Collective Redress and Private 
International Law, in E. LEIN, D. FIRGRIEVE, M. OTERO CRESPO, V. SMITH (eds.), Collective Redress in Europe – Why 
and How?, London, 2015, p. 242 ff; E. LEIN, Cross-Border Collective Redress and Jurisdiction under Brussels I: A 
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The reason  why NGOs should  be  allowed to  bring  collective  claims  also  in  the  courts
mentioned in Arts 4(1) and 7(2) B1R is that, on the contrary, the controller could resort to a greater
number of MS courts, where to file an action seeking a declaration of non-liability under Art 7(2)
B1R333.
Conversely, it is submitted that rules on the coordination of jurisdiction set forth in the B1R
based on the principle  of  temporal  priority do not  «provide adequate solutions» in  mass  harm
situations, where «there is a high probability that [such situations] will be picked up by various
representative associations or claimants in different Member States»334.
In similar situations, where harm results from the same infringement of the GDPR, if the
general rules of the B1R were applicable, the instituting of proceedings by a single data subject or
NGO in the courts of a Member State could block the proceedings instituted by the other injured
data subjects or Art 80(1) GDPR NGOs in the courts of a different MS.  The data subjects or  Art
80(1)  GDPR NGOs  would  be  tripping  themselves…  Furthermore,  if  such  general  rules  were
deemed applicable, controllers could be encouraged to practice “forum running”: to sue first in the
most favorable courts and block any following proceeding instituted by the data subjects or NGOs
in a different MS. 
Hence, in mass harm situations, a rule bestowing discretion upon the Member State courts
second seised, such as that in Art 81 GDPR, appears to be consistent with the protective policy
underlying the regulation, as well as a more appropriate rule in mass harm situations335. Besides, Art
81 GDPR, addresses the risk of conflicting decisions adequately, by placing on the MS court second
seised the duty to take contacts with the MS court first seised. 
This is the reasons why, a part from the far reaching wording employed in Art 81 GDPR,
Arts 29 and 30 B1R should be no longer deemed applicable where multiple proceedings concern the
processing by the same controller.
6. The parallel application of the heads of jurisdiction of the GDPR and those of the B1R
might be a “forensic nightmare”, but it should be endorsed to the largest extent possible. 
Most of the issues examined above appear to be the result of a drafting shortcoming in Art
79(2) GDPR: unlike protective heads of jurisdiction of the B1R, the provision does not deal with
jurisdiction over actions brought by the stronger party, the controller. As a consequence, provided
that the controller may rely on the rules of the B1R, the data subject should be allowed to rely on
the same rules too. If otherwise, especially in the case of actions in tort and those brought by NGOs,
there is a risk that the data subjects may resort to a lower number of MS courts than those made
available to the controller, and this would be inconsistent with the protective policy underlying the
GDPR. 
Mismatch, p. 132 ff.
333 This is true to the extent that it is submitted that the jurisdictional favor that reflects the protective policy underlying
the GDPR also concerns NGOs.
334 A. STADLER, Focus on Collective Redress: Cross-border Problems. Available at 
https://www.collectiveredress.org/collective-border-problems (accessed 15.8.2018). See also ID, The Commission’s 
Recommendation, p. 247-248.
335 But see A. BARLETTA, La tutela effettiva della privacy nello spazio (giudiziario) europeo nel tempo (della 
“aterittorialità”) di internet, p. 1199.
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Conversely,  since  they appear  to  be  inadequate  in  mass  harm situation,  in  cases  where
multiple proceedings concern the processing by the same controller, rules on the coordination of
such proceedings provided for in the B1R should no longer be deemed applicable.
In conclusion, though criticized by most scholars, yet the jurisdictional rules of the GDPR
represent an effort that must be praised, in that they are the first known uniform rules that govern
jurisdiction over civil and commercial claims in matters relating to the right to data protection.
ENNIO PIOVESANI
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Comity upon request. What does the new U.S. CLOUD Act tell us
about the future of data flow regulation?
SUMMARY: 1. The argument and background of the paper. – 2. An overview of the U.S. v. Microsoft
litigation and the U.S. Cloud Act. – 3. Possible motivations for a comity-upon-request rule and the
“information problem”. – 4. Assumptions and observations supporting the “information problem”
view. – 5. Clashing state interests: Securitization of private data flows and the facilitation of global
market  access.  – 6.  Data location as a  connecting factor.  – 7.  The proxy theory of  connecting
factors. – 8. Conclusion.
1.  This  paper  focuses  on  a  new  framework  provided  by  the  U.S.  “Clarifying  Lawful
Overseas Use of Data Act” (hereinafter “Cloud Act”)336 that is designed overcome jurisdictional
conflicts with regards to law enforcement orders compelling service providers to disclose user data
that is stored abroad on cloud computing based systems.
The Cloud Act was passed by the Congress in March 2018, bundled in a yearly budget act
and passed without much discussion in the legislature.  The Cloud Act  seeks to  circumvent the
jurisdictional problem by authorizing disclosure warrants compelling service providers resident in
the U.S. to disclose user information to U.S. authorities wherever the information is stored, but at
the same time allowing the service provider to move to quash the compelling order (“warrant”) in
cases where the service provider finds it on its own initiative and discretion that the compliance
with  the  order  risks  giving  rise  to  a  conflict  of  laws.  The  law sets  guidelines  for  a  “comity”
assessment that the court will undertake upon a motion to quash duly made by the service provider.
I argue that a motivation on the part of the U.S. government to create such a solution may be an
interest in facilitating global market access of U.S. service providers without forfeiting more of its
prescriptive authority than necessary.  I further argue that this motivation should be studied as a
universal central trend that is shaping the global regulation of data flows.
336 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), H.R. 4943, enacted by Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, 23 March 2018 (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-115hr1625enr/html/BILLS-
115hr1625enr.htm). 
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2.  The Cloud Act became law just in time to render the  U.S. v. Microsoft 337 (hereinafter
“Microsoft”) case before the U.S. Supreme Court moot, dodging (at least for a time) international
repercussions that would result from a generally applicable Supreme Court judgment. That case
concerned the refusal of Microsoft Corporation to disclose to the FBI user data that was stored in a
data  center  located in Ireland upon the service of  a  disclosure warrant  issued by a  U.S. court,
arguing  that  the  warrant  constituted  an  unlawful  extraterritorial  application  of  the  Stored
Communications Act (SCA) under which the disclosure warrant was provided for.338 A generally
applicable Supreme Court judgment would be problematic whichever party prevailed at the end,
because  it  would  either  force  the  U.S.  internet  service  providers  to  disclose  user  information
wherever in the world that the information was stored, or it would foreclose the access of U.S. law
enforcement to user data stored abroad in all cases, even when the crime and suspect was closely
connected to the U.S.
The Cloud Act  was drafted  and passed following debates  that  focused on whether  data
location  could  be  a  feasible  determinant  of  which  state  had  prescriptive  and  enforcement
jurisdiction over the compelled disclosure by law enforcement of user data with regard to cloud
computing based services. Major U.S. service providers were apprehensive of the penalties they
might face if  they disclosed to U.S. law enforcement (upon a warrant from a U.S. court)  data
located in  other  countries  that  had strict  rules on international  personal  data  transfers.  The EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)339 in particular proved to be very problematic due to
the fact that (i) Europe was one of the major export markets of major U.S. cloud providers, (ii) a
combination of court cases (such as Google Spain340) that strengthened the reach of the EU personal
data protection rules to a broader range of service provider activity and the consolidation of the
view in Europe that personal data protection rules should exclusively regulate law enforcement
cooperation with third countries341,  and (iii)  the GDPR prescribed very substantial  penalties for
violation  of  third  country transfer  rules.342 American  law enforcement  worried that  without  the
authority to compel disclosure of data located abroad, it would not be possible to collect evidence in
many crimes that  exclusively concerned the United States or U.S. persons,  since Mutual  Legal
Assistance  Treaties  were  not  efficient  in  the  timely  collection  of  electronic  evidence.343 The
government  of the United Kingdom also had a  prominent  voice in  these discussions,  and they
337 United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 584 U.S. ___ (2018). (https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-2).  
338 18 U.S.C. § 2703, (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2703).
339 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88, (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj).
340 Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja González, Case C-131/12, 13 May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
341 The latter can be evidenced in the (ex) Article 29 Working Party’s position related to the Council of Europe 
Budapest Cybercrime Convention. The WP29 strongly advocated against any interpretation of Articles 18 and 32 of that
Convention that might undermine the application of the GDPR’s data transfer regime to criminal law enforcement 
cooperation with third countries. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, Data Protection and 
Privacy Aspects of Cross-Border Access to Electronic Evidence, statement of 29 November 2017 
(http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=48801).
342 See B. SMITH, Written Testimony of Brad Smith President and Chief Legal Officer, Microsoft Corporation 
submitted the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 10 May 2017 
(https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/05-24-17-smith-testimony).
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advocated for either setting up a bilateral framework that allowed the two governments to directly
request the disclosure of user data from service providers in cases where the crime was exclusively
related to one of the states and their residents, wherever the data is located.344 As to contributions
from academia, two voices distinguished themselves. Jennifer Daskal, who was one of the main
proponent  of  the Cloud Act  in  academia,  argued that  the  nature of  data  increasingly created  a
discrepancy between the outcome that a data location based territorial rule is expected to yield in
terms of a stratification between the several  sovereign interests  involved,  and the real  outcome
created  when that  territorial  rule  is  applied  and enforced in  practice.345 Daskal  argued that  the
solution  necessarily  required  a  multilateral  approach  at  the  international  level.  Contra Daskal,
Andrew Woods turned to conflict of laws methodologies for the solution. According to his point of
view, data does not offer a special difficulty, and the conflict of laws discipline has the necessary
tools in its disposal to deal with the conflicting interests, largely on a case by case basis, and to
create new guiding principles to equitably distribute prescriptive and enforcement powers to the
sovereigns involved. Woods suggested that the abovementioned discrepancies between expected
outcomes and real outcomes be overcome by courts employing some type of governmental interest
analysis.346 For  American  commentators,  reference  to  a  governmental/state  interest  analysis  is
informed  by  American  common  law  that  incorporates  various  choice-of-law  methodologies
developed as a result of the so-called American Conflicts Revolution.347 In Europe, on the other
hand, there is generally less doctrinal ground on which courts can explicitly analyze the conflicting
interests on a case by case basis. 
The Cloud Act creates two new statutory rights for service providers. 18 U.S.C. §2702(b)(9)
stipulates that service providers may voluntarily disclose the contents of communications held in
electronic storage, or carried or maintained by the provider to foreign governments upon request
given that the foreign government is party to an executive agreement pursuant to §2523. §2702(c)
(7) provides the same right in relation to customer records. Direct disclosures of user content data to
foreign governments were explicitly forbidden under the previous version of the law. The second
statutory right is the right to file a motion to quash or modify a warrant obtained from a U.S. court
for disclosure of user data only if the disclosure would require the service provider to violate the law
of a foreign government qualified by executive agreement  and the subject of the warrant is not a
U.S.  person  or  U.S.  resident  (§2703(h)(2)).  Upon this  motion,  the  court  will  make  a  «comity
343 «the MLA process can lack the requisite efficiency for time-sensitive investigations and other emergencies, making 
it an impractical alternative to SCA warrants in many cases» B. WIEGMAN, Statement of Brad Wiegman U.S. Deputy 
Ass’t Att’y Gen. before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 24 May 2017, p.6 
(https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/05-24-17-wiegmann-testimony); «[MLATs] are widely regarded in the law 
enforcement community as a wholly ineffective alternative to obtaining evidence.» R. LITTLEHALE, Written Statement 
by Richard Littlehale Special Agent in Charge Tennessee Bureau of Investigation submitted to the United States House 
of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, June 15, 2017, p. 2 (https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Littlehale-Testimony.pdf). 
344 P. MCGUINNESS, Written Testimony of Mr Paddy McGuinness United Kingdom Deputy National Security Adviser 
submitted the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 10 May 2017, 
(https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/05-24-17-mcguinness-testimony). 
345 J. DASKAL, The Un-Territoriality of Data, in YLJ, 2005, p. 326.
346 A. K. WOODS, Against Data Exceptionalism, in SLR, 2016, p.729.
347 S. C. SYMEONIDES, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future, Leiden, 2006.
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analysis» by considering the specific factors provided under §2703(h)(3). This comity analysis that
is done upon motion (which I call “comity-upon-request” in line with the argument of this paper) is
explicitly  distinguished  in  the  text  of  law  from the  ordinary  comity  doctrine  under  American
common law. Also, service providers may notify qualified foreign governments in cases where a
disclosure of data process concerns data belonging to their nationals or residents, which would be
illegal under the previous version of the law.
American critics of the new law have mostly focused on another set of provisions in the law
that relax the SCA’s previous categorical ban on the disclosure of user content data to foreign law
enforcement  by  allowing  U.S.  service  providers  to  disclose  user  content  to  criminal  justice
authorities  of  foreign  governments  that  have  signed  an  executive  agreement  with  the  U.S.
government.348 These critics fear that direct foreign government access to U.S. provider held user
data could be used to circumvent U.S. rules regarding user privacy, since the executive agreement
framework does not require foreign legal systems that will be authorized to have a probable cause
standard for compelled search and seizure equivalent to the U.S. standard and the data acquired
could end up being used in U.S. lawsuits, which is especially problematic if data regarding U.S.
persons are  also  acquired  in  the  process  although the  executive  agreement  framework requires
foreign governments to adopt data minimization procedures to filter out and eliminate data that may
be connected to U.S. persons.349 These critics also point at the danger that the relaxation of the
absolute disclosure ban may result in “bad states” accessing data of users.
3.  The  important  privacy  and  evidence-standard  implications  of  the  Cloud  Act
notwithstanding,  in  this  paper  I  want  to  focus  instead  on the  comity-upon-request  rule  and  its
possible motivations and logic. I argue that the comity-upon-request rule might be motivated by an
information  problem  that  is  the  result  of  an  effort  to  recalibrate  and  use  conflict  of  laws
methodology to facilitate corporate access to a global data storage and processing market. As data
storage is a commodity in these markets, the fact that data location (which is an inalienable physical
property of data storage) is imbued with jurisdictional claims by legal systems creates compliance-
related costs  but also costs  related to legal  uncertainty.  A legal  system, which in  turn seeks to
facilitate its domestic corporations access to a foreign data (storage) market can forfeit a part of its
own prescriptive and enforcement authority in order to reduce the potential for conflict of laws that
create  such  costs;  but  such  a  forfeiture  has  its  own social  and  political  costs  as  forfeiture  of
authority (which corresponds to deference to a foreign legal system) means a decrease in the state’s
348 18 U.S.C. §2523, (http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-
section2523&num=0&edition=prelim). 
349 Electronic Frontier Foundation: C. FISCHER, The CLOUD Act: A Dangerous Expansion of Police Snooping on 
Cross-Border Data, 8 February 2018 (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/cloud-act-dangerous-expansion-police-
snooping-cross-border-data); D. RUIZ, Responsibility Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, 22 March 2018, 
(https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflected-cloud-act-passes); K. RODRIGUEZ, The U.S. CLOUD 
Act and the EU: A Privacy Protection Race to the Bottom, 9 April 2018, (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/us-
cloud-act-and-eu-privacy-protection-race-bottom); American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU): N. S. GULIANI, N. SHAH, 
Proposed CLOUD Act Would Let Bad Foreign Governments Demand Data From US Companies Without Checks and 
Balances, 19 March 2018, (https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/consumer-privacy/proposed-cloud-act-
would-let-bad-foreign-governments-demand); Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC): The CLOUD Act 
(https://epic.org/privacy/cloud-act/). 
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capacity  to  realize  public  policy,  e.g.  prosecuting  child  pornography  or  drug  sales  as  in  the
Microsoft case. 
On the other hand, testimonial evidence suggests that although, theoretically,  the risk of
conflict of laws is high in scenarios where more than one legal system has a veritable jurisdictional
claim on  the  activity  in  question,  in  practice,  U.S.  service  providers  have  not  met  substantial
opposition by other states when they were disclosing user data stored on their territories to U.S. law
enforcement; that is until the U.S. service providers themselves started objecting to the practice.350 If
this was indeed the case in practice, then facilitating global market access via forfeiting prescriptive
authority  in  anticipation  of  (theoretical)  costs  of  conflict  of  laws  might  possibly  be
overcompensating this risk at a high social and political cost. 
Herein lies what I call the information problem. Due to the lack of information as to the
possibility of foreign legal systems claiming (or not claiming) jurisdiction where they have typically
have not (or have), which partly results from the fact that the matter of international cooperation in
law enforcement is  typically managed in the bureaucratic level that is  susceptible to capricious
changes in practice, the legal system (both the legislative and the courts) cannot efficiently calculate
the costs to corporations of conflicts of laws and thus balance ex ante these costs with the costs of
forfeiture of authority. The comity-upon-request solution thus makes use of the corporation’s own
intelligence, know-how, and legal resources to assess scenarios when a U.S. court’s warrant for
worldwide disclosure of user data would be opposed by a foreign legal system, and require the U.S.
to forfeit authority only in these scenarios but not in others where such a warrant could be fulfilled
without opposition. 
The information problem introduced above can be analyzed in finer detail  to assess the
merits of the proposed solutions and predict future uses of regimes similar to that in the Cloud Act. I
propose  a  preliminary  analysis  of  the  information  problem  suggesting  that  legislators  and
government organs are faced with three types of information problems when deciding whether to
assert prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in cases concerning data flows:
The three information problems 
The general political information problem: Following the failure of activity location as a
proxy, courts and the State cannot determine the extent of its interests affected in a given 
conflict. The corporate actor is “closer” to the conflict and its (economic and political) 
fallout.
The special political information problem: In the light of its role vis-à-vis the corporate 
actor, the State cannot determine with high certainty the outcome relative to the interests of
the corporate actor, and application of proxy rules do not provide enough flexibility to the 
State to achieve results in line with the State’s role vis-à-vis the corporate actor.
The judicial information problem: The courts do not have sufficient information to 
350 See B. SMITH, Written Testimony of Brad Smith President and Chief Legal Officer, Microsoft Corporation 
submitted the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, cit.
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ascertain the exact outcome relative to interests at stake preferred by the political branches.
This is not a new problem, but is exacerbated by the dynamics of the modern economy, and
increased rate of technological change that makes policy inherent in certain rules obsolete 
at a rate that the political branches cannot keep pace.
4. My interpretation of the motivations of the Cloud Act is based on two assumptions based
on observations that will be discussed in this paper. The first assumption is that the facilitation of
global market entry for corporate subjects is genuinely identified as a central interest of the state in
the  context  of  the  application  of  conflict  of  laws  methodology.  The second assumption  is  that
connecting  factors  such  as  data  location  can  be  thought  of  having  intrinsic  links  with  certain
interests, to the effect that a shift in the perception of its interests would be a motivation for a state
to abandon it for the sake of a connecting factor that is more instrumental to its newly perceived
interests. I shall call this second assumption the proxy theory of connecting factors.  
If these assumptions hold and my interpretation of the Cloud Act framework is workable,
then this might yield insight helpful to predict future directions for the regulation of data flows and
big data applications from a perspective different from substantive privacy law by placing the issue
in  a  broader  context  of  globalization  and  global  governance.  The  use  of  conflict  of  laws
methodology,  including  doctrines  of  comity,  to  facilitate  corporations’ participation  in  global
denationalized markets by enabling corporations to release themselves from national jurisdictions is
discussed in the literature and advocated by some commentators to be the correct path that the
conflict  of  laws/private  international  law  scholarship  should  take  to  remain  relevant  in  the
contemporary  legal  environment,  where  non-state  private  actors  are  competing  with  states  for
legitimacy in norm creation.351 
The approach I am advocating will also help filling a gap in critical commentary of the
ongoing trend of  “privatization”  of  data  flow regulation,  such that  directed  at  “the right  to  be
forgotten” regime set after the ECJ decision in the  Google Spain case.  For instance,  comments
coming  from  the  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation  (EFF)  regarding  the  Cloud  Act  and  similar
proposals  in  Europe  appear  to  suggest  that  the  “privatization”  of  the  legal  safeguards  and
assessment processes in both sides of the Atlantic have their basis in a lack of political will to
uphold  digital  privacy  rights.  An  innate  inclination  to  surveil  its  citizenry  that  is  frequently
attributed to the nation state is a usual suspect in these critiques, however, in light of the structural
and procedural distinction between criminal law instruments and national security instruments, and
the hybrid character of these novel types of regulation, this explanation seems unsatisfactory. Thus,
an explanation that accounts for the motivations for such policies of “privatization” and how they
351 R. WAI, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in
an Era of Globalization, in CJTL, 2002, p. 209; H. MUIR-WATT, Private International Law Beyond the Schism, in TLT,
2011, p. 347. I additionally argue that recent developments in the U.S. yields further evidence of the existence of a
global market access facilitation motif also in the field of U.S. personal jurisdiction, whereby the exposure of large
multinational companies to litigation in state courts are being significantly lowered as the U.S. Supreme Court adopts a
stricter general/specific personal jurisdiction distinction akin to the Brussels (recast) regime in the EU, however made
even more advantageous to multinationals due to specific additional doctrines of U.S. personal jurisdiction law.
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are legitimized through joint appeals to both commercial necessities and security threats without
relying too much on essentialist assumptions about the state could be useful.
5.  The following factors can be identified as main governmental interests that could clash
with  each  other,  requiring  a  novel  approach  to  jurisdictional  rules  that  might  make  use  of
“privatizing” frameworks, such as comity-upon-request in the Cloud Act.
(1) Securitization of private data flows: The last decade has seen a proliferation of perceived
online threats emanating from private persons or private groups. Social media and other web 2.0
applications have enabled certain types of private behavior  that threatens public safety such as
online radicalization and/or the spreading of disinformation regarding to all kinds of societal events.
The perceived increase of such threats combined with the fact that the relevant medium of the threat
is increasingly based on cloud computing technology, creates a motive for states that I call the
“securitization” of private data flows. Securitization of cross-border communications is of course
nothing new, it is arguably as old as the invention of writing systems, but at the very least it predates
the popularization of cloud computing.352 Instead, what I refer to by the securitization of data flows
is a distinct phenomenon. I mean the perception of digital communications as a medium that is
extremely conducive to hostile activities against the state and/or social order due to its enormous
capacity to reach private citizens and the public domain. This perception guides the stance of the
security  apparatus  of  the  state  including  criminal  justice,  national  security,  and  military
departments.353
The  threat  that  securitization  of  private  data  flows  envisions  is  typically  derived  from
communications  directed  to  persons  located  within  the  territory  of  the  state,  originating  from
persons, or groups, that may be located inside or outside of the territory of the state. From this
perspective, the use of virtual networks, shell user accounts, automated bots, or other clandestine
techniques render determinations of applicable law based on physical origin of the communication
irrelevant  to  the  state  interest  that  is  impacted  by  the  communication,  while  the  fortuitous
connection  between the  communication  and origin  state  offer  poor  justification  for  exclusively
352 Samuel Morland, an officer in the Royal Mail under Oliver Cromwell, on surveillance of private letters: «A skillful 
prince ought to make a watchtower of his general post office and there place such careful sentinels as that by their care 
and diligence he may have a constant view of all that passes. By the frequent inspection of letters a king soon know the 
temper of all his principle and active subjects.» T. SIMPSON, Liberty and Surveillance: What Governments and Private 
Corporations Know About You?, CIS Occasional Paper 162, 2018, p. 7, 
(https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2018/01/op162.pdf).  
353 Securitization of data flows happen on a wide continuum that extends from policing petty criminality to conducting
counterterrorism and at the extreme, militarization of cyberspace. In June 2017, following a long period of efforts and 
discussions since 2004, the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security failed to finalize a document concerning 
how international law applies to States’ use of ICTs, due to a lack of consensus on whether malicious use of ICTs could 
be considered as an “armed attack” as a matter of jus ad bello, and whether humanitarian law would apply to ICT-based 
operations of security forces. A. M. SUKUMAR, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed as 
Well?, 4 July 2017, (lawfareblog.com, archived at https://perma.cc/5QZY-GUVD). Also see U.S. envoy to the GGE 
Michele G. Markoff’s statement concerning the failure to reach a consensus: M. G. MARKOFF, Explanation of Position 
at the Conclusion of the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 23 June 2017, 
(https://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/272175.htm). 
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determining prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of location.354 This puts the pressure on judicial
systems to claim prescriptive and enforcement authority based on effects felt within their territories
(inasmuch as territoriality remains as a proxy for a great majority of other state interests). This
pressure may sometimes result in a government position that is unilateralist (some may say realist):
«Congress  did  not  enact  a  disclosure  scheme that  a  U.S.  provider  could  nullify  by the
expedient of shifting data to storage devices that it locates over the border. To allow that
result would permit a private provider in the United States to thwart Section 2703’s critical
role in assisting law enforcement to combat terrorism and crime.» (Brief for the United
States in U.S. v. Microsoft).355 
«the possibility of a future conflict between U.S. and foreign law does not change the best
construction of an important domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism tool enacted
more than 30 years ago.» (ibid.)356
«it takes on average about 10 months to obtain communications from a U.S. Provider in
response to an MLAT [Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty] request, and can take even longer.
This is not timely enough to be useful to the U.K.’s law enforcement when they are trying to
anticipate and head off terrorist and security threats or stop ongoing crimes such as drug
trafficking and child abuse.» (Amicus Brief for the U.K in U.S v. Microsoft).357
The last  testimony regarding the  failure  of  MLATs as  an efficient  instrument  for  cross-
border cooperation is a common theme that appears in arguments surrounding unilateral compulsion
of service providers to disclose user data, and parties to this debate appear to have conflicting views
on their  value.  For  instance,  while  the  U.S.  and  U.K.  government  agencies  seem to  generally
complain of their unsuitability faced with the large volume and immediate nature of online threats,
the Irish government seems confident of the efficiency of the U.S.–Ireland MLAT system, and the
354 For instance, the U.S. deputy assistant attorney general’s testimony before a Senate hearing on law enforcement 
access to data stored abroad represents such a perspective: «The impacted [by the Second Circuit decision allowing 
Microsoft to not disclose user data stored in Ireland] investigations run the gamut – from child exploitation and human 
trafficking, to firearms and drug smuggling, to tax fraud, computer fraud, and identity theft. These cases directly affect 
public safety and may even affect national security. While the most obvious impact of the Microsoft decision may be to 
frustrate investigations of foreign nationals targeting U.S. victims, these examples make clear that the Microsoft 
decision also thwarts or delays investigations even where the victim, the offender, and the account holder are all within 
the United States.» B. WIEGMAN, Statement of Brad Wiegman U.S. Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen. before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, cit., p. 6.
355 Brief for the United States in U.S. v. Microsoft, 6 December 2017, p. 43 
(https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-2/22902/20171206191900398_17-2tsUnitedStates.pdf).
356 Id. p. 52.
357 Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as amicus curiae in U.S. v. 
Microsoft, 13 December 2017, p. 11 (https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
2/23693/20171213140104710_17-2%20-%20Government%20of%20the%20United%20Kingdom%20of%20Great
%20Britain%20and%20Northern%20Ireland.pdf).
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European Data Protection Board (EDPB) seem to consider MLATs to be central to the GDPR’s
framework for data transfers to third countries in the context of law enforcement cooperation.358 
Thus, the sense of urgency produced by a securitization posture regarding private data flows
and  the  perceived  inefficiency  of  bilateral  cooperation  agreements  may  create  a  motive  for
unilateral claims to prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction, or push governments to advocate in
the domestic and international level jurisdictional rules that make use of effects-based connecting
factors rather than data (and/or processing) location-based ones. In this context, rules that assign
prescriptive jurisdiction based on nationality or residency of the user may be interpreted to contain
an assumption that communication originating from these persons have some effect on the territory
and subjects of the state by virtue of the connections these persons have with the state and its
society.
It  should  not  be surprising  that  in  determining an extraterritorial  jurisdiction  “strategy”,
governments consider international “political” costs of their choice, which are typically envisioned
as a scenario of reciprocation of the strategy by foreign states. In the context of cyberspace, the
tension  between states’ capacity to  engage in  unilateral  action  with impunity and the  potential
benefits of an international rule-of-law has been a treated as important issue in since the beginnings
of “cyberlaw” scholarship.359 However, in relation to digital markets, the securitization of data flows
bring with it  demands for alignment between international trade strategies and national security
strategies,  which  is  not  very  conducive  to  achieving  a  solution  based  on  wide  international
cooperation.360 
(2)  Facilitation  of  global  market  access: Admittedly  at  this  point  I  can  only  offer
circumstantial evidence regarding the existence of a coherent conception of facilitation of global
market access as a governmental interest to be taken into consideration when the administration or
courts decide on the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, distinct from the customary
358 Cf. Brief for the United States in U.S v. Microsoft: «to the extent that an MLAT covers the requested data in a 
particular case, the process can be slow and uncertain, often taking many months or even years to generate results» (pp. 
44-45), Brief for the Government of the U.K in U.S v. Microsoft as Amicus Curiae. (see relevant quote above in text), 
Brief for Ireland in U.S v. Microsoft as Amicus Curiae: «Ireland continues to facilitate cooperation with other states, 
including the United States, in the fight against crime and is ready to consider, as expeditiously as possible, a request 
under the MLAT, if and when it be made.» (p. 8), and EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD, Guidelines 2/2018 on 
derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679, 25 May 2018: «In situations where there is an international 
agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), EU companies should generally refuse direct requests and 
refer the requesting third country authority to existing MLAT or agreement.» (p. 5, https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-
tools/our-documents/guidelines/guidelines-22018-derogations-article-49-under-regulation_en) 
359 M. HILDEBRANDT, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace?: Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in Cyberspace, 
in UTLJ, 2013, p. 196.
360 In the context of cloud computing services, one factor leading to such an alignment may be the national security 
implications of powering governmental and public services with private cloud computing services. E.g. see V. KUNDRA,
Federal Cloud Computing Strategy, 8 February 2011, 
(https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/federal-cloud-computing-strategy.pdf). 
In the U.S.A., this demand for alignment manifests itself in discussions regarding extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction in the form what I call the “bad state” reciprocity paradox. Simply put, the “paradox” arises from asking the
question of «would we like if the governments of [insert “bad state” of choice] asserted their jurisdictional authority in 
the same way?” for each possible solution for exercising jurisdiction in cyberspace and reaching the answer “no” each 
time. Even a pure territorial solution based on data location cannot escape the paradox, as «that would create data 
havens for malign activity».
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deference shown to the foreign state’s sovereign right of regulating commerce in its own territory.  
Nevertheless, at least in the context of the U.S., there seems to exist a doctrinal basis to
consider such an interest, if found to exist, in to the international comity consideration regarding the
extraterritorial  application  of  U.S.  law.361 It  has  been  observed  that  courts,  including  the  U.S.
Supreme Court have considered the United States’ interest in deferring to foreign law by way of the
doctrine  of  comity  for  the  sake  of  «harmony  […]  needed  in  today’s  highly  interdependent
commercial world».362 Also, it is stated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which
compiles  a  review of and comments  on the valid  American common law in matters related to
foreign relations including prescriptive jurisdiction, that in deciding whether a state (or the federal
government) may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction a court will evaluate, inter alia, «the importance
of  the  regulation  to  the  international  political,  legal,  or  economic system».363 Perhaps  more
significantly, the comity analysis prescribed in the Cloud Act itself, which will be undertaken by the
court upon a motion to quash filed by the provider, stipulates that the court shall take into account,
inter alia  «the likelihood, extent, and nature of penalties to the provider or any employees of the
provider as a result of inconsistent legal requirements imposed on the provider.»364 Moreover, the
Cloud Act requires foreign states to «[demonstrate] a commitment to promote and protect the global
free flow of information and the open, distributed, and interconnected nature of the Internet» in
order to be eligible for entering into an executive agreement with the U.S. government that would
authorize  that  state  to  order  U.S.  service  providers  to  disclose  certain  user  data  to  their  law
enforcement  authorities  and would make them eligible  for  benefiting  from the  comity analysis
prescribed in the Act.365
Concerning the particular context of cloud service provision and export, it appears that the
U.S. government perceives conflict of laws as an important barrier for U.S. companies to exploit
global markets. The U.S. Department of Commerce has assessed foreign law compliance issues,
361 Although not directly relevant to the question if prescriptive jurisdiction, this point is further evidenced in the field 
of personal jurisdiction. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman 571 U.S. ___ (2014) have effectively shifted the focus of the criteria 
required for a court to claim general personal jurisdiction over a transnational corporation from the degree of 
commercial presence a corporation has within the territory of a state objectively determined, to the degree of presence 
subjectively determined, i.e. presence relative to the overall size and organization of the company itself. The result is 
that a very large transnational corporation can escape general personal jurisdiction of a court even in cases where its 
operations in the forum state are worth billions of dollars. The main aim behind this change is shielding large multistate 
(or multinational) corporations from forum shopping, thus enabling them to enter foreign markets without attracting 
litigation risks in the forums of that market, except in cases where the dispute arises from the activity located in that 
host state, and only for damages that are suffered in that host state. General personal jurisdiction under this scheme is 
only allowed in the residence or headquarter of the corporation, and in practice companies can manage litigation risk 
through intelligent corporate structuring and by objecting jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. The overall
result is that the adjudicatory powers of the state (and the access to justice of potential plaintiffs) are curtailed for the 
benefit of enabling easier market access for corporate subjects.
362 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 144, 164–65 (2004).
363 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 403 (1987, 
October 2017 Update), (emphasis added).
364 18 U.S.C. §2703(h)(3)(C).
365 18 U.S.C. §2523(b)(1)(B)(vi).
88
II.2
including particularly data transfer and data localization requirements as the primary international
competitiveness issues facing U.S. cloud computing service providers:
«Key International Competitiveness Issues
When entering or expanding into international markets, U.S. cloud service providers might
face some of the following market challenges:
1)Data localization restrictions requiring data to be stored, processed or handled in the same
country where it originated.
2)Compliance with foreign laws establishing measures regarding how certain data maybe
transferred across borders.
3) Being required to have a local presence in-market (e.g., distributor, sales office, business
representative, joint venture partner, etc.) could make a significant difference in a company’s
abilities to do business, especially with the public sector.
4) Other  competitive ness issues such as licensing requirements,  and cyber security and
restrictive procurement policies.»366 
(3) Protection of the privacy rights of subjects: Although an important interest of the state,
this interest is not directly relevant to the question of deference to foreign law in the context of the
comity-upon-request  framework  of  the  Cloud  Act.  However,  the  foreign  state’s  interest  in  the
protection  of  the  privacy rights  of  its  citizens  and  residents  plays  a  direct  role  in  the  comity
assessment. The consideration of privacy rights of subjects may also be indirectly relevant in a
comity analysis if the “political” consequences of exercising extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
are (somehow) taken into account, e.g. the foreign state reciprocating by ordering service providers
to disclose data of users resident in the first state. This issue will not be detailed in this paper.
(4) IT protectionism: This interest does not play a role from the perspective of the U.S. due
to  the  already  dominant  position  of  U.S.  service  providers  (and  the  weak  competition  these
providers  face  from  foreign  providers  in  the  U.S.  market),  however  for  other  governments
protecting domestic providers from the complete domination of their national markets by foreign
providers may be a real motivation which could lead the passing of privacy laws that encourage or
require data localization as a matter of fact, if not by law, benefiting domestic providers in the
process.367 Nevertheless,  protectionist  motivations  may be  also thought  as  overlapping with the
securitization trend and the facilitation motivation discussed above, as foreign domination of the
domestic market could make it difficult for domestic service providers to thrive, and foreign control
of a large volume of citizen (and public) data may be perceived as a security threat.
How a protectionist interest may interact with the law of jurisdiction, especially in legal
systems which ostensibly reject openly protectionist trade policies is must play an important part in
any theory of how globalization in computing/data services are affecting the use of conflict of laws
366 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, 2017 Top Markets Report Cloud 
Computing Sector Snapshot, p. 2, (https://www.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Sector%20Snapshot%20Cloud%20Computing
%202017.pdf).
367 For a recent example, see V. GOEL, India Pushes Back Against Tech ‘Colonization’ by Internet Giants, NYT Online,
1 September 2018, (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/technology/india-technology-american-giants.html?
action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage).  
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doctrines. However, as this paper is focused on the use of the particular use of comity in the Cloud
Act, the protectionist motive will not be discussed in detail. 
6.  It has been suggested by various commentators that the fundamental reason that causes
data location to be a problematic connecting factor is that in the case of data (as opposed to physical
things or persons) location does not correlate with the existence of legitimate interests of the state
governing that location to an extent sufficient enough to justify the exclusive prescriptive authority
of the state in question regarding the regulation of the behavior related to that data.368 It appears in
the light of recent legislation and official commentary either side of the Atlantic that there is a
divergence on the acceptance of this  idea,  at  least  in  the policy making level.  In the U.S.,  the
recently passed Cloud Act provides for an unusual framework for international cooperation that
envisions  both executive-level  international  cooperation and collaboration between transnational
service providers and (foreign) law enforcement. This framework acknowledges that deference to
foreign law is inevitable to uphold the existing global data flows and value chains created by these,
but it is also firm in its adoption of the idea suggested above. 
On the other hand, in Europe, the recent entry into force of the GDPR with its strict rules for
data transfers to third countries and extensive claim to prescriptive jurisdiction seems to represent a
maximalist approach to prescriptive jurisdiction that rejects complete irrelevancy of data location as
proposed  by the  abovementioned  view.  It  appears  that  in  current  EU data  protection  law,  the
location of data is thought to correlate with a bundle of core interests that are protected by the most
hallowed of norms, viz. the sovereign’s right to non-intervention, and the user’s fundamental right
to privacy. Moreover, the from the perspective of EU law, the unfettered enjoyment of the latter
right and the Union’s interest in upholding it justifies extraterritorial application of EU law – this
time  by  way  of  the  user’s  residence  as  a  connecting  factor.  The  line,  however,  is  drawn  at
extraterritorial  enforcement,  which represents a more traditional understanding of the difference
between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction in the context of international law.
On the day of the entry into force of the GDPR, two Guidelines were adopted by the new
European Data  Privacy Board that  replaced the Article  29 Working Party.  Unsurprisingly,  both
concerned transfer of data to third countries. The second, Guidelines 2/2018, directly foreclosed the
possibility that Article 49 could provide a basis for cooperation of the data controller with third
country law enforcement,  a  possibility  that  was suggested  by the  European Commission  in  its
amicus brief in Microsoft:369 
368 E.g. see J. DASKAL, Borders and Bits, in VLR, 2018, p. 226; D. SVANTESSON, A New Jurisprudential Framework 
for Jurisdiction: Beyond the Harvard Draft, AJIL Unbound, 2015, p. 72. For a view arguing that territory never had 
much representative power regarding state interest see P. D. SZIGETI, The Illusion of Territorial Jurisdiction, in TILJ, 
2017, p. 371.
369 «The legitimate interest [under GDPR art. 49(1)] could, again, be the interest of the controller in not being subject 
to legal action in a non- EU state» Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus 
Curiae in U.S. v. Microsoft, 13 December 2017, p.16, but also «It should also be noted, however, that Article 49 is 
entitled “Derogations for specific situations.” Therefore, these grounds are to be interpreted strictly» (ibid. at 17) 
(https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-2/23655/20171213123137791_17-2%20ac%20European
%20Commission%20for%20filing.pdf).
90
II.2
«The GDPR introduces a new provision in Article 48 that needs to be taken into account
when considering transfers of personal data. Article 48 and the corresponding recital 115
provide  that  decisions  from  third  country  authorities,  courts  or  tribunals  are  not  in
themselves legitimate grounds for data transfers to third countries. Therefore, a transfer in
response to a decision from third country authorities is in any case only lawful, if in line
with the conditions set out in Chapter V. […] In situations where there is an international
agreement,  such  as  a  mutual  legal  assistance  treaty  (MLAT),  EU  companies  should
generally refuse direct requests and refer the requesting third country authority to existing
MLAT or agreement.»370
Similarly, an amici brief for MEPs in Microsoft, whose amici includes Viviane Redding, the
EU commissioner that initiated the legislative work for the GDPR, and Jan Philipp Albrecht, the
parliamentary rapporteur for the GDPR and the U.S.-EU “Umbrella Agreement”, took a strict view
of the exclusivity of the Art. 48 rule requiring an international agreement basis for data disclosure to
third country law enforcement organs and categorically denied the applicability of the Article 49(1)
“important reasons of public interest” exception to disclosures to foreign law enforcement.371
This difference in views poses a problem for transnational service providers which deal in
very large volumes of transatlantic data transfers. As purveyors and movers of data and storage
thereof, it appears that it would be more in the interest of service providers if data location would
not  be  representative  of  the  existence  of  such  a  bundle  of  core  governmental  interests.  As  a
significant feature of their business models and economies of operation depends on global transfers
of data, it can be conjectured that the less a change in data location signifies a change in corporate
legal obligations, the better  it  is  for the corporation.  On the other hand, if  it  is not possible to
completely disassociate governmental interest from data location, another beneficial option would
be curtailing extraterritorial application to avoid conflicts of law for the sake of foreseeability. Both
configurations can theoretically be achieved through international intergovernmental cooperation,
but  the  latter  configuration  may  also  arise  through  unilateral  actions  of  states  under  certain
circumstances  where  governmental  interest  is  found  to  be  best  served  with  prescriptive  self-
restraint.
States are jealous of their prescriptive powers, and they will not forfeit them lightly. States
may voluntarily limit their extraterritorial prescriptive powers when they recognize an interest in
deferring to the sovereign rights of other states, notwithstanding the theoretical legal problem of
whether there is a norm of international law that require them to do so. For example, it seems that
the  United  States  courts  recognizes  an  interest  in  upholding  the  «highly interdependent  global
market»  by refusing  to  apply U.S.  law in  cases  where  legitimate  foreign  interests  call  for  the
application of foreign law, or by deferring to private choice-of-law or arbitration agreements at the
370 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD, Guidelines 2/2018 on derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679, 
cit., p. 5 (emphasis added).
371 Brief of amici curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Sophie In’T Veld, Viviane Reding, Birgit Sippel, and Axel Voss, members
of the European Parliament in U.S. v. Microsoft, 18 January 2017, p.17, 
(https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-2/28328/20180118155453076_17-2%20bsac%20Jan%20Philipp
%20Albrecht.pdf).
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expense of the authority to enforce public policy.372 Although the issue is far from settled in U.S.
law, it is notable that in his amicus brief in Microsoft, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Privacy seemed to espouse the view that considered deference to the foreign law via the doctrine of
international comity as a requirement of fostering commercial relationships between nations, citing
the Empagran decision: 
«Respect for foreign sovereigns is not, however, premised solely on an abstract notion of
sovereign independence. Rather, it is a practical element of fostering positive diplomatic and
commercial  relationships  between nations  and preventing “international  discord.”  Nor is
comity solely the concern of the judiciary. As this Court observed in F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd.  v.  Empagran  S.A.,  it  is  assumed  “that  legislators  take  account  of  the  legitimate
sovereign  interests  of  other  nations  when  they write  American  laws,  [which]  helps  the
potentially conflicting laws of  different  nations  work together  in  harmony – a  harmony
particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.” Executive agencies
are  similarly  expected  to  consider  the  interests  of  foreign  sovereigns  when  enforcing
domestic laws.» [citations omitted]373 
7.  A common theme found in critiques of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
decision for Microsoft374 (which was appealed to the Supreme Court and had found that the FBI’s
use  of  the  disclosure  warrant  was  indeed  extraterritorial  based  on  data  location  and  therefore
unlawful) and Microsoft’s pure territorialist views on data location and prescriptive jurisdiction is
the argument that data location does not serve as a good proxy for the state interests involved in the
dispute, rendering the use of data location as a connecting factor a bad conflict of laws practice. At
the core of this argument is the premise that all connecting factors, especially those that are based
on the notion of territoriality, are proxies for certain preferred stratifications of the interests (of
relevant  parties,  sovereigns,  and  third  parties)  being  affected  by  the  legal  event  in  question.
According  to  this,  rules  concerning  adjudicative,  prescriptive  and  enforcement  jurisdiction  all
operate through concepts that encapsulate the postulated interests of actors. Examples are territory
of a sovereign,  nationality of an actor,  location of an immovable,  place of contracting,  using a
satellite uplink, advertising in a certain language, participating in a commercial fair. In other words
what these kinds of factors and concepts achieve is to allow courts to favor the interests of one party
(or sovereign, or third party) over another by simply making a binary choice as to the existence of
the connecting factor,  thus keeping the question strictly within the sphere of legal analysis,  by
372 F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A 542 U.S. 155 (2004) cited in J.R. PAUL, The Transformation of 
International Comity, in LCP, 2008, p. 36. Paul critiques the development of the doctrine of international comity in U.S.
courts and argues that it is increasingly used to relinquish state authority to prescribe public policy not only in deference
to foreign sovereigns, but more importantly in deference to the global market itself.
373 Brief Amicus Curiae of U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy Joseph Cannataci in Support of Neither 
Party in U.S. v. Microsoft, 13 December 2017, pp. 32-33, (https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
2/24918/20171222120327043_35632%20pdf%20Krishnamurthy.pdf) 
374 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 2nd Cir., 14 June 2016, vacated by Supreme Court as United States v. Microsoft 
Corporation, 584 U.S. ___ (2018).
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having the court not to engage into a technical discussion of all the interests at stake in the conflict
and stratifying them, which is a political action in nature.  
For instance, when a court decides that the law of country X applies and not country Y,
because the performance of the contract provision in question was to take place within the territory
of country X, the conflict rule that the court is applying, i.e. that the law of the place of performance
of the contractual obligation will apply, solves the balancing of interests problem by reducing the
question of competing interests to a relatively less controversial,  less complex, and much more
easily observable factual finding that the court can make based on much less evidence and technical
expertise compared to actually identifying and calculate the interests at play.  The binary choice
(existence or non-existence of performance obligation in X or Y) essentially provides two scenarios
in which the stratification of interests are “pre-calibrated” by the legislator, e.g. in our scenario of
the contract, it is decided by the legislator  ex ante to the dispute that the interests of the state in
whose territory the performance will take place trumps that of the state which is connected to the
legal relationship in other ways, with regards to the regulation of the contract. The pre-calibration of
this  preference for the interests  of  the state  in  whose the territory the contract  is  performed is
applied generally and may include cases in which the normative concerns of the legislator would
actually point to the other state’s law to be applied, but the benefits of the general rule is assumed to
outset the occasional misappropriation. The view that such ex ante pre-calibration is prone to error
in  and  is  essentially  arbitrary  has  formed  the  basis  of  what  is  called  the  American  Conflicts
Revolution, and the rise of “governmental interest analysis” as an alternative ex post facto interest
stratification method for courts to choose the applicable law in the United States.375 In Europe,
where active interest analysis by the courts was theoretically undesirable due to its political nature,
courts have nonetheless used ordre public exceptions and other escape mechanisms included in the
system based on the pre-calibrated rules to bridge cases in which they thought the conflict of laws
rules yielded misappropriation.
The proxy theory is compatible and favorable to the hypothesis propounded in this work,
that there is an informational problem that underlies the development of the “privatizing” solutions
in global data flow regulation, and in particular, the  comity-upon-request  regime brought by the
Cloud Act in the U.S. The informational problem is more acute if it is assumed that facilitating or
ensuring global market access for domestic capital has become a central interest of the State. This
would mean that determining the state’s interests in a conflict case now (to a much greater extent)
entails assessment of market responses to the global regulatory reach of the of the State. In the
context of data flows, such assessment increasingly requires specialized technical knowledge and
insights because of the rapidly changing and disruptive nature of the technology sector. Courts no
longer can rely on proxy concepts to make an interest analysis that can properly account for the
State’s interest flowing from its new role. They simply lack the information, and the application of
the  former  proxies  can  lead  to  unintended  results.  Thus,  the  solution  to  this  problem  is  to
“outsource”  the  information  gathering  to  the  corporations  that  can  avoid  rules  that  are
“counterproductive” in the light of the State’s new central interest through choice of law, choice of
forum, or arbitration agreements; but now even in the field of regulation that is based on public
policy,  it  appears  that  States  may  allow  transnational  companies  to  make  decisions  about  the
375 S. C. SYMEONIDES, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future, cit.
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regulatory  reach  of  the  state  according  to  the  information  they  have  from  their  commercial
operations, as it will happen under the Cloud Act’s comity framework. Corporations then can have a
say on whether the application of public policy would be beneficial or not on their own information
on the possible effects of a conflict.
It is in this sense that data is different because it no longer serves the courts (but also the
legislators) as a proxy for public policy – the regulation of a located thing according to the territory
that it is located in makes sense insofar as the regulation of such thing serves in some way the
interests  of  the  state,  such  as  the  distribution  of  resources  among  the  members  of  a  located
populace. But when the role of the state is providing the members of that populace access to the
markets that distribute the profits generated from the processing of that thing, which in the context
of data entails its continuous movement and global flow, the State’s interest in regulating such thing
is decoupled from the location of that thing, as there is no nexus left between the location of the
thing and the benefits expected from its regulation. 
Let us exemplify what is said here by reference to the provisions of the Cloud Act. Let us
assume that the U.S. law maker has in its focus two competing interests (as I have argued above is
indeed the case) namely securitization of private data flows and the facilitation of global market
access for U.S. service providers. Data location is not a connecting factor conducive to the efficient
protection of both these interests. According to §2703(h)(2)(A)(i), the comity-upon-motion option is
conditional on the provider’s reasonable belief that the target user is not a United States person and
does not reside in the United States. Upon motion to quash, the court will ensure that this is the case
before making a comity analysis. This provision effectively locates the focus of state interest in the
close connection between the user and the state, rather than connection between the service (data
storage) and the state.  Data location,  that suggests the latter  type of connection, is not rejected
completely as a valid ground for prescriptive jurisdiction, but can be overridden via comity analysis
when the U.S. service provider risks “penalties”376 due to the conflict of laws. This is in line with
the state’s facilitation interest. On the other hand, by foreclosing the comity analysis for disclosure
orders regarding U.S. persons, the law basically provides for an effects jurisdiction rule with an
irrefutable assumption that activity of U.S. persons and persons located in the U.S. will always be
directed to the U.S, as the security interest of the state requires that procedural and substantive
rights under foreign laws should not be invoked to limit the jurisdiction of American courts and
lawmakers  in  cases  where the effects  of  the  activity is  directed  towards  the U.S.  It  cannot  be
asserted that the law tries to uphold the jurisdiction of the natural judge of the user, as jurisdiction to
issue a warrant in any case lies with the court of the judicial area in which the crime or activities
related to the crime have occurred (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(b)(6)). 
8. This paper sought to argue that the comity-upon-request framework provided in the new
U.S. Cloud Act is a partly a result of the U.S. government’s motivation to facilitate global market
access of its domestic cloud computing service providers. To achieve this goal, an “information
problem” as I have explained in this paper must be overcome, and I have argued that the comity
analysis solution provided in the Cloud Act has been shaped to solve this information problem by
shifting the job to determine and address conflicts of laws to the service providers. Through this
376 18 U.S.C. §2703(h)(3)(C).
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authority, service providers now have a say in whether and when the exercise of extraterritorial
prescriptive  and  enforcement  jurisdiction  is  acceptable,  a  job  that  is  traditionally  within  the
exclusive competence of state organs, since it is typically considered to be a function of sovereignty.
My findings are dependent on two assumptions to be inferred properly. First, there must be
an identifiable state interest of facilitating global market access, and this interest should be able to
clash with other traditional state interests so that a novel jurisdictional rule that takes into account
the information problem would be needed. Second, data location based territorial rules should be
unable to meaningfully distribute authority between states in a way sensitive to the clashing state
interests I have identified in my assessment of the first assumption. In this paper, I sought to provide
evidence and observations to support these assumptions, and thus justify my inferences about the
form of the new comity framework. 
KAYAHAN CANTEKIN
European University Institute (EUI)
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Digital evidence for the criminal trial: limitless cloud and state
boundaries
SUMMARY: 1. A baffled king. – 2. Mutual Legal Assistance and its shortcomings. – 3. The Empire
strikes  back:  national  remedies.  –  4.  Finding  effectiveness:  an  EU  regulation  proposal.  –  5.
Conclusions.
1. It  is  hard  to  find  a  stronger  manifestation  of  state  sovereignty  than  the  power  to
investigate a crime, try the suspect for it, and punish him once he is found guilty. The whole process
is a show of public force: it brings reluctant witnesses to the stand, forcing them to tell the truth; it
can violate the privacy of an apartment or listen to a phone call. In the last decade, another tool has
been gaining importance on the criminal trial’s stage: the sheer amount of data we produce daily can
tell  a  lot  about  what  we  are  up  to,  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  it  can  come  handy  during  the
investigation of almost any crime. There is no need for a cybercrime, or for the misuse of a device:
digital information can always be relevant. The list of the last locations of the victim, the name of
the person s/he was texting with, the record of a phone call or an email; all this data could play a
role in any investigation.
This type of evidence, however, differs substantially from something as mundane as a knife:
we share a significant amount of information with the company that provides the service to us377.
They gather almost everything we produce and store it on a server378: we can access the information
whenever we like, but it is physically preserved in a data center at the other corner of the world,
displaced from time to time to ensure the efficient use of the infrastructure379.
377 A couple of examples: the Onion – a satire U.S. website – described Facebook a C.I.A. program, and the most 
effective one. Since then, the company has gained access to more information developing a facial recognition algorithm,
sharing the information among devices, so that it can keep track of phone calls and text messages sent outside the 
platform. However, Facebook is not the only one: Tinder – the dating app – keeps scrupulous records of all the users to 
improve the matching algorithm. A journalist asked for her entire record and received a staggering amount of data 
regarding her preferences: see J. Duportail, I asked Tinder for my data. It sent me 800 pages of my deepest, darkest 
secrets, in theguardian.com, September 26, 2017.
For a strong critique of the status quo and technological ways forward see: S. Rasmussen, The BINC 
Manifesto: Technology driven societal change, science policy &stakeholder engagement, in C. Gershenson, T. 
Forese, J. M. Siqueiros, W. Aguilar, E. J. Izquierdo, H. Sayama (eds.), Proceedings of the Artificial Life 
Conference 2016, at turing.iimas.unam.mx; M. Monti, S. Rasmussen, RAIN. A Bio-Inspired Communication and 
Data Storage infrastructure, in Artificial Life, 2017, p. 552-557.
378 Sometimes it is a service; some others it is a business model: acquiring and selling data has become a business of 
its own, and according to the documentary Terms and conditions may apply (2013), it began with the Patriot Acts, that 
required the big tech companies to store information for surveillance purposes. Then they realized they could make 
money off of the incredible haystack they were building and started to do so.
For other industries, gathering data is vital to maintain the product working: artificial intelligence, for instance, 
needs to learn from past examples. Without memory, it cannot function, so it needs to keep a considerable amount of 
information to calculate the next answer.
379 See J. Spoenle, Cloud Computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of disposal?, 
August, 31, 2010, rm.coe.int; for a technical explanation, see Y. Sahu, R. K. Pateriya, R. K Gupta, Cloud Server 
Optimisation with Load Balancing and Green Computing Techniques Using Dynamic Compare and Balance Algorithm,
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Long story short, those data have an owner: often a big, powerful one that operates on an
international level day in and day out. The company does not need to be located or even represented
in a country to provide services within its boundaries, and it is free to set up branches of their
organization wherever they want, according to the most convenient business strategy.
This  scenario  is  enough  for  traditional  categories  to  lose  their  focus:  citizenship  and
sovereignty can be set aside with ease, whereas the private policies of a single company can have a
transnational impact380.
On the one hand, being a citizen means enjoying a certain set of rights, which does not
necessarily apply to one's data once they transit over a foreign server381.
On the other hand, the authority of the state is not enough to gain access to the information
produced on its own soil, relating to a crime entirely carried out on its territory. It is somewhere
else, out of its reach. Law enforcement authorities have to ask for the help of the competent state
through the available Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) tools, and not because of the transnational
nature of the crime: as we already mentioned, that could be entirely carried out within a nation’s
territory. Digital evidence, however, follows the fragmented, international territoriality of providers;
not the political boundaries set to national states.
Given this framework, we will rapidly point out the main flaws of the traditional system and
how some  European  states  have  been  developing  a  different  approach  to  secure  the  evidence
anyway. Then, we will focus on a proposal for a European regulation that faces the issue, aiming to
introduce new possibilities of direct interaction between states and service providers.
2.  When the state cannot secure the necessary information on its own, it can ask for help:
every nation has its arsenal of tools and procedures to obtain the assistance of the competent state,
generally based upon a patchwork of bilateral  or multilateral  treaties.  The procedures that  they
provide for, however, are often cumbersome and slow, which is especially problematic for a kind of
evidence that can be quickly erased, modified, encrypted or displaced382.
Within  the  European  Union,  the  cooperation  should  be  simplified  by  the  brand  new
European Investigation Order (EIO), in an attempt of standardizing and expediting the procedure;
nonetheless, it does not contain any specific provision on digital evidence, focusing only on spot
operations  like  the  identification  of  the  person  “holding  a  subscription  of  a  specified  […]  IP
address”383.
in 2013 5th International Conference and Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks, IEE Xplore, 11 
November 2013.
380 For a vivid example, see R. Budish, H. Burkert, U. Gasser, Encryption Policy and Its International Impacts: 
A Framework for Understanding Extraterritorial Ripple Effects, May 2, 2018, in cyber.harvard.edu. 
381 See Terms and conditions may apply (2013) on the Total Information Awareness program; see Citizen four (2014) 
on the NSA domestic surveillance programs, based upon the documents leaked by Edward Snowden and subsequently 
made available by the N.S.A. itself, on the web page of the Domestic Surveillance Directorate: nsa.gov1.info.
382 For further considerations on the topic, see A. K. Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, in Stanford Law Rev., 
2016, p.749.
383 Art. 10, lett. e of the directive; the Italian transposition added to this list also the identification of the person behind 
an email address: art. 9 lett. e D.Lgs. June 21, 2017, n. 108.
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Moreover, Ireland is not a party to the directive, so it has not transposed it nor can be bound
by its provisions, and this could be a major problem: most of the big tech corporations have their
the European headquarters there. As a result, the ordinary MLA procedure is to be adopted, which
means at least that the competent central authority has to be involved in the transmission of the
request. The same applies to requests directed to non-EU countries such as U.S. and Canada.
Another  problematic  step  is  the  phrasing  of  the  request,  that  should  be  as  specific  as
possible, so that the competent authority can decide what to do with it. It is tricky for all kind of
requests, but the dialogue about digital evidence can be further complicated: there is no shared legal
definition  about  the  type  of  data  that  can  be  demanded,  and  no  shared  understanding  of  the
conditions under which a certain kind of information can be released. The lack of common grounds
can hurt the communication and a request – complete under the law of the issuing country – can be
discarded as unbearably generic by the recipient384.
Once the application is ready, one must decide to whom it shall be addressed, and it is no
easy step. Which is the competent state to deal with it? The country where the company is based?
The country where a local branch is based? The country where the data are stored? Each law can
locate the provider according to different criteria, and as a result, there is little or no clarity as to
who can obtain the information385. Providers as well hold their views as to which country has the
authority to compel the production of their records, agreeing spontaneously to some requests and
fighting others386
The  best  shot  of  the  issuing  authority  is  to  forward  the  request  to  every  state  that  is
potentially connected to the information, hoping for at least one positive answer; of course, this
method is not the most efficient for both the issuing and the receiving authorities387.
But  let  us assume that  at  least  one of  these requests  has  landed in front  of a receiving
authority that can actually help. The investigators should find the required data, and the best way to
do that is asking the provider, but not many European countries have a transparent procedure in
place to cooperate with them.
Finally, MLA requests are suddenly going from “boutique” to “fast food”388: the number has
been increasing, and many states do not have the resources to respond to all the asks adequately. It
is time and energy consuming, and there is no interest of the receiving authority at stake, which can
384 For more on the topic, see the Commission staff working document Impact Assessment Accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the 
purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings, April 17, 2018, SWD(2018) 118, p. 30 and following.
According to a survey on cross-border access to electronic evidence conducted by the European Commission, 
another common experience is the refusal to comply with the request due to the difficulty in establishing probable 
cause, which is also a sign of lack of specificity; see Questionnaire on improving criminal justice in cyberspace. 
Summary of Responses, 2017, p. 5, ec.europa.eu.
385 See K. Westmoreland, G. Kent, International Law Enforcement Access to User Data: A Survival Guide and 
Call for Action, in Canadian Journ. of Law and Technology, 2015, p. 232.
386 A. K. Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, p. 735-736 and p. 745-747.
387 See Questionnaire on improving criminal justice in cyberspace, p. 7.
388 A. K. Woods, Data Beyond Borders. Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Age, 2015, uknowledge.uky.edu, p. 
3.
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result in a time-conservative work schedule. Those requests will be answered but with low priority,
which could defeat the purpose of cooperation or make it impossible: data cannot be stored forever;
they could be erased or encrypted while the ask lingers on someone’s desk389.
This delay in the response is the most urgent problem to solve: a good timing has always
been critical to the success of the operations but, with electronic evidence, the whole process needs
to be further expedited. 
Confronted with this  reality,  many scholars  have  come up with  proposals  to  adjust  and
modernize the framework.
One calls for a better response from private companies, which could be victims of cyber-
attacks at any time: that they should invest more in digital security and digital forensics so that they
can provide data to whoever can prosecute the crime they suffered390. It seems to be a form of self-
help  though,  and not  a  solution that  could  benefit  the entire  system:  the cooperation could be
smoother for attacks on some victims, leaving everyone else out.
Other  proposals  touch  directly  upon  a  deeper  problem:  is  the  cloud  manageable  at  all
through the territoriality principle,  or is  it  too hard to  maintain this  expression of sovereignty?
According to some scholars, it is time to break down the borders, since territoriality is “the main
obstacle for investigating actions within the clouds”391. Many theories stemmed from this premise:
according to one of those392, territoriality should be adapted to the challenges of a globalized world,
or, at least, it should apply just to the jurisdiction, but not to the investigation. The cross-border
access to digital evidence would then been ensured. This idea, however, could be hard to sell to the
states themselves: they should allow a foreign authority to carry out an inquiry on their soil393,
which does not seem a realistic expectation. Moreover, the proposal would be of some use while
following a live communication, but not as much in asking a private company for stored data, which
seems to be the main issue394.
Others have been trying to make territoriality more manageable, for instance by searching
for a more tangible connecting factor: the location of the data can bring to inconsistent results, and
it is difficult to establish. It should be replaced by something easier to ascertain as the formal power
of disposal of the information395
Finally, it has been argued that digital information is not so special after all: it is stored on a
physical  layer  that  permits  –  among  other  criteria  –  to  establish  jurisdiction  according  to  the
389 According to Liberty and Security in a Changing World. Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communication Technologies, December 12, 2013, in obamawhitehouse.archives.gov  , p. 
227, “requests appear to average approximately 10 months to fulfill”. Since the report, the number of MLA request 
directed to the U.S. has more than doubled: see A. K. Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, p. 750.
390 J. I. James, How Business Can Speed Up International Cybercrime Investigation, in IEEE, 2017, p. 105.
391 J. Spoenle, Cloud Computing and cybercrime investigations, p. 8: 
392 D. J. B. Svantesson, Law Enforcement Cross-border Access to Data, 2016, in researchgate.net. 
393 J. Spoenle, Cloud Computing and cybercrime investigations, p. 10.
394 J. P. Mifsud Bonnici, M. Tudorica, J. A. Cannataci, La regolamentazione delle prove elettroniche nei 
processi penali in “situazioni transnazionali”: problemi in attesa di soluzioni, in M. A. Biasiotti, M. Epifani, F. 
Turchi (a cura di), Trattamento e scambio della prova digitale in Europa, Napoli, 2015, p. 213.
395 J. Spoenle, Cloud Computing and cybercrime investigations, p. 10-11.
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territoriality principle, allowing the whole structure to function396. The MLA system, nonetheless,
would need a serious restyling to improve the response time and improve efficiency397.
3. Given the intricacies of the MLA, States have come up with different approaches based
on unilateral action, to obtain access and avoid the pains of cooperation with foreign authorities
altogether. The individual strategies can be more effective, but that can also imply a big price to pay
for the companies or the rights of the user. 
The most infamous shortcut is mass surveillance, which impacts disproportionately on the
individual’s  right  to privacy.  Other  methods can protect  the people and the national  interest  to
access evidence, but strongly affect the liberties of the service providers: some states ask (or have
considered asking) to locate all relevant information within the borders, so that it can be accessible
at all time.
We will not delve into these attempts; instead, we will analyze the different strategies put in
place by France, Germany and Italy. All those countries share the same need, but do not adopt the
same approach in dealing with it.
France, for instance, is one of the few countries in the European Union to have explicit
legislation in place that allows for the direct cooperation between law enforcement and service
providers, and it has been there for quite some time. In 2004, art. 60-2 was introduced in the Code
of  Criminal  Procedure,  offering  a  legal  base  for  direct  cooperation  with  service  providers398.
Although it is limited to a particular kind of inquiry (enquête de flagrance), it serves as a model to
the other provisions enabling such joint effort also in the other types of investigation that the Code
describes: it is the case of art. 77-1-2 for the enquête préliminaire and art. 99-4 for the instruction.
This  system contains  two main possibilities:  first,  the providers have to  disclose all  the
“information that is useful to the manifestation of the truth”, unless they can oppose a privilege
recognized by the law. The provider has to respond within the shortest delay possible; if it fails or
refuses to answer without a legitimate motive, it will receive a 3.750 euro fine. Second, the law
enforcement  authorities  can  also  require  a  specific  class  of  service  provides  –  those  hosting
communications over the internet – to preserve content information for up until one year; to do that,
a judge has to review the application.
The requests are subject to the procedure that the regulatory part of the Code lays out. They
ask the police to write a detailed report on the ask, specifying which company has been asked and
what kind of information are to be handed over. As to the practical details of the interaction, they
are established by a protocol approved by the ministry of justice and every organization with which
the law enforcement needs to cooperate.
396 It is the main argument of A. K. Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, to which responded D. J. B. 
Svantesson, Against ‘Against Data Exceptionalism’, in Masaryk University Jour. of Law and Tech. 2016, p. 200; as 
well as Z. D. Clopton, Data Institutionalism: A Reply to Andrew Woods, Stanford Law Rev. (online), 2016.
397 For a multi-dimensional approach, see A. K. Woods, Data Beyond Borders, p. 8-14. The same view has been held
by DigitalEurope,  DIGITALEUROPE views on Law Enforcement Access to Digital Evidence, October 17, 2016, p. 4:
the document encourages a more efficient MLA remedies instead of unilateral actions to access cross-border evidence.
398 Art. R15-33-68 contains the list of what enterprises are to be considered service providers for the purposes of this 
statute.
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So, when the state asks for information, the request is regarded by the state as binding: not
answering is punished with the fine but also with a class II misdemeanor, for disobeying the orders
of a court of law399; both the punishments, however, can be easily factored in the decision not to
answer: the criminal misdemeanor is punishable with another fine whose maximum amount is 150
euros. Moreover, those rules do not seem to apply to a service provider that is not established in
France, or, in any case, it is not clear how they could be enforced without the cooperation of another
country400, which leads us back to square 1.
The system, however, seems adequate to interact at least with domestic providers, even if the
deterrence of the sanctions is quite low. This mechanism relies heavily on the voluntary cooperation
of the service providers but does not solve the main issue: the state does not have means to coerce
compliance, if necessary.
The  approach  has  not  been  shared  by  Germany,  that  has  recently  passed  a  new  law
addressing  the  issue  of  illegal  content  spreading  through  social  networks
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz – NetzDG)401. This piece of legislation, among other things, asks all
social networks to choose a representative that operates within the territory of the state: he or she
will be in charge of dealing with the (criminal) law enforcement authorities’ demands; the company
is required to disclose the information within 48 hours upon receipt402. The style here is radically
different. What Germany has done is forcing the providers to establish a direct, visible connection
between the country and the platform, so that the state can have an easy access point and start the
procedure quickly and officially. Unlike the French regulation, it gives a precise deadline to the
companies, under the penalty of 500.000 euros for the failure to respond403. The law clearly states
that the infractions shall be punished even if they are committed abroad. The aim is clear: it is about
getting back territoriality (so, sovereignty) as to what happens within German borders, and the jokes
are on the service provider. It is its responsibility to delete illegal content, to battle hate speech and
to help to prosecute potential crimes in a short delay from the request.
399 Art. R642-1 of the French Criminal Code. 
400 The survey of the European Commission showed that France is among the states that have concluded formal or 
informal agreements with foreign service providers and that consider the cooperation mandatory, although it is not clear
what to do in case of the company’s failure or refusal to respond. 
401 This new statute is highly controversial. On the one hand, it has been criticized by the U.N. and the E.U. as a law 
allowing for censorship; on the other hand, the application of its provisions to their full extent would lead to an extra 
esteemed cost of 530 million euros per year: M. Etzold, Facebook attackiert Heiko Maas, May 28, 2017, wiwo.de. 
The new law imposes to all the major social networks operating within German boundaries to delete illegal 
contents after 24 hours from a complaint. It is now in force since a few months and the German press already reported a
general failure to respond to the illicit content. According to the reports that have been released, the compliance rate 
varies highly from company to company. While YouTube and Twitter try to be as efficient as they can, Facebook 
reportedly fall way behind the schedule, and has been criticized for how the report mechanism has been structured: F. 
Rütten, Wie Facebook und Twitter das neue Löschgesetz umsetzen, January 4, 2018, stern.de; Facebook löschte bisher 
nur 362 Beiträge, July 27, 2018, t-online.de; Fast 500.000 Beschwerden, nur wenuge Löschungen, July 27, 2018, 
manager-magazin.de; F. Steiner, Wie viel Facebook & Co. mithilfe des NetzDG löschen, July 27, 2018, 
deutschlandfunk.de.
402 § 5 (2) NetzDG.
403 § 4 (1) n. 8, § 4 (2) NetzDG.
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Nothing of the kind has been happening in Italy: there is no legislation regulating interaction
with any service provider, that fall under the general regulation of searches and seizures. They can
voluntarily cooperate  and give out  the  information  or  be searched.  There has  been little  or  no
attention to specific issues, apart from some vague provisions regarding the chain of custody and
the  seizure  by copy,  which is  an  option available  only for  service providers404.  Playing in  this
scenario, the investigators have two main ways to get the information they want: the first one is
targeting the device405. It is an easy remedy, but it has two main flaws: first, the device could not be
an easy access point to all the information stored in the cloud; it could be the opposite: the cloud
could be an effective way to peek into an encrypted cell phone406. Second, the information displayed
on the device is often a copy of the original, which is stored safely somewhere else: some records
could be altered or canceled, undermining the reliability of the evidence. The issue here is not the
admissibility in court – the rules on authentication are quite relaxed – but it is still important that the
evidence collected and presented at trial has a strong probative value, which could be achieved
through the transparent cooperation with service providers. Law enforcement has to rely then on the
spontaneous cooperation of the providers, that can decide to answer to disclosure requests or to
refuse it without fear of consequences407.
4. The current legal framework needs to be reshaped, as it does not seem to be efficient for
any of the stakeholders involved. The states cannot rely upon sure means of cooperation, and the
MLA procedure does not seem to be an option (at least, not for all cases that potentially require
access to digitally stored evidence). The providers are in an awkward position: they have to keep
good relationships with the states they are doing business in, but they also cannot afford to disclose
costumers’ data without due process: the enhanced protection of privacy has been a selling point
since Snowden’s revelations408. In between, the users cannot do much more than wait and see: they
agreed to terms and conditions that normally allow for any kind of appropriate action to help to
404 This is another issue that legislations struggle with: does the copy of a bunch of information amount to a seizure? In
Italy yes, but just for one kind of duplicate (bit stream image): see Cass., S.U., July 20, 2017, Andreucci, n. 40963, in 
C.e.d., n. 270497, for a note, see L. Bartoli, Sequestro di dati a fini probatori: soluzioni provvisorie a incomprensioni 
durature, in Arch. pen. (web), 2018, f. 1. In the U.S. it is still unclear whether or not the Fourth amendment is to be 
applied to the digital duplication: according to a well-known perspective, yes, but only if it is not possible to examine 
the data before copying it: O. Kerr, Fourth amendment seizures of computer data, Yale L. Journ., 2010, p. 700; for an 
overview on the issue, see Digital Duplication and the Fourth Amendment, Harv. L. Rev., 2016, p. 1046. 
405 On the low level of protection that the device enjoys in the Italian system see G. Lasagni, Tackling phone 
searches in Italy and in the US. Proposals for a technological re-thinking of procedural rights and freedoms, in NJECL,
2018, p. 386. 
406 Quite the contrary: it could be encrypted and the cooperation with the provider could be the shortest way to get 
ahold of the contents, as the S. Bernardino case has clearly demonstrated.
407 Facebook, for instance, has been heard on how it cooperates with law enforcement authorities to prevent hate 
speech and violence against women: for an example, see the Italian Senate commission on Femicide and gender related 
violent crimes, transcript of the hearin held on July 25, 2017, senato.it, p. 30 and following.
408 Amazon, for instance, has made very clear that it will challenge all the requests that deems insufficient and that it is
lobbying for the introduction of adequate standards for this kind of cooperation: see S. Schmidt, Privacy and Data 
Security, June 12, 2015, aws.amazon.com. After all, Amazon had the largest share in the cloud services’ market: see C. 
Coles, AWS vs Azure vs Google Cloud. Market Share 2018, May 1, 2018, skyhighnetworks.com.
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investigate a crime. The decision is ultimately in the companies’ hands: if they tend to be indulgent
towards  the  requests,  the  information  will  be  handed  over,  and  often  the  procedure  will  not
guarantee the basic safeguards as to the necessity and the proportionality of the investigative action.
The overall picture is nothing short of chaotic. The burden of extra-territoriality has been
passed on to providers, which directly receive the requests, phrased according to different national
frameworks instead of having them channeled through a single “competent authority”. Together
with the burden, however, comes the power to decide on a case-to-case basis: the single company
can make its own policy as to the cooperation, and since it is voluntary, ‘No’ is always an option409.
Thanks  to  a  thorough  consultation  with  States,  national  judiciaries,  law  enforcement
authorities and the association of the service providers, the European Commission identified the
core issues:  the complete  obscurity in the procedure,  the lack of reliability and the troubles  in
holding both companies and law authority agencies accountable for their actions. To face these
deficiencies, the European Commission has drafted a proposal for a regulation which – if approved
– would govern and enhance direct cooperation between individual states and service providers by
introducing two new tools, the European Production Order and the European Preservation Order410. 
The  European  Production  Order  is  intended  to  oblige  service  providers  to  hand  over
information to  the member state  that requires it,  without  the necessary involvement  of the law
enforcement authorities of another member state. The European Preservation Order aims at freezing
useful information, allowing the law enforcement authorities to follow through with a request to
secure the evidence, neutralizing the risk of losing relevant material.
They would enlarge the spectrum of possibilities when it comes to cross-border access to
digital  evidence:  they  would  not  replace  any  MLA solution;  they  would  just  provide  for  an
alternative. Moreover, they would not abolish per se any national solution already in place, meaning
that any law enforcement authority will be able to choose how to ask for the information it needs.
On  the  one  hand,  this  strategy  could  play  well,  allowing  a  certain  degree  of  flexibility:  the
investigators could be free to choose the tool that better fits into their strategies, being just able to
count on two new cards in the game. On the other hand, this could bring to a residual application of
the regulation: it is a compelling mechanism, but it also comes with some conditions attached. It
could be easy to circumvent its limitations by simply resorting to an informal ask to the service
provider: it has worked so far and could work again in the future. It looks like it is up to the private
companies to uphold a single standard when it comes to this matter: they are the ones having to
respond to the information requests in the first place, and they have an interest in reducing the
409 As a result, some states normally get what they want whereas some others are left behind: See European 
Commission, Non-paper: Progress Report following the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on 
Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace, December 2, 2016, 15072/16, in data.consilium.europa.eu (hereafter: Non-
paper 1), p. 9-10.
K. Ligeti, G. Robinson, Cross-border access to electronic evidence: Policy and legislative challenges, in 
S. Carrera, V. Mitsilegas, Constitutionalising the Security Union: Effectiveness, rule of law and rights in 
countering terrorism and crime, Brussels, p. 103. The authors remarked that the compliance rate highly varies form 
country to country, at least in Google’s response pattern. They positively respond to the 75% of requests from Finland, 
but they do not respond to Hungarian authorities.
410 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European
Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, SWD(2018) 118, April 17, 2018, eur-
lex.europa.eu.
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variables. Then, they would probably use the procedure as a shield: they would hand over data
under  a  binding  order,  instead  of  passing  information  “under  the  desk”,  according  to  non-
transparent policies or a case-by-case rationale. 
Coming down to the details: the regulation provides for a common set of definitions as to
what qualifies as a service provider and what kind of records can be secured. 
Let’s start with the first classification: the draft regulation mentions communication services,
internet domain and IP numbering services and information society services as defined by Art. 1(1)
point  (b)  of  Directive  (EU)2015/1535.  This  last  reference  is  designed  to  include  «any service
normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request
of  a  recipient  of  services»,  which  can  apply to  a  broad set  of  situations:  for  instance,  all  the
marketplace and social networks are included. The companies that provide such a service can be
reached by the authorities of any member state as long as they offer their services in the European
Union. In other words, they are subject to those orders if they enable physical or legal persons
within the union to use the services they provide or if they have a substantial connection to the
European Union; therefore, the regulation does not apply to companies that do not fall in those
categories and to services that are rendered outside the European Union. 
As for  the  type  of  data  that  can be obtained,  the  regulation  lays  down four  categories:
subscriber data, access data, transactional data and content data. 
The first two categories are the least problematic with respect to the interference that the
disclosure  would  realize,  and  they  should  normally  be  interesting  at  the  early  stages  of  an
investigation to identify the suspect; they consist in information such as the name and address of the
user; the IP address and the logs of access to the service411. 
Transactional and content data, on the contrary, are suitable to be presented as evidence as to
what happened: they can be defined as metadata and the actual text message, email, photo, video,
recording and so on. The treatment of these last two is much more problematic: even if the metadata
does not seem as decisive, they can be interconnected with other information and help painting a
pretty accurate picture of what the specific content was; however, the most intrusive measure is for
sure the order to disclose content data. 
For this reason, and to ensure a minimum level of proportionality, the regulation provides for
two safeguards: the order to produce transactional and content data shall be approved by a judge or
a court, and can be only issued if the alleged infraction is punished with a custodial sentence of not
less than three years in its maximum amount. 
A production order for subscriber and access data can be issued for all criminal offenses, and
the authority of the prosecutor will suffice as there is no need for the validation of the judge. 
The difference in treatment seems reasonable: it takes into account the different intensity of
the public authority’s interference in the subject’s private life412, but this order of things also shows
411 It is also the object of the vast majority of the requests. 
412 During the discussion on the Proposal, the EESC has pointed out that also subscriber and access data are personal 
information: therefore, a judge should be involved in issuing the order as well: Opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee, n. 11533/18, July 12, 2018, eur-lex.europa.eu, point 1.7. The opinion, however, does not square with 
the fact that the prosecutor normally has access to personal data of the defendant or a person of interest in an 
investigation, without the judge being necessarily involved. Moreover, these types of data do not necessarily involve a 
third party, which can also justify a more relaxed standard. 
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one main critical aspect. Setting a threshold at three years of maximum custodial sentence is hardly
a limit at all: in the Italian legal system, there is basically no petty crime that would not allow law
enforcement authorities to ask for the disclosure of the most sensitive information on the scale413. To
be fair, it is very hard to set a reasonable scope with this kind of legal instrument: regulations work
immediately  throughout  the  entire  Union,  regardless  of  how the  criminal  codes  punish  crimes
within one state’s borders. There is no harmonized criminal code; the harshness of punishment is for
the single nation to decide and the European Union has little to do with that. However, three years
of maximum custodial sentence seems to be too generous, and the proposal itself tries to justify the
choice,  aimed  at  not  undermining  «the  effectiveness  of  the  instrument  and  its  use  by
practitioners»414. Yet, this explanation does not seem to be fully satisfactory. If effectiveness had to
be a concern in this phase, it would have been better served by setting no general limit. On the
contrary: effectiveness should be properly balanced with the proportionality of state’s action, or the
outcome could be an odd, efficient tool that systematically harms more individual rights than it is
necessary and reasonable to do. 
Now, let’s have a closer look at the procedure. The issuing authority – a court, a judge, a
prosecutor – can resort to those Orders during the investigation or the trial and has to comply with a
series of instruction provided by the draft regulation. The document shall specify the issuing and (if
necessary) the validating authority; the provider that the measure addresses; the person whose data
are to be disclosed; the requested data categories; the criminal statute whose alleged violation is
being investigated; a couple of other technical details and, most importantly, the ground for the
necessity and proportionality of the measure415. 
This last requirement is particularly relevant when the issuing authority is asking for the
disclosure of content and transactional information: in this case, a judge or a court shall validate the
order, which would be a hard thing to do without a reasoned explanation on why this measure has to
be taken and why it is proportionate. 
In all other cases (production order for less sensitive data; preservation order) the prosecutor
can do everything on his own; nonetheless, the grounds on which the action is taken should be
specified: the person whose data have been sought could later challenge the legality of the Order,
especially on those grounds. In the first part of the procedure, however, these explanations will
remain between the issuing authority and itself. 
The Proposal also states that an Order can be issued if a similar action is allowed under the
issuing state’s law, which is a difficult condition to verify: one of the points of departure for this
drafted regulation is exactly the absence of national provisions on direct cooperation with service
providers, and it is not clear how to establish an analogy. If the order demands the disclosure of
stored communication, the closest proxy could be the national ‘interception of communications,’
that is only allowed under different standards. It is as if the regulation would like to impose uniform
standards across the countries, but also wanted these two Orders to blend in the national system: it
seems  hard  to  have  it  both  ways.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  it  is  plausible  for  this  clause  to  be
disregarded: the Proposal sets its own limits, which are way easier to control and verify. 
413 See also Meijer Commitee, ‘CM1809 Comments on the proposal for a regulation on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters’, statewatch.org, 18 July 2018, p. 1.
414 Proposal, p. 16.
415 The complete list of requirements is contained by articles 5 and 6 of the Proposal. 
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Another circumstance that should prevent the adoption of a Production Order is the fact that
the disclosure of those data would harm fundamental interests of the addressee’s state, such as its
national security and defense; or that the information would be privileged under the addressee’s
state law. The first condition deals with the protection of the other county’s most delicate balance,
and it is bizarre that such an evaluation is left to a single judicial authority of a foreign country.
Probably it will have no means to assess the impact that such a request should have on another
State’s national security, and it is why those requests were managed through MLA to begin with.
This trait has also been noticed by a member state that, during the discussion of the proposal, has
underlined  that  it  is  important  to  involve  also  the  addressee’s  state  in  the  early  stage  of  the
procedure, to avoid an erosion of the state’s sovereignty416. The same goes for the second possible
issue: the assessment is not as difficult, but the single authority is supposed to know the precise
extent of another country’s laws establishing privilege, which does not seem realistic. Moreover, if
the Italian law authority asked Facebook for the content data – including the messaging history – of
the person A, it could stumble upon privileged communications that they did not expect to find
there in the first place. It is not possible to know in advance the full extent of what does a service
provider  have,  and it  could  be  complicated  to  establish  in  advance  whether  the  information  is
protected by the other state’s law. 
Let us assume that the Order has been issued. It is not still enough to address the company:
the issuing authority needs to complete a Certificate417 that can be sent directly to the provider,
without any communication with the state where the provider is established. The certificate contains
all  the  information  that  the  Order  had to  provide,  except  for  the  necessity  and  proportionality
justification: that content shall remain confidential, not to put the investigation at risk.
The addressee has then 10 days upon the receipt to send the relevant data to the issuing
authority;  it  the  EPOC  is  incomplete  or  contains  error,  the  company  has  5  days  to  ask  for
clarifications through the form provided for by the Annex III of the proposal.
The provider informs the user of the disclosure, unless it is not asked to keep the request
confidential; in this case, the issuing authority will have to inform the person without delay about
the execution of an EPOC (but not of an EPOC-PR), or they can postpone such a notification until
when it would not damage the investigation. According to the proposal, this provision has been
shaped following the example of the EIO directive: its art. 19 provides for precautions to preserve
confidentiality. This parallel, however, does not seem to hold too well: art. 19 of the Directive is
addressed to a judicial authority of another member state, and not a private company. Only the last
paragraph mentions banks, but it points out that the States should take the necessary measures to
prevent them from disclosing their cooperation with an ongoing investigation. The approach seems
radically different here: the general rule is that providers – a private corporation – can give notice to
their clients unless they are explicitly prohibited to.
Assuming that the addressee is  (or was) providing a service to the suspect  and that  the
EPOC appears to be legitimate and complete, there is still a window of legitimate non-compliance
416 See the Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Delegations, Interinstitutional File n. 
2018/0108(COD), June 26, 2018 (hereafter: Note), eur-lex.europa.eu, p. 6.
417 The Proposal also provides for the templates: the European Production Order Certificate (EPOC) template is 
referred to as Annex I; the European Preservation Order Certificate (EPOC-PR) as Annex II. 
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with the request,  and the drafted regulation does  envisage two main kinds of  reasons for  that:
technical and legal. 
As  for  the  technical  side,  the  data  could  have  been  canceled  due  to  the  ordinary  data
retention obligations, or upon request of the user. Those are listed under the ‘de facto impossibility’,
that gives the provider a legitimate reason not to answer418. It could also avoid liability if it is not
answering because of force majeure. 
As for the legal reasons, the provider could take issue at the manifestly abusive EPOC or at
the request that violates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. If this is the
case, the addressee can reject the EPOC and send a copy of the rejection form to its EU home-state,
so that the competent authorities can ask for clarifications to the issuing authority.
Moreover, the EPOC could conflict with a third country’s legislation on data disclosure, and
at that point, the addressee would be put in a “damn you if you do, damn you if you don’t” kind of
situation. The conflict of obligation has to be notified to the issuing authority and argued in depth
by the provider,  that  also must  point  out  the  rules  that  are  relevant  to  the  case  and how they
contradict the European obligation. 
Both the evaluations require a deep knowledge of the law and the necessary skills to apply it, and
they are quite extraordinary tasks to be assigned to the legal department of a private corporation.
Besides,  not  all  service  providers  are  trillion-dollar-worth  conglomerates  with  the  necessary
resources to hire the sharpest legal minds on the market: some of them are middle-sized companies
and playing the judge would be quite demanding419. 
In case of non-compliance, however, the issuing authority can decide to ask the relevant
member state to execute the measure: first, the Order has to be recognized. This approval should be
given without  formalities  and would  bring  to  a  second round of  cooperation  with  the  original
addressee, that can oppose the order again, for the same set of reasons. At that point, the executing
state can impose sanctions.
The picture appears to be quite convoluted: the procedure is basically put in place since its
inception, but carried out by the competent member state, which should act upon the Order written
by a foreign authority.  This  step of  the procedure is  the  only one to  be directly linked to  the
principle of the mutual recognition (art. 82 TFEU), and yet it pointed to as the legal basis for the
entire regulation. 
5. The compact territoriality of the national state clashes with the diffused territoriality of the
cloud and they are not easy to reconcile. Sure, unilateral action is a captivating method: it promises
quick results, but it also unbalances the system. The providers are charged with a role for which that
418 To a certain extent, the de facto possibility depends on the policy of the provider: after the San Bernardino case, for 
instance, many messaging applications shifted to end-to-end encryption (before – among the mainstream apps – it was 
implemented by the secret conversations of Telegram): the message is stored in a server, but the company cannot open 
it; only the users (the two ends of that communication) have the key. For more on the topic, see: R. Budish, H. 
Burkert, U. Gasser, Encryption Policy and Its International Impacts.
419 Those expectations have already been defined as “unrealistic”: see Note, p. 6-7. For another critical view on the 
point, see V. Mitsilegas, The privatization of mutual trust in Europe’s area of criminal justice. The case of e-evidence,
in MJECL, August 9, 2018.
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they have no authority (or  credibility)420,  the  states  go searching for  information  at  the  risk of
harming even national security of another country. 
This approach, however, does not seem consistent with the role of sovereignty as we know
it. To implement a coherent solution, we should reconceptualize the concept to make it compatible
with a liquid cloud. Besides, the other path forward is to give MLA a serious try, by investing in
bilateral or multilateral treaties which could provide for easy and standardized procedures, secure
portals for the presentation of the requests and a user-friendly system to check and answer them.
LAURA BARTOLI
420 It is just a step forward in a known direction; service providers have already been charged with institutional tasks: 
see E. Haber, Privatisation of the Judiciary, in Seattle University Law Rev., 2016, 115.
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Towards an alternative to territorial jurisdiction to face criminality
committed through or facilitated by the use of blockchains
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The territoriality principle to determine State jurisdiction. – 3. The
development  of  cybercrime  and  its  consequences  on  the  territoriality  principle.  –  4.  The
development  of  blockchains  and  its  consequences  on  the  territoriality  principle.  –  5.  The
applicability  of  the  targeted  public  theory  to  establish  jurisdiction  over  offences  enabled  or
facilitated by the use of blockchains. – 6. Towards an alternative to State jurisdiction based on
territoriality. – 7. Conclusions.
1.  According  to  Christopher  Pierson,  «  States  occupy  an  increasingly  clearly  defined
physical  space  over  which  they  claim  sole  legitimate  authority421».  The  territoriality  principle
supposes that a State has authority to exercise jurisdiction over conducts taking place within its own
territory422. At the birth of the modern State, the territoriality principle was subject to almost no
doubt or question. However, the globalisation of the world, especially through the development of
technological means and through the Internet, marked a real change of society and raised new legal
questions. In a society which is built globally, jurisdiction based on national borders does not make
sense  anymore.  According  to  Darrel  C.  Menthe  « [...]  cyberspace  takes  all  of  the  traditional
principles of conflicts-of-law and reduces them to absurdity423 ». After the launch of Bitcoins, ten
years  after  this  quotation,  Darrel  C.  Menthe  could  have  said  the  exact  same  thing  about
blockchains424.
The objective of this article will be to assess whether the territoriality principle in its current
form may be used in order to tackle offences facilitated by or committed through a blockchain. The
developments to the territoriality principle resulting from the raise of cybercrime will be used as a
background. Finally, some of the proposals that have been made by scholars will be assessed in
order to imagine an alternative to State jurisdiction based on territoriality to overtake criminality
committed through or facilitated by the use of blockchains. 
In order to do this, the concept of territoriality as it  is used in order to determine State
jurisdiction over an offence will be studied (2), then the consequences of the development of the
Internet and cybercrime on State jurisdiction established through the territoriality principle will be
assessed  (3).  The fourth part  of  this  article  will  study the  development  of  blockchains  and its
421 C. PIERSON, The modern State, London, 2002, II ed., p. 9, http://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Pierson,
%20The%20Modern%20State,%202nd%20ed.PDF.
422 D. IRELAND-PIPER, Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: Does the long arm of the law undermine the rule of law,
in MJIL, 2012, p. 130.
423 D. C. MENTHE, Jurisdiction in cyberspace: a theory of international spaces, in MTLR, 1998, p. 71.
424 For more clarity, within this article, Blockchain should be understood as a transparent, secure information storage
and  transmission  technology  that  operates  without  a  central  control  body  (the  “Blockchain”).  By  extension,  a
blockchain is a database that contains the history of all exchanges between its users since its creation. This database is
secure and distributed: it is shared by its various users, without intermediaries, which allows everyone to check the
validity of the chain.
(a  “blockchain”)  –  definition  provided  by  Blockchain  France,  https://blockchainfrance.net/decouvrir-la-
blockchain/c-est-quoi-la-blockchain/. 
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consequences  on the territoriality principle  (4)  before studying the applicability of  the  targeted
public theory to establish jurisdiction over offences enabled or facilitated by the use of blockchains
(5) and finally, it will move on to review some of the proposals made in order to better respond to
cybercrime  and  analyse  their  applicability  to  criminality  enabled  or  facilitated  by  the  use  of
blockchains (6).
2. Sovereignty constitutes one of the founding principles of the modern State. The Peace of
Westphalia,  which  constitutes  for  scholars  the  beginning  of  the  modern  international  system,
implied the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. This concept supposes the inviolability of borders,
the equality between all sovereign States and above all, the non-interference in the affairs of foreign
States425. The principle of national sovereignty supposes that « within the limits of its jurisdiction
(set by the division of the world into a series of similarly sovereign nation-states), no other actor
may gainsay the will of the sovereign State426 ». This Westphalian sovereignty principle is stated in
article  2(4)  of  the  United  Charter,  according  to  which  « Members  thus,  shall  refrain  in  their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial  integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations ». No limitation to the power of the State can be brought by another. The right to punish
(ius  puniendi)  expresses  the  Sovereign’s  authority  throughout  its  population  and territory.  This
means that only the State should have a right to punish individuals on its own territory427. Therefore,
criminal  law constitutes  the  core  of  the  State’s  Sovereignty428.  The  principle  of  territoriality in
criminal law confirms the sole authority and jurisdiction of the States and the right to punish it has
on its citizen and within its territory. 
The territoriality principle – to be understood as the right for a sovereign State to prosecute
offences  committed  within  its  territory  –  is  recognised  by  public  international  law.  Public
international law makes a distinction between subjective and objective territoriality429. Subjective
territoriality should be understood as the right to prosecute offences committed – or at least initiated
– within the territory of the State when objective territoriality gives the right to prosecute offences
initiated within the territory of another State but that are completed430 or whose effects are to be felt
425 B. TESCHKE, La théorisation du système étatique westphalien: les relations internationales de l’absolutisme au 
capitalisme, in CRS, 2012, p. 31; W. BERGE, Criminal jurisdiction and the territorial principle, in MLR, 1931, p. 240; 
S. GARIBIAN, Souveraineté et légalité en droit pénal international: le concept de crime contre l'humanité dans le 
discours des juges à Nuremberg, in M. HENZELIN, R. ROTH (eds.), Le droit pénal à l'épreuve de l’internationalisation, 
Paris-Genève-Bruxelles, 2002, p. 2, https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:23564.
426 C. PIERSON, The modern State, cit., p. 11.
427 S. GARIBIAN, Souveraineté et légalité en droit pénal international: le concept de crime contre l'humanité dans le 
discours des juges à Nuremberg, in M. HENZELIN, R. ROTH (eds.), cit., p. 2.
428 On the role of criminal law as the core of the State’s sovereignty, see for example B. MATHIEU, M. VERPEAUX, 
Droit constitutionnel, Paris, 2004, paragraph 384.
429 J. B. MAILLART, The limits of subjective territorial jurisdiction in the context of cybercrime, in ERA Forum, 2018, 
p. 3, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12027-018-0527-2#Fn7.
430 The objective territoriality has been recognised at an international level in the Lotus Case, Permanent Court of 
International Justice, S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 7 September 1927, series A, no. 10, https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf.
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within the territory of the State431. This extensive comprehension of the territorial principle follows
the ubiquity theory, which recognises the possibility for an offence to be present in more than one
place. The ubiquity theory supposes that an offence may be located where any of its constituent
element are located – this may be the place where the offence itself took place but also the place
where the effects of the offence took place432. 
We find similar rules of jurisdiction at the national levels. Therefore, it does make more
sense to refer to the objective and passive territoriality as they result from international law than to
refer to specific national jurisdiction rules that would echo these principles. For example, French
criminal law is applicable to offences committed within the territory of the Republic433. However,
since it is not that easy in practice and since offences are often committed only partly in a certain
State, the notion of offence committed within the territory is viewed in an extensive way. Thus, the
concept  includes  all  of  the  offences  whose  only one of  the  constituent  elements  took place in
France434.  German  criminal  law  is  also  applicable  to  all  offences  that  were  committed  in
Germany435. An offence is to be understood as committed on the German territory either when the
agent acted or when the effects of the offence are to be felt in Germany436. Additionally, an offence
is considered as committed within the territory of Italy when the constituent element to the offence
happened entirely or in part in Italy or if the consequence of the constituent element to the offence
happened in Italy437. 
The globalisation of the world that we perceive tends to enable the development of social
relations beyond territorial constraints. Because of the global character of the social relations of our
era, of course, such a conception of territoriality accepts the risk that different jurisdictions may be
established over a same offence, whose constituent elements are located in different countries that
may all have jurisdiction over the conduct438. It is sometimes argued that, even though the Internet
was first referred as a lawless area439, the ubiquity theory finally renders it an overflow of repressive
powers440.
431 C. RYNGAERT, The concept of jurisdiction in international law, Oxford, 2015, II ed., p. 5, 
https://unijuris.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/12/The-Concept-of-Jurisdiction-in-International-Law.pdf; D.
IRELAND-PIPER, Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: Does the long arm of the law undermine the rule of law, cit., p. 
130.
432 H. ASCENSIO, L’extraterritorialité comme instrument, in Travaux du Representant special du Secretaire general 
des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’homme et entreprises transnationales et autres entreprises, 2010, p. 5, 
https://www.rse-et-ped.info/IMG/pdf/10-12-10_Ascencio_extraterritorialite-1.pdf.
433 French penal code (Code pénal), article 113-2-1 and French code of criminal procedure (Code de procédure 
pénale), article 693.
434 French penal code (Code pénal), article 113-2-2.
435 German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch), section 3.
436 German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch), section 9 paragraph 1.
437 Italian penal code (Codice penale), article 6.
438 L. DESESSARD, France, les compétences criminelles concurrentes nationales et internationales et le principe ne bis
in idem, in RIDA, 2002, p. 917.
439 T. SCASSA, R. J. CURRIE, New first principles – assessing the Internet’s challenges to jurisdiction, in Geo. J. Int'l L.,
2011, p. 1037; A. C. YEN, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and perceptions of cyberspace, in Berkeley 
Tech. L.J., 2002, p. 1037.
440 R. BOOS, La lutte contre la cybercriminalité au regard de l’action des État, 2016, p. 162, https://tel.archives-
ouvertes.fr/tel-01470150/document.
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3. While  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  cybercrime  (the  “Convention”)441 does
provide for examples of what should be considered a cybercrime and thus, should be tackled by
national  substantive  criminal  law,  the  Convention  does  not  provide  for  a  general  definition  of
cybercrime. However, the doctrine seems to agree on a rather large definition of cybercrime: Majid
Yar defines cybercrime as any illegal activities facilitated by a computer442 while Sarah Gordon and
Richard  Ford  define  it  as  any crime committed  through or  facilitated  by the  use of  electronic
devices or IT networks443. Thus, any offence enabled or facilitated by the use of a blockchain may
also fall under this definition and it should therefore make sense to use the legislation on cybercrime
as a background in order to try to apply it to criminality committed through or facilitated by a
blockchain.
Throughout the last decades, we observed a global integration of the world which enhanced
the interactions among people at a global level. This enhanced integration at a global level has been
the  consequence  of,  amongst  others,  the  development  of  technology  and  of  the  Internet.  The
development of the Internet has been accompanied by the one of criminality facilitated by the use of
the Internet and the law had therefore needed to respond to such a phenomenon. However,  the
particularity of cybercrimes raised certain difficulties that the territoriality of criminal law has to
face. We should recall that the Internet is a network; the communications it contains are not limited
to a specific territory. « Material published on the internet can be uploaded in one state, downloaded
in another, and viewed in a large number of other states444 ». What raises some difficulties is the fact
that the jurisdiction is based on delimited territorial rules while the Internet is,  on the contrary,
characterised by its universality445. Conducts on the Internet happen at once anywhere and nowhere:
it seems thus difficult to decide which jurisdiction is more entitled to have jurisdiction over an
offence than another one446.  « Unlike traditional jurisdictional problems that might involve two,
three, or more conflicting jurisdictions, the set of laws which could apply to a simple homespun
webpage is all of them447 ». For an offence committed online, any State may be competent448. This
can be explained by the fact that, through the use of the Internet, an illegal content may be made
available by an agent in a foreign country, through the use of a foreign server for data storage, but
441 Council  of  Europe,  Convention  on  cybercrime,  Budapest,  2001,  ETS  185,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185.
442 M. YAR, Cybercrime And Society, 2006, London, p. 10.
443 S.  GORDON,  R.  FORD,  On The Definition And Classification Of Cybercrime,  in  J. Comput.  Virol.,  2006, p. 2,
https://download.adamas.ai/dlbase/ebooks/VX_related/On%20the%20definition%20and%20classification%20of
%20cybercrime.pdf.
444 S. NILOUFER,  The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or
moving towards unification?, in JTLP, 2013, p. 1, https://tlp.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/tlp/article/view/124/127.
445 J. FRANCILLON, Cybercriminalité, aspect de droit pénal international, 2014, 
http://www.penal.org/sites/default/files/files/RH-7.pdf.
446 S. P. BEATTY, Litigation in cyberspace: the current and future state of Internet jurisdiction, in U. Balt. Intell. Prop. 
L.J., 1999, p. 139; D. R. JOHNSON, D. POST, Law and borders – the rise of law in cyberspace, in Stanford L. Rev., 996, 
p. 1375.
447 D. C. MENTHE, Jurisdiction in cyberspace: a theory of international spaces, cit., p. 71.
448 D. C. MENTHE, Jurisdiction in cyberspace: a theory of international spaces, cit., p. 70.
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still  making the  illegal  content  available  to  any person benefiting  of  an Internet  access  in  any
State449.  Therefore,  we understand that  the principles that  we developed in the first  part  of the
article, that are used to establish jurisdiction, may be difficult to apply to the cyberspace. 
Regarding  the  subjective  territoriality:  first,  we  understand  that,  because  of  the  global
character of the Internet and the multiplicity of its actors, it may be difficult to determine where an
offence  took  place.  The  complexity  related  to  the  localisation  of  the  causal  event  has  been
highlighted  by  the  Advocate  General  Wathelet  in  the  case  Concurrence  SARL  v.  Samsung
Electronics France SAS and Amazon Service Europe Sarl450. In order to respond to this, it should be
determined in which territory is located an offence on the Internet? There are many possibilities to
decide what constitutes the location of the offence: the location of the author or creator of the illegal
content may be one but it  would however face the risk of forum shopping to choose the most
clement jurisdiction to commit an offence. We could also quote some others such as the location of
the  viewer  of  the  illegal  content,  but  it  would  not  prevent  positive  conflicts  of  jurisdiction451.
Therefore,  regarding  cybercrime,  Lord  Denning said  that  « a  well-advised  plaintiff  is  likely to
commence  proceedings  in  the  most  favourable  forum452 ».  This  is  particularly relevant  since  a
similar conduct on the Internet may be tackled in a complete different manner according to the
competent jurisdiction. The location of the server giving access to the Internet and enabling the
upload of illegal content may also be a solution. The location of the server may be difficult to
determine because of technical issues and because of the possible use of multiple sub-servers. We
could finally think about the first location of the website containing the illegal content to establish
jurisdiction453. So far, we have no consensus on what constitutes the place of location of an offence
on the Internet, this is why positive conflicts of jurisdiction may therefore not be solved by the use
of subjective territoriality. 
Regarding the objective territoriality: since the Internet is available almost everywhere, the
constituent elements to a crime occurring on such an Internet page, may be located anywhere; in
fact, in any jurisdiction that provides for access to the website. If this was the case, the territorial
principle would not make sense anymore since by using it, it would give jurisdiction to any State.
Therefore, the competence would tend to be a universal one454. Finally, the consequence would be
449 M. D. DUBBER, T. HÖRNLE, Criminal law a comparative approach, Oxford, p. 149. 
450 Advocate General WATHELET, 9 November 2016, Opinion on Concurrence SARL v Samsung Electronics France 
SAS and Amazon Service Europe Sarl, Case C-618/15, ECLI: EU:C:2016:843, paragraph 2. 
451 S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or 
moving towards unification?, cit., p. 2; H. VAN LITH, International jurisdiction and commercial litigation: uniform 
rules for contract disputes, The Hague, 2009, p. 5 ss. Also see a similar theory for copyrights law on the internet in T. 
SOLLEY, The problem and the solution: using the Internet to resolve Internet copyright disputes, in Ga. St. U. L. Rev., 
2008, p. 818.
452 S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or 
moving towards unification?, cit., p. 2; Forum Shopping reconsidered, in Harvard L. R., 1990, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1341283.pdf  .
453 For more information on the pro and contra arguments related to these different possibilities, see S. F. MILLER, 
Bloomingtom, 2003, p. 235 ss, https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1270&context=ijgls.
454 J. FRANCILLON, Cybercriminalité, aspect de droit pénal international, cit.
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constant positive conflicts of jurisdiction455. So, using the objective territoriality does not solve the
problem of positive conflicts of jurisdiction456. 
If the traditional rules of jurisdiction are used without taking into account the specificity of
the Internet, this would lead not only to incoherencies but also to a lack of legal certainty457. While
criminal law should respect the principle of legality which supposes that it should be not only clear
but  also predictable458 and that « punishment,  coercive measures,  prosecution and sentencing of
criminals  should  be  predictable and  be  applied  uniformly and  in  a  systematic  order459 »  these
uncertainties constitute a problem if  they lead to  as many different  solutions as the number of
potential competent States (which, as we have seen before, is extremely high). The fact of being
potentially subject to all of the criminal law systems of the world may constitute a threat vis-à-vis of
fundamental principles of criminal law – especially vis-à-vis the legality principle. This could also
endanger the principle of  ne bis in idem if more than one jurisdiction is competent and decide to
prosecute  the  same  offence  committed  online.  As  a  consequence,  legal  certainty  –  which
encompasses both the legality and the  ne bid in  idem principles460 –  may be weakened by the
inadequacy of traditional jurisdiction rules to face cybercrime and this may endanger the rule of law
in the information society, which reposes on principles including, amongst others, the certainty and
predictability of the legal environment461.
In 2001, the Council of Europe published a Convention on cybercrime. In its explanatory
report regarding the Convention, the Council of Europe explained that it was aware of the necessity
to  use  international  law  in  order  to  address  such  a  form of  criminality  that  produces  effects
regardless of borders and regardless of the location of the offender462. The challenge that constituted
the  global  character  of  the  Internet  was  taken  into  account  by  the  Council  of  Europe,  which
distinguished the creation of a common space – the cyberspace – which may be used to commit
offences at a transnational level463. In its explanatory report, the Council of Europe recognised the
fact that criminals using the Internet may be located in places different to those where the offences
they commit produce their effects464. This was notably the reason why the Council of Europe argued
455 M. DELMAS-MARTY, Le relatif et l’universel. Les forces imaginantes du droit, tome 1, Paris, 2004, p. 342.
456 J. FRANCILLON, Cybercriminalité, aspect de droit pénal international, cit.; K. N. EDWIN, J. SHILILU, Jurisdictional 
challenge of the Internet ; a focus on electronic contracts, p. 3, 
http://www.academia.edu/27265774/JURISDICTIONAL_CHALLENGE_OF_THE_INTERNET_A_FOCUS_ON_EL
ECTRONIC_CONTRACTS.
457 Z. D. CLOPTON, Territoriality, technology, and national security, in U. Chi. L. Rev., 2016, p. 49.
458 On the exigence of quality of the law according to the European convention on human rights, see for example, 
European Court of Human Rights, Cantoni c. France, no. 17862/91, 15 November 1996. 
459 A. SUOMINEN, What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law Within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the EU?, in BJCLCJ, 2014, p. 7.
460 A. SUOMINEN, What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law Within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the EU?, cit., p. 9.
461 S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or 
moving towards unification?, cit., p. 2.
462 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Convention on cybercrime, ETS 185, Budapest, 2001, paragraph 6, 
https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b.
463 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Convention on cybercrime, cit., paragraph 8.
464 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Convention on cybercrime, cit., paragraph 6.
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for the necessity to tackle the challenge of cybercrime at an international level465. Therefore, the
Council  of Europe decided to  tackle the question of jurisdiction and more precisely the issues
regarding the determination of the place of commission of the offence466.  However,  even if  the
Convention provides for State parties to exercise jurisdiction when an offence is committed on their
territory, it does not give specific rules on what should be considered an offence committed in a
State’s  territory.  The  only way provided  for  by the  Convention  in  order  to  deal  with  positive
conflicts of jurisdiction is that it provides for States to consult to determine among them which State
constitutes  the  most  appropriate  jurisdiction  for  prosecution,  when  more  than  one  State  has
jurisdiction over an offence according to the jurisdiction rules provided for by the Convention467.
This  should  be  done  in  order  to  « avoid  duplication  of  effort,  unnecessary  inconvenience  for
witnesses, or competition among law enforcement officials of the States concerned, or to otherwise
facilitate the efficiency or fairness of the proceedings468 ». It is a big step to focus on the regional
level in order to find solutions to a global problem instead of focusing on national rules. However,
the  Convention and the rules  it  provides  on jurisdiction,  even if  they can help because  of  the
cooperation that they provide for, do not really give clear rules on territoriality that would permit to
prevent positive conflicts of jurisdiction.
At a national level, judges confronted to jurisdiction issues within cybercrime cases, often
relied  on  the  objective  territoriality  principle.  In  the  Töben  case,  the  German  court  held  that
jurisdiction of German courts may be established solely because Internet users located in Germany
could have access to the content that constituted a criminal offence, even if this content had been
created and stored in foreign States. The Court considered that the offence had consequences (if not
only, at least also) in Germany and the objective territoriality principle should thus give jurisdiction
to Germany. Before 2008, the French jurisprudence also considered that the French jurisdictions
were competent as soon as illicit content were available on the Internet and were accessible from
France: thus, as soon as the website containing the criminal offence was accessible from France,
jurisdiction  was  established469.  This  view  was  taken  in  the  Yahoo!  case  in  which  the  French
jurisdictions declared themselves competent to hear the case because the website was available in
France, even if it was not supposed to be intended for the French public470. However, conscious of
the risks that  the application of  the objective territoriality principle  means in  terms of  positive
conflicts of jurisdiction, a French court in 2008471 took a different view regarding cybercrimes. The
French jurisdiction decided that it is not sufficient that the content on the website which constitutes
465 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Convention on cybercrime, cit., paragraph 6.
466 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Convention on cybercrime, cit., paragraph 11(v).
467 Council of Europe, Convention on cybercrime, Budapest, 2001, ETS 185, art 22(5), 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680081561.
468 Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Convention on cybercrime, cit., paragraph 239.
469 Groupe de  travail  CECyF – Cyberlex,  La procédure pénale face  aux évolutions de la  cybercriminalité  et  du
traitement  de  la  preuve  numérique :  propositions  pour  une  efficacité  juridique  renforcée,  24  janvier  2018,  p.  6 ;
Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, CCE 2002/5. Comm. 77, 26 February 2002.
470 A. CAMARD, Commentaire des arrêts Yahoo v. La ligue contre le Racisme, in MBDE/Société de l’information, 
droits et médias, 2011.
471 Cour de Cassation, chambre criminelle, no. 07-87.281, 9 September 2008, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?
oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000019570259&fastReqId=850465415&fastPos=1. 
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the criminal offence is accessible on the French territory,  but it  should also be proved that the
website in question is dedicated to the French public. Certain advices may help in order to decide
whether a website is dedicated to the French public: these include, for instance, the language of the
website or also the fact that the products sold on the website are available to French citizens 472. This
view  was  confirmed  by  the  French  Court  of  cassation  in  2010473.  This  trend  can  also  be
distinguished in other national laws474. Especially, the United States introduced such jurisdiction
rules based on the targeting of a specific public by making a distinction between active and passive
websites475. A passive website should be considered insufficient to establish jurisdiction when an
active website may give jurisdiction to the State’s courts. The principal criteria to be taken into
account in order to determine whether a website is to be considered as active in a State is: the fact
that the website is interactive,  that it  conducts business in the State and that it  is advertised to
potential customers in that State.476
4.  What  we  distinguished  with  the  development  of  the  Internet  was  a  simultaneous
development of criminality facilitated by it. Even though this phenomenon had to be tackled by law
enforcement authorities, this did not become a reason to over regulate the Internet or to diabolise it.
The same approach should be taken with regard to blockchains. While certain authors consider
blockchains and cryptocurrencies as too risky and plead for very strict  rules477 and while some
countries decided to completely ban the use of cryptocurrencies478 because of the possible threats it
contains, many scholars stress the fact that these potential risks should in no way be used in order to
reject  the  advancements  in  technology and  innovation479.  A distinction  should  always  be  made
between the positive and the negative effects of the technology and the existence of negative effects
should not have consequences that would detriment the positive ones. However, this should not be a
reason to ignore the criminal activities taking place within the Blockchain ecosystem. The objective
of the article is not to highlight the phenomenon of criminality committed through or facilitated by
the  use of  blockchains  or  cryptocurrencies,  but  just  to  raise  awareness  regarding its  existence:
Interpol identified amongst others, the use of blockchains for sharing illegal data such as child
pornography while  Europol  highlighted  the  risk  of  money laundering  facilitated  by the  use  of
cryptocurrencies480. There are two different ways blockchains may be used for criminal purposes:
472 See for example, Cour de Cassation, chambre criminelle, no. 15-86645, 12 July 2016, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000032900131.
473 Cour de Cassation, chambre criminelle, no. 10-80.088, 14 December 2010, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000023433809.
474 T. SCASSA, R. J. CURRIE, New first principles – assessing the Internet’s challenges to jurisdiction, cit., p. 1049.
475 R. BOOS, La lutte contre la cybercriminalité au regard de l’action des État, cit., p. 175 ss.
476 See  for  example  Zippo  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Zippo  Dot  Com,  Inc.,  952  F.  Supp.  1119,  W.D.  Pa,  1997,
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/952/1119/1432344/;  Cybersell Inc v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d
414, 9th Cir., 1997, https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/748638/cybersell-inc-v-cybersell-inc/.
477 See for example E. ENGLE, Is Bitcoin rat poison? Cryptocurrency, crime and counterfeiting, in JHTL, 2016.
478 M. DI GIUDA, Countries where the cryptocurrencies are banned: busted for Bitcoin, 2018, 
https://bitnewstoday.com/market/bitcoin/countries-where-the-cryptocurrencies-are-banned-busted-for-bitcoin/.
479 R. ANDERSON, Risk and Privacy Implications of Consumer Payment Innovation in the Connected Age, in 
Consumer Payment Innovation, 2012, p. 99.
480 Report of the Commonwealth Working Group on virtual currencies, in Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 2016, p. 292.
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either as instrumentality of the crime – in this case the offence would just be facilitated by the use
of blockchain but could have been conducted in other ways also (one could for instance think about
money  laundering  or  the  selling  or  buying  of  illicit  products  with  cryptocurrencies)  or  the
blockchain  may be  the  object  of  the  crime which could not  have been committed  without  the
existence  of  blockchains481.  For  example,  one  could  think  about  the  theft  of  cryptocurrency or
broadcast of child pornography pictures through blockchains. 
Thus,  criminality  committed  through  or  facilitated  by  the  use  of  blockchains  –  and
especially the jurisdiction dilemma – constitutes an issue for the criminal justice systems that they
should be able to tackle.
In the third section of this article, when trying to deduce what may constitute the place of
location of an offence committed on the cyberspace, we highlighted the multiplicity of the actors
within the Internet ecosystem. Especially, we developed the possibility to focus on the location of
the viewer of the illegal content, the location of the creator of the illegal content, the one of the
server enabling the publication of the content and finally the first location of the website in order to
establish jurisdiction. We distinguish a similar – if not worse – multiplicity and transnationality of
the actors on a blockchain. The first actor to mention is the creator(s) of the blockchain. Then, we
should mention the different users of the blockchain – also called nodes. The system has been
designed as an open one: this means that it is, by its very nature, open to anyone (in the case of a
public blockchain) and thus also internationally open since any individual who wishes to participate
to the public blockchain may be given a pair of keys randomly by the system. The existence of
miners should also be highlighted. Miners should be understood as special nodes whose role is to
verify the transactions by performing a proof-of-work or any similar consensus mechanism in order
to accept the valid transactions in a block that will then be added to the blockchain. Finally, even
though the functioning of a blockchain only requires the participation of nodes and miners, some
other actors exist around the ecosystem. They render its use easier for non-technicians and as a
consequence,  more  accessible.  The  ones  mentioned  in  this  paragraph  do  not  constitute  an
exhaustive list of the actors existing around the Blockchain ecosystem: the purpose is only to focus
on some of  them, which  are commonly used by participants.  One could  think about  exchange
platforms  (whose  activities  consist  in  providing  people  with  exchange  services  between  fiat
currency  and  cryptocurrency  for  example)  and  we  could  also  mention  digital  wallets  (whose
activities  consist  in storing the users’ information on the blockchain including their  public  and
private keys). 
Blockchains are also known as distributed ledgers. This supposes that the data within the
blockchain is distributed to all of the nodes of the system instead of being concentrated into one as
it is the case for centralised ledgers. Therefore, all of the participants to the network gets a copy of
the blockchain as it currently is. Each block that is added to the blockchain is also added at the
nodes’ level so that there is a consensus between the nodes on the state of the register482. Distributed
ledgers  require  the  consensus  of  these  nodes  rather  than  just  the  confirmation  by one  central
authority in order to add information on the blockchain. This means that, even though a miner
481 Report of the Commonwealth Working Group on virtual currencies, in Commonwealth Law Bulletin, cit., p. 292.
482 G. MARIN-DAGANNAUD, Le fonctionnement de la blockchain, in Annales des mines: réalités industrielles, 2017, p. 
43. 
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validates a block, it still needs to be accepted and reused by the other nodes of the system to be
integrated to the blockchain: a consensus of a majority of the nodes is needed. « Each resulting
block is forwarded to all users in the network, who can then check its correctness by verifying the
hash computation. If the block is deemed to be "valid", then the users append it to their previously
accepted blocks, thus growing the [...] blockchain483 ». Because of this consensus mechanism, we
distinguish a joint control of the blockchain. 
According to international law, the competent jurisdiction is usually either the State where
the offence has been initiated (subjective territoriality) or the State where the offence is completed
or its effects are to be seen (objective territoriality and ubiquity theory); in the specific case of a
criminal conduct taking place on a blockchain, these States may be difficult to identify. This can be
explained by the fact that the activities taking place on blockchains operate themselves without any
particular spatial linkage since blockchains are developed in a global way and the localisation of the
actors does not have a strong importance484. 
Regarding the subjective territoriality, it may be difficult to determine the State where the
offence has been committed and what the competent jurisdiction should be. The multiplicity and
global character of the actors to the blockchain – either essential or not to the functioning of the
system – and also, the fact that the conducting of a transaction result from the actions of many
different actors – possibly located in different jurisdictions – complicates the determination of the
place of commission of the offence. It may be difficult to decide on which territory such an offence
has been committed if we try to distinguish a single jurisdiction that could tackle the offence. On
the contrary, we could argue that many countries may have jurisdiction over such an offence if not
all  of  them  –  because  of  the  multiplicity  and  internationality  of  the  different  nodes  to  the
blockchain485. The subjective territoriality aims at finding some links and thus a jurisdiction that
would have more legitimacy to be declared competent.  As we realise the global  character to  a
transaction happening on a blockchain, it  may be questioned whether there is such a State that
would have more legitimacy than another one to conduct investigations.486
Regarding the objective territoriality, it may also be difficult to determine where an offence
committed through or facilitated by the use of blockchains is completed or where it has effects. As a
blockchain is distributed to all of its nodes, the effects may be felt in any jurisdiction which gives
access to the blockchain and permits  individuals to join the network.  As a consequence,  if  the
Internet was seen (rightly) as a transnational technology that enabled to make content available in
any State simultaneously,  distributed ledgers share also this  transnational characteristic but in a
483 A. MALLARD, C. MÉADEL, F. MUSIANI, The paradoxes of distributed trust: peer-to-peer architecture and user 
confidence in bitcoin, in Journal of peer production, 2014, p. 6, https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-
00985707/document. 
484 For a similar reasoning regarding the financial economy, see J. B. AUBY, La globalisation, le droit et l’Etat, IIe ed., 
Paris, 2010, p. 20.
485 On top of the fact that determining the location of an offence on a blockchain may be difficult because of the 
multiplicity of its nodes and the fact that they all contribute to the functioning of the system, this distribution of the 
blockchain and the consensus mechanism raise additional issues regarding criminal responsibility. This comes from the 
fact that the addition of a block to the blockchain results from the acts of many different nodes and that, the behaviour 
of one only node is not sufficient to modify the blockchain.
486 Private blockchains may however raise different issues, notably because of the fact that certain activities,
such as mining, may be limited to certain actors.
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more developed way, because of the fact that they are (as their name supposes it) distributed and
thus, that any node to the network is provided with an accurate version of the blockchain.487
5. Blockchains function without the intervention of any central authority or third party. The
functioning of the system is ensured only through the participation of the nodes and through the
work of the miners. Thus, the participants to the blockchain only need to have confidence in the
system and its protocol: the participants do not need to trust themselves in order to transact or to
make sure that the person they plan to transact with is trustworthy. Therefore, a third party or central
authority,  whose role  would be to ensure that  the participants are well-intentioned and that  the
transactions are feasible, is not needed. However, these characteristics correspond in reality to only
a  subgroup  of  the  Blockchain  ecosystem:  public  blockchains,  also  known  as  permissionless
blockchains. On the contrary, private blockchains (also known as permissioned blockchains) do not
share all of these characteristics. Their functioning in a technological way is similar to the one of
public blockchains but there is a considerable difference: a kind of central authority does exist and
exercises a certain control. The authority is in charge of deciding who should be given a right to
participation to the blockchain. This means that these private blockchains are, contrary to public
blockchains, not open to anyone but only to those who got provided with an access right to the
system by the authority488. The development of private blockchains can be at least partly explained
by the inadequacy of  public  blockchains  to  tackle the need of  regulated activities  (such as  the
activities of the financial sector). 
A private blockchain, contrary to a public blockchain, often has a Constitution (or other
similar documents) that should have some legal effects489. This document which may for instance be
a whitepaper and Terms and Conditions in the case of ICOs - should contain classical elements to a
contract, including the governing law and jurisdiction490. Of course, from a legal perspective, this
Constitution or any similar document are private contracts. Criminal jurisdiction is not subject to
the individuals’ disposition and may therefore not be chosen by the parties to a contract. Thus, it
would make no sense to introduce a clause that would provide for the competence of a specific
jurisdiction  that  would  be  competent  over  an  offence  in  such  a  document.  However,  these
documents may provide for some advices regarding the targeted public of the private blockchain. 
We should recall the French jurisprudence tackling cybercrime and which considers that to
establish competence of the French jurisdictions, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the website
was available in France but it should also be demonstrated that the website was dedicated to the
French public. The advices that could help to deduce to which public the website was targeting
487 Private  blockchains  may  also  raise  different  issues,  notably  because  of  the  fact  that  reading  the
blockchain may be limited to certain actors.
488 P. WAELBROECK, Les enjeux économiques de la blockchain, in Annales des Mines - Réalités industrielles, 2017, p. 
10. 
489 A. SANITT, I. GRIGG, Norton rose Fulbright, Legal analysis of the governed blockchain, 2018, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/167968/legal-analysis-of-the-governed-blockchain.
490 For instance, the Booking Token Unit’s whitepaper specifies that any contract relationship relating to the tokens’ 
protocol are governed by French law, V. CHRIQUI, H. HABABOU, Whitepaper Booking Token Unit (BTU) Protocol, 2018,
p. 21, https://www.btu-protocol.com/pdf/whitepaper.pdf, also, the Crypto20 Token terms and conditions provides for the
applicability of English law as the governing law, Crypto20, Terms and conditions, https://crypto20.com/en/legal/.
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include the language of the website or also its content. A similar reasoning could be made regarding
private blockchains. Thus, we could argue that the Constitution of a private blockchain targets also
a specific public (that may not be limited to a certain country but that may be limited to a certain
number of States) such as the Whitepaper of an ICO by selling its tokens to a specific public and by
describing the legal statute of blockchains in certain countries491. Also, the language of publication
of the documents of the blockchain may be taken into consideration492. As a consequence, if we
stick to the advices distinguished by the French jurisprudence that may be useful in order to deduce
the targeted public of a specific website, a similar reasoning could be made with regards to private
blockchain: the targeted public may be deduced from the documents to the blockchain and may help
to establish jurisdiction. 
This  targeted  public  theory,  even  though  it  may  be  useful  in  the  context  of  private
blockchains  may  be  insufficient  to  establish  jurisdiction  over  offences  committed  through  or
facilitated by a public blockchain because these networks are, by nature, open to anyone. If we take
the example of the Bitcoin blockchain, we can see that it is used worldwide and it is in no case
targeting a special public located in a certain country. Therefore, we understand that the national
rules permitting to establish criminal jurisdiction according to the territoriality principle may not be
sufficient in order to tackle the phenomenon of criminality facilitated or committed through the use
of blockchains or cryptocurrencies – as they were not sufficient to tackle the issue of cybercrime.
While private blockchains may give some pieces of advice in order to decide which jurisdiction
should be competent, public blockchains do not propose such tools. Thus, the same consequences
that we highlighted from the uncertainties about jurisdiction rules regarding cybercrime can be
made regarding blockchains: they may result in numerous positive conflicts of jurisdiction. This
may weaken the principle of legal certainty and the principles of the rule of law.
6. According to Amartya Sen, the indispensable response to the doubts about globalisation
resides in its construction493. This supposes that globalisation in terms of criminal matters and more
specifically in our case, in terms of territoriality, should be built. In order to do so, it should be
accepted that the territoriality of criminal law should be rethought because of its inability to fit with
the globalisation permitted by technology. 
491 For instance, the ‘Legal’ part of the MaxiMine whitepaper describes the legal status of blockchains, 
cryptocurrencies and ICO tokens for certain jurisdictions (China, United States, European Union, Australia and 
Singapore), Maximine Whitepaper, p. 37 ss, https://maximine.io/whitepaper/whitepaper_en.pdf; the Booking token Unit 
whitepaper’s section on disclaimer provides for some legal information regarding the statute of cryptocurrency and ICO
tokens according to European and French laws. It also submits the purchaser of the tokens to some obligations of 
French law, including some obligations whose breach is to be considered a criminal offence according to French law, V. 
CHRIQUI, H. HABABOU, Whitepaper Booking Token Unit (BTU) Protocol, cit., p. 21. See also, for example The Tokes 
platform whitepaper launching tokens related to the Cannabis industry limits the selling of tokens to jurisdictions where 
a legal cannabis industry exists and, it only provides for exchange of the tokens in exchange of cryptocurrency or U.S. 
Dollars, Tokes Platform, Whitepaper version 3.1, 2018, p. 27, https://tokesplatform.org/TokesPlatform_WhitePaper.pdf, 
which provides that « Tokes may not be resold to purchasers who are citizens or permanent resident of China, 
Singapore, New York or any other jurisdiction where the purchase of Tokes may be in violation of applicable laws 
(including but not limited to laws regulating controlled substances, such as cannabis) »
492 For instance, the MaxiMine Whitepaper has been published in several languages, including English and Chinese, 
Maximine Whitepaper, cit.
493 A. SEN, Dix vérités sur la mondialisation, in Le Monde, 2001, p. 1.
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Seen  the  insufficiency of  the  regional  response  provided  for  by the  Council  of  Europe
Convention and its rules on jurisdiction, conscious of the difficulties faced by national jurisdiction
rules, and above all conscious of the necessity for States to coordinate in order to prevent numerous
positive conflicts of jurisdiction, scholars kept on looking for alternatives to territoriality. Some of
the  proposals  made by scholars  in  order  to  develop jurisdiction  rules  that  would  better  fit  the
cyberspace than the territoriality principle currently does will be reviewed in this paragraph. Most
of those have been only made with regard to cybercrime and as a result, authors were not aware of
the issues raised by blockchains (especially because most of the opinions were made before the
quick and recent development of blockchains). While it is not the aim of this article to provide for a
unique solution in order to tackle the issue of jurisdiction on blockchains, we will review some of
the solutions proposed by scholars and see whether they might be applicable and desirable for the
Blockchain environment.
One proposal would suppose that, even though the new challenges brought by the global
character of the Internet cannot be denied, it is unlikely that it will lead to special jurisdictional rules
if  the  Internet  could  adapt  itself  in  order  to  impose  fictional  territorial  borders  within  the
cyberspace494.  Thus,  traditional  jurisdiction  rules  based  on  territoriality  may  be  adequate  and
sufficient  to  solve  jurisdictional  issues495.  In  the  context  of  blockchains,  we  distinguished  a
beginning of such a development for private blockchains in the third section of the article when we
analysed  the  possibility  to  apply  the  targeted  public  theory  to  private  blockchains  in  order  to
establish jurisdiction. However, this may be more difficult when dealing with public blockchains
which are by nature globally open and not subject to any restrictions that could be applied by any
authority or third party.
In the context of jurisdiction in Internet disputes, a proposal was made in order to consider
the  cyberspace  as  a  separate  international  space  (such  as  it  is  the  case  for  the  high  seas,  the
international space or the Antartica). According to this proposal, jurisdiction should be based on the
nationality principle irrespective of the geographic location as it is already the case for the other
international spaces, mentioned above496. This may be hardly manageable regarding blockchains,
especially because it may be difficult to determine which person committed the offence. We should
recall that a blockchain is by nature distributed. Since the approval of an additional transaction on a
blockchain results from the actions of many actors, it may be difficult to isolate one person that
would be responsible for an offence. Even if this proposal argued for the so called active nationality
principle  to  establish  jurisdiction  (which  refers  to  jurisdiction  established  according  to  the
nationality of the offender), we could make a link between this proposal and the modifications made
to the French criminal code in 2016 in order to solve the territorial issue of cybercrime497 by adding
article 113-2-1 according to which any crime realised by means of an electronic communication
network which is committed against a person living in France, is to be considered as committed
494 T. SOLLEY, The problem and the solution: using the Internet to resolve Internet copyright disputes, cit., p. 834.
495 S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or 
moving towards unification?, cit., p. 17 ss.
496 Proposal made in D. C. MENTHE, Jurisdiction in cyberspace: a theory of international spaces, cit.
497 Loi no. 2016-731 du 3 juin 2016 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, et 
améliorant l'efficacité et les garanties de la procédure pénale, JORF n°0129, 4 June 2016, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032627231&categorieLien=id.
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within the territory of France. So, even if the offence had been committed somewhere else, if the
victim is located in France, the offence should be considered as having been committed in France
and  thus,  the  French  jurisdictions  should  be  competent.  This  competence  echoes  the  passive
nationality principle (according to which a State may have jurisdiction over offences committed
abroad when the victims are its nationals). This modification to the criminal code has been admitted
by the French Council of State which considers that it responds to the Government’s objective to
secure and legally reinforce the proceedings in terms of cybercrime498. 
With  regard  to  blockchains,  if  this  passive  nationality  theory  enables  to  overcome  the
difficulties that reside in the determination of the place of commission of the offence that are faced
with  active  nationality  theory,  it  may not  solve  all  of  the  difficulties.  As  we already saw,  the
distributed character of the blockchains supposes that the effects of an offence, and the victim may
be located in any jurisdiction where the blockchain is available. 
Some scholars pleaded for a unification of national jurisdiction rules499 that would consist in
the introduction of a transnational criminal law, specific to the era of Internet500. In this respect, it is
argued that the cyberspace should be considered a sovereign jurisdiction501. In this case, it would be
necessary  to  take  into  consideration  the  characteristics  of  the  cyberspace,  especially  the
transnationality of the offences502, in order to establish new rules that would correspond better to the
global character of the Internet.  In other areas of law, amongst other regarding Internet dispute
resolution, some share this view and call for a Convention on Internet jurisdiction, which should be
an effective strategy for ensuring legal certainty503, predictability and enforceability. However, even
though a common approach may be beneficial, it may not happen because of States’ reluctance to
do so and to abandon their sovereignty and jurisdictional claim over the Internet504. This reluctance
has been highlighted in the area of copyrights law on the Internet505 and it is even more important in
the area of criminal law given the nature of the area and the sovereignty principle to which States
are strongly attached.
498 Conseil d’Etat, Avis sur un projet de loi renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé et son financement, l’efficacité 
et les garanties de la procédure pénale, N° 391004, 28 January 2016, http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/content/download/54700/484379/version/1/file/391004%20EXTRAIT%20AG%20AVIS.pdf.
499 A. HUET, Droit pénal international et internet, Travaux du centre de recherche sur le droit des marchés et des 
investissements internationaux (eds.), Souveraineté étatique et marchés internationaux à la fin du 20e siècle, Mélanges 
en l’honneur de Philippe Kahn, Paris, 2000, p. 675 ss; L. XIAOBING, Q. YONGFENF, Research on criminal jurisdiction 
of computer cybercrime, in Procedia Comput. Sci., 2018, p. 795; S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising 
jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or moving towards unification?, cit., p. 2.
500 See for example A. HUET, Droit pénal international et internet, Travaux du centre de recherche sur le droit des 
marchés et des investissements internationaux (eds.), cit., p. 675 ss.
501 S. P. BEATTY, Litigation in cyberspace: the current and future state of Internet jurisdiction, cit., p. 139. 
502 C. MEIER, Vers un système judiciaire mieux adapté à la cybercriminalité, p. 6, http://www.lecreis.org/colloques
%20creis/2001/is01_actes_colloque/meier.htm. 
503 S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or 
moving towards unification?, cit., p. 19; R. DAVID, The methods of unification, in AJCL, p. 25, 1968, 
http://www.imeryurdaneta.com/archivos/clases/art_382__DAVID%20-%20The%20Methods%20of%20Unification.pdf.
504 See for example, J. FRANCILLON, Cybercriminalité, aspect de droit pénal international, cit.; D. J. B. SVANTESSON, 
Borders on, or border around – The future of the Internet, in Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech., 2006, p. 352.
505 T. SOLLEY, The problem and the solution: using the Internet to resolve Internet copyright disputes, cit., p. 834.
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Other  scholars  rather  argue  for  a  harmonisation  of  national  jurisdiction  rules506.  While
unification would consist in a unique set of rules, directly applicable for State parties, harmonisation
would focus more on developing more coherence between the different national jurisdiction rules
by  reducing  the  differences  among  them  but  while  respecting  their  particularities.  This  may
constitute a more reasonable solution because it would be more respectful of national sovereignty
and States may therefore be less reluctant to such a proposal.
7. In criminal matters, the territoriality principle is used in order to determine that a State has
jurisdiction  over  offences  committed  on its  territory.  The territoriality is  strongly linked to  the
principle of national sovereignty which supposes that no State should interfere with the competence
of another for offences committed on its territory. According to the ubiquity theory, the territorial
principle is extended and it enables a State to prosecute any offence whose, at least,  one of its
constituent elements is located on its territory – including the effects of such an offence. 
However,  territoriality  was  challenged  by  the  development  of  the  Internet  and  by  the
phenomenon of cybercrime which accompanied it.  Because of the multiplicity of its  actors and
because of the fact that the Internet makes content available simultaneously at an international level,
it seems difficult to determine on which territory a cybercrime has been committed – either through
the  use of  the  subjective  or  objective  territoriality principle  and national  jurisdiction  rules  that
follow those  principles.  At  the  regional  level,  the  Council  of  Europe  published  a  Convention,
providing for basic jurisdiction rules based on territoriality. Even if the Convention was a progress
because of its regional character, it did not solve the issue of positive conflicts of jurisdiction and let
State parties discuss among them in order to choose the most adequate jurisdiction when more than
one has jurisdiction over an offence.
We saw that the development of blockchains and of the criminality that accompanies it raise
similar questions to those that accompanied the development of the Internet. To determine which
jurisdiction  is  competent  over  an  offence  committed  through  or  facilitated  by  the  use  of  a
blockchain  may be  particularly difficult  for  public  blockchains  because  of  the  multiplicity  and
global  character  of  its  actors  but  also because  of  the joint  control  the  nodes  exercise  over  the
blockchain. This may be less complicated for private blockchains where the applicability of the
jurisprudence focusing on the targeted public that had been developed to tackle cybercrime, could
be  envisaged.  However,  a  global  response  in  order  to  determine  with  certainty  a  competent
jurisdiction is lacking and, since the consequence is constant positive conflicts of jurisdiction, this
may endanger the principle of legal certainty and the principles of the rule of law. 
Most  scholars  have  different  views  on  what  the  best  option  is  to  tackle  the  issue  of
jurisdiction over cybercrime. Some would rely on technology itself to reinstall national borders and
keep the territorial principle the way it is. This may be feasible for private blockchains but could be
more difficult for public ones. Some would give up jurisdiction based on territoriality and would
rely solely on the nationality principle to establish jurisdiction over offences on the cyberspace. This
may also involve difficulties because of the multiplicity of the actors and the joint control exercised
506 S. NILOUFER, The proper basis for exercising jurisdiction in internet disputes: strengthening state boundaries or 
moving towards unification?, cit., p. 25; Y. A. TIMOFEEVA, Worldwide prescriptive jurisdiction in Internet content 
controversies: a comparative analysis, in Conn. J. Int'l L., 2005, p. 214.
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by nodes over the system. Some others argued for unification or harmonisation of national rules of
jurisdiction even though States may be reluctant to such proposals.
So far, we should stress the inadequacy of national jurisdiction rules to tackle the issue of
criminality on blockchains and the need to rethink the territoriality principle. The response should
be discussed at a global level in order to prevent positive conflicts of jurisdiction and thus, reinforce
legal certainty and the principles of the rule of law. However, the form of this response should still
be discussed and thought about. 
LOREN JOLLY
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Automated administrative procedure and right of access
to source code
SUMMARY: 1.  Introduction. – 2.  Automated procedure: preliminary remarks. – 3.  Right to access:
preliminary  remarks.  –  4.  Automated  procedure  and  right  of  access  to  the  source  code.  –  5.
Tentative conclusions.
1. The aim of this work is to reflect on how a classical instrument of administrative law, i.e.
the right of access to administrative documents (ex article 22 law 241/90), can be exercised, in case
of  automated  administrative  procedures,  with  respect  to  the  source  code of  a  software,  and to
discuss a number of problems raised by this issue.
Firstly, I offer a reconstruction of essential elements of the automated procedure and of the
classic right of access. Secondly, also based on the most recent Italian case law, I focus on some
problematic  issues,  including a)  whether  the  source  code can  be qualified as  an  administrative
document according to access’ regulation and b) whether the source code and the related software –
as protected by the intellectual property laws – can be subject to the right of access. This case opens
a more general discussion on the methodology and the extent of the automation of administrative
decisions, and how to adapt, through the example of the right of access, classical legal tools to
innovations due to IT technologies. 
2. First of all, it should be noted that when we talk about automation, we are referring to an
activity carried out by a computer. 507
Therefore, automated administrative procedures may be defined as all the cases in which the
machine replaces the Administration in decision making processes. 508
The fact that computers replace men, or public servants in the case of the Administration,
obviously does  not  mean that  human action completely disappears.  As explained by Pubusa509,
human intervention remains essential in order to initiate automated administrative procedures. The
Public Administration decides what the computer should do and elaborates instructions in the form
of a program, which is therefore an expression of a human decision – in this case,  of a public
decision enacted by the Administration.
“Program”  is  also  a  central  concept  in  administrative  procedures,  being  composed  by
instructions  based  on  logical  rules  that  together  form  the  algorithm.  Through  the  program's
instructions, the machine is able to reproduce a set of logical steps which elaborate the decision
507 For a general reconstruction see R. BORRUSO, Computer e diritto, Milano, 1978.
508 There is  a vast literature on this subject:  cf.  ex multis D. MARONGIU,  L’attività amministrativa automatizzata,
Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, 2005. U. FANTIGROSSI, L’automazione e la pubblica amministrazione, Bologna, 1993. A.
USAI, Le elaborazioni possibili delle informazioni. I limiti alle decisioni amministrative automatiche, in G. DUNI (edited
by),  Dall’informatica  amministrativa  alla  teleamministrazione,  Roma,  1992,  p.  55  e  ss.,  P.  OTRANTO,  Decisione
amministrativa  e  digitalizzazione  della  P.A.,  in  federalismi.it, 2017.  (cf.
https://www.federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?
artid=35595&dpath=document&dfile=17012018100422.pdf&content=Decisione%2Bamministrativa%2Be
%2Bdigitalizzazione%2Bdella%2Bp%2Ea%2E%2B-%2Bstato%2B-%2Bdottrina%2B-%2B  ).
509 Cf. F. PUBUSA, Diritto di accesso e automazione, Profili giuridici e prospettive, Milano, 2006.
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(based on data  already provided,  inputs).  We can already observe that  the most  complex issue
consists in translating the law into an algorithm, since the “will” determining an administrative
decision or a legal rule has to be both completely and correctly represented to be lawful. 510
When  debating  the  possibility  of  automating  the  administrative  activity,  we  might  first
consider that the operation is not so hard. One could think that the automation of the administrative
activity  is  anything  different  from an  ‘automatic’ application  of  the  law,  the  latter  being  the
application of an abstract norm to a concrete case. Being ‘automatic’, this operation could easily be
carried  out  by  a  program  realized  for  that  purpose  (a  series  of  inputs,  which  are  elaborated
according to the rules of the programme, should be provided to the machine).
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  a  much  more  complex  operation,  requiring  some  specific
precautions  for  the  following  reasons:  firstly,  because  the  law should  always  be  interpreted511;
secondly, because the relationship between law and administrative activity, and, ultimately, between
the principle of legality and administrative action, is not clear cut. Indeed, the law can regulate the
activity of the administration according to a principle of substantial legality and, thus, limit the
options of the available political decisions of the Administration. On the contrary, the law could also
allow leeway for the Administration and thus a margin of discretion in the discipline of the concrete
case according to a principle of formal legality. In this second scenario, constituting an example of
discretionary activity  of  the  Administration,  the  latter  has  to  make  an  assessment  and balance
involved interests. Of course, different possible outcomes could be reached in carrying this activity.
Nevertheless,  in  case  of  administrative  discretionary  activity,  there  is  the  assumption  that  the
Administration is in the best position to effectively assess and pursue the public interest. It follows
that the automation of discretionary administrative activity is challenging: while the identification
of  public  and  private  interests  and  the  resulting  various  solutions  could  be  performed  by the
machine, the choice of the best solution for the concrete case should a prerogative of the human
being.512
The paper argues that the automation for the entirely administrative activity subject to the
principle  of  substantive  legality  is  possible,  but  poses  some  difficulties  in  relation  to  the
interpretation of the applicable norm or the circumstances in which a rule, even if precisely and
correctly interpreted, refers to indeterminate extra-legal concepts. Therefore, we can conclude that
510 Cf.  D. MARONGIU,  L’attività amministrativa automatizzata, p. 11: «A relevant problem is how communication
between legal and IT experts should take place when the software is realized, if  it  is necessary to identify formal
procedures  when public  servants communicate to  the programmers,  to  guarantee a the perfect  "translation" of  the
natural language to the programming language» (translation mine) [«una problematica  posta in evidenza è come debba
avvenire la comunicazione fra giuristi e tecnici informatici al momento dell’ideazione del  software, se cioè occorra
individuare procedura formali nel momento in cui i funzionari comunicano ai programmatori le determinazioni che
dovranno  essere  assunte  mediante  automazione,  a  garanzia  della  perfetta  “traduzione”  del  linguaggio  naturale  al
linguaggio di programmazione»].
511 Cf.  F.  PUBUSA,  Diritto di  accesso e automazione,  Profili  giuridici  e  prospettive,  cit.  p.  139 ss.  For a  general
reconstruction see G. SARTOR, Le applicazioni giuridiche dell’intelligenza artificiale, Milano, 1990. 
512 In this paper we decided not to take into consideration evolution of the AI in reproducing human reasoning. See ex
multis  F. AMIGONI, V. SCHIAFFONATI, M. SOMALVICO, Intelligenza artificiale,  in Enciclopedia della scienza e della
tecnica, Roma, 2008,  S. CIVITARESE MATTEUCCI, L. TORCHIA,  La tecnificazione, in  L. FERRARA, D. SORACE,  A 150
anni dall’unificazione amministrativa italiana. vol. IV, , in Inf. Dir., 2008. 
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there is a close link between the application of the principle of substantial legality to administrative
activities and the potential for automation in administrative procedures.
3. It would be challenging to contain in one paper a thorough analysis of the entire set of
rules  governing the right  of  access in  the Italian legal  system: there is  a vast  literature on the
subject, to which we refer. 513
For the purposes of our discussion, it is more appropriate to consider selected aspects related
to the exercise of this right, especially in light of the regulation introduced by the law no 15 of the
11th February 2005. 
Within the law 241 of 1990, the right of access is placed at the end of the regulation of the
administrative  procedure.  As  such,  it  constitutes  a  tool  to  balance  the  need for  celerity  in  the
administrative  action  and  the  protection  of  those  subjective  legal  positions.  Law 241  provides
devices to exert the public function with efficiency, efficacy, and cost saving, while at the same time
offering suitable tools to protect private interests, either directly or indirectly. Specifically, it offers
tools  that  license  access,  both  in  the  course  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  procedure,  to  the
documentation employed by the administration to evaluate private and public interests and reach the
final decision. This cognitive accessibility is achieved through the right of access. In this respect,
the right of access constitutes a relevant public interest to the effect that it is enforced nation-wide
on the same level.  The extent to which the right  of access is  licensed by the Constitution still
constitutes, however, a matter of dispute. Whereas its connection with article 97 is uncontroversial,
scholars and case law still discuss whether the right of access can also be connected with the right
of information ex art. 21, or better with article 24. The latter is also grounded on the fact that full
knowledge of the administrative action is the condition and grants the effectiveness of the judicial
protection.
4. We can assume that there is the possibility that an automated administrative decision is
vitiated by ‘invalidity’: indeed "the invalidity of an administrative act is a consequence of the act’s
non-conformity compared to its legal model,  to the punctual regulation of its conditions,  of its
procedural rules and to the effects expected with its adoption". 514 
Since the early studies on the administrative automated procedures, scholars have observed
that  one  of  the  main  expectations  arising  from this  new type  of  procedures  was  the  potential
significant reduction of invalidities of administrative acts (e.g. breach of the principle of impartial
treatment). It is undeniable that this was a reasonable expectation. However, it is equally undeniable
that new and unknown invalidities may occur precisely because of the automation: they could be
513 Cf. ex multis, L. MAZZAROLLI, L’accesso ai documenti della Pubblica Amministrazione. Profili sostanziali, Padova,
1998.
514 Continued: « […] The invalidity of an administrative act is a consequence of the non-conformity of the act to its
legal model and to the punctual regulation of its conditions, of the effects and ways of the procedure for its adoption»
(translation)  [«l’invalidità  di  un  atto  amministrativo  è  conseguenza  della  non  conformità  dell’atto  rispetto  al  suo
modello  legale  ed  alla  regolamentazione  puntuale  dei  suoi  presupposti,  dei  sui  effetti  e  dei  modi  di  essere  del
procedimento previsto per  la  sua  adozione»]  Cf.  A.  Masucci,  Procedimento amministrativo  e nuove  tecnologie.  Il
procedimento amministrativo elettronico a istanza di parte, Milano, 2011, p. 107.
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related  to  the  instructions  provided  by  the  Administration,  to  wrong  algorithms  or  software
operations, or to the processing of the individual automated act. 515
It  is  suggested  that  invalidities  of  administrative  acts  resulting  from  administrative
automated procedures could be divided in two groups:
First,  invalidities  related to how the software’s structure and operation.  In this  case,  the
invalidity would affect all acts adopted with the same program. Second, invalidities of individual
automated acts. 
In  order  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  invalidities  of  both  traditional  administrative
decisions - adopted by administration employees and officials - and automated ones, it is necessary
to  have  full  knowledge  of  the  relevant  law  (and  therefore  of  instructions  provided  by  the
Administration for the program), and for the software’s functioning itself.
The aim of this section is to investigate the relationship between automated procedure, right
of access and the scope of the relevant judicial protection.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  right  of  access  can  be  exercised  for  the  purpose  of  a  possible
subsequent judicial protection. As a starting point, our analysis should focus on whether article 22
of the law 241/90, which provides the right to access,  could apply in relation to an automated
administrative procedure. Notably the question would be whether this provision could be applied to
gain access to the programme used for the administrative procedure. Thus, the first issue would be
what part of a programme could be accessed and whether there should be any limits attached to
access. 
In order to answer these questions, a case study could provide useful insights.  Back in 2016,
the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) decided to instruct a private
company  to  elaborate  a  ranking  to  determine  the  location  on  the  national  territory  of  newly-
recruited teachers. Consequently, teachers were asked to fill in an online application according to
the methods  indicated  in  the  order  241/2016,  which  identifies  rules  concerning the  mobility of
teaching staff for the 2016/2017.
A group of teachers appealed the decision of MIUR on grounds of alleged breach of the
principle  of  fairness,  and brought  an action  in  order  to  have  access  to  the  source  code of  the
software that produced the ranking. Following the request of access to the programme used by
MIUR, the applicants were provided only with a generic description of the software’s function but
not the code itself. The Administration relied on two arguments:
515 Another interesting aspect, which goes beyond the scope of the present paper, is which kind of judicial control
could be exerted on automatic decisions. see ex multis F. SAITTA, Le patologie dell’atto amministrativo elettronico e il
sindacato  del  giudice  amministrativo,  in Rivista  di  diritto  amministrativo  elettronico,  2003,  A.G.  OROFINO,  La
patologia dell’atto amministrativo elettronico: sindacato giurisdizionale e strumenti di tutela, in Foro amm., 2002, p.
2257 e ss. See also the decision no. 152 of Consiglio di Stato, sez. VI, 7 February 1995: «the administrative act which
relies on automated procedures is not different from the ordinary administrative one, and scrutiny over its validity does
not differ from the general rules, which require, first, the assessment of whether the act and its effect conform to the
applicable  rules,  and,  second,  whether  the  claimant  has  suffered  an  actual  and  direct  damage  from  the  alleged
violation”. Translation from “l'azione amministrativa che si avvalga dell'informatica non si differenzia in nessun modo
da quella ordinaria, e lo schema logico - giuridico da applicare nel caso di sindacato giurisdizionale si identifica con
quello generale che esige la verificazione della conformità dell'azione e dei suoi effetti alla norma che li disciplina, in
relazione alla circostanziata denuncia, da parte del soggetto che invoca tale sindacato, di una lesione personale, diretta
ed attuale».
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a. The source code of the algorithm should not be qualified as an administrative document
under article no. 22 of the law no. 241 of 1990 (d);
b. The source code and the related software constitute intellectual works and are protected
by the intellectual property laws.
The first point to be addressed is whether the software can be qualified as an administrative
document ex. art. 22 l. 241/90 (d). 516
As a preliminary observation, it is worth pointing out that most scholars interpret letter. d) of
article 22  (as modified by the law no. 15 of the 11th February 2005, see p. 2),  providing for the
notion of administrative document, in a considerably extensive way, in the light of the substantial
administrative nature of the document rather than its origin. In fact, it is settled administrative case
law that the criterion of the origin of the document itself is relative and can be rebutted. The only
relevant fact is whether the document concerns an activity of public interest. Thus, also private law
acts can be qualified as administrative when they pursue the public interest.
It is the ratio of the law (article 22) that must be investigated to identify its extensive scope:
the  aim  is  to  make  knowable  every  act  that  made  a  contribution  to  form  the  will  of  the
administration (it  is  not surprising therefore that exclusion’s cases from the right  of access are
specific disciplined by article 24 of law 241/1990).
Some scholars and the established case law517 therefore consider relevant the document due
to the information it contains. To this effect, the document would be the object of access because it
is  the only reliable  instrument  (compared to  others,  e.g.  to  an  oral  will  expressed  by a  public
servant) to verify the information held by the Administration.
In the light of the above, the following question arises: is legitimate the request of access to
the source code of the software used by the Administration?
Many objections could be raised to an affirmative answer: first of all, the software, due to its
nature, is not intelligible by the public servant, nor directly elaborated by him. Moreover, it may be
argued that the Administration adopts ex ante its decisions, and, therefore, that the software plays an
auxiliary role, merely reproducing the will of the Administration.
Nevertheless,  two considerations  should be carefully analysed:  Firstly,  it  is  through the
software  that  the  content  of  the  decision  is  realized  and  subsequently  applied.  It  cannot  be
considered a mere execution, since the software performs those passages  which previously were
responsibility of the public servant. Secondly, the discretionary choice of the Public Administration
to employ innovative instruments (in this case, the choice to use a software to manage a procedure)
cannot result in a limit and should not place obstacles to the accessibility of the administrative act or
of the procedure used.
516 Cf.  l.  d)  art.  22  l.  241/90:  «For  "administrative  document",  any  graphic,  photographic  or  electromagnetic
representation  or  any  other  form  of  the  content  of  acts,  including  internal  acts  or  acts  not  related  to  a  specific
administrative procedure, held by a public administration and concerning activities of public interest, regardless of the
public  or  private nature  of  their  substantial  discipline» (translation mine) [«per  "documento  amministrativo",  ogni
rappresentazione grafica, fotocinematografica, elettromagnetica o di qualunque altra specie del contenuto di atti, anche
interni o non relativi ad uno specifico procedimento, detenuti da una pubblica amministrazione e concernenti attività di
pubblico interesse, indipendentemente dalla natura pubblicistica o privatistica della loro disciplina sostanziale»].
517 See  G.  TARANTINI,  Pubblicità  degli  atti  e  diritto  di  accesso,  in  B.  CAVALLO (edited  by),  procedimento
amministrativo e diritto di accesso, Napoli, 1993. G. ARENA, l’accesso ai documenti amministrativi, Bologna, 1991.
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When examining the highlighted questions in relation to the MIUR case, the administrative
court (Tar Lazio, III-bis section) has held, first, that the source code of the software used by the
MIUR could be qualified as an "administrative document" under l. d) art. 22 l. 241/90. 518
A second  problematic  issue  raised  by  the  Administration  is  related  to  the  protection  of  the
intellectual property of the software.  This matter can open a more general discussion about the
possibility for the Public Administration of choosing open source software or specifically produced
by the Administration. 
Leaving aside the question of why the Administration has chosen - legitimately or not - to
resort to a company in order to implement the software, the matter remains as to whether the right
of access can be denied due to the protection of the copyright of an intellectual work (we assume
that  the  software  integrates  the  requirements  of  creativity  and  originality  that  allow  the  IP
protection).
The  applicable  provision  in  this  context  is  article  24  of  of  law  241/90,  regulating  the
exemptions of the right of access.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the aim of copyright protection legislation is to
preserve the economic advantage from the author or for the owner. Yet, the economic advantage of
the author or the owner can be balanced with the interest protected by the right of access. Notably,
the  administrative  court  in  the  MIUR  case  has  observed:  «Neither  copyright  nor  intellectual
property  preclude  basic  reproduction,  but  preclude,  instead,  only  a  reproduction  which  allows
economic exploitation. The access does not damage the right to the exclusive economic use of the
work, since there is a duty to make appropriate use of the information obtained with the access to
the “document”, that is exclusively a functional use to the interest claimed with the request for
access. The interest is represented by the protection of the rights of the claimants, as this constitutes
not only the function for which access is allowed, but, at the same time, also the limit of use of
information  obtained.  Whoever  obtains  access  will  be  directly  liable  to  the  software  owner  »
(translation from original).519
Another ground used to justify the refusal of access by the Public Administration is article 6
of law 97/2016, where the limits to the civic access are identified, because letter c) indicates also
the economic and commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,
copyright and trade secrets. We do not have the possibility to reconstruct the civic access regulation
here520: we can just observe how the constitutive differences between the so-called "documental"
access ex article 22 of 241/90 and the civic access made the reference to civic access’ limits made
518 Tar Lazio, sez. III-bis del 22 March 2017 no. 3769.
519 «Né il diritto di autore né la proprietà intellettuale precludono la semplice riproduzione, ma precludono, invece, al
massimo, soltanto la riproduzione che consenta uno sfruttamento economico e, non essendo l'accesso lesivo di tale
diritto  all'uso  economico  esclusivo  dell'opera,  l'ostensione  deve  essere  consentita  nelle  forme  richieste  da  parte
dell'interessato, ossia della visione e dell'estrazione di copia,  fermo restando che delle informazioni ottenute dovrà
essere fatto un uso appropriato, ossia esclusivamente un uso funzionale all'interesse fatto valere con l'istanza di accesso
che, per espressa allegazione della parte ricorrente, è rappresentato dalla tutela dei diritti dei propri affiliati, in quanto
ciò costituisce non solo la funzione per cui è consentito l'accesso stesso, ma nello stesso tempo anche il limite di utilizzo
dei  dati  appresi,  con  conseguente  responsabilità  diretta  dell'avente  diritto  all'accesso  nei  confronti  del  titolare  del
software».
520 Cf.  D.U.  GALETTA,  Accesso  civico  e  trasparenza  della  Pubblica  Amministrazione  alla  luce  delle  (previste)
modifiche alle disposizioni del D. Lgs. n. 33/2013, in federalismi.it, 2016.
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by the Administration ineffective: indeed, in classical access – as seen in paragraph 2 –  there is a
direct interest in protecting a qualified legal position, which could justify higher knowledge. 
5. In the MIUR case, the administrative court authorizes access to the software source code
(related to the teachers’ mobility procedure 2016/2017). Regardless of the solution adopted by the
court and the effects521 of this decision, some (tentative) conclusive remarks arise. First, it is useful
to read the preliminary technical evaluation522 carried out on the code after the access: it is of course
a preliminary evaluation and it was made upon motion of a party (even if it raises some interesting
issues on programming methods) but it suggests a central reflection. In the context of the technical
evaluation,  the experts  assess how the way in which the code was provided does not  allow to
execute it and to test the functioning and it invalidates the order of extension of the court.  523  It
could be argued that it is precisely the use of automation that makes more difficult to understand the
functioning of the mobility procedure; in this way it would be carried out in fact the risk noted by
the court: "the use of innovative tools by the administration for the management of its procedural
activity [...] could produce a limit to the cognitive accessibility by the recipient of the act". Indeed,
in our opinion, the problem does not arise in a different way when the access request is promoted
towards a “classical” document. This leads to a more generic methodological consideration: instead
of creating new tools in light of technological innovations, efforts should be made to adapt already
existing notions.
In the second place, a comparative perspective is also required, in order to understand how
other  national  legal  systems  have  dealt  with  similar  problems.  Indeed,  the  case  at  hand  is  an
excellent example of the need to assess at least the best practices on the European level (consider
for instance the case of France and its regulation to access in case of automated administrative
decisions). 524
521 As a result of the mobility procedure, were presented a very large number of applications.
522 The preliminary technical evaluation (June 2017)  was required by claimants on the software after the delivery by
the Administration.
523«It is clear that the lack of clarifications, as well as the lack of the files indicated in the code, in the database, of the
files that the software uses as well as the technical specifications, configures a conduct that is not transparent, despite
the order of extension by the court.  These omissions irreversibly affect the possibility of a complete control on the
concrete work of the algorithm and, therefore, on the way in which it has determined the positions of teachers on the
national territory» (translation mine) [«È evidente che la mancanza di tali precisazioni, così come la mancanza dei file
richiamati all’interno del codice, del database, dei file che il software utilizza in lettura e scrittura dei dati (non tanto nei
contenuti quanto nella forma) nonché delle specifiche tecniche, configura una condotta poco trasparente, nonostante
l’intervenuto ordine di ostensione dei dati e degli atti da parte del TAR, nei confronti del Ministero. Tali omissioni
inficiano  in  maniera  irreversibile  la  possibilita  di  un  completo  controllo  sulle  concrete  modalita  di  utilizzo
dell’algoritmo  e,  quindi,  sulle  modalita  che  hanno  determinato  lo  spostamento  degli  insegnanti  sul  territorio
nazionale»], preliminary technical evaluation of the software 4 June 2017.
524 Decret no. 2017-330, March 2017.
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A final note concerning the relationship between organizational autonomy and automated
procedures. The assumption that the choice of the administration to automate its procedures lies
within  the  administration’s  power  has  widely  gone  unchallenged.  However,  it  is  questionable
whether this entail a certain degree of ambiguity,  for example concerning the interpretation of the
law, and whether a more uniform choice on the national level should be pursued instead.
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The Algorithmic Governance of Administrative Decision-Making: 
Towards an Integrated European Framework for Public
Accountability
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction and Outline of the Study- 2. Context and Features of the ‘Algorithmized’
Public Administration- 2.1 The Private-Public Partnerships for the Delivery of Algorithm-driven
Public Services- 3. Legal Obstacles to Accountable Algorithmic Public Decision Making- 3.1. The
Subjective  Obstacle:  the  Unsuitability  of  Administrative  Law  Principles  of  Accountability  and
Transparency-  3.2  The  Objective  Obstacle:  the  Intellectual  Property  Protection  of  Privately-
Developed Algorithms- 4. The General Data Protection tools of Transparency and Accountability-
5. Conclusions
1. The shift from a big data- to an algorithm-driven economy, currently changing the face of
many private domains, is ultimately touching also upon the public sector. Here, the growing use of
algorithms  for  the  purposes  of  decision-making  in  the  field  of  public  services  is  sensitively
transforming the way in which public action is carried out. 
Examples of algorithm-driven public decisions are blossoming in the USA and are starting
to become apparent also in the European Union. In the USA, for example, and more specifically in
the city of New York, the local government has employed algorithms in order to carry out the most
various activities, ranging from the allocation of police officers, firehouses, public housing, food
stamps525. Also within European Union Member States, examples of algorithmic employment in the
public sector are proliferating. In these regards, mention must be made of the practice of profiling
the unemployed done by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy in Poland526. In France, with the
declaration of the state of emergency after the last terror attacks, the police has started employing a
software that predicts where and when crime is going to occur527. Also the Dutch tax authority is
relying on algorithm-driven correlations to increase the efficiency of the tax system528. 
All these examples show that the enhancement of computational capabilities is structurally
changing  the  ways  in  which  public  services  are  delivered.  This  paper  moves  from  this
acknowledgment and enquires the legal pitfalls of this newly emerging scenario from a European
Union law standpoint. 
Against this backdrop, the paper is structured into two sections. 
525 J. Powles, New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make Algorithms Accountable, published on the 20th December
2017 on the New Yorker,  online available at  https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/new-york-citys-bold-flawed-
attempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable.  
526 This is documented by J. Niklas, K. Sztandar-Sztanderska, K. Szymielewicz, Profiling the unemployed in Poland:
Social  and  Political  Implications  of  Algorithmic  Decision-making,  2015,  online  available  at
https://panoptykon.org/sites/default/files/leadimage-biblioteka/panoptykon_profiling_report_final.pdf, passim.
527 K. Kubler,  Surveillance, Power and Algorithms in France’s State of  Emergency,  in  Big Data & Society,  July-
December 2017, p. 1 ff.. 
528 C. Quelle, Privacy, Proceduralism and Self-Regulation in Data Protection Law, in Teoria Critica della Regolazione
Sociale, 2017, p. 3. 
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The first section illustrates the features of the ‘algorithmized’ public administration, showing
how the increasing reliance on data-driven systems, obliges the public sector to lean on private
companies’ technical  expertise  and  infrastructure.  In  light  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  emerging
environment,  the  second  section  will  enquire  the  (in)effectiveness  of  traditional  European
administrative law tools in respect to accountability objectives. Hence, the analysis will turn to the
consideration of the new provisions  of  the General  Data Protection Regulation.  The study will
conclude with some systemic considerations regarding the need to adopt an integrated approach
between traditional administrative law tools and business-centred provisions entailed in the GDPR. 
2. Algorithm-driven decision-making has first proliferated in the private sector where it has
become the major business model in so-called digital markets, exploiting users’ personal data for
commercial  purposes-  i.e. is  primarily  for  predicting  and  thus  orienting  users’  commercial
behaviour- and thus with the primary aim of maximising companies’ profits529. The employment of
such  massive  processing  techniques  in  the  public  sector  has  come  behind  and  has  sensitively
different features and outcomes in respect to the private and commercial-oriented sphere. 
Lately,  algorithmic  processing  infrastructures  have  triggered  governments’ attention  that
have over time become large depositories of citizens’ personal data530. The digitisation of public
administrations’ databases has soon enabled a faster consultation of collected and available datasets.
These  patterns  have  been  amplified  with  the  increasing  employment  of  algorithms  as
processing infrastructures of public administrations’ collected data. Through processing algorithms,
data are not any more a static evidence merely working as a support of public decision making
carried out by public officials, but have themselves become, in those sectors where algorithms are
employed, the centre and the source of decision-making531. 
The increasing quantitative and qualitative importance of algorithms for the purposes of
decision  making in  various  fields  of  the  public  sector  is  transforming algorithms into  outright
governance tools: algorithms are indeed employed as a means for authorities to manage “individual
behaviour and allocate resources” It thus appears that, similarly to the private sector, also the public
sector is being overtaken by a new form of algorithmic governance532.
Through  the  ‘algorithmisation’ of  public  action,  public  affairs  begin  to  be  regarded  as
technical  problems  that  need  to  be  addressed  through  technical  solutions533.  With  algorithms
becoming the engines of public affairs’ management, and thus exerting control over society534, a
new  form  of  technocratic  public  governance  emerges,  apparently  providing  impartial  and
scientifically-grounded decisions on the basis of data-driven models. These data-driven models are
529 G. Comandè, The Rotting Meat Error: From Galielo to Aristotele in Data Mining?, in EDPL, 2018, 4, 3, p. 270.  
530 G.  Carullo,  Big Data e Pubblica Amministrazione nell’era delle banche dati  interconnesse ,  in  Concorrenza e
Mercato, 2016, 23, p. 181 ff.. 
531 K. Yeung, Algorithmic Regulation: a Critical Interrogation, in Regulation & Governance, July 2017, online 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972505, p. 20 ff..
532 The term ‘algorithmic regulation’ was first coined by T. O'Reilly,  Open Data and Algorithmic Regulation, in B.
Goldstein, L. Dyson (ed.), Beyond Transparency - Open Data and the Future of Civic Innovation, San Francisco, 2013,
p. 289-300.
533 R. Kitchin, The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, in GeoJournal, 2014, 79, 1, p. 9. 
534 M. Janssen, G. Kuk,  The Challenges and Limits of Big Data Algorithms in Technocratic Governance, in  Gov.
inform q., 2016, 33, p. 371.  
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ultimately creating a new form of “technological determinism” given by algorithms’ predictions
triggering  public  action535.  Algorithms  indeed  rely  on  “actuarial  predictions”  given  by  the
correlations between the features or characteristics drawn from the data536. As framed in these terms,
the  “algorithmised”  public  governance  is  drastically  overturning  the  traditional  manners  of
conduction of public affairs537, ordinarily based on what some strand of the literature has called
“clinical  predictions”,  consisting  in  public  officials’  management  of  specific  situations538.  
Conversely,  in  the  current  technological  environment,  the  human  evaluative  factor  is
increasingly being replaced by machine-driven calculations539. Hence, in respect to these automated
processing systems and the readily usable knowledge they generate,  public  administrations  and
public  officials  specifically  in  charge  of  exercising  public  action  become  mere  executors  of
evaluations entirely carried out through automated systems. In other terms, algorithms are being
deferred the substantial part of the decision-making process, whereas public officials maintain only
the function of formalising and practically enacting judgements taken by the machine-driven model.
2.1. Governments’ technical limitations make private contractors key components of data-
driven decision making processes540. The technological support provided by private corporations
has thus become of primary importance for addressing the public need in an era of technological
disruption, and thus for acquiring the analytics necessary for “smart” urban systems. 
The  outsourcing  of  processing  infrastructures  needed  for  the  handling  of  the  enormous
available  datasets  is  formally occurring through public-private  partnerships541,  which have been
defined in the literature as “any arrangement between government and the private sector in which
partially or traditionally public activities are performed by the private sector”542. 
These private-public partnerships create a bi-directional flow of datasets that benefits both
the private and the public stakeholders involved. Indeed, through these service contracts, publicly
owned data flow into the processing infrastructures offered by private companies. In this way, these
companies acquire control of such data, which thus come to aliment and thus enrich their processing
535K. Yeung, Algorithmic Reguation: a Critical Interrogation, cit. p. 20.
536 R. Brauneis, E.P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, in YJoLT, 2018, 103, p. 111 ff.. 
537 M. Tenney, R. Sieber,  Data-Driven Participation: Algorithms, Cities, Citizens, and Corporate Control, in Urban
Planning, 2016, 1, 2, p. 101 ff.. 
538 R. Brauneis, E.P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, cit. p. 111 ff..
539 This is the general definition of governance given by J. Black, (2014)  Learning from Regulatory Disasters. LSE
Law,  Society  &  Economy Working  Papers 24/2014,  online  available  at  http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60569/1/WPS2014-
24_Black.pdf. 
540 T.  Filer,  Developing  AI  for  Government:  What  Role  and  Limits  for  the  Private  Sector?, online  available  at
https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/developing-ai-government-what-role-and-limits-priv/. For  a  general
assessment, see P. Vincent-Jones, The Regulation of Contractualization in Quasi-Markets for Public Services, in Pub.
L., 1999, p. 304. 
541 For a deeper assessment over the issue of private-public partnerships, although specifically focused on the police
sector, see N. Purtova, Between GDPR and the Police Directive: Navigating through the Maze of Information Sharing
in Public-Private Partnerships, in IDPL, 2018, 8, 1, p. 52 ff.. 
542 E.S.  Savas,  Privatization  and  Public-Private  Partnerships, Chatham  House,  2000,  4.  See  also  European
Commission, Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions,
April 2004, p. 9. 
136
III.2
systems543. On the other side, private corporations’ data- and the information they entail-, originally
feeding the provided algorithmic infrastructure, become equally relevant for the purposes of public
actors: this privately-owned data that has originally trained the algorithmic model has a sensitive
impact on the results rendered by the processing system; it is thus this data that ultimately defines
public decision-making. In addition to this, governments also often make specific agreements for
accessing privately held data in order to strengthen the evidence given by public datasets544. The
agreements specifically designed for the transfer of datasets from private actors to public bodies
often accompany the private-public partnerships aimed at providing the processing infrastructure545. 
The proliferation of private-public partnerships for the allocation of “algorithmised” public
services  are  giving  rise  to  an  interesting  process  of  infiltration  of  market  rationales  in  the
determination  of  public  actions’ courses.  With  privately-constructed  algorithms  shaping  public
interventions, private corporations are gaining an increasing important role in the organization and
orientation of the public sector546. The related spillover effect is that the growing involvement of
private  corporations  in  public  affairs  causes  the  marketization  of  public  services  given  that
corporations increasingly provide these processing services to public actors in order to increase
their  profits.  This  phenomenon has  been elsewhere  called ‘corporisation’ of  city governance547,
bringing about the risk of corporate capture of public power548. 
The delegation of the decision making site governing the allocation of public services to
private  actors  requires  a  robust  regulation  and  a  strong  enforcement  in  order  to  avoid  an
uncontrolled interference of the technology sector in public matters: with the rise of public-private
partnerships for the machine-driven delivery of public services, governments’ accountability results
to be intrinsically connected to- and thus depends on- the transparency of companies’ processing
activities. 
3. The above-outlined paragraphs have shown how the rising employment of algorithms in
the public sector is sensitively transforming the dynamics of public decision-making. 
The increasing involvement and role of private informational and technological assets in the
delivery of public services has two main effects.  On the one hand, indeed,  it  “neutralizes” the
administrative law rules of accountability and transparency that traditionally guard the traceability
of  public  administrations’  actions.  This  occurs  because  these  rules  only  apply  to  public
administrations- that, as illustrated above, are emptied by algorithms of substantial decision making
functions-, and thus cannot be applied to private contractors (subjective obstacle).On the other hand,
543 See L. Edwards, Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective, in EDPL,
2016, 2, p. 28-58. 
544 For an analysis regarding government access of privately held data in the UK, see I. Brown, Government Access to
Private Sector Data in the United Kingdom, in IDPL, 2012, 2, 4, p. 230 ff.. 
545 F.H. Cate, J.X. Dempsey, I.S. Rubinstein, Systematic Government Access to Private-sector Data, in IDPL, 2012, 2,
4, p. 195 ff.. 
546  R. Brauneis, E.P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, cit. p. 114, where the Authors recall the
registration by IBM of the trademark ‘smart city”. 
547 R. Kitchin,  The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism., cit. p. 5. See also J.S. Hiller, J. M. Blanke,  Smart
Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, in Hastings L.J., 2017, 68, p. 309. 
548 R.  Brauneis,  E.P.Goodman,  Algorithmic Transparency for  the Smart City,  in  YJoLT,  2018,  103, p.  20. See L.
Edwards, Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective, cit. p. 32.
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conversely, it operationalizes the whole set of intellectual property tools that companies have at
their disposal in order to protect the products of their technological research & development, thus
raising substantial barriers for public administrations that turn out to be incapable of accessing the
logic underlying the privately-originated machine-driven processes (objective obstacle). 
These two points will be enquired in the following paragraphs. 
3.1.  The  private  algorithmic  processing  infrastructures  to  which  public  bodies  are
increasingly  resorting  and  the  private-public  partnerships  that  govern  the  transfer  of  such
technology  call  into  question  some  fundamental  principles  that  rule  both  the  political  and
administrative action, and more precisely the ones related to the accountability and the transparency
of  public  administrations’  action.  These  principles  are  foundational  principles  of  good
governance549. 
The notion of public accountability relates to the political legitimacy of public institutions in
democratic  systems.  More  precisely,  public  institutions’  political  legitimacy  implies  a
responsabilization of these same institutions in the sense that their actions have to satisfy the public
mandate received and that they have to signal such compliance to the citizens who bear the effects
of public actions. In this perspective accountability contributes to strengthening the principle of
democracy as expressed in art. 6 of the European Treaty and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union. 
In these regards,  it  is  interesting to recall  that the 1998 OECD Principles for managing
Ethics  in  Public  Services  explicitly  acknowledges  the  principle  of  accountability,  stating  that
“public servants should be accountable for their actions to their superiors and, more broadly, to the
public. Accountability should focus both on compliance with rules and ethical principles and on
achievement of results (…)”550. Along these lines, also the European Commission’s White Paper on
European Governance stresses the need for clarity with regards to “the roles in the legislative and
executive  processes”  as  well  as  the  need  for  European  institutions  to  “explain  and  take
responsibility” for their actions551. Accordingly, the Paper affirms the “need for greater clarity and
responsibility from Member States  and all  those involved in  developing and implementing EU
policy at whatever level”552. 
Against this backdrop, accountability implies openness of public authorities’ interventions,
requiring institutions and administrative bodies and agencies to open their activities to the public553.
The principle of openness not only requires these actors to conduct their work as openly as possible,
but also to proactively open their operations to the public. As will be assessed below, administrative
549 C. Harlow, Global Administrative Law: the Quest for Principles and Values, in the EJIL, 2006, 17, 1, p. 187 ff..
550 OECD, 1998 Recommendation of the OECD Council on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service, 
including Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service, online available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Principles-on-Managing-Ethics-in-the-Public-Service.pdf, p. 76.  
551 European  Commission,  European  Governance-  A  White  Paper,  25  July  2001,  online  available  at
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-white-paper-governance-com200142820010725_en.pdf,
p. 10.  
552 Ibid.. 
553 In these regards, see A. Alemanno, Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU law- Transparency, Participation
and Democracy, in European Law Review, 2014, 39, 1, p. 72. 
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openness  has  an  instrumental  value  for  it  ensures  the  participation  of  civil  society  in  public
decision-making and with that the more fruitful enactment of democratic ideals. 
Against this backdrop, the principle of accountability is intimately connected to the principle
of transparency554,  which is explicitly acknowledged in art.  41.2 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights  as  part  to  the  right  of  good administration,  requiring  institutions  to  “maintain  an open,
transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society”. 
The principle  of transparency is  enshrined in  art.  15.3 TFEU, providing substantive and
procedural  rules  for  the  operationalization  of  such  principle.  Transparency  is  highly  context-
dependent and thus varies depending on the activities that are carried out555. The public information
released must be up to date,  complete-  that is,  ready for consultation-,  and consistent with the
original documents held by the administration. It moreover needs to contain the indication of its
origin and of how it can be reused. 
The quality of  transparency is  strictly related to  the administrations’ use of  a  clear  and
understandable language of the information posted on the institutional channels of information. The
requirement of a clear and plane language of the public information released to the public has been
widely acknowledged by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union556, which has
stressed that clarity of language in the documents of the public institutions is strictly related to the
principles  of  legal  certainty  and  the  protection  of  legitimate  expectations.  In  these  terms,
transparency enables the predictability of policy action and is thus the more important the more the
specific public action is the result of discretionary powers557. 
Public  transparency’s  golden  rule  is  given  by the  right  of  access  to  public  documents,
enshrined in art.  15 TFEU, in art.  42 of the ECHR, and in Regulation EC N. 1049/2001 of the
European Parliament and of the Council on public access to EU institution documents558. 
As objectified in the right to access, transparency is itself functional to the right of defence
and thus directly serves due process rationales559. This is well expressed in art. 41 ECHR defining
the components of the right to good administration, entailing according to para 2 of the same article
i) citizens’ right to defence and due process, ii) the right to access to administrative documents and
iii) the right to receive explanations regarding public actions. 
554 For a theoretical reconstruction, see C. Harlow, Global Administrative Law: the Quest for Principles and Values,
cit. p.187 ff.. 
555 Ibid..
556 See,  for  example,  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  Administration  des  douanes  v  Société  anonyme
Gondrand  Frères  and  Société  anonyme  Garancini,  C-169/80,  9  July  1981,  online  available  at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=90884&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=319462, para 17;  Court of
Justice of the European Union, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Srl Meridionale Industria Salumi and others
and Ditta Italo Orlandi & Figlio and Ditta Vincenzo Divella v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, C-212/80, 12
November  1981,  online  avalable  at  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=91124&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=321098.
557 S. Prechal, M. de Leeuw, Dimensions of Transparency: the Building Blocks for a new Legal Principle?, in 
REALaw, 2007, 1, p. 51 ff.
558 So art. 2 para 1 of the Regulation EC N. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access
to EU institution documents. 
559 In these regards, see S. Prechal, M. de Leeuw, Dimensions of Transparency: the Building Blocks for a new Legal
Principle?, cit. p. 55. 
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According to the interpretation given by the literature560, art. 298.1 TFEU, by stating that
“the institutions,  bodies,  offices  and agencies  of  the Union shall  have  the support  of  an open,
efficient and independent European administration”, extends the principles of accountability and
transparency to  the  entirety  of  EU administrations,  i.e. the  administrations  that  act  within  the
territory of the European Union561. 
The  emergence  of  a  horizontal  chain  of  stakeholders  governing  public  decision-making
courses relying on algorithmic processing infrastructures sensitively challenges the above-outlined
framework562. As has been demonstrated, indeed, in the networked algorithmised public decision-
making environment, the role of the public authority is lessened and substantially substituted by
private companies who do not have the typical democratic accountability requirements that, in a
representative  democracy,  traditionally  belong  to  public  administrations563.  Private  entities
contracting  with  public  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  delivering  algorithmic  processing
infrastructures  are  not  subject  to  the  accountability  and  transparency  requirements  of  public
subjects. These entities can indeed hardly be considered as “bodies governed by public law”, since
the  definition  of  such  notion  under  art.  1.9  Directive  2004/18/EC  excludes  the  industrial  or
commercial  character  of  these  bodies564.  To  the  contrary,  the  entities  that  provide  algorithmic
processing infrastructures as a support to public authorities’ decision-making mostly have a strong
commercial and industrial characterization. 
Against this backdrop, hence, the achievement of public accountability and transparency in
the  illustrated  terms  appears  to  be  primarily  obstructed  by  a  subjective  obstacle,  that  is  the
inapplicability of the principles of good administrative governance to the private entities that are
progressively taking the reins of such governance. This means that in the networked algorithmic
environment accountability of the public authority diminishes. As a consequence, control of the
policy address through traditional administrative law tools becomes less effective. 
560 A. Alemanno, Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU law- Transparency, Participation and Democracy, cit. 
72.
561 For the notion of EU administrations, see   H. Hoffman, G. Rowe, A. Turk,  Administrative Law & Policy of the
European Union, Oxford, 2012, p. 171 ff.. 
562 For an empirical  analysis of the challenges to democratic accountability posed by the contracting activities of
public administrations with private entities, see C. Di Martino, J. Scott,  Private Sector Contracting and Democratic
Accountability, in Educational Policy, 2012, p. 1 ff.. 
563 On the issue see P.R. Verkuil,  Public Law Limitations on Privatisation of Government Functions, Cardozo Legal
Studies  Research  Paper  N.  104,  1  March  2005,  online  available  at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=681517, p. 8, affirming that “delegations to private hands in our society come with strings attached that
ensure fairness at the individual level and accountability at the political level”. 
564 Conversely, according to art.1.9 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March
2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public work contracts, public supply contracts and public
service contracts, “(…) a body governed by public law means any body: (a)  established for the specific purpose of
meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character; (b) having legal personality; and
(c) financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law; or
subject to management supervision by those bodies; or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more
than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by
public law”. The provision thus clearly excludes the industrial or commercial nature of the contracting entities in order
to be considered a body governed by public law. 
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In addition to this, public administrations relying on privately-developed algorithmic models
are themselves incapable of accessing the information needed to satisfy normative transparency and
thus accountability requirements because of the existence of a strong set of intellectual property
tools,  which  run  contrary to  transparency duties  and thus  to  the  enactment  of  effective  public
accountability mechanisms. 
3.2. The European intellectual property framework provides several tools for the protection
of corporations’ developed algorithms. These are to be found in copyright, database rights and trade
secret rights. 
Although  there  have  been  long  discussions  regarding  the  patentability  of  “computer
implemented inventions” 565, the option of patenting softwares has soon been put aside, due to the
legal and practical difficulties related to such an extension566. The exclusion of the eligibility of the
patent as a tool for the protection of algorithms has caused the shift of focus onto other tools of
protection. 
With regards to copyright protection, the Directive on the legal protection of computers of
2009567, replacing the previous 1991 Software Directive568, has redefined the scope of copyright
protection of computer programs. The persisting uncertainties around such forms of protection have
triggered the intervention of the European Court of Justice in the case Sas Institute Inc. c. World
Programming  Ltd569.  Here,  the  Court  has  clarified  that  the  protection  under  copyright  law  of
computer  programs  applies  only  to  “the  forms  of  expression  of  a  computer  program and  the
preparatory design work capable of leading, respectively,  to the reproduction or the subsequent
creation of such a program570”, but does not include the functionalities, the programming language
of the program, and the format of data files used in a computer of it571. By stating so, the European
565 Cf. Proposal of a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council related to the patentability of computer
implemented  inventions,  released  on  the  20th February  2002,  online  available  at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52002PC0092. See J Drexl, RM Hilty et. al.,  Data ownership and access to data,
Position statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of the 16th August 2016 on the Current
European Debate, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 16-10, online available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833165, p. 5-6, stressing that patent “protection (of algorithms)
would pose a risk of two negative effects: first, protection of abstract subject-matter would cause needless – and, in the
case  of  algorithms,  unreasonable  –  restraints  on  competition  that,  according  to  current  knowledge,  would  not  be
economically justified. (…) Second, it is barely foreseeable what markets and sectors would be affected. This makes
finding suitable approaches to a regulation seem unrealistic”. 
566 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, clarified that abstract inventions,
such as algorithms, do not become patentable merely because they are implemented on a computer. So Alice Corp. Pty.
V. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 234, 2358 (2014). For a comment see Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets
and Stymied Competition, cit. p. 1425. 
567 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of
computer programs, OJ L. 111, 5-5-2009. 
568 See Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, 91/250/EEC, OJ 17-5-91,
N.L. 122/42. 
569 Court of Justice of the European Union,  Sas Institute Inc. c. World Programming Ltd., C-406/10, 2 May 2010,
online available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=122362&doclang=EN. 
570 Ibid., para 37. 
571 Ibid., para 39. For a comment, see P. Samuelson, T. Vinje, W. Cornish, Does Copyright Protection Under the EU
Software Directive Extend to Computer Program Behaviour, Languages and Interfaces?, in EIPR, 2012, 34, 3, p. 158.
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Court of Justice has reaffirmed the basic copyright law principle on the basis of which copyrights
protects only the original expression of an idea572. 
Through licensing terms, copyright protection can be used in order to restrict the ability of a
third party to use the protected parts of the computer program. Indeed, in case the licenses are
established through valid contracts, uses that do not respect the license terms may constitute breach
of  contract.  Hence,  copyright  protection  of  algorithms  has  an  important  restrictive  function
regarding the use of the protected technology573. This means that copyright restrictions can well be
used for impeding governments to employ the provided algorithms for purposes that are different
from the ones indicated in the licensing terms. 
Shifting from the processing infrastructure to the object of the processing, copyright can be
employed  for  the  protection  of  aggregated  digital  data  processed  by algorithms574 in  case  the
selection and arrangement of it meets the originality threshold575. 
Irrespectively  of  any inventiveness,  digital  datasets  can  find  protection  under  the  1996
Directive  on  legal  protection  of  databases576,  establishing  an  exclusive  sui  generis right  over
databases resulting from a “substantial investment”577. 
However, the strongest tool of protection that algorithms’ developers have is trade secret
protection as recently reformed by the Trade Secret Directive 2016/943. The new Directive provides
indeed  very  broad  conditions  for  protection,  encompassing  nearly  every  business  confidential
information578. Despite formal declarations579, the Directive provides a proprietary-styled protection
over information580, which thus offers strong grounds for big data companies to obscure both the
572 See J. Litman, P. Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, in BTLJ, 2010, 25, p. 1190-
1191. 
573 Highlighting the function of copyright as  a means to restrictively regulate the use of  the protected object,  N.
Shemtov, Beyond the Code: Protection of non-Textual Features of Softwares, Oxford, 2017, p. 151. 
574 For  a  reflection  upon  the  copyrightability  of  so-called  computer-generated  works,  see  R.  Abbott,  Artificial
Intelligence, Big Data and Intellectual Property:  Protecting Computer-Generated Works in the United Kingdom, in T.
Aplin (ed.),  Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Digital Technologies, forthcoming, online available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064213. 
575 It should be however recalled that it is very difficult for a database to accomplish the originality threshold required
under European copyright law. On the issue see DJ Gervais,  The internationalisation of Intellectual Property: New
challenges from the very old and the very new, in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal,
2002, 12, p. 929-935. 
576 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal Protection of
Databases,  online  available  at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML.
577 Cf. art 7, 4 par. Database Directive. Recently, see I. Gupta,  Footprint of Feist in European Database Directive: a
Legal Anaysis of IP making in Europe, Springer, 2017, p. 11-37.
578 See art. 2 of the Directive where trade secrets are defined as any information that i) is not generally known among
or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; ii) has
commercial value because it is secret; and iii) has been subject to reasonable steps to keep it secret. See D. Sousa Silva,
What exactly is a trade Secret under the proposed Directive?, in JIPLP, 2014, 9, p. 11-15.
579 See recital 10 of the Directive affirming that its “provisions (...) should not create any exclusive right on the know-
how or information protected as trade secrets” 
580 Trade secret protection and enforcement is confined to cases of conducts of “acquisition, use and disclosure” that
are to be considered “unlawful”.  The notion of unlawfulness is very broad and comprehends also any “unauthorised
access to, appropriation of, or copy of any documents, objects, materials, substances or electronic files (…) containing
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processed  health  data  and  the  procedural  information  regarding  algorithm-driven  processing
activities.  This  procedural  information  encompasses  information  regarding  how  algorithms  are
developed, how they are validated and the data on which they are trained581.
The  above-outlined  intellectual  property  tools  not  only  shield  corporations’ algorithmic
assets  from the eyes of competitors,  but,  in the dynamic of public-private partnerships,  end up
creating a substantial safeguard also in respect to the public counterpart582. Indeed, these tools and
the contractual restrictions regarding them, block public contractors’ access to the functional logic
of  the  algorithms they get  to  employ,  with  the  ultimate  effect  of  rendering  these  same public
administrations incapable of releasing to the wider public explanations regarding the process of the
formation of public administrations’ will. 
In these regards, it is interesting to recall that access to document rules, such as the ones
entailed in art. 41 ECHR, in art. 15 TFEU and in Regulation EC N. 1049/2001 regarding public
access  to  European  institutions  documents  provide  specific  exemptions  with  regards  to  the
disclosure of those documents that “would undermine the protection of the commercial interests of
a natural or legal person”583. The protection of business secrets has been recognised by the Court of
Justice  of  the  European  Union  as  a  general  principle  applicable  in  the  context  of  public
procurement584. Accordingly, these commercial confidentiality exemptions have been interpreted by
the Court of Justice of the European Union in a very broad way585 and also the latest rulings in these
regards have confirmed the existence of an outright presumption of confidentiality in the case law
of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding access to public documents586. 
The  obscurity  of  algorithmic  decision-making courses  renders  it  arduous  for  citizens  to
assert  a  claim  of  a  right  or  a  legitimate  interest.  Algorithms’ intrinsic  and  extrinsic  obscurity
impedes a direct participation of citizens in machine-driven decisions carried out by governments.
the trade secret (…)” carried out “without the consent of the trade secret holder”. See artt. 4 n. 56 and 6 of the EU Trade
Secret  Directive.  See  EU  Directorate  General  for  Internal  Policies,  Trade  Secrets,  2014,  online  available  at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/493055/IPOL-JURI_NT(2014)493055_EN.pdf,  p.  4;  T
Aplin,  Right  to Property and Trade Secrets, in C. Geiger,  Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property Cheltenham, 2015, p. 421-426. 
581 All this information regarding algorithms constitute the so-called ‘e-trade secrets’. R. Niebel, L. De Martinis, B.
Clark, The Eu Trade Secrets Directive: all change for trade secret protection in Europe?, in JIPLP, 2018, p. 3. 
582 D.S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability in Our Public Infrastructure, in Florida Law Review, 200, 59, p. 149. 
583 So art. 4.2 EU Access Regulation. 
584 Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-450/06,  Varec SA v.  Belgian State, 14 February 2008; online
available  at  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=c-450/06,para 49;  Opinion  of  AG Kokott  of  23
September 2010 in Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others, C-266/09, online available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62009CC0266, para 77. 
585 For the American perspective,  see D.S. Levine,  The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency,  in R.C.
Dreyfuss, K.J. Stranburg, The Law and Theory of Trade Secrecy. A Handbook of Contemporary Research, Cheltenham,
2011, p. 406 ff.
586 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-562/14 P, Sweden v. Commission, 11th May 2017,
online  available  at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130dc33afe3f799b84a4e9ab3c8c36aca0434.e34
KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Pb3uPe0?
text=&docid=190582&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=715713.  In  the  same
sense, Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-139/07, Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, online
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=c-139/07. 
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In this perspective, the opaqueness of privately developed algorithms implemented at governmental
level  brings  about  public  disempowerment  and  loss  of  accountability.  In  respect  to  obscure
algorithm-driven decisions shaping public interventions, citizens lose their participatory rights in
collective  ruling  and  become  passive  recipients  of  machines’  determinations587.  Against  this
backdrop,  the  acknowledgment  of  the  unsuitability of  traditional  administrative  “command and
control regulation”, suggests the need to look for new regulatory tools and governance mechanisms
that are better capable of addressing the complexity of emerging algorithm-driven administrative
decision-making patterns. The fact that algorithms who drive governments’ decisions are privately
controlled  requires  a  shift  in  terms  of  systemic  perspectives  and  thus  of  the  tools  needed  to
effectively pursue the accountability and transparency objectives. These tools are to be found in the
General  Data  Protection  Regulation,  which  provides  specific  tools  with  the  aim  of  achieving
accountability and transparency of algorithmic decision-making courses. As will be assessed in the
following  paragraph,  these  tools  acquire  a  specific  relevance  for  public  accountability  and
transparency purposes in the “algorithmised” public environment. 
4. In the effort to provide constructive regulatory responses to the phenomenon of massive
machine-driven data processing, the General Data Protection Regulation has newly emphasized and
reinvigorated the principles of accountability and transparency in the realm of data protection law.
In this way, the two principles have acquired a new significance for the protection of data subjects’
rights in the context of algorithmic processing activities. 
The  Regulation  establishes  an  entire  set  of  obligations  born  by  entities  that  carry  out
personal data processing activities “wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing
other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended
to form part of a filing system”588.  The Regulation applies to both private and public entities. This
reflected by recital 6, acknowledging that “technology allows both private companies and public
authorities  to  make  use  of  personal  data  on  an  unprecedented  scale  in  order  to  pursue  their
activities”; as well as by the definition of “controllers” and “processors” under art.  4.7 and 4.8
GDPR, encompassing a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body”. In light of
these provisions, it seems that for the purposes of the Regulation, private and public entities are
generally equalized589. 
There are only a few regulatory differences between public and private actors590. The most
significant  relates  to  the requirement  of  the appointment  of  a  data  protection officer591,  always
compulsory for public authorities and only compulsory for private entities if their core activities
“consist of processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or their purposes,
587 Ibid.. 
588 So art. 2.1 GDPR, defining the “material scope” of the Regulation. 
589 However,  as  Recital  19 GDPR clarifies  that  the  processing activities  carried  out  by public  authorities  for  the
purposes of “the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security and the free movement of
such data” falls outside the specific scope of the Regulation. 
590 In these regards, see O. Butler,  Obligations Imposed on Private Parties by the GDPR and UK Data Protection
Law: Blurring the Public-Private Divide, in European Public Law, 2018, 24, 3, p. 555 ff..
591 Art. 37 GDPR. 
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require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale” or “of processing on a
large scale of special categories of data pursuant to Article 9 and personal data relating to criminal
convictions and offences referred to in Article 10”592. 
Under these premises, the GDPR becomes a highly important source of regulation of the
conduct of public administrations that make use of algorithmic processing infrastructures for the
purposes of public services’ delivery593. 
However, the GDPR’s regulatory potential for public authorities’ algorithm-driven decision-
making is to be perceived also from a different,  indirect  or subsidiary, perspective: by regulating
private  corporations’  processing  endeavors,  the  GDPR’s  provisions  assure  as  a  reflex  the
enhancement of the accountability and the transparency of public authorities actions that are defined
by privately-generated algorithms. 
Under  these  premises,  it  is  extremely interesting  to  observe  that  the  regulation  of  data
processing activities enacted by the GDPR is achieved through reliance on the same foundational
principles  regulating  public  administrations’  acts,  i.e. the  principle  of  accountability  and
transparency. Nonetheless, the notion of accountability outlined in the GDPR is sensitively different
from  the  administrative  law  one  that  has  been  outlined  above.  Conversely,  the  principle  of
transparency shares some interesting common features with the administrative law principle. 
In  the  GDPR,  accountability has  become  a  central  principle  governing  machine-driven  data
processing operations. In respect to the administrative law notion, accountability is only indirectly
related  to  the  purpose of  participation and empowerment.  To the contrary,  it  is  related to  data
controllers’ and processors’ ‘responsabilization’ and is primarily linked to the object of verifiability,
which  is,  in  turn,  related  to  risk  management  concerns.  The  GDPR expressly  affirms  that  the
principle of accountability under data protection law serves the function of detecting- and thus of
signaling- whether an occurred personal data breach “is likely to result  in a risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons”. 
The  accountability  principle  is  established  under  art.  5.2  GDPR,  affirming  that  ‘the
controller  shall  be  responsible  for,  and  be  able  to  demonstrate  compliance  with  paragraph  1
(accountability)’.  By  stating  so,  art.  5.2  GDPR  establishes  the  autonomy  of  the  principle  of
accountability in the data protection law ecosystem, and at  the same time the strict  operational
connection to other principles relating to the processing of personal data- such as the principle of
lawfulness, fairness, purpose limitation, data minimisation and ultimately of transparency. 
As the same wording of art. 5.1 GDPR clarifies, the accountability parameter demands that
compliance to normative requirements is externally verifiable, thus traceable. For these purposes,
the principle of accountability is substantiated in the rules entailed in art. 22 GDPR, establishing
that i) “the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly
592 Other regulatory differences relate to enforcement and specifically relate to the exemption under art. 41.6 GDPR
from the monitoring of approved codes of conduct with regards to the processing carried out by public authorities and
bodies and the unavailability established under art. 79.2 GDPR of the option of bringing proceedings “before the courts
of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence”, in case the controller or processor is a
public authority of a Member State in the exercise of its public powers”. 
593 O.  Butler,  Obligations Imposed on Private Parties by the GDPR and UK Data Protection Law: Blurring the
Public-Private Divide, cit. p. 560 ff..
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affects him or her”; ii) “the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller”; iii) the
right “to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision”; in art. 13.2 lett. f GDPR and
art. 14.2 lett. g GDPR, requiring the controller to inform the data subject about “the existence of
automated  decision-making,  including  profiling  (…)  and,  at  least  in  those  cases,  meaningful
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of
such processing for the data subject” (so-called ‘right to explanation’); and ultimately in art. 58.1
lett. b GDPR that assigns to supervisory authorities the power to carry out “investigations in the
form of data protection audits”. 
These measures strengthen the accountability regime of the GDPR respectively assuring a
direct  interaction  between  data  subjects  and  data  controllers  (art.  22  GDPR);  the  release  of
information regarding the ratio and the legal effects of the data processing operations (art.  13.2
lett.f;  art.  14.2  lett.g  GDPR);  the  enactment  of  control  mechanisms  capable  of  signalling
irregularities or system weaknesses in the management of personal data (art. 58.1 lett.b GDPR). All
these measures encumber data controllers and processors with disclosure obligations that render
processing activities transparent and thus traceable. In these regards, also in data protection law,
transparency is a fundamental means to achieve accountability and is thus to be considered a key
component of it594.
As the same GDPR states, transparency “requires that any information and communication
relating to the processing of those personal data be easily accessible and easy to understand, and
that  clear  and plain  language be used  (…)”595.  More  precisely,  transparency “requires  that  any
information addressed to the public or to the data subject be concise, easily accessible and easy to
understand, and that clear and plain language and, additionally, where appropriate, visualisation be
used”596. 
As  in  the  context  of  administrative  law,  also  in  the  data  protection  law  ecosystem,
transparency is primarily achieved through the right of access, which is established under art. 15
GDPR. 
With regards to the content of the right to access, art. 15 GDPR provides a specific list of the
information that needs to be made available to the data subjects. First of all, data subjects shall have
the right to “obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning
him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to personal data”597. In addition to
this, the right to access encompasses a variety of other types of information regarding, amongst
others, “the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1)
and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the
significance  and  the  envisaged  consequences  of  such  processing  for  the  data  subject”598.  The
provision of “meaningful information about the logic involved” as well as of “the significance and
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject” concretises what has been
594 B Goodman, A Step towards accountable algorithms?: Algorithmic Discrimination and the European General Data
Protection,  29th  Conference  on  Neural  Information  Processing  Systems  (NIPS  2016),  Barcelona,  Spain,  online
available at http://www.mlandthelaw.org/papers/goodman1.pdf, p.7-9. 
595 Recital 39 GDPR.
596 Recital 58 GDPR. 
597 Art. 15 GDPR. 
598 Ibid.. 
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appointed as “the right to explanation”599.  As some strand of the literature600 has suggested,  the
expression  “meaningful  information”  is  to  be  interpreted  as  “legibility”  of  “architecture”  and
“implementation” of algorithmic processing601. Overall, it can be said that meaningful information
about  the  logic  involved  must  provide  clarity  with  regards  to  the  causal  connections  and  the
inference processes that orient the data-driven system so that the data subject may evaluate what
type of consequences arise from the processing and thus exploit the remedies needed to address
such  “envisaged  consequences”.  In  this  light,  the  proposed  concept  of  “legibility”  of  the
information to be provided under art. 15.1 lett. h GDPR is systematically consistent with the call for
accessibility  and  understandability  of  the  information  regarding  the  processing  entailed  in  the
above-recalled recitals602.
The  right  to  access  under  art.  15  GDPR with  its  related  transparency  and  explanation
functions enables data subjects to verify the processing entities’ conducts and more specifically
their compliance with the data protection rules established by the Regulation. In this perspective, it
is  a  primary  tool  for  responsabilizing  processing  businesses  and  thus  for  achieving  their
accountability as defined in art. 5.2 GDPR. 
Finally, it needs to be clarified that the effectiveness of the so-defined right to access is not
destined to be blurred by the statements under recital 63 GDPR, affirming that the right to access
“should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of others, including trade secrets or intellectual
property and in particular the copyright protecting the software”. Although the balancing between
individuals’ right to data protection and businesses’ intellectual property rights is debated in the
literature603, some strand of the scholarship604 has convincingly argued in favour of the prevalence of
the right to access over the protection of intellectual property rights, observing- amongst others- that
the same recital 63 GDPR specifies that “the result of those considerations should not be a refusal to
provide all information to the data subject”, suggesting in this way that the right to access can be
limited but never totally rejected.
As interpreted in these terms, the transparency rules entailed in the GDPR turn out to be
precious  regulatory  tools  for  the  networked  algorithm-driven  public  decision-making,  shedding
light  over  the first  stage of the complex public  decision-making chain,  that  is  the stage of  the
algorithmic processing carried out by private corporations. Since the outcomes of such processing
activities come to define the courses of public decision making, the information provided on the
basis of the mentioned GDPR’s provisions to data subjects, become a useful means to empower
citizens  in  respect  to  automated  public  adjudications  and  to  control  public  interventions.  The
acknowledgment of the complexity of the “algorithmised” public administration decision-making
599 See, generally,  M. Kaminski,  The Right to Explanation, Explained,  University of Colorado Law Legal Studies
Research  Paper,  18-24,  15th June  2018,  online  available  at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3196985, passim. 
600 G. Comandè-G. Malgieri,  Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data
Protection Regulation, in IDPL, 2017, 7, 4, p. 243-244. 
601 Ibid.. 
602 Recitals 39 and 58 GDPR. 
603 S. Wachter, B. Mittlestandt, L. Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making does not exist
in the General Data Protection Regulation, in IDPL, 2017, 7, 2, p. 76. 
604 G. Comandè, G. Malgieri,  Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data
Protection Regulation, cit. p. 263-264.
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courses and of the structural and functional features of the new data protection law tools offered by
the GDPR, thus ultimately reveals the significance of these same tools for public accountability
purposes. With private parties assuming an increasingly important role in the performance of public
functions through the grant of technological support, technical verifiability becomes an important
source of political accountability.
5.  The above-outlined analysis leads to two final considerations, one of practical and the
other of more theoretical nature.
From a practical standpoint,  the study has demonstrated that the increase in the private-
public  partnerships  for  the  delivery  of  public  services  through  algorithmic  models,  sensitively
challenges  the  effectiveness  of  traditional  administrative  law  tools  of  accountability  and
transparency of administrative decision-making. The unsuitability of traditional administrative law
tools is mainly given by the fact that they cannot be applied to private processing entities and that
public authorities cannot  themselves  access the relevant  information concerning the algorithmic
models employed for their decision-making since these are protected by strong intellectual property
safeguards. In this light, transparency provisions entailed in the GDPR, and especially the right to
access under art.  15 GDPR, assure the release of information regarding the privately conducted
processing activities that increasingly orient public interventions. In this perspective, they become
thus essential  tools for data subjects  to trace complex public decision-making courses and thus
indirectly enhance political accountability as promoted by traditional access to public documents
channels. 
Against this backdrop, it appears that an integrated approach between new data protection
law tools and traditional administrative law tools is needed in order to achieve a satisfying level of
political accountability in respect to “algorithmised” public interventions. Such integrated approach
is ultimately deemed to be essential for an effective protection of citizens’ legitimate interests and
fundamental rights that a short-sighted conception of public accountability would undermine in the
shadow of algorithm-driven administrative rulings. 
Ultimately, at a deeper level, the traced analysis reveals the complexity of the private-public
divide  in  the  algorithmic  economy,  requiring  a  rethinking  of  the  interaction  between  different
regulatory  branches  of  European  law  and  more  precisely  between  different  regulatory  tools
provided by these. The increasing intertwining between private and public parties for the algorithm-
driven  delivery of  public  services  raises  profound questions  regarding  the  ways  of  integrating
administrative and data protection law, the opportunity and limits of the applicability of general data
protection law to public  actors’ processing activities as well  as the functions to be assigned to
traditional administrative law tools in the algorithmic environment605.
GIULIA SCHNEIDER
605 In these regards, it is interesting to recall that the Administrative Tribunal of Lazio with the ruling has granted
access to the information regarding the algorithms of a software employed by the Italian Public Administration for the
purposes of the transfer of teachers under the Italian law 10/2015 under the right to access to public documents as
established by art. 22 of the Italian law n.241/1990. So TAR Lazio-Roma, Sez. III bis, ruling 22 March 2017 n. 3769.
For a comment see M. Iaselli,  Diritto di accesso all’algoritmo, TAR Lazio apre nuovi scenari, published on the 17th
May 2017, online available at http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2017/05/17/diritto-di-accesso-algoritmo. 
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Artificial Intelligence in the public sector: 
opportunities and challenges*
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. - 2. Public bodies and artificial intelligence: new opportunities by data-
driven regulation. -  2.1.  From data to granular knowledge. -  2.2.  New ways of delivering public
services. -  3. Automated decision-making: challenges for administrative law principle. - 3.1. A brief
overview on the functioning of Artificial intelligence. -  3.2.  GDPR protection: a “human-on-the-
loop” meaning. - 4. Conclusion.
1. Nowadays, the most important challenge that public administration has to deal with is the
management of a large amount of data. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  ‘90’s,  the  process  of  digitalization  has  started,  hence  public
administration begun to collect manually data related to administrative documents and procedures.
The amount of data was insignificant, because of the traditional tools used to collect data and the
shortage of digital resources606; but the trend changed when fast development of cloud computing
and information and communication technologies (ICT) made it  easier  to generate,  storage and
analyse data.
It is true that public bodies are changing under legislative efforts, such as, firstly, Digital
Administration Code (d.lgs. 82/2005) in order to digitalise own processes and organizations, in line
with administrative principles.
The  digitalization  process  provide  a  «logical  data»607 structure  instead  of  a  «logical
documents» one, with the consequence that artificial intelligence’s outcomes as well as data derive
from digital  sources  (i.e.  database interconnected,  public  platform) should be introduced in the
procedure under the public bodies’ control.  
The shifting to logical  data  paradigm makes the phase of managing and collecting data
crucial  for  the  legality  of  proceeding.  Therefore,  artificial  intelligence’s  outcomes  could  be
considered «legally relevant»608 as long as they are generated under a legal framework.
Consequently, one of the main revolution that public bodies have been living is the shifting
from digitalization to datafication609 that is an approach that considers that all elements could be
quantified and analysed. This phenomenon is due to information technologies available at lower
cost and their ubiquity throughout society.
606   * Paper reviewed and updated, presented during the Seminar on “ Big Data and Public Law: New Challenges
beyond Data Protection”, Gargnano sul Garda, 15-17 October 2018.
On the contrary, nowadays documents are borm digital and data can be collected immediately.
607    See E. MENICHETTI, Accessibilità e tutela della riservatezza, in B. PONTI (a cura di), Il regime dei dati pubblici.
Esperienze europee e ordinamento nazionale, Santarcangelo di Romagna, 2008, pp. 181 ss.
608    The article 1, comma 1, lett. p) of Digital Administration Code (d.lgs. 82/2005) considers «informatic document
all document in which there is the digital representation of acts, facts and data legally relevant». 
609    V. MAYER-SCHONBERGER AND K. CUKIER, Big data. Una rivoluzione che transformerà il nostro modo di vivere e
già  minaccia  la  nostra  libertà,  Garzanti,  Milano,  2013,  pp.  103  ss.  created  the  term  datafication  and  give  some
examples of ubiquity of ICT and the possibility of quantify everything, such as location, relations, own self, words, and
so on. 
149
III.3
Due to advanced ICT tools,  public  and private actors collect  and analyse an impressive
quantity of data.610 Related to public sector, this revolution influence policy and rulemaking process
because predictive analytics on ICT’s outcome could facilitate the merging of scattered data and the
establishing of unexpected correlations.
Internet of things throughout the city, social networks, digital procedures, e-mails and so on
are just some of the instruments, which public bodies and people use every day to produce and
capture a significant amount of data.
Everywhere there are data, thus the ability of collecting and analysing them is crucial «to do
more,  better,  faster  and  more  cheaply»611:  public  bodies  have  to  understand  this  improvement
urgently and to govern it, both in order to re-think how public services could be delivered and to
preserve administrative principles into administrative proceedings.
It  is  clear that this  huge amount  of data poses both opportunities  and challenges to  the
administrative law system, which scholars have to face612.
On the one hand, big data and artificial intelligence create new opportunities to understand
reality in a deep way, thanks to specific tools (such as Internet of Things, predictive analysis and
datasets) and new ways of working (i.e. interoperability and sharing between public bodies) and
new ways of government (i.e. data driven regulation). 
On the other hand, however, they pose some questions, related to administrative principles,
especially to due process, rule of law and accountability.
In  this  way,  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  2016/679  (GDPR)  represents  the  first
attempt to unify the fundamental right of data protection and, at the same time, the free circulation
of data in a safe and trustworthy digital society. In particular, one of the main purpose of GDPR is
to protect rights and freedoms of people as a whole and not only the ones of data subjects.
For this reason, scholars may appreciate both the public aim of this act and the attempt of
regulating the rise of artificial intelligence in the public sector to protect rights and freedoms.613
Starting from these characteristics, this contribution would offer some insights in order to re-think
and to adapt traditional legal categories and principles, i.e. due process, to this new phenomenon.614
GDPR tries  to  highlight  the  central  role  of  guide-principles,  such as  accountability and
transparency and, at the same time, it provides for specific rights to recipients. It pays attention to
610    Public bodies collect a large amount of data during own activities, called administrative data; indeed private
sector collect data, namely, from e-commerce, payment transaction, trade agreements and so on.
611    In  this  way,  M.  MACIEJEWSKY,  To  do  more,  better,  faster  and  more  cheaply:  using  big  data  in  public
administration, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83, 2017, pp. 120-135.
612    It  is a matter of fact that the big data phenomenon has been studied under several point of views, such as
technological, urban policy and protect of privacy ones, while only recently legal scholars have started to study it.
613    F. PIZZETTI,  La protezione dei dati personali e la sfida dell’Intelligenza Artificiale, in F. PIZZETTI (a cura di),
Intelligenza artificiale, protezione dei dati personali e regolazione, Torino, 2018, pp. 164 ss. The Author argues, «to the
heart of GDPR there are people with their rights and freedoms», p. 165.
614    O. POLLICINO, Tutela dei diritti fondamentali nell’era digitale e contest valoriale: una indagine transatlantica, in
Rivista di diritto dei media, 2, 2018, suggests that changes of digital area push scholars and judges towards two ways.
They could choose to transfer sic et simpliciter traditional legal categories into digital scenario or they could choose to
re-think and adapt them to new scenario.  This choice is hardly influenced by cultural  framework (resistance to or
openness to the innovation).
150
III.3
these  aspects  with  the  aim  of  significantly  enhancing  people’s  trust  about  the  use  of  new
methodologies in the public  decision-making, such as big data analytics,  internet of things  and
artificial intelligence, with the final purpose of protecting people affected by.
Artificial intelligence uses as main raw material a huge amount of data (also known as big
data),  with  the  consequence  that  accessibility  and  correctness  of  data  are  a  pre-condition  to
guarantee a good administration principle and to protect rights and freedoms. GDPR focuses on
these  elements  in  order  to  be  both  a  normative  framework  to  avoid  pervasive  as  well  as
unreasonable public control and a tool for improving a sound data circulation.
Scholars must urgently assess what are the consequences of the administrative decision-
making process in the machine-learning era. In particular, attention should be paid to two issues:
data quality and compatibility between artificial  intelligence and well-established administrative
principles. 
Consequently, the quality of data, collected and used for decision-making process, is one of
the main challenges that public administration has to deal with.
Strictly connected to the first one, the second challenge is about the consideration of legal
compatibility  of  automated  individual  decision  making  with  principles  of  administrative  law.
Scholars should have the ability to re-address this new kind of activities into the legal framework,
using renewed and adapted old traditional categories to the concerns connected to the machine-
learning era615. 
However, artificial intelligence could strengthen regulatory public administrations to make
them  smarter  or  able  to  develop  data-driven  regulation,  so  that  they  permit  to  turn  good
administration principles into reality. Hence, scholars may be optimistic about artificial intelligence
used by public administrations, but, for doing that, the re-thinking of traditional guarantees must be
a priority.
Article 22nd GDPR expresses that data subject have the right not to be subject to a decision
based solely on automated processing, which produces legal effects concerning him/her or similarly
significantly affects him/her. Nevertheless, GDPR permits automated processing even if there are
some legal guarantees, such as the right to obtain human intervention, the right to be heard and the
right to contest the decision.
In a literal interpretation, GDPR offers some tools to allow public administrations to use
artificial intelligence legally, namely in a way that permits them to be transparent and to act reason-
giving in order to preserve due process principle. In particular, scholars could individualize ways to
standardize rights and procedure to concrete them, to well-defining ex ante duties on civil servants,
artificial  intelligence  and  programmers  and  to  make  the  functioning  of  artificial  intelligence
transparent.
In order to enhance public accountability and transparency, algorithmic impact assessments
may be introduced in the public-sector procedures to correct bias and to augment protection (for
example, discrimination could be prevented).
615    About the inadequacy of old categories to the digital era, see L. FLORIDI, Soft Ethics and the Governance of the
Digital, in  Philosophy & Technology, 31, I,  pp. 1-8 available at  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13347-
018-0303-9. 
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To sum up, in the second chapter of the article I try to highlight how artificial intelligence
redefines the way of delivering public services; in particular the rise of evidence-based methods
could  change  administrative  decision-making  process  (i.e. data  driven  regulation)  and,  more
generally, boundaries of public function.616
In the third chapter, I pay attention to challenges, which public bodies deal with, relating to
the introduction of artificial intelligence in an adjudicatory proceeding. The main challenge is about
automated decision-making, consequently I suggest a “human- on-the-loop” interpretation of article
22nd  GDPR in order to preserve administrative principle and to avoid discriminations. Moreover, I
prompt  an  extensive  interpretation  of  good  administration  principle  in  order  to  preserve
accountability.
Scholars  should  reflect  about  these  opportunities  and  challenges  both  to  overcome
oppositions against the introduction of artificial intelligence in the public sector and to shape a new
cultural framework based on renewed and adapted legal categories to the new digital context in
order to guarantee procedural and jurisdictional rights and freedoms’ protection.
2. A big amount of data is useful to public administration for at least two reasons: both the
better government of the city and the completeness of inquiry activities during the administrative
procedure.
My focus  will  be just  about  the  first  point  on  data  collected  for  issuing administrative
decisions: this new kind of regulation calls data-driven regulation.
In the ICT era, data science and big data allow public administrations to analyse, store and
process a large amounts of collected data in order to take administrative decisions, plans, strategies
and actions better fit to citizens’ needs617. It is important to underline that «the usefulness of big data
is followed by multiple levels of operational steps, such as acquisition, information extraction and
cleaning, data integration, modelling and analysis, and interpretation and deployment».618
The main revolution of this age is the possibility for public administrations to collect a large
amount  of  personal  data  on citizens  and daily commuters  or  tourists,  known as  administrative
data619 as well as urban data on city infrastructures and utilities (such as traffic, public transports
616    It  is  particularly  interesting  the  study  of  G.  CARULLO,  Gestione,  fruizione  e  diffusion  dei  dati
dell’amministrazione digitale e funzione amministrativa, Torino, 2018 in which he highlights how ICT could change the
way of public bodies’ working and the relationship with citizens. Especially, under the ICT push, participatory rights,
transparency, regulation and public service delivering, as I try to explain below in chapter 2.2. Another point of view is
also offered by  S.  CIVITARESE MATTEUCCI,  L.  TORCHIA (a  cura di),  La tecnificazione dell’amministrazione,  in  D.
SORACE, L. FERRARA, S. CIVITARESE MATTEUCCI, L. TORCHIA (a cura di), A 150 anni dall’unificazione amministrativa
italiana.  La tecnificazione, IV, Firenze, 2017 in which the relation between digitalization, public administration and
citizenship is deeply analyzed. 
617    About the possibility to re-design the delivery of services, see F. MALOMO and V. SENA,  Data intelligence for
local government? Assessing the benefits and barriers to use of big data in the public sector, in Policy and Internet, 9, I,
2017, pp. 7-27. 
618    S.  K.  PAL,  S.  K. MEHER,  A. SKOWRON,  Data science,  big data and granular mining,  editorial  in  Pattern
Recognition Letters 67, 2015, pp. 109–112.
619    Administrative data derive from the operation of administrative systems, as information collected for the purposes
of  registration,  transaction  and  record  keeping.  Frequently,  administrative  data  derived  from  a  wide  range  of
administrative systems such as those in education, healthcare, taxation, housing or vehicle licensing as well as registers
of births,  deaths, marriage and so on. See  R. CONNELLY,  C. J. PLAYFORD,  V. GAYLE AND C. DIBBEN,  The role of
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routes,  number  of  services  access).  It  represents  a  unique  opportunity  to  inform  policy  and
regulation for governing the growing problems of unsustainable urban expansions, inequality and
insecurity and other governance problems. In this way, the employment of data science, big data,
Internet  of  things,  algorithms and predictive analytics  are  useful  to  enhance  efficiency of  their
services and decision-making.620
2.1. Throughout the centuries, public bodies collected data about cities and their citizens in a
very large  datasets  based  on relatively limited samples,  in  a  specific  time and space,  with  the
restricted number of variables. They have been defined as small data, which are referred to data
captured with questionnaire surveys, case studies, city audits, interviews and focus groups as well
as national censuses621, and government records. Limited and out of time are characteristics of small
data because of inadequate tools for capturing and analysing them and, consequently, scholars and
researchers undertook to limit the collecting of data622.
Something changed when statistics demonstrated that casualty makes samples better623 and
when  new  powerful  information  and  communication  technologies  have  been  developing  and
employed: the data revolution era begins.624 In fact, not only the possibility to collect and store data,
but also the possibility to interconnect625 and mash data gathered by different institutions represent
administrative  data  in  the  big  data  revolution  in  social  science  research,  in  Social  Science  Research,  59,  2016,
particularly p. 3. 
620    Firstly, Michael Abramowicz, an American economist, argued that predictive analysis is useful in the market
regulation,  because  it  is  possible  to  predict  more  effectively  the  outcome on  cost-benefit,  see  M.  ABRAMOWICZ,
Information Markets, Administrative Decision-making, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, in University of Chicago
Law  Review,  71,  2004.  See  also  J.  MITTS,  Predictive  regulation,  June  27,  2014,  available  at  SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2411816 or  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411816,  who  considers  predictive  analysis  to
better individualize regulatory priorities. 
621    For  example,  Catholic  churches  developed  databases  on  birth  and  death  of  people  or  their  marriage;
municipalities used tools for processing census information.
622    Some authors consider it as an artificial line due to the inadequacy of tools; see V. MAYER-SCHONBERGER AND K.
CUKIER, Big data. Una rivoluzione che transformer il nostro modo di vivere e già minaccia la nostra libertà, Garzanti,
Milano, 2013, pp. 34 ss.  
623    This assumption is considered important to shift from causation rules to correlations one, that is the Big data’s
method of research.
624   A new paradigm arises, from one in which it was important to manage and control a little amount of data to
another in which it is important to manage and collect as data as possible; see M. FALCONE, Le potenzialità conoscitive
dei dati amministrativi nell’era della “rivoluzione dei dati”: il caso delle politiche di eradicazione dell’epatite C,  in
Istituzioni del federalismo, 2, 2017, p. 426.
625    At the beginning of 90’s when the digitalization of Italian public administration was at dawn, A. MASUCCI, L’atto
amministrativo  informatico.  Primi  lineamenti  di  una  ricostruzione,  Napoli,  1993,  p.  67  wrote  that  the  rationality
parameter, which informs administrative proceedings, impose «the necessity of connecting different public bodies in
order to share data storage everywhere».  See also, G. CARULLO,  Big Data e Pubblica Amministrazione nell’era delle
banche dati interconnesse, in Concorrenza e mercato, 23, 2015.
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one of the main revolution626 for public bodies in the digital era that allows public bodies to have a
granular627 and deeper knowledge about society.
Data refers to «units or morsels of information that as a whole form the bedrock of modern
policy decisions by government and nongovernment authorities», so data is the «starting point for
what we know»628, especially if data represents almost all pieces of information available.629 
Informational  and  communicational  technologies  provide  «a  deeper,  more  holistic  and
robust analysis»630 because of the indexical objects, which are embedded into almost all urban and
environmental spaces as well as able to communicate and share data among each other, in order to
obtain new derived data.
For example, throughout the city there are a network of cameras and transponders for capturing
data, which feed back to a central control hub, where analysts could monitor the flow of traffic and
could  modify  traffic  light  sequences  and  speed  limits  as  well  as  automatically  punish  traffic
violations.631
Basically, public and private actors create a citywide instrumented system that unify together
data streams from different agencies related to different public services into an hub service centre.632
Here, these data are visualized and monitored by analysts’ process, which could aggregate data over
time and huge volumes of administrative data. After these operations, these correlations appear on a
virtual operations platform that enables city officials to have significant information on different
flows throughout the city.
In this context, data science, big data and other technologies have an important role in the
enhancing  of  public  powers  because  they  facilitate  both  the  collection  of  data,  and  the
interconnection among several public administration databases633 and they allow public bodies to
convert  scattered  data  into  valuable  knowledge.  Therefore,  «governments  are  central  to  both
626   Just at the beginning of the 2000’s, some scholars considered that telematics was a good opportunity for public
administrations to innovate and became transparent and more efficient them and to make simpler relationship between
public bodies and citizens. See P. MERCATALI, Informatica applicate alla pubblica amministrazione, Simone, 2003.
627    As an example of some doctrine, R. KITCHIN, The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, in Geo Journal,
79,  2014,  p.  2;  S.  ALLWINKLE AND P.  CRUICKSHANK,  Creating  smarter  cities:  an overview,  in  Journal  of  Urban
Technology, 18, 2011, p. 2;  S. K. PAL, S. K. MEHER, A. SKOWRON, Data science, big data and granular mining, in
Journal  Pattern  Recognition  Letters,  67,  2015,  p.  110,  in  which  they  consider  how  granular  mining  permits  to
understand society meticulously.
628    S. RANCHORDAS AND A. KLOP,  Data-driven regulation and governance in smart cities, in  Handbook on Data
Science and Law, A. BERLEE, V. MAK, E. TJONG TJIN TAI, Edward Elgar, 2018, p. 8.
629    Some case studies conducted by ALBERT LASZLO-BARABASI permit to understand how a complex system works:
it is possible thanks to a huge amount of data collected and analysed useful to highlight something new and previously
unknowable. 
630 R. KITCHIN, The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, in Geo Journal, Springer, Dordrecht, 79, 2014, p. 7.
631    Many other examples are possible: smart tickets could trace passenger travel; transponders could measure vehicle
flow or empty spaces in a car park; SEE R. KITCHIN, The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, cit.; R. KITCHIN,
T. P. LAURIAULT AND G. MCARDLE,  Knowing and governing cities through urban indicators, city benchmarking and
real-time dashboards, in Regional Studies, Regional Science, 2015. 
632    One of the main specialized examples in Italy is Consorzio per il Sistema Informativo – CSI, which makes big
data analysis in Piedmont. 
633    This activity is technically called massive data integration.
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creating and managing knowledge»634 because they do not just produce knowledge, but also manage
it, especially with the aim of «serving the public interest».635
On the one hand, it is clear that ICT offer the possibility to see an objectively measured, well
defined as well as a real-time analysis of everyday life, infrastructures and needs, consequently
public bodies could use these significant information and try to regulate the services of the city and
to offer public services more focus-oriented.
On the other hand, predictive analytics permit to establish new correlations between pieces
of information: this method of knowledge overturns the traditional way, based on causation rules.
Thanks to Big data analytics, public bodies have the ability to find useful correlations within
datasets «without understanding causation»636; nonetheless, it is important that users have in mind
that there is «the risk of finding spurious correlations».637 Anyway, with improved statistical and
computational methods and the possibility of linking different datasets could begin a new process of
creating knowledge. In particular, the big data revolutions is based on patterns, which come from
linkage and connections about  pieces  of data,  which the ordinary human assessment  could not
understand.638
It is also useful to highlight that these data offer knowable and governable systems, which
show a rational, mechanical, linear and hierarchical ways of being.639 This knowledge is useful for
public bodies in order to act effectively and efficiently.  In fact, they could see «the world as it
actually  is  through  descriptive  statistics  and  visual  representations»640.  The  use  of  indicator,
634    C. FREDRIKSSON,  F.  MUBARAK,  M. TUOHIMAA AND M. ZHAN,  Big data in the public sector: a systematic
literature review, Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration, 21, III, 2017, p. 47.
635    H.  MAUREEN,  The value and challenges of  public sector information,  in  Cosmopolitan Civil  Societies: an
interdisciplinary approach, 5, III, 2013, p. 81.
636    J. SHAW,  Why big data is a big deal, in Harward Magazine, 116, IV, 2014, p. 33.  H. EKBIA, M. MATTIOLI, I.
KOUPER, G. ARAVE, A. GHAZINEJAD, T. BOWMAN, V. RATANDEEP SURI, A. TSOU, S. WEINGART, C. R. SUGIMOTO, Big
data, bigger dilemmas: a critical review, in Journal of the association for information science and technology, 66, VIII,
2015, p. 1529 ss. pay attention to the historical evolution about the epistemological paradigm and they argue that «the
distinction between causal relation and correlation is at the center of current debates…..a debate that has been going on
for decades,..between the advocates of data-driven science and those of theory-driven science». Also J. COWLS AND R.
SCHROEDER, Causation, correlation and Big Data in social science research, in Policy & Internet, 7, IV, 2015, pp. 447
ss. show debate about methodological change, from causation paradigm to correlation one and the consequence about
social science research.
637    J. SHAW, cit., p. 34.
638    In addition, M. FALCONE argues that big data analytics are deeply changing the way in which public bodies know;
see M. FALCONE, Le potenzialità conoscitive dei dati amministrativi nell’era della “rivoluzione dei dati” , cit., pp. 423
ss.  An interesting point  of view is offered by  H. EKBIA,  M. MATTIOLI,  I.  KOUPER,  G. ARAVE,  A. GHAZINEJAD,  T.
BOWMAN, V. RATANDEEP SURI, A. TSOU, S. WEINGART, C. R. SUGIMOTO, Big data, bigger dilemmas: a critical review,
cit., p. 1527; in this article they consider that, in a cognition-oriented perspective, the limited capacity of the human
mind to  make  sense  of  large  amounts  of  data  requires  «mediation  through  trans-disciplinary work,  technological
infrastructure, statistical analyses, and visualization techniques to enhance interpretability».
639    Study on network science, system complex and self-organization principle of system complex show that «our
action are led by rules, schemes and mechanisms», consequently there are reproducibility and predictive ability as in
hard science, A. LASLO-BARABASI, Lampi. La trama nascosta che guida la nostra vita, Torino, 2011, p. 13; see also R.
CAVALLO PERIN, Beyond the municipality: the city, its rights and its rites, in Italian Journal of Public Law, 2, 2013, pp.
307-315.
640    F. ASTLEITHNER AND A. HAMEDINGER,  The analysis of sustainability indicators as socially constructed policy
instruments: benefits and challenges of “interactive research”, in Local Environment, 8, VI, 2003, pp. 627-640.  
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benchmarking and dashboard, as well as big data analysis and internet of things permit to capture
the external reality in a fully and representative way. 
Some authors641 consider data as value-free and objective tools of knowing the city, based on
the assumption that data are independent of ideas and contexts. In this sense, data are simply able to
reflect the truth without subjective interpretation.
Indeed  other  authors642 are  critical  because  of  the  assumption  that  data  do  not  exist
independently of the ideas and of instruments used to generate process and analyse them. In fact,
data «is the product of choices and constraints, shaped by a system of thought, technical know-how,
public and political opinion, ethical considerations, the regulatory environment and funding and
resourcing…framed and used contextually to try and achieve certain aims and goals»643.
This latter interpretation is partially true and it is a relevant challenge that public bodies deal with.
In chapter 3, I develop this idea because I am critical about algorithmic functioning in relation with
legal categories and principles.
Anyway,  the outcome knowledge represents  the  substance  of  data-driven regulation and
thanks to this, public bodies could issue administrative decisions, plans, strategies and actions for
better managing infrastructures, for allocating urban resources and for nudging citizen, tourist and
daily commuters in order to govern the city in an efficient way.
Consequently, it seems proper to consider that the delivering of public services are changing
deeply, from a traditional way to an innovative one.
2.2.  In  the  Italian  administrative  system,  the  delivering  of  public  services  is  based  on
authoritative and unilateral decision, as a result of the application of rational rules.
In fact, the Italian Constitution establishes at the article 41 that public or private actors must deliver
public services according to the law that orders plans and controls, which actors must operate to
reach social objectives. 
It seems interesting to analyse how big data, artificial intelligence and predictive tools could
transform the way of planning and controlling public services.
First, it appears that the law is not the only way to better individualize citizens’ needs and,
secondly,  it  seems partly outdated to consider that only the law, as stated by the Constitutional
Court644, individualizes social purposes.
641    D. ROSENBERG, Data before the fact, in L. GITELMAN, Raw data is an oxymoron, Cambridge, MIT press, 2013,
pp. 15-40.
642    T.  P.  LAURIALT,  Data  infrastructures  and geographical  imaginations:  Mapping  data  access  discourses  in
Canada, Phd thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2012, available at https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/7eb756c8-
3ceb-4929-8220-3b20cf3242cb/etd_pdf/79f3425e913cc42aba9aa2b9094a9a53/lauriault-
datainfrastructuresandgeographicalimaginations.pdf; G. BOWKER AND L. STAR, Sorting things out: classification and its
consequences, Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1999; R. KITCHIN AND M. DODGE, Code/Space: software and everyday life,
Cambridge, MA, MIT press, 2011; R. KITCHIN, The data revolution: Big data, open data, data infrastructures and their
consequences,  Sage, London, 2014;  D.  RIBES AND S.J. JACKSON,  Data bite man: the work of sustaining long-term
study, in L. GITELMAN, Raw data is an oxymoron, Cambridge, MIT press, 2013, pp. 15-40.
643    R. KITCHIN, The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, cit., p. 9.
644    The reference is to judgement  n.  29/1957, in which the Italian Constitutional  Court  established that  social
purposes were individualize by «general and social needs, determined by the law». 
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These assumptions are overcome by the fact that citizens’ needs are individualized with
sensors  networks645 (such as  cameras,  light  monitors,  proximity sensors),  cloud computing  and
digital platforms. 
As mentioned above, with big data analytics public bodies could analyse behaviour of public
services’ users in real-time, predict their needs and respond to potential crisis in a very short-term.
It is noteworthy to consider that the use of predictive tools, artificial intelligence and big
data allow public bodies to overcome traditional procedures of law making based on «anecdote or
intuition or clientelist politics or periodic/partial evidence»646 and «paternalism»647.  
Hence,  these  tools  permit  to  shift  «from fact-free  policy to  rational  and evidence-based
rules»648; in particular, some case-studies649 demonstrate that informational technology architecture,
predictive analytics algorithm and data governance «define a mechanism for transforming from a
reactive  mode  of  operation  based on  gut  instincts  to  a  proactive  mode  of  operation  based  on
mathematical models»650. 
A proactive approach is based on tools, which are able primarily to identify indicators and to
collect insights (i.e. data); secondly, to integrate, unify and analyse data from different sources in
order  to develop a predictive,  flexible  model  useful  for  giving relevant  information.  The result
645    This expression refers to very small sensors or actuators embedded or placed on different structures to measure
specific predefined outputs, such as movement and speed of traffic jam, levels of light, temperature and air pollution.  
646    R. KITCHIN, The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, cit., p. 7.
647    F. DI PORTO AND N. RANGONE,  Cognitive-based regulation: new challenges for regulators?, in  Federalismi.
Rivista di dirittopubblicoitaliano, comunitario e comparato,  20, 2013, p. 7, in which Authors argue that nowadays
public bodies and other regulators could overcome the lack of knowledge about real people, consequently traditional
regulatory strategies based on paternalistic objectives seem to be enriched with crucial information in order to be more
focus-oriented.
648    S. RANCHORDAS AND A. KLOP,  Data-driven regulation and governance in smart cities, cit., p. 12. About the
rising of evidence-based law making, see R. VAN GESTEL AND J. DE POORTER,  Putting evidence-based law making to
the test:  judicial  review of  legislative rationality,  in  The theory and practice of  legislation,  4,  2016, pp.  155-185.
Authors analyse how this kind of law making process is rising with the consequence of shifting from codification of
existing customs to modification of human behaviour. In particular, the article’s core is how courts could judge about
legislation and regulation based on evidence fact  and scientific  researches.  It  might  consider  that  subsidiarity and
proportionality play an important role to conduct procedural review. Proportionality as external or internal limits to the
use of big data insights as well as cognitive ones in regulation.Proportionality must lead public bodies’ choices with or
without artificial intelligence; but, especially, in public sector the use of ICT should be less intrusive as possible because
of the leading of public interest. For wider examination see R. ANGELINI, Intelligenza artificiale e governance. Alcune
riflessioni di sistema,  in  F. PIZZETTI (a cura di), Intelligenza artificiale, protezione dei dati personali e regolazione,
Torino, 2018, pp. 298 ss. 
In other fields of knowledge, such as economics, scholars pay attention to the overcoming of paradigm of
rational choice in favour of cognitive-based one. This shifting is important because of the unprecedented attention to
real people, their behaviours and habits in order to analyse people’s decision-making mechanism. This awareness allows
public bodies (and other regulators in general) to make «better formulation of rules and the provision of more adequate
responses to the public interest they are intended to satisfy», see  F. DI PORTO AND N. RANGONE,  Cognitive-based
regulation: new challenges for regulators?, cit., p. 3  
649    An example of case study is conducted by an IBM RESEARCH TEAM on property vacancy problem in Syracuse
city, NY in 2011, as a result of IBM’s Smarter Cities Challenge project (www.smartercitieschallenge.org).
650    S. APPEL ET AL., Predictive analytics can facilitate proactive property vacancy in Technological forecasting and
social change, 89, 2014, p. 172.
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represents the «core information that can be used to make policy decisions, understand gaps and
monitor the status of actions and their impact on achieving the desired outcomes».651
Some  literature  show  that  the  activity  of  planning  public  services  is  shifting  from  a
predetermined  and  authoritative  activity  to  a  predictive  and  proactive  one:  in  this  way,  policy
development is based on a comprehensive view of the city and it allows public bodies to act more
focus-oriented  and  to  reshape  local  services.  In  the  digital  age,  nodality  is  one  of  the  four
properties652 that public bodies should have for pursuing effective objectives: that is, public bodies
should put themselves «in the middle of an information»653 because of their «social centrality and
visibility»654. Thanks to their own strategic position as nodal receivers public bodies could receive
and give information in order to better govern.655
Public bodies could have some benefits from this way of knowing needs, because they could
issue regulatory acts efficiently, forecast risks and prevent restrictions on competition656: they could
use information as object as well as tools of regulation. 
Evidence-based method is based on deeply knowledge of trends and on  ex ante  perspective,
hence on knowledge available at the time of regulation: evidence-based law-making process is not
new, but it is growing thanks to indicators suites, which capture real-time data and represent them
on dashboard graphs, which provide detailed information about city performance. Nowadays, this
kind of process has been pushed by powerful technologies657 and «the desire to reform the public
sector management of city services to make them more efficient, effective, transparent and value for
money, combined with citizen and funder demands»658.
3. In the public sector, the use of big data analysis, predictive analysis, internet of things and
so on, creates some concerns.
651    S. APPEL ET AL., Predictive analytics can facilitate proactive property vacancy, cit., p. 167.
652    C. HOOD AND H. MARGETTS in  The tools of government in the digital age,  Palgrave, 2007 individualize four
properties useful for a government in the digital era: nodality, authority, treasure and organization. Governments should
be in the middle of information and have a legal or official power, as well as money or anything which could be freely
exchanged and people with specific skills.
653    C. HOOD AND H. MARGETTS, cit., p. 5. 
654    C. HOOD AND H. MARGETTS, cit., p. 8.
655    In the network science discipline nodality is crucial property. In fact, every complex system (social, biological,
technological, trade, energy and so on) have a structure based on central node and link that connect each other. There
are some huge node, called hub, which gather many nodes; consequently, hub becomes important for the stability of the
system, see A. LASLO-BARABASI, Network science, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 247 ss.  
656    F. DI PORTO, L’informazione come “oggetto” e come “strumento” di regolazione (il caso dei mercati energetici
al dettaglio), in Riv. Trim. dir. Pubb., 4, 2011, pp. 975 ss., in which Author argues that information plays an important
role for regulators in the information and communication technologies era. Author examines the role of information in
the retail energy market and she takes into account the development of nudging and reflexive governance as two new
ways of government.     
657    It is necessary to underline that since the early 1990’s some indicators (single and composite) have been used to
capture details of city, but only with potential computational and mining process, data are very useful for public bodies.
658    R. KITCHIN, T. P. LAURIAULT AND G. MCARDLE, Knowing and governing cities through urban indicators, city
benchmarking and real-time dashboards, in Regional Studies, Regional Science, 2, I, 2015, p. 8.
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The first reason is that public bodies and the government have always been considered «of
the people, by the people».659 Connecting to this idea, information and communication technologies
should be subordinated to humans.
The second reason regards the respect of rule of law and the achievement of public interest.
Undoubtedly, public bodies benefit from the use of technological tools, but, as the public interest
requires, they must respect administrative principles.
Many concerns  about  artificial  intelligence  rise  from their  ubiquity660,  their  uncertainty
about legitimacy and their hiddenness and opacity of functioning, based on algorithms661.
Some studies662 demonstrate that algorithmic perception changes relating to the nature of
decision-maker  as  well  as  tasks,  which  they  do.  In  particular,  if  artificial  intelligence  does
mechanical tasks, people perceive them as equally fair and trustworthy because of their efficiency
and objectivity; indeed, if artificial intelligence does human tasks, people perceive them as less fair
and trustworthy because of their lack of intuition and their dehumanization.
Moreover, the use of artificial intelligence in the public sector poses some questions about
legitimacy663 because «algorithms structure and constrain the ways in which humans act»664; on one
hand,  legitimacy could  exist  in  an  instrumental  way that  is  the  better  goals  are  gained,  more
legitimate they are. On the other hand, procedure could legitimate tools if they allow recipients to
participate and contribute to decision-making. 
The classification above permits to argue that in our administrative system we should prefer
a mixed approach, in which public bodies preserve procedural rights as well as tools’ efficiency, as I
examine below in chapter 3.2.
In addition to these concerns, another one rises related to artificial intelligences’ opacity.
These  tools  rely on predictive  or  descriptive  algorithmic  processes  that  allow public  bodies  to
discover useful patterns and outcomes as well as to take decisions. Concerns rise to unknowable and
unpredictable  data-mining  proceedings  not  based  on  rationales  and  factors  understandable  by
humans.  This  complexity of  algorithmic  proceeding  creates  some problems  to  the  due  process
659    C. COGLIANESE AND D. LEHR, Regulating by robot: administrative decision-making in the machine-learning era,
Institute for law and economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School, research paper, 8, 2017, pp. 1152 ss.; they
report  a  phrase  of  Abraham  Lincoln’s  speech  at  Gettysburg  Address  on  19 th of  November  1863  available  at
http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm.
660    In this article, I do not argue about concerns on surveillance and privacy issues.
661    Here,  I  adopt  the algorithm definition elaborated by  T.  GILLESPIE,  The relevance of  algorithms,  in  Media
technologies: Essays on communication, materiality, and society, T. GILLESPIE,  P. J. BOCZKOWSKI and  K. A. FOOT
(eds.),  Cambridge Mass.,  MIT Press,  2014, pp. 167; also  N. DIAKOPOULOS,  Algorithmic Accountability,  in  Digital
Journalism, 3, III, 2015, 400.  
662    M. K. LEE,  Understanding perception of  algorithmic decisions:  fairness,  trust  and emotion in response to
algorithmic management, in Big data and society, 2018, pp. 1-16; M.K. LEE AND S. BAYKAL, Algorithmic mediation in
group decisions: fairness perceptions of algorithmically mediated vs discussion-based social division, in  CSCW '17
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing, pp.1035-
1048.
663    As J. DANAHER argue, legitimacy is the property that coercive public decision-making processes must possess if
they are to  rightfully exercise  the requisite  authority over  our  lives;  about  the regulation of  human behaviour by
algorithms, see L. LESSIG, Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, New York, 1999. 
664    J. DANAHER, The threat of algocracy: reality, resistance and accommodation, in Philosophy technology, Springer,
2016, p. 3 .
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principle  because  it  should  be  preferable  that  decision-making  procedures  are  rationally
comprehensible to those who are affected by them665. 
Two solutions could be suggested in order to preserve due process principle in automated-
decision making: to enhance participatory rights according to article 22nd of GDPR and to re-think
good administration principle, applicable ex ante.
3.1.  Artificial  intelligence  and  algorithms  are  useful  tools  for  making  public  bodies’
operational activities faster and more efficient.     
As  mentioned  above,  artificial  intelligence  works  with  the  use  of  machine  learning
techniques,  which  are  able  to  learn  on  their  own,  starting  from  training  and  testing  data.  In
particular, algorithms in machine learning change in response to their output and «automatically
improve with experience».666
Basically, all data collected in ways mentioned above, are used by developers to programme
machine  learning tools.  Consequently,  these  data  are  previously divided in  testing  and training
data667, then machine learning techniques use them in an unknowable way.
This  property  is  called  “black  box”668 and  create  some  ethical  and  legal  concerns  that
scholars have to face for preserving rights and freedoms as well as administrative law principles.
Especially, some concerns arise when artificial intelligence is used in an automated decision-
making.
Machine learning techniques base on profiling activities, consequently, it is likely the risk of
unjustly stereotyping individuals for their ethnicity, lifestyle or residence. Hence, the surveillance
on data quality without discrimination biases is important duty on public bodies in order to preserve
due process principles, and good administration.
In fact, algorithmic bias could contribute to the risk of stereotyping, especially if biases exist
in the «data used to train deep learning systems»669. For example, public bodies could deliver, or
665    In  this  sense,  also  P.  SAVONA,  Administrative  decision-making  after  the  Big  data  revolution,  in
www.federalismi.it,  19,  2018.  Similar  problems  could  arise  in  criminal  proceeding  law,  as  evidenced  by  S.
QUATTROCOLO and U. PAGALLO,  Fair trial and the Equality of arms in an algorithmic society, in Global Law. Legal
answers for concrete challenges, M. L. LABATE MANTOVANINI PADUA LIMA and J. GARCEZ GHIRARDI (eds.), 2018, pp.
261-274; S. QUATTROCOLO, Equità del processo penale e automated evidence alla luce della Convenzione Europea dei
Diritti  dell’Uomo,  in  Revista  Italo-Espanola  de  Derecho  Procesal,  2,  2018,  reperibile  al  sito
http://www.rivitsproc.eu/es/articulos/equita-del-processo-penale-e-automated-evidence-alla-luce-della-convenzione-
europea-dei-diritti-delluomo/.
666    T. MITCHELL, Machine learning, Indian edition, 1997, p. XV.
667    Supervised machine learning is based on each data labels with its correct reference so that the algorithm knows
when it is making errors. Unsupervised learning uses unlabeled data, so that performance criteria being optimized are
not measures of error rates, because the truth is not known, but measures of similarity between digits determined by the
algorithm to be the same. See C. COGLIANESE AND D. LEHR,  Regulating by robot: administrative decision-making in
the machine-learning era, Institute for law and economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School, research paper, 8,
2017, pp. 1158 ss.
668    F.  P ASQUALE,  The black  box  society.  The  secret  algorithms that  control  money and information,  Harvard
University Press, 2015, p. 3 in which the Author highlights that it is a useful metaphor that represents «a system whose
workings are mysterious; we can observe its inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other».
669    GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE,  Artificial  intelligence: opportunities and implications for the future of
decision making, 2016, p. 14.
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not, some public services or other benefits because of historical data on individuals, that could be
discriminatory and reflect, consciously or unconsciously, biases.
3.2.  In  order  to  avoid  discrimination  on  public  decisions,  article  22nd of  General  Data
Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) provides for some rights to recipients670 and it bans all
decisions that are adopted solely on automated processing, because of concerns mentioned above. 
This  article  should  require  that  public  bodies  must  fully  respect  rights,  such as  to  give
specific information to data subjects, to guarantee the right to obtain human intervention, to express
one’s own point of view, to give a full reason giving and the possibility to challenge the decision.
In  my  view,  this  article  provides  a  human-on-the-loop671 perspective,  that  is,  artificial
intelligence could work autonomously, but the human oversight and override are guaranteed. In this
case, civil servants could decide whether follow or not artificial intelligence’s outcome672.
In the digital era, new duties for public bodies rise673: on the one hand, they should control
how developers produce algorithms.  Indeed,  algorithms are value-laden674 and,  in  spite  of their
efficiency, they could reproduce discrimination biases.675 For these reasons, public bodies should
extend own control ex ante, especially during the programming phase. 
In order to preserve good administration and impartiality, public bodies have to control how
programmers  and  engineers  programme  algorithms  as  well  as  have  to  give  specific  duties  to
them676; for example, public bodies could cooperate with engineers to provide guidelines on legal
framework and technological measures for compliance (i.e. legal by design).
I argue that the difference between private and public sector must be preserved: artificial
intelligence, which is programmed for public bodies activities will be very different in scope and in
way in which rights are protected.677 Public bodies could provide compliance rules and principles to
programmers in order to build artificial intelligence in line with administrative principles.
670    For a critical perspective about right to explanation (articles 13-15), see  S. WACHTER,  B. MITTELSTADT, L.
FLORIDI,  Why a right to explanation of automated decision-making does not exist in the General Data Protection
Regulation,  in  International  Data  Privacy  Law,  7,  II,  2017,  pp.  76-99, available  at:
https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article/7/2/76/3860948 
671    The European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil 
Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103INL) relating to robotic weapon’s debate suggests three kind of human engagement: 
human-in-the-loop, in which robotics could act only under human commands; human-on-the-loop explained above and 
human-out-of-the-loop, in which robots could act autonomously without any human controls. This Resolution is 
available at 
              http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-
0051+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
672    Recently, Italian Administrative Courts have promoted the idea that artificial intelligence should be used as tools,
see Tar Lazio, sez. III bis, 4 April 2017, n. 4195; Tar Puglia, Bari, sez. I, 27 June 2016, nn. 806 and 807.
673    See  E.  CARLONI,  Tendenze  recenti  e  nuovi  principi  della  digitalizzazione  pubblica,  in  Giornale di  Diritto
Amministrativo, 2, 2015, p. 4.
674    K. E. MARTIN, Ethical implications and accountability of algorithms, in Journal of business ethics, May 2018, p.
2. The author conceptualize that «algorithms create moral consequences, reinforce or undercut ethical principles, and
enable or diminish stakeholder rights and dignity». 
675    About this concern and its consequence, see R. BINNS, Algorithmic accountability and public reason, in Philos.
Technol., 2017, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5. 
676     In the same sense, see G. PESCE,  Digital first.  Amministrazione digitale: genesi, sviluppi, prospettive, Napoli,
2018, p. 235.
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Building technical legal standards could be a first step to allow public bodies or judiciary
courts  to  optimize  external  oversight.  Therefore,  it  is  valuable  that  the  internal  and  external
oversight can be developed together, in order to guarantee, «the former provides all the relevant
information  to  the  latter  to  evaluate  the  adopted  decision».678 Therefore,  this  proposal  might
empower rights of article 22nd GDPR, whose efficacy could be at risk without added technical legal
standards.
The  extension  of  good  administration  principle  to  the  preliminary  phase  of  artificial
intelligence programming responds to  the necessity to  «balance the loss in  comprehension and
participation against the potential gains in outcomes and procedural fairness»679. At the same time,
also  impartiality  could  be  respected:  algorithmic  construction  is  a  «translation  process»680 so
automated systems could replicate discrimination biases of humans.
Consequently,  public  bodies  should  prepare  an  impact  assessment681 to  verify  whether
artificial intelligence works legally, as well as fairly. It could be a useful way to verify ex post the
reasonableness and proportionality of administrative act. In addition to this proposal, public bodies
could promote the use of distributed ledger technology (blockchain) in order to track every stage of
algorithmic functioning.682
On the one hand, public bodies must control the programming of artificial intelligence683, in
order  to preserve the good administration and impartiality principle.  On the other  hand,  public
bodies have to guarantee rights to participation and opposition, according to article 22nd GDPR. In
this way, artificial intelligence could be used without concerns and they could be integrated in the
existing constitutional and administrative system. 
4. Public power and the content of some principles are changing. The use of ICT in public
sector  transforms  the  public  power  because  of  new  tools,  which  allow  public  bodies  to  do
something more.  For example,  the use of ICT throughout the city permits  local  government to
reallocate financial resources in an efficiently way, more respectful of people’s needs: as mentioned
above, evidence-based government leads the planning of public services, indeed of traditional and
authoritative way. 
677    GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE,  Artificial  intelligence: opportunities and implications for the future of
decision making, 2016, p. 14 is really clear about the necessity of defining ex ante public benefit.
678    A. ROIG, Safeguards for the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing (article 22
GDPR), in European Journal of Law and Technology, 8, III, 2017, p. 9.
679    J. DANAHER, The threat of algocracy: reality, resistance and accommodation, cit., p. 13
680    R. KITCHIN,  Thinking critically about researching algorithms, in  Information, Communication & Society, 20,
2017, p. 22.
681    See some guidelines Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability, by
D.  REISMAN,  J.  SCHULTZ,  K.  CRAWFORD,  M.  WHITTAKER,  April  2018,  available  at
https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf.  In  which authors  give  rules  for  public  bodies  in  order  to  use  artificial
intelligence legally as possible.
682    GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE,  Artificial  intelligence: opportunities and implications for the future of
decision making, 2016, p.16.
683    F. PIZZETTI,  La protezione dei dati personali e la sfida dell’Intelligenza Artificiale,  in  F. PIZZETTI (a cura di),
Intelligenza artificiale, protezione dei dati personali e regolazione, Torino, 2018, pp. 124 ss. Author argues that many
rights are involved, such as right not to be discriminated, right to self-determination, consequently public bodies control
that programmers respect ethic principles.
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At the same time, the use of ICT in the administrative proceedings, such as the adjudicatory
one, could rise some concerns about the safeguards of due process principle. In fact, the article 22 nd
GDPR provides some rights to recipients affected by automated decision-making, but they could be
ineffective  alone.  For  these  reasons,  in  the  ICT era,  principles  that  lead  public  administration
activity could be re-thought. 
In  particular,  I  suggest  that  public  bodies  could  anticipate  good  administration  and
impartiality principle at the preliminary stage of artificial intelligence programming. Therefore, they
could preserve legality in the functioning because of their own technical standardization. Thanks to
this effort, not only recipients could understand how artificial intelligence works, but also judicial
review could judge consciously. 
At the same time, public bodies could prepare an impact assessment about the functioning
of artificial  intelligence, in order to verify  ex post whether these tools could be used legally.  It
should be important that scholars identify some guarantees in order to correctly introduce artificial
intelligences’ outcome in the proceedings and to rethink categories of public purposes, suitability
and proportionality of decisions.
Scholars  have  to  lead  the  transformation  of  public  administration  in  a  deep  and  wide
perspective, in accord to suggestion of legislators and Italian Digital Agency. In fact, at national
level, Code of Digital Administration is the main source of law, which allow public bodies to make
transition toward data revolution. For example, datasets are considered of national interest684, some
crucial national registers685 are unified at national level and Italian Digital Agency conducts many
efforts686, in order to standardize687 and rationalise informational public heritage.
These legislative tools could support public bodies to correctly deal with challenges and
opportunities provided with information and communication technologies and give opportunities to
scholars to comprehend the evolution of administrative law in the digital era.
ISABELLA ALBERTI
684    D.lgs  december 30th 2010, n. 235 modified article 60th of Code of Digital Administration in order to make
datasets of national interest wider.
685    National  Registry of  the Resident  Population  ( Anagrafe  Nazionale della  Popolazione  Residente  –  ANPR),
National  Registry  of  territorial  data  (Repertorio  Nazionale  dei  dati  territoriali),  National  Database  of  Public
Procurement (Banca Dati Nazionale dei Contratti Pubblici - BDNCP) 
686    For example it tries to make standardize and interoperable public datacenter; it gives some guidelines such as
Libro Bianco sull’Intelligenza Artificiale al servizio del Cittadino. France makes a similar attempt with Report Donner
un sens à l’intelligence artificielle. Pour unestratégienationale et européenne, 2018.
687    Nowadays, informatics coordination principle from article 117, 2 nd  paragraph, letter r) seems to prevail on the
public administration autonomy principle, see  F. CARDARELLI,  Amministrazione digitale, trasparenza e principio di
legalità, in Diritto dell’Informazione e dell’Informatica, 2, 2015, paragraph 4 in which he describes the legal and case
law framework about this principle. See also, A. G. OROFINO, L’esternazione informatica degli atti amministrativi, in S.
CIVITARESE MATTEUCCI, L. TORCHIA (a cura di), La tecnificazione dell’amministrazione, in D. SORACE, L. FERRARA, S.
CIVITARESE MATTEUCCI,  L.  TORCHIA (a  cura  di),  A  150  anni  dall’unificazione  amministrativa  italiana.  La
tecnificazione, IV, Firenze, 2017, p. 195.
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Government discretion in digitizing public administration – the
Brazilian perspective*
SUMMARY:  1.  Introduction.  –  2.  Time to  change –  public  administration  reform in  Brazil.  2.1.
Transparency.  –  3.  E-Government  in  Brazil.  3.1.  E-Fiscal.  3.2.  E-Banking.  3.3.  E-Voting.  –  4.
Brazilian health system. 4.1. E-SUS. 4.2. Deficiencies of the Brazilian Healthcare System. 4.3. E-
health card. 4.4. Medical E-files. 4.5. Civil engagement. 4.6. The protection of privacy. – 5. Chaos
in the public healthcare system means increased litigation. – 6. Conclusion. 
1.  Since 2009, when the United States issued its Open Government Directive, improving
public access to federal administration information, the world has seen a wave of transformation
towards  an  open  government  philosophy,  favoring  transparency,  efficiency,  accountability,  and
public participation. In the sequence, the US issued the  ‘Digital Accountability and Transparency
Act of  201’688,  and,  more recently,  the ‘Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act  of
2017’689 prompting a worldwide proliferation of regulations that characterize a global trend towards
Electronic Government.
These new winds quickly reached the Southern Hemisphere, bringing hope for improvement
through  an  administration  system  less  susceptible  to  fraud  and  corruption.  Along  with  other
American  countries,  Brazil  has  produced an  incredible  amount  of  legislation  providing for  the
digitization of public proceedings and administrative procedures, enabling its entrance into the new
digital era. However, some problems still have to be addressed.
First, one ought to consider whether this transition to a digitalized public administration is
occurring  horizontally  or  resulting  in  some  sector  being  more  favoredthan  others,  showing  a
government priority for strategic areas – such as the economic area –, causing the social area to lag
way back. In fact, both the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service and the Brazilian Central Bank have
long implemented the digitized process and completely integrated it within the realm of the ‘Smart
Government’. 
Nonetheless,  in  the  public  healthcare sector  –  which is  vital  to  materialize  fundamental
rights – the information is either not digitized, or when it is, it is done so poorly that it fails to help
improve transparency. It is almost impossible for an ordinary citizen to obtain information on his or
her own treatment, or else to understand why disclosure takes so long – or the reasons for it not to
bedisclosed at all. Although countless data portals are available, there is no input of relevant data or
else the available data outdated or inaccurate. 
Secondly, the deficiency in digitizing data favors inefficiency and inequality. Considering
that public healthcare in Brazil is subject to constitutional principles of equality, due process and
universality  –  meaning  that  everyone  is  equally  entitled  to  receive  health  assistance  from the
government through a regular administrative proceeding, with no preferences or privileges afforded
to anyone – we wish to examine whether these constitutional mandates are actually being abided
and  whether  the  lack  of  transparency  in  the  public  healthcare  system  causes  a  high  level  of
688 Available  from:  <https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ101/PLAW-113publ101.pdf>.  Accessed  on   Aug  26
2018.
689 Available from: ˂https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/577˃. Accessed on Aug 26 2018.
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dissatisfaction among users, forcing them to go to court seeking clarification as to their standing in
the waiting lists  for  surgery,  hospital  entry,  and provision of medicine by means of injunctions
demanding expedited treatment.
In fact, within the enormous number of new lawsuits filed every year in Brazil, a major part
concerns the deficiencies of public health services and the disrespect of fundamental rights. To deal
with this phenomenon of judicialization, the new Code of Civil Procedure690 mandates that all legal
case records are to be digitized. Since 2015, much computer software has been developed to allow
faster case resolution, improving the administration of justice. Nonetheless, one ought to enquire
whether all effortsdesigned for judiciary digitization will have a positive effect in the improvement
of the health system itself. 
The big challenge that the digitized era imposes is the protection of privacy. One ought to
consider whether the Brazilian government is taking appropriate action to protect privacy in all
digitized data – which includes personal data –, especially under the due process law clause, which
requires  proper  notification  of  parties  involved.  In  fact,  this  massive  amount  of  digitized  data
produced by the public health system and the judiciary system is now open to the public at large and
is available for research and reuse anywhere in the world. It is thus important to develop measures
to secure this BIG DATA as it is not bound by border or jurisdiction constraints.
Lastly, considering that Brazil has had a broad and successful experience with electronic
elections for the executive and legislative branches of power since 1996 and that this expertise
could  easily  be used  to  engage the  civil  society in  the  decision-making process,  one ought  to
examine whether  the  Brazilian government  intends to  enable democratic  participation  in  social
issues by giving due notice on forthcoming policies and the opportunity for comments.
In  conclusion,  we  intend  to  demonstrate  that  Brazil  has  all  the  means  necessary  to  be
integrated  as  an  e-Government  through  digitization  and  integration  of  all  areas  in  public
administration. Fundamental constitutional principles on the rule of law and public interest urge the
implementation of the healthcare system along with equality, universality and due process, devoid
of any discretionary policies aiming only at specific areas – such as taxation and financing –, as has
been the case during past decades. 
The  real  issue  will  be  to  create  institutional  constraints  and  to  ensure  that  political
decisionsupon implementing a high-quality e-healthcare system will apply efficiency, transparency
and accountability principles to public action, thus meeting the expectations of Brazilian society.
2. It is common knowledge that Brazil is a huge country, it is the world’s 5 th largest country
and has an estimated population of more than 206,1 million, an approved annual budget of R$ 3,5
trillion in 2018691, and GDP [PPP] of $ 3,1 trillion reais. Considered the world’s largest rain forest,
Brazil is extremely rich in many different natural resources692. Although it occupies the 8th position
690*Paper prepared for presentation at the University of Milano Seminar“Big Data and Law: New challenges Beyond
Protection”, in October 2018.
Law 13,015 of July, 21, 2014. New Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure,  Articles 193 through 199. Available
from: ˂http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13105.htm˃. Accessed on  Aug 26, 2018.
691Available from: ˂http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2017-12/orcamento-de-2018-e-aprovado-com-
previsao-de-gastos-de-r-357-trilhoes˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
692Available from: ˂https://www.heritage.org/index/country/brazil˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
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among the 10th  largest economies in the world and a USD 1.8 economy693,  there is great social
inequality and poverty among its population694. 
In addition, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 expressly sets forth the Brazilian state’s goals,
namely: to build a free, just and equal society. This constitutes a major challenge as it requires that
the government make social rights fully available for its population – which includes education,
health,  food,  work,  housing,  leisure,  security,  social  security,  protection  of  motherhood  and
childhood, and assistance to the destitute695, establishing the grounds for a welfare State, a social
state, as defined by the Brazilian Supreme Court696. 
Such challenge and huge numbers called fora reform in the administrative branch. In 1996,
the  Brazilian  government  launched  a  Reform Plan697,  starting  with  the  19th amendment  to  the
Constitution – which imbedded the principle of efficiency into the administration principles listed in
article 37698, all with a view to building astrong, social and democratic state. The Reform Plan was
inspired by the New Public Management ideas, based on the principle that «governments could be
managed like an enterprise”699, so as to modernize and improve Brazilian public administration. 
The global financial and economic crises of 2008, however, marked the end, or at least the
reinvention of the NPM, with profound changes to  «the establishment of a Smarter State that is
fiscally sustainable»700with an emphasis on fostering efficiency, accountability, and transparency in
government action, as well as the introduction of anticorruption practices, through investments in
modern technological tools, such as Information Technology [IT].
693 Available  from:  ˂https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/˃.  Accessed  on
Aug 26, 2018.
694According  to  IBGE,  50  million  Brazilian  citizens  live  below  the  poverty  line.  Available  from:
<http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2017-12/ibge-brasil-tem-14-de-sua-populacao-vivendo-na-linha-de-
pobreza>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
695 BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988. Article 6.  “Education, health, food, work, 
housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the destitute are 
social rights, as set forth by this Constitution.” Available from:  
˂http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf˃
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
696 BRAZIL. Supreme Court (Ag. Reg. no RE) 1.101.106/DF.  Reporter: Justice Celso de Mello. Brasília, August 9,
2018
697 Available from: ˂http://www.bresserpereira.org.br/rgp.asp˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
698BRAZIL, Federal Constitution, 1988. Article 37. “The governmental entities and entities owned by the Government 
in any of the powers of the Union, the states, the Federal District and the Municipalities shall obey the principles of 
lawfulness, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency.” Available from: 
˂http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf˃
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
699 G. Napolitano, Looking for a smarter government (and administrative law) in the age of uncertaint, in S. Rose-
Ackerman, P. Lindseth, B. Emerson, Comparative Administrative Law, Cheltenham, 2017, II ed., p. 358.
700 Ibidem, 2017, p. 359.
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Again, following the world openness trend inspired by the United States’ Open Government
Directive of 2009, Brazil launched the Transparency Act701 – which provides on the access to public
information and constitutes the framework for Brazilian E-government policies702.
2.1.  One of the first requirements for a modern ‘Smart State’ is to ensure transparency and
openness in governmental activities. It is not easy to define transparency, however, as its concept is
«expanding, becoming larger and more diffuse by incorporating more ideas into it»703. It is true that
«Transparency limits corruption, protects against opportunistic behavior by officials and encourages
public participation»704.
Although  many  scholars  define  transparency  simply  as  access  to  information,  it  surely
encompasses much more than that.
«First, transparency is particularly about lowering the cost of physical access to information
in real-time. «Transparency” or «access” does not really exist if obtaining and securing information
is costly in either time or effort […]
Second, «transparency» has a computational or complexity dimension»705
In order to be transparent, a government has to make information available at a low cost and
in real time, which means online, in the Internet. The burden is now on the government to open
data, in order to make information ready for public access. Also, it is not only about the data, but the
quality, the complexity of the data made available – that is, data which will enable people to find the
right answers to the questions asked.  
On the other hand, transparency encourages public participation with a view «to improving
the  democratic  process  and  more  informed  agency  deliberation”706.  Although  transparency
provisions do not define the standards of said participation [but, of course, the more direct it is, the
better], they include the participation of individuals and non-governmental groups - «the groups that
will be affected by the administrative decisions»707.
701 BRASIL. Law 12,527 of November 18, 2011. This law shall govern the access to information afforded by item 
XXXIII of Art. 5, item II of Paragraph Three of Art. 37, and Paragraph 2 of Art. 216 of the Federal Constitution; 
amends Law No. 8,112 of December 11, 1990; revokes Law No. 11,111 of May 5, 2005, as well as the provisions on 
Law No. 8,159 of January 8, 1991; and sets forth other actions that ought to be taken.Available from: 
˂http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2011/lei/l12527.htm˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
702 F. S. O. S. Bonelli, Administração pública contemporânea e Informática: o surgimento, os princípios 
administrativos envolvidos e os limites ao avanço do Governo Eletrônico no Brasil (e-Gov), in Revista de Direito 
Administrativo contemporâneo: ReDAC, 2014, II 2, 9, jun. 2014, p. 13.
703 R. G. Vaughn, Transparency in the Administration of Laws: The Relationship between Differing Justification for 
Transparency and Differing Views of Administrative Law. American University International law review, v. 26, Issue 4, 
Article 3.  p. 969, 2011 - Provided by Harvard Law School Library. Available from:  
˂http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=auilr˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 
2018.
704 A. Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State. 51 Houston Law Review, 2013, p. 386. Provided by Harvard
Law School Library. Available from:  ˂http://www.houstonlawreview.org/2013/12/06/512-transparency-in-the-
administrative-state/˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
705 Ibidem, 2013, p. 387.
706 Ibidem, 2013, p. 389.
707 R. G. Vaughn, op. cit., 2011, p.981.
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Despite different doctrinal opinions, Bonelli argues that transparency has been incorporated
into the Brazilian Constitution as a principle – when it refers to publicity and access to information
– in article 5, XXXIII708, as well as in article 37 and II, and paragraphs 2 and 3 of art. 216709, which
provides on  the access to information concerning government actions710.  The Brazilian Supreme
Court  has  pointed  in  the  same  direction,  stating  that  publicity  is  a  «precept  that  recommends
governmental transparent action»711;  and transparency is  a  more specific aspect of the publicity
principle712,  which renders it  more concrete and gives the citizen the possibility to be aware of
governmental action. 
Transparency demanded  openness  of  governmental  information.  Starting  with  the  federal
statute  that  governs  public  management  responsibility713,  the  federal  government  decided  to
implement transparency by issuing several acts whichaddressedits duty to disclose information on
public  finances  [see the  Transparency Federal  Act714].  The  Supreme Court,  however,  ruled  that
708 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution, 1988.  Art. 5. XXXIII – All individuals are entitled to obtain from public authorities
any information of private interest to said individuals, or else of collective or general interest, and such information 
shall be disclosed within the timeframe provided by law, subject to liability penalties applicable to authorities 
addressed, except where such information is classified, as required by security concerns applying to society or the State.
Available from:  
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
709 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution, 1988.  Art. 216. […] Paragraph Two. Public administration authorities shall manage
government documents and afford consultation thereof to all who need it in the manner provided by law. Available 
from:  
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
710 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution 1988.  Art. 37. All direct or indirect public administration authorities of any of the 
branches of power of the Union, the states, the Federal District and municipalities shall abide by the principles of 
legality, impersonality, morality, publicity and efficiency and, further, by the following: […] Paragraph Three.  The law 
shall provide as to the manner of user participation in direct or indirect public administration and shall specifically 
regulate: […] II – User access to administrative records and information on government action, due observance to be 
given to the provisions of art. 5, X and XXXIII. (our emphasis) Available from:  
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
711 BRAZIL. Supreme Court. Writ of Mandamus (MS) No. 33,340/FD. Brasilia, May 26, 2015.
712 BRAZIL. Supreme Court. Direct Unconstitutionality Action (ADI) No. 2,444/RS. Brasilia, November 6, 2014.
713 BRASIL. Complementary Law No. 131 of May 27, 2009. Available from: 
˂http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/LCP/Lcp131.htm˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
714 BRASIL. Law 12,527 of November 18, 2011.  Available from: ˂http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-
2014/2011/lei/l12527.htm˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
168
III.4
ensuing regulation proved to be  «insufficient to deal with the problem»715. Concrete action and a
change of mentality were needed. 
Transparency is crucial in contemporary administrative governmentin a democratic society,
especially when most of the population have access to Internet716 and this calls for more interaction
with government action717. 
It is important to mention that since 2004 the Federal Government has created a  Portal da
Transparência718 that was totally renovated in 2018 – a cyberspace that should be able to «explain
governmental  action»719,  aiming  the  provide  tools  for  the  citizen  to  know  and  to  question
government activities, acting as a state controller, enabling social control of public expenditure and
public management [which should be guided by legality and ethics, mindful of public interest]720.
The Portal da Transparência is just the beginning. Nonetheless, recent studies show that the
portal is deficient because transparency is only more accurate when it relates to the «organizational
structure»  and the  «programs  and  actions»  of  public  institutions  [and  this  includes  the  easiest
information  to  deliver];  nonetheless,  when  it  gets  to  financial  information,  such  as  «public
expenses» and «contracts», disclosures are neither accurate nor clear. The conclusion is that «it is
clear  that  transparency  is  not  among  the  priorities  for  [Information]  law  implementation»721.
Weknow well  that,  as  Vaugahn warned,  «all  governments  an most  organizations  exercise some
discretion in determining what will be known and what will be kept in secret»722.
3.  As  «[…]  Governments  around  the  world  have  realized  the  great  potential  of  using
Information and Communication Technologies [ICTs] to create so called «smart societies for social
and economic development»723, in 2012, Brazil gave the first steps towards the regulation of public
715BRAZIL. Supreme Court. Extraordinary Appeal (RE) No. 865,401/MG. Brasilia, August 14, 2015. SUMMARY:
Constitutional Law. Fundamental  right  to access information of collective or general interest. Extraordinary appeal
grounded on infringement of art. 5, item XXXIII of the Federal Constitution. Application filed by a city council member
as city representative and as citizen, directly with the chief of the Executive Branch, with a view to securing information
and documents concerning municipal management. Application denied. Invocation of the fundamental right to access
information, calling for compliance with the duty to ensure transparency by public authorities, as well as principles
governing the republic and publicity.  Thesis of municipality grounded on undue interference, the separation of the
branches of  power and the difference between congressional prerogatives  and congressmen prerogatives.   General
repercussion  not  acknowledged.  Available  from:  ˂http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/downloadPeca.asp?
id=15338868743&ext=.pdf˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
716 According to IBGE, a Brazilian statistical data institute, 48,1 million households have access to internet, a figure 
that represents 69.3% of all households in Brazil. Available from: <https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-
noticias/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/20073-pnad-continua-tic-2016-94-2-das-pessoas-que-utilizaram-a-internet-o-
fizeram-para-trocar-mensagens.html>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
717 F. S. O. S. Bonelli, op. cit., 2014, p. 24-25. Author´s translation
718 Available from: <http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
719 R. G. Vaughn, op. cit., 2011, p. 971.
720 M.  M.  Ribeiro,  C.  O.  de  A.  Freitas,  Análise  crítica  do  e-government  como  instrumento  de  eficiência  da
arrecadação tributária, in Revista de Direito Empresarial, 2012, p. 10. 
721 T. C. Marinho, Saúde Transparente: uma análise do cumprimento da Lei de Acesso à Informação nas instituições
públicas federais de saúde, 2017, p. 85.  Available from:  <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/19480>.
Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.)
722 Ibidem, 2017, p. 971.
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record digitalization724.  In 2000725,  the Brazilian government created a special  group to develop
electronic policies of interaction in all branches and levels of government administration, aiming at
providing the universalization of services, accessible government, and advanced infrastructure. 
After the world crises of 2008, the Brazilian federal government finally launched a digital
government policy, aiming to provide for more administrative efficiency, access, and transparency,
enabling the proximity of the society with the public services that are available726.
The  benefits  of  e-government  by  use  of  IT  and  technology  are  enormous  as  the
latterincreasespopular participation, universalizes public services, and cuts costs727 by focusing on
basic principles such as equal access to social rights, openness and transparency, by favoring  co-
working, and by prioritizing digital services, security and privacy, social participation and control
[as well as the government as a platform for innovation].
The power to  define strategic  goals for E-government  [Estratégia de Governança Digital
– EGD] was delegated to regulatory bodies of the Executive branch through the creation of the
Governmental  Digital Portal728, which aims at  improving government action towards citizens and
gathering information on federal public policy in such a way as to facilitate public participation
devoid of barriers.
As we will demonstrate below, digitalization policies have not been uniform for all areas.
Some areas that are considered more strategic and vital - such as taxation and fiscal – have been
totally integrated into the digital era. Nonetheless, social areas are lagging far behind and remain on
their implementation stage.
3.1.  In 1964, the Fiscal Federal Department created the first Federal Tax Database729 with a
view to regulating and implementing fiscal  policies and rendering all  tax information in  Brazil
uniform. In 1968, the first  electronic tax returns were filled and all  Brazilian citizens,  whether
taxpayers or not were assigned both a taxpayer number [CPF – Cadastro Pessoa Física] and a
taxpayer identification card [CIC]. Since then, the system has seen much improvement730. 
723 M. I. Manda, J. Backhouse, Towards a “Smart Society” Through a Connected and Smart Citizenry in South Africa:
A Review of  the National  Broadband Strategic and Policy,  in H.  J.  Scholl,  O.  G. M. Janssen,  B.  K.  Lindgren,  I.
Lindgren, P. P. E. Tambouris, M. A. W. T. Janowski, D. S. Soares. LENCC – Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9820 -
Eletronic  Government  –  15th  IFIP-WG  8.5  International  Conference,  EGOV 2016, p.228,  Guimaraes,  Portugal,
September 5-8, 2016 Proceedings. Switzerland, 2016- Provided by Harvard Law School Library.
724Available from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12682.htm>.Accessed on Aug 26, 
2018.
725Available from: <https://www.governodigital.gov.br/EGD/historico-1/historico>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
726Available form: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/d8638.htm>. Accessed on Aug 
26, 2018.
727 M. M. Ribeiro, C. O. de A. Freitas, op. cit., 2012, p. 3.
728Available from: <https://www.governodigital.gov.br/EGD>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
729 BRAZIL. Federal Law nº. 4,516 of December 1st, 1964. This law establishes the Federal Data Processing Service, 
an entity linked to the Brazilian Finance Ministry. Available from: 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L4516.htm>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
730Available from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del0401.htm  ˃ 
 ˂ http://idg.receita.fazenda.gov.br/sobre/institucional/memoria/imposto-de-renda/historia/1968-a-1981-comeca-a-era-da-
secretaria-da-receita-federal>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
170
III.4
In 1997, the government created and implemented  Receitanet, a web portal for individual
taxpayers that afforded the electronic tax return filing option [no hard copy needed] to all. In 2013,
the  Brazilian  Revenue  Serviceprocessedmore  than  25,571,747  e-tax  returns,  and  in  2017,  the
number of taxpayers rose to 29,269,987731 and in less than three months 10% of all tax returns had
already been processed, and taxpayers started to receive whatever tax refunds they were entitled to.
All this efficiency is also seen in all levels of government where e-filingis afforded to all other
kinds of taxes - including state and local taxes, all of them completely integrated into sophisticated
software. As Ribeiro recalls, «if there is an area where e-government is really advanced, that area is
tax administration» because it is «vital for the State»732. Information cross-examination is swifter
and more accurate,  and control is made easier through the use of electronic book-keeping. The
entire  fiscal  obligation  can  be  fulfilled  and controlled  through the  Internet,  and this  boots  tax
revenue733. 
3.2.  Due to the inflation that plagued Brazil in the 80’s – causing interest rates to rise to as
high as 84% a month –, all efforts were focused on controlling the inflation rate [which reached
more than a whopping 707.4 per cent in 1985-9 period]734. To face the challenges of its production
and  cope with financial market demands, the  Brazilian banking and financial system entered the
digital era in the mid 90’, offering new digital services that conformed to federal regulations.
The Brazilian Central Bank developed a spectacular national payment system, which became
one of  the quickest  fund-transfer,  clearance and settlementsystems in the world.   «[...]  Internet
banking became widely used:  by the end of 2009, some 35 million cashing accounts  could be
accessed remotely via Internet – a figure that accounted for some 48% of all banking transactions in
terms of volume that year»735.
In 2016, Brazilian Central bank issued new regulations requiring digitalization of all banking
transactions, even public banking institutions – such as Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal,
and BNDES, who are responsible for fostering public policies - are extremely efficient, offering the
most  sophisticated  Internet  sites,  with  total  integration  of  products  and services,  with  branches
spread across almost every city in the country and overseas736.
As a result,  the Brazilian Banking system ranks 32nd in efficiency in the world financial
system according to a World Economic Forum study737, due to the fast digitalization of the financial
system that started in the 80s.
In sum, a system that is totally integrated in the realm of the ‘Smart Government’ transition to
a digitalized public administration.
731Available from:  http://www.serpro.gov.br/menu/noticias/noticias-2018/mais-de-29-milhoes-de-declaracoes-do-irpf-
2018-foram-entregues-no-prazo>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
732 M. M. Ribeiro, C. O. de A. Freitas, op. cit., 2012, p. 10.
733 M. M. Ribeiro, C. O. de A. Freitas, op. cit., 2012, p. 11.
734 Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/157697?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
735 Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Brazil, CPSS – Red Book – 2011. Available from: 
<https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d97_br.pdf>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
736Available from: <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Brazil-Banking-Systems Accessed on 08.26.2018>. Accessed 
on Jun 23, 2018
737Available  from:  <https://exame.abril.com.br/economia/os-paises-onde-o-sistema-financeiro-funciona-melhor/>.
Accessed on Jun 23, 2018.
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3.3.  Another area that deserves attention is the electoral area, as the Brazilian Constitution
mandates a direct voting is to be in place as of 1988738. Brazil has developed incredible know-how
in direct electronic elections – with modern software – «to ensure more transparency in the electoral
process […] a symbol of credibility and democracy» [e-voting 739], thus guaranteeing direct political
participation for the citizen. 
In 2014, more than 140 million citizens were able to use e-voting for presidential elections,
and  the  resultswere  disclosed  in  a  matter  of  hours  the  very  same  day.  The  same  happened
throughout  the  country  for  governor  and  mayor  election,  alongwith  all  the  legislative
representatives. 
This successful experience in electronic elections, with e-voting machines, for the executive
and legislative branches could easily be used to obtain civil society participation in the decision-
making process in the social areas as well. 
4.  The  Brazilian  Constitution  promulgated  in  1988 establishes  that  healthcare  is  a  social
right740, as well as «a right for all, and a duty for the State, and shall be guaranteed by means of
social  and economic  policies»,  which  means that  all  200 million  Brazilians  should  have  equal
access to the public healthcare system [ranking as the largest public health system in the world741].
The approved federal healthcare system budget for 2018 was R$ 130 billion and is expected
to service more than 60% of poor – which depends solely on the public system [SUS] for primary
care, and 90% for secondary and tertiary care. 
In order  to cope with this  enormous duty,  constitutionalistsconceived a  unified healthcare
system” [Sistema Único  de  Saúde –  SUS]  with  a  view to  supervising  and controlling  medical
procedures, products and substances of interest to healthcare and to participate in the production of
drugs, equipment, personal and sanitation actions, among other things742. To achieve its objectives,
several statutes were promulgated to regulate said unified healthcare system - SUS743. 
738 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution, 1988. Article 14. The sovereignty of the people shall be exercised by universal 
suffrage and by the direct and secret voting, with equal value for all, and, according to the law. Available from: 
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
739Available from: <http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/2014/Junho/conheca-a-historia-da-urna-eletronica-
brasileira-que-completa-18-anos>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
740Article 6. “Education, health, food, work, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and 
childhood, and assistance to the destitute are social rights, as set forth by this Constitution.” Available from: 
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on  Aug 20, 2018. 
741 See: National Health Covenant. Available from: 
<http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/publicacoes/pacto_nacional_saude_mais_medicos.pdf>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
742 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution, 1988.  Art. 200. […] It shall be incumbent upon the Unified Healthcare System, 
among other duties and as provided by law, to: […]. Available from: 
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
743 BRAZIL. Law No. 8,080 of September 19, 1990. This law provides on conditions necessary to promote, protect
and recover health, as well as on the organization and the functioning of services applying thereto, and sets forth other
actions that ought to be taken. Available from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8080.htm>. Accessed on
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Although Brazil spends 9% of its GDP in public healthcare744, these funds made available
seem to never be enough. The major obstacles for better healthcare – an area in which it can mean
the difference between life or death – are the lack of information and corruption.745. Currently, there
are  5,530  public  hospitals  in  Brazil,  with  336,941  hospital  beds,  including  intensive  care,  for
hospital  entry  –  a  figure  that  includes  all  federal,  state  and  municipal  hospitals,  as  well  as
emergency care units746.
4.1. The Unified Healthcare System government portal enables access to e-SUS747, a kind of
software that was developed to collect, simplify, manage and use healthcare information, aiming at
the integration of healthcare professionals and the population. e-SUS includes e-SUS-AB748, which is
an integrated system of primary healthcare for all the municipalities in Brazil that was developed to
modernize and restructure all  the information system, aiming at  the improvement  of healthcare
provided to the population749. 
The  healthcare  system  includes  a  branch  for  the  primary  healthcare,  family  doctors,
specialists, pharmacy, laboratories, home care, daycare, and Hospital Care with a Hospital Database
– HIS –  [Hospital  Information  System].  All  units  should  be  computerized  to  enable  access  to
electronic medical records [PEP – Prontuário Eletrônico do Paciente]. 
Although  e-SUS  represents  great  improvement  in  the  healthcare  system,  government
investments in IT, equipment and training personnel have been neither sufficient nor proportional to
the needs of the population. Despite the efforts to implement e-SUS, in reality the conclusion is
dramatic: «Brazil is far from a true e-healthcare system, hence the importance of developing a clear
and complete strategy for the sector»750.
Aug 26, 2018.
BRAZIL.  Law  No.  8,142  of  December  28,  1990.  This  law  provides  on  community  participation  in
management  of  the  Unified  Healthcare  System  (SUS)  and  on  intergovernmental  transfer  of  funds  intended  for
healthcare,  and  sets  forth  other  actions  that  ought  to  be  taken.  Available  from:
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L8142.htm>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018. 
BRAZIL. Decree No. 7,508 of June 28, 2011. This decree regulates Law No. 8,080 of September 19, 1990, so
as to provide on the organization of the Unified Healthcare System (SUS), the planning of healthcare, the assistance to
health  and  the  inter-federal  coordination,  and  sets  forth  other  actions  that  ought  to  be  taken.  Available  from:
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2011/Decreto/D7508.htm>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
744Available  from:  <https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/05/the-struggle-for-universal-
healthcare/361854/>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
745 T. C. Marinho, op. cit., 2017, p. 14. Author´s translation
746 Available from: <http://www.conass.org.br/consensus/numero-de-hospitais-brasil-sus/>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
747 Available from: <http://www2.datasus.gov.br/ESUSHOSP/>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
748Available  from:   <http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/saudelegis/gm/2013/prt1412_10_07_2013.html>.AccessedonAug
26, 2018.
749 J. P. Alves, Í. V. A. Diniz, K. T. G. França, L. M. da Silva, C. S. Martiniano, Avanços e Desafios na Implantação do
e-SUS-Atenção  básica,  2018,  p.  3.  Available  from:
<http://www.editorarealize.com.br/revistas/conbracis/trabalhos/TRABALHO_EV071_MD4_SA7_ID788_15052017202
831.pdf>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018. Author´s translation
750 R. M. E Sabbatini, e-Saúde, in P. T. Knight, C. C. C. Fernandes, M. A. Cunha, E-Desenvolvimento no Brasil e no
mundo – subsídios e programa e-Brasil. Camara-e.net - Câmara Brasileira de Comércio Eletrônico - YENDIS, 2007, p.
751.  Available  from:   <http://www.sabbatini.com/renato/papers/e-saude.pdf>.  Accessed  on  Aug 26,  2018.  Author´s
translation.
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4.2.  Although  Brazil  spends  more  than  9%  of  its  PPP  in  healthcare751,  the  level  of
dissatisfaction in its population is very high, and we can point out many reasons, starting with the
size of the Brazilian territory and infrastructure deficiency, as well as a lack of trained healthcare
professionals, «corruption and inefficiency»752, all of which could certainly be minimized through
the effective implementation of e-health in the public sector 753.
Implementation of e-healthcare through e-SUS would certainly help to improve the healthcare
system, but «medical care has been one of the last areas to have adopted the modern ITC in its
routines and proceedings. One of the main causes for this delay is the cultural obstacle represented
by  healthcare  professionals,  who  until  just  recently  still  ignored  or  were  refractory  to  such
progress»754.  
Another major problem for implementing e-health is the lack of a computerized structure in
the healthcare system – only 52% of SUS units have computers and only 36,7% have access to the
Internet755–,  as  well  as  hardware  and  software  incompatibility.  More  investment  in  SUS  unit
computerization and proper personnel training [to ensure proper use of the new technology made
available] is needed to overcome the first implementation stage of the process 756.
Another challenge is to provide clear and accountable information, allowing its integration
and sharing, which is the foundation for an efficient e-health system. Healthcare webportals do not
provide objective data, and the information provided is not sufficient to make the population aware
of  its rights757.
One of the most common complaints of the population is the lack of primary assistance in
public hospitals. Users of the healthcare system never know if or when the doctor will be there for
assistance or surgery, and if or when they will receive treatment or prescribed medicine. There are
never enough hospital beds for patients, and it is not uncommon to see people receivingmedical
treatment in chairs, at the hall entrance or corridors of the public hospitals. There is no therapy
offered for terminal patients, who are invariably sent back hometo die with their family, devoid of
either assistance or dignity.  
Moreover, the amount of waiting time prior to surgery is a serious complaint.According to the
Federal Medical Counsel, in 2017, there were more than 900,000 Brazilians in the waiting list for
751 Available  from:   <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2017-12/gastos-com-saude-crescem-mesmo-
em-meio-crise-e-atingem-91-do-pib>.  Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
752 T. C. Marinho, op. cit., 2017, p. 9. Author´s translation
753 J. P. Alves, Í. V. A. Diniz, K. T. G. França, L. M. da Silva, C. S. Martiniano, op. cit., 2018, p. 5.
754 R. M. E Sabbatini, op. cit., 2007, p. 741. Author´s translation
755 J. P. Alves, Í. V. A. Diniz, K. T. G. França, L. M. da Silva, C. S. Martiniano, op. cit., 2018, p. 3.
756 E.H. DINIZ, O governo eletrônico no Brasil, Revista de Administração Pública.  Rio de Janeiro, 2009. Available
from:  <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-76122009000100003&script=sci_abstract&tlng=pt>.  Accessed  on
Aug 26, 2018.
757There  are  many proposal  under  discussion  to  alter  the  law that  regulates  health  system,  to  open  information
concerning  the  lines  for  treatment.  See:  Projeto  de  Lei  do  Senado  (PLS)  nº  192,  de  2018.  Available  from:
<https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/133007>. Accessed on Aug26, 2018.
See  also  Senate  Bill  (PLS)  nº  393  of  2015.   Available  from:
<https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/audios/2017/08/transparencia-em-fila-de-cirurgia-vai-acabar-com-privilegios-
no-sus-diz-otto-alencar>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
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different types of surgery with no expected date in sight. Although patient position in line can be
known, the information provided by healthcare web portalsis  totally insufficient for it  does not
provide either clear information on the expected waiting time or scheduled medical procedures.
People  end  up  passing  while  still  in  the  waiting  list  before  getting  to  undergo  the  procedure
needed758.
The Federal Government implemented a healthcareregulation systemcalled SISREG759 aiming
to integrate, organize and discipline the waiting lines for primary assistance, hospital admission and
surgeries [available in all three levels of health units]. The idea was that a patient would be able
tokeep track of their position in the line through an app [Meu Digi SUS]. However, in reality the
system is not available for all units, as it covers less than 1/3 of all municipalities, with only 204
ambulatorial regulation centers and 19 hospital regulationcenters – which is not enough to meet
demand760. Furthermore, as there is no control or supervision, healthcare units do not respect the
lines. The system ends being unreliable, as the number of lawsuits filed has shown. 
Regulation  should  be  more  stringent  specifically  for  cancer  treatment,  as  federal  Law
12,732/12 stipulates a 60-day deadline to start treatment761.  However, in 2014, only in the state of
Rio de Janeiro over 500 individuals had been waiting for more than a year  for treatment.  The
Brazilian Department of Justice [Ministério Público] sued the federal, state and local governments
seeking  proper  enforcement  of  the  law  and  calling  for  organized  waiting  lines  and  proper
treatment762.
It is also not clear why some surgery lines run faster than others. Sometimes patients in need
of a knee surgery may wait longer than those who need backbone surgery, with neither explanation
nor accurate information being given. This single example shows that the lines are not managed in a
clear or transparent way, favoring corruption and fraud. Frequent scandals involving surgery lines,
even in transplant lines, exposes the scenario763. 
Another huge problem involves medicine procurement in public hospitals764, which involves a
lack of transparency in the system. The Federal Government issues a list of medicines that are to be
dispensed in public hospitals and public pharmacies.Until 2010, there were only 500 basic drugs in
the list. In 2017, this number rose to 869 different drugs as included in the list765. It is not unusual to
seelawsuits being filed in order to receive the medication prescribed by public hospital  doctors
758 Available  from:  <https://portal.cfm.org.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27314:crise-no-sus-
brasil-tem-mais-de-900-mil-cirurgias-eletivas-represadas&catid=3>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
759Available from: <https://www.servicos.gov.br/servico/cadastrar-se-no-sistema-de-regulacao>. Accessed on Aug 26,
2018.
760Available  from:  <http://www2.datasus.gov.br/DATASUS/index.php?acao=11&id=30430>.  Accessed  on  Aug  26,
2018.
761 Available from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12732.htm>.Accessed on Aug 26,
2018.
762 See Public Civil Action. Case No. 00067445-1.2014.4.02.51.01. 15th Federal Court in Rio de Janeiro. Available
from: <http://procweb.jfrj.jus.br/portal/consulta/resconsproc.asp>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
763 Available  from:  <https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/desvio-de-dinheiro-do-into-prejudica-milhares-de-
pacientes-que-esperam-por-uma-cirurgia-na-unidade-de-saude.ghtml>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
764Available  from:  <http://portalarquivos2.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2017/maio/26/1.a-Banco-Mundial-Eficiencia-do-
Gasto-com-Saude-CIT.pdf>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
765Available  from:  <http://portalfns.saude.gov.br/ultimas-noticias/1727-ministerio-da-saude-publica-nova-lista-de-
medicamentos-essenciais-para-o-sus>.  Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
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[medicine  included  in  the  list  but  not  available  to  be  delivered  to  patients,  with  no  neither
reasonable nor timely justification being given]. 
The implementation of e-health would help to improve the efficiency and transparency in the
public healthcare system, but it would depend more than anything on political will to invest on IT
and infrastructure766, as has already been done in other areas of government.
4.3.  Albeit  created  in  2011  as  an  «ambitious  project»  to  give  each  citizen  a  National
Healthcare Card, a personal digital identification health card allowing identification and use of the
healthcare system767, until today the population is not aware of the importance of the using the SUS-
card. 
The implementation of the e-health card would bring benefits in terms of management and
planning to  the whole healthcare system, allowing its  reorganization,  with more efficiency and
accountability, permitting the interconnection of information on doctor appointments and surgery, as
well as medication prescription and medical e-files.  
Improvement of the healthcare system depends on total integration of the e-health card at all
levels of healthcare: federal, state and municipal768. It is impossible to understand why a country
that  has  had  a  taxpayer  identification  card  [CPF]  for  each  citizen  since  1996  has  so  much
difficultyin implementing a similar card in its healthcare system.  
4.4. Medical e-files [PEP – Prontuário Eletrônico do Paciente] represent a major evolution in
e-health  as  they  can  store  all  of  a  patient’s  medical  data,  laboratory  tests,  clinical  assistance,
diagnoses, and treatment; plus, they can be sharedby doctors and hospitals, regardless of distance or
patient location. Another advantage is that they prevent medical procedure and test result duplicity
and are thus an excellent, cost-saving tool.
Although federal  law mandates  the use of  electronic healthcare records,  said useis  still  a
dream in Brazil. Studies show that medical e-files are effectively used in «less than 1% of Brazilian
hospitals»769. 
Unbelievable as it  may seem, in Brazil,  in 2018, patient healthcare records  are still  hand
written, unavailable, incomprehensible, and subject to fraudulent alterations. Just as is the case with
hospital formsand medical prescriptions, both filled out on paper, by hand and subject to all sorts of
damage and inaccuracy. Bills designed to improve the use of electronic files are still in Congress770,
pending  approval,  without  urgency,  despite  the  fact  that  they would  bring  substantial  benefits,
affordingquality, organization, safety, and efficiency to the whole system. Sabbatini believes that
«In the future, we hope that the core for e-health development in Brazilwill come with web-based
medical e-files»771.
766 R. M. E. Sabbatini, op. cit., 2007, p. 752. 
767 R. M. E. Sabbatini, op. cit., 2007, p. 747.
768 R. M. E. Sabbatini, op. cit., 2007, p. 757.
769 R. M. E. Sabbatini, op. cit., 2007, p. 743. Author´s translation.
770Available  from:    <https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/04/03/aprovada-digitalizacao-de-
prontuarios-medicos-em-hospitais>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
771 R. M. E Sabbatini, op. cit., 2007, p. 755.   
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4.5.  As we mentioned above,  most  public  healthcare users  in  Brazil  are  among the  poor
[invariably illiterate individuals, considering that more than 7% of the Brazilian population has no
access elementary education, a percentage that rises to 13,8%772 in the northeast region]. This factor
contributes tremendously to the lack of civil engagement in the decision- making process. Poor
people don’t participate.  They are either not heard or heard only when the consequences are serious
and get the attention of big media – namely, when people die because of lack of assistance.
To make matters even worse, we now see the rise of a social phenomenon called «digital
exclusion», which is the inability to access the Internet and digital technology due to the high cost
of equipment773and to use sophisticated technology. As only 69,3% of households in Brazil have
Internet access [roughly 48,1 million households],  we can infer  that the population has limited
access to e-government web portals and will be even farther from any information at all, a fact that
will cause even greater social exclusion. 
This means that the e-Government project demands not only public investment in technology
within the administrative branch but also the provision of public computers and Internet access to
poor communities to make e-government accessible to the population774.
Popular  participation  could  easily be  achieved at  all  levels  of  government  through direct
participation in public hearings, referenda and plebiscites – tools already afforded by the Brazilian
constitution775.
There is also a provision requiring popular participation in the  SUS Management Board on
federal Law 8,142/90776, a provision that could enable public policy control and supervision. Cruz
emphasizes that reinforcing social participation in public healthcare policy-making will be valued as
a political decision, affording power to allow growth in the universalization and equal access to
healthcare,  thus  constituting  a  great  opportunity  for  the  active  and  creative  insertion  of  the
population in the promotion of public healthcare777.
The  reality  is  that  popular  participation  and  control  are  not  effective  due  to  lack  of
information and multiple conflicting interests that subtract power from society.778
In short, we could conclude that it is urgent to find a way to give voice to the poorto improve
citizen  engagement,  participation  and  community  collaboration.  The  mechanisms  for  effective
popular participation, whether legal or technological, already exists in Brazil, and it is now up to
politicians  to  decide  whether  they  want  to  enable  democratic  participation  by  disclosing
forthcoming policies and giving the opportunity for comments. 
772Available  from:    <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/educacao/noticia/2017-12/taxa-de-analfabetismo-no-pais-na-
faixa-de-15-anos-ou-mais-foi-de-72-em-2016>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
773 M. M. Ribeiro, C. O. de A. Freitas, op. cit., 2012, p.11.
774 F. S. O. S. Bonelli, op. cit., 2014, p. 33.
775 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution, 1988. Article 14. The sovereignty of the people shall be exercised by universal 
suffrage and by the direct and secret voting, with equal value for all, and, according to the law, by means of: I – 
plebiscite; II – referendum; III – people’s initiative. Available from: 
<http://www.stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_en_us/anexo/Constitution_2013.pdf>
. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
776 Available from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L8142.htm>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
777 Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/sausoc/v21n4/v21n4a25.pdf>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
778 Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/sdeb/v37n96/16.pdf>.Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
177
III.4
4.6. The big challenge imposed by digitization lies on the protection of privacy. It yet remains
to see whether the Brazilian government is taking appropriate measures to protect the privacy of all
digitized data [data that includes personal data, especially under the due process law clause, which
requires that due notice to be given to parties involved]. 
In fact, there isa massive amount of digitized data – produced by the public health system and
the judiciary system – that is currently available for public scrutiny, research and reuse all over the
world.  As BIG DATA is not  subjected to  either  international  border  or jurisdiction limits,  it  is
important to develop measures to ensure its confidentiality.
Medical e-files call for much attention, especially in terms of privacy, security and ethical
issues involving the use of open data [just as is the case in any other field]. The basic precautions
such as providing username and password to login into the system and have access to the health
information ought to be taken.
5. Although the last decade has seen much improvement ine-government, the great deficit in
the social area, especially in the healthcare system, where poor people have been suffering directly
from the inefficiency and lack of transparency, has made it necessary for citizens to go to court to
secure their rights through injunctions, orders and explanations for lack of treatment. 
When the first cases reached the Supreme Court, the court held that fundamental rights had
not been afforded to those entitled to them and that Government could refrain from meeting its
obligation  to  provide  healthcare  to  citizens,  as  mandated  by  article  196  of  the  Brazilian
Constitution779.  This reliance on courts  and judicial  means for addressing these matters became
known as healthcare judicialization.
According to the National Board of Justice  [Conselho Nacional de Justiça], in 2016, there
were more than 1,346,931 pending cases involving healthcare.  In 7 years,  there was a  1.300%
increase in the number of lawsuits of the cases involvingdrug dispensing, a situation that made it
necessary  for  the  government  to  create  the  National  Health  Forum in  the  Justice  system780 to
monitor these lawsuits and diagnose the deficiencies in SUS through studies geared toward the
development of solutions designed for improving the healthcare system. Healthcare comities were
created, and federal courts have become specialized in healthcare cases781. 
779 ‘This court has already ruled that, despite the merely programmatic nature of art. 196 of the Federal Constitution,
the State cannot refrain from complying with its duty to make available the means necessary for full enjoyment of the
right to healthcare by citizens. Accordingly, due attention ought to be given to the following summary of the individual
ruling entered by Justice Celso de Mello in extraordinary appeal (RE) no. 271,286: ‘The right to healthcare is not only a
fundamental right afforded to all individuals but also a constitutional consequence inseparable from the right to life.
Public authorities, regardless of their institutional rank within the organization of the Federal Republic of Brazil, cannot
ignore  problems  affecting  an  individual’s  health  without  engaging  –  even  through  omission  -  in  a  shameful
unconstitutional  behavior.’   Available  from:  ˂http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?
docTP=AC&docID=335538˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
780Available  from:  <http://www.cnj.jus.br/busca-atos-adm?documento=2831http://www.cnj.jus.br/programas-e-
acoes/forum-da-saude>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
781 National Council of Law (BR). Resolution No. 238 of September 6, 2016.  This law provides on the creation and
maintenance of State Healthcare Councils by Trial Courts and Federal Regional Courts, as well as on the creation of
specialized trial courts in cities having more than one tax court. Available from:  ˂http://www.cnj.jus.br/busca-atos-
adm?documento=3191˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
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Statistics show that the judicial branch of power has become the actual manager of public
healthcare policies through the issuance of preliminary injunctions.  Again, the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the citizens, holding that the judicial  branch can rule on the implementation of the
healthcare system, and that by doing so no infringement of the system of checks and balances
results [separation of the branches of power clause]782.
The vast majority of cases involve individual rights and seek the provision of medicine or
treatmentby public hospitals. The endless lines for surgery and hospital admission are questioned.
The scenario was so dramatic that the Supreme Court ruled that all the three levels of government,
federal, state and municipal are jointly and severally liable for healthcare783. 
Considering the tremendous quantity of individual healthcare cases and the collective interest
involved, the Supreme Court is now deciding whether the Brazilian department of Justice has the
standing to file class actions involving healthcare784.  Said court is also deciding whether the judicial
branch of power can or not control government expenditure on healthcare when the Constitution
requires that state and local authorities allocate a minimum percentage of public funds785 for public
healthcare actions and services.
To deal with the judicialization phenomenon, the judicial branch had to readapt its systems,
as the new code of civil procedure mandates all the judicial files are to be digitized. Since 2015,
computer programs have been developed to improve the administration of  justice. 
782 BRAZIL.  Supreme  Court.  Bill  of  Review on  Suspension  of  a  Preliminary  Injunction  (SL-AgR)  No.  47/PE.
Reporter:  Justice  Gilmar  Mendes.  Plenary.  Brasilia,  April  30,  2010.  SUMMARY:  Suspension  of  a  Preliminary
Injunction. Bill of Review. Public health. Fundamental social right. Art. 196 of the Federal Constitution. Public hearing.
Unified Healthcare System (SUS). Public policies. Judicialization of the right to healthcare. Separation of the branches
of power. Parameters for judicial resolution of concrete cases involving the right to healthcare. Joint responsibility of
entities of the Federation in matters concerning health. Mandate to regularize the services provided by a public hospital.
No evidence of serious lesion to public order, to the economy, to health and public security. Possible reverse damage.
Bill  of  Review  denied.   Available  from:  ˂http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?
docTP=AC&docID=610254˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
783See the  leading case (Theme 793 of STF decisions): EXTRAORDINARY APPEAL. CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE  SUBJECT MATTER.  THE  RIGHT  TO  HEALTHCARE.  MEDICAL TREATMENT.  JOINT
RESPONSIBILITY OF  ENTITIES  OF  THE  FEDERATION.  GENERAL REPERCUSSION  ACKNOWLEDGED.
REAFFIRMATION OF CASE LAW. Proper medical treatment for those who need it is one of the duties of the State, as
it constitutes a responsibility for entities of the Federation. Defendants may be any one of such entities either severally
or  jointly.  Available  from:   <http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudenciaRepercussao/verAndamentoProcesso.asp?
incidente=4678356&numeroProcesso=855178&classeProcesso=RE&numeroTema=793>. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
784 Available  from:   <http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudenciaRepercussao/verPronunciamento.asp?
pronunciamento=3307461> Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
785 BRAZIL. Supreme Court. Extraordinary Appeal (RE) No. 858,075/RJ. Reporter: Justice Marco Aurelio. Brasilia,
June 16, 2015. SUMMARY: BUDGET – PROVISION OF MINIMUM FUNDS FOR HEALTHCARE – JUDICIAL
CONTROL  –  SEPARATION  OF  THE  BRANCHES  OF  POWER  –  SCOPE  OF  ART.  2,  ART.  160,  SOLE
PARAGRAPH, ITEM II, AND ART. 198, PARAGRAPHS TWO AND THREE OF THE PERMANENT TEXT, AND
ART. 77, ITEM III, PARAGRAPHS THREE AND FOUR OF THE FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS OF
THE  FEDERAL CONSTITUTION  OF  1988  –  EXTRAORDINARY  APPEAL –  GENERAL REPERCUSSION
ACKNOWLEDGED. Available from: ˂http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarJurisprudencia.asp?s1=%28RE
%24%2ESCLA%2E+E+858075%2ENUME%2E%29+OU+%28RE%2EPRCR%2E+ADJ2+858075%2EPRCR%2E
%29&base=baseRepercussao&url=http://tinyurl.com/q3nvgsn˃. Accessed on Aug 26, 2018.
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Nonetheless,  whether  judicial  branch  endeavors  have  a  positive  effect  in  improving  the
healthcare  system  itself  issubject  to  debate.  Perhaps,  it  would  be  simpler  for  administrative
healthcare authorities to implemented public healthcare policies themselves. 
6. We hope that this paper contributes to the debate in two ways; first, by demonstrating the
improvement  of  Brazilian  public  policies  geared  towards  ‘Smart  Government’  and  our
government’s entrance into the e-Government era; and, secondly, by demonstrating that legislative
efforts are not enoughif not coupled with concrete actions designed for improvement, especially in
the healthcare area.
Brazil has established a reform plan to modernize its administration and its entrance in the E-
Government era. Nonetheless, digitization of public administration is far from being uniform and
has been more favorable to financial areas – such as taxation and banking, which nowadays are
totally integrated and digitalized – and caused social areas to lag far behind. 
As we have demonstrated, Brazil – a country currently managing the biggest public healthcare
system in the world – now faces a huge challenge; namely, to ensure that all of its citizens get to
fully enjoy their social rights, including the right to healthcare, under the principles of universality
and equality. 
The constant dissatisfaction of the population with the Brazilian healthcare system is visible.
Many structural problems - such as the lack of transparency – remain unsolved. Individuals have the
right to know when treatment will begin and when they will receive medicine; yet, in practical
terms, healthcare records are inconsistent, and information is insufficient. The implementation of a
digitized healthcare system is still in its inception, with medical records still being made in hard
copy with no integration among healthcare units and no dissemination of the healthcare national
card. 
Furthermore, fundamental constitutional principles of rule of law and public interest require
transparency in a modern administration. All the legislative efforts for fostering transparency and e-
government will be worthless if data input is not accurate. 
No technological tools will be enough if there is not a change in mindset, that is, one that
favors disclosure of data on public spending and allows real participation of the population in the
decision-making process and its control of government action with a view to achieving efficiency
and curtailing corruption. 
In  short,  e-government  in  Brazil  can  be  successfully achieved if  the  government  has  the
political will to prioritize social areas by integrating the poor – so that they may benefit from the use
of  electronic  systems  –,  providing  equipment  and  trained  personal  to  educate  individuals,
implementing the program and preventing further digital exclusion. 
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